The experience of absorption : comparison of the mental processes of meditation between emic yogic and etic neuroscientific perspectives on Ishvara Pranidhana meditation by Holte, Amy Jo 1972-
Copyright 
by 
Amy Jo Holte 
2010
The Dissertation Committee for Amy Jo Holte  
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: 
The Experience of Absorption: Comparison of the Mental Processes of Meditation 
between Emic Yogic and Etic Neuroscientific Perspectives on  
Ishvara Pranidhana Meditation 
Committee: 
______________________________ 
Kristin Neff, Supervisor 
______________________________ 
Frank Richardson 
______________________________ 
Martha Selby 
______________________________ 
Walt Wilczynski 
______________________________ 
Theresa Jones
 
The Experience of Absorption: Comparison of the Mental Processes of Meditation 
between Emic Yogic and Etic Neuroscientific Perspectives on  
Ishvara Pranidhana Meditation  
 
 
 
by 
 
Amy Jo Holte, B.A.; M.Ed. 
Dissertation  
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements  
for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
The University of Texas at Austin 
May 2010
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like to thank many people for their help, support, encouragement, and 
inspiration to make this project possible. First, thank you to my Dissertation Committee 
for working with me to create an Interdisciplinary Program, and for their generous time 
and comments: to Frank Richardson and Martha Selby for their careful guidance in the 
conceptual development of this project; to Walt Wilczynski for a steady hand keeping the 
project on track; to Theresa Jones for all her clarity and editorial comments; to Leslie 
Jarmon for teaching me many things; and to Kristin Neff for chairing the committee and 
seeing this project through to a successful conclusion. To all, thank you for believing in 
this project. Thank you to a number of faculty members who have also been of great help 
on this project in different ways, especially Diane Schallert and Edmund Emmer, and to 
Virginia Stockwell. I wish to also extend gratitude to a few people in my personal life, 
without whom this project would not have been possible: my parents, Roger and Laurina, 
and sister, Lee Anne, who have been with me all along my schooling years. A special 
thanks to Chris Palmer who has been by my side in so many ways throughout most of my 
graduate school career. Finally, thank you to a dear teacher, Didi Ananda Mitra, whose 
inspiration and grace has moved me to understand the subject matter of this dissertation. 
 v 
 
The Experience of Absorption: A Comparison of the Mental Processes of Meditation 
between Emic Yogic and Etic Neuroscientific Perspectives on  
Ishvara Pranidhana Meditation  
 
Amy Jo Holte, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2010 
 
Supervisor: Kristin Neff 
 
Modernity has seen the exchange of ideas about cognition between western 
science and eastern meditation traditions. In particular, western ways of thinking about 
the natural world have infiltrated Indian theories of yoga. This intersection of ideas in the 
twentieth-century has resulted in a problematic trend to theorize yogic phenomena, 
including meditation, in scientific terms. These translations converge on explicating 
yogic processes within a context of advancing knowledge about the brain. This 
translational approach to bringing etic and emic perspectives together in the same 
framework results in interpretations of meditation that succumb to problems cognitive 
science faces at a broader level in theorizing cognition and mind-body interrelations. In 
this study, I take a different approach to bringing emic and etic perspectives together by 
placing a phenomenologically interpreted emic account of absorption (the meditative 
shift in consciousness) into dialogue with current scientific understandings of three 
central mental processes of meditation. Specifically, I analyze ways of conceptualizing 
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attention, memory, and emotion, and their underlying mechanisms as posited in yoga and 
science, focusing on the problem of how each system interprets the reality of absorption. 
This comparison suggests a basic similarity between the two systems: theorizing 
cognition and meditative absorption in terms of embodiment. This finding emphasizes the 
dual nature of embodiment as both experiential and physical. Finally, I consider this 
dialogue from an embodied mind perspective, an emerging way of thinking about and 
theorizing the mind-body in cognitive science, because this perspective challenges 
longstanding theoretical problems in western understandings of how the mind works. 
This analysis suggests that theorizing meditation in these dual terms of embodiment 
potentially solves the reductive challenges of dualistic and materialist philosophy that 
have plagued both religious and naturalistic attempts to explain absorption. This 
interdisciplinary dialogue provides a framework with which to think more critically about 
translational and cross-disciplinary efforts that have previously confused the goals of 
yoga and science and their respective foci on practice and mechanisms. I conclude that 
bridging ideas in this dialogical way reveals a complementary perspective between 
phenomenological and biological ways of understanding the mind that both hinge on 
embodied cognition.  
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PART 1
2 
Chapter One 
Experience and Physicality: Dual Realities of Meditative Absorption 
In recent decades, the Western world has seen meditation grow in popularity 
among people interested in relieving personal suffering and attaining psychological well 
being or spiritual growth (e.g., Barnes, Powell-Griner, McFann, and Nahin, 2002; Barnes, 
Bloom, and Nahin, 2008). For example, a 2007 US government survey that sampled over 
23,000 adults found that nearly 9½ % of the population had used some form of 
meditation in the previous year, up from 7.6% in a similar survey conducted in 2002 
(Barnes, Bloom, and Nahin, 2008). Meditation is also one of the most widespread and 
researched of all psychotherapeutic methods (Walsh and Shapiro, 2006). However, 
despite all of this research there is still no widespread consensus and acceptance of the 
potential healing power of meditative practice, especially within healthcare communities, 
in part because there are widely different views and theoretical perspectives on 
meditation. For example, meditation has been defined both in terms of relaxation and 
intense concentration (Jaseja, 2008). This breadth of meditative discipline complicates 
the systematic scientific study and evaluation of specific practices from the scientific 
perspective (Lutz Dunne, and Davidson, 2007). 
A main reason for the popularity of meditative practices among practitioners, 
clinical professionals, educators, and researchers is the belief that meditation effects a 
profound and enduring psychological transformation within the mind of the practitioner 
(Rama, Ballentine, and Ajaya, 1976; Shaperio and Giber, 1978; Murphy and Donovan, 
1997; Whicher, 1997; Anantharaman, 2007). Most meditation traditions would agree that 
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meditation entails a shift from an ordinary state of consciousness into another state, one 
that meditation traditions define in terms of absorption (samadhi) (Feuerstein, 1979; 
Bastow, 1980; Chapple, 1982; Whicher, 1997). Both philosophical and 
phenomenological descriptions of this state abound (Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson, 2007), 
as well as trait-like descriptions of characteristic qualities of meditative consciousness 
(Cahn and Polich, 2006). The unusual combination of a calm and peaceful yet alert mind, 
along with joyful and blissful feelings, is believed to characterize this state, and in some 
meditation methods, practitioners claim to feel close with or one with god when in this 
state (Aurobindo, 1976; Goleman, and Schwartz, 1976; Delmonte, 1985; Murphy, and 
Donovan, 1997; Levine, 2000). Such meditative consciousness has been described as 
“mystical” in both Western and Eastern literature (James, 1902; Eliade, 1958; Feuerstein, 
1979), particularly by theistic traditions that involve contemplation of ultimate reality in 
terms of god (James, 1902; Proudfoot, 1985).  
However, because of labels such as “mystical” and “transcendent,” meditative 
states, especially those induced through mantra (a sound or collection of sounds, a 
syllable, or a word, often with a specific meaning, believed to be capable of creating 
transformation), are also viewed with skepticism by people who take for granted the 
Enlightenment consensus against belief in “magic” (Alper, 1989). As a result, alternative 
explanations are sought. Two likely reasons for this disinclination to embrace meditative 
practice are: (1) the philosophical or religious belief systems surrounding Eastern 
meditative traditions outwardly clash with dominant Western ideology and, more 
specifically, (2) the limited scientific understanding about phenomena related to 
meditation. In their own ways, both of these factors influence intellectual perspectives 
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and research on meditation, especially when they depend on theories about how the mind 
and body interrelate. Religious, philosophical, historical, and scientific perspectives, to 
name a few, have all participated in and influenced the millennia-long dialogue on a 
psychological understanding of meditation. This project focuses at this nexus, where 
these multiple perspectives converge in both emic and etic ways of understanding the 
mind’s transformation during meditation, in an attempt to penetrate the mystical shrouds 
surrounding states of meditative absorption. 
 
Theorizing Meditation 
 At least three central problems presently confound a psychological examination of 
meditation. The first concerns the theoretical problem of characterizing the state of 
meditation because meditation processes are conceived of in both physical and 
psychological terms, even though these terms of interrelation are not always clear.  
This problem is especially evident in the common view of meditation as tool for coping 
with mental and emotional states implicated in suffering, because coping processes are 
also conceptualized in both physical and psychological terms (Folkman and Lazarus, 
1988; Sapolsky, 1994). Thus, meditation is often referred to in popular culture as a 
“mind-body” practice or – as is growing in popularity – therapy (Harrington, 2008). For 
example, one sphere in which meditation has gained some degree of acceptance is within 
clinical practice as a strategy for helping people cope with both psychological and 
physical problems (Barnes, Powell-Griner, McFann, Nahin, 2002), and stress-related 
problems such as anxiety, pain (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, et al., 1995; Kabat-Zinn, et al., 1985), 
and depression (Teasdale et al., 2000), all of which have both physical and psychological 
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dimensions. Clinical and research interest in the potential usefulness of meditation as a 
treatment protocol has become so great that the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) adopted 
meditation and yoga within their definition of mind-body medicine (Harrington, 2008). 
This issue of the dual psychological and physical nature of meditation takes on 
special significance in light of recent trends to view both stress and coping in relation to 
emotion (Folkman and Lazarus, 1988; Tugade and Fredrickson, 2004), emotion 
regulation (Gross, 1998; Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin, 2000), cognitive, appraisal, and 
relational processes (Folkman and Lazarus, 1988; Frijda, Kuipers, and Ter Schure, 1989; 
Lazarus, 1993; Ashby, Turken, and Isen, 1999), and self-regulation (Posner and Rothbart, 
2000; Beauregard, Levesque, and Bourgouin, 2001; Watt, 2004; Posner, Rothbart, and 
Sheese, 2007). This is because meditation has been shown to affect all of these processes. 
For example, more than a means to induce relaxation (Benson, Beary, and Carol, 1974), 
meditation has been shown to improve negative emotion states such as anxiety and 
depression (Delmonte, 1985; Miller, Fletcher, and Kabat-Zinn, 1995), and has thus been 
seen in terms of emotion regulation (Fredrickson, Coffey, Pek, Cohn, and Finkel, 2008). 
Meditation has also been shown to affect cognitive processes implicated in stress and 
coping responses, such as attention (Tang et al., 2007) and memory (Sreenivasan and Jha, 
2007). Meditation is currently used as a tool to help with cognitive appraisal (e.g., 
Teasdale, Segal, Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby, and Lau, 2000), and is now seen as a 
means of improving conscious self-regulation (Tang, et al. 2007).   
The central problem with theorizing meditation is that emic and etic theories of 
mind and body differ in important ways. Science focuses on the mechanical processes of 
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the body, and especially in the past two decades on the brain, while religion emphasizes 
the person’s experienced relationship with the cosmos. These are very different levels of 
analysis, yet both perspectives attempt to understand human nature and meditation. This 
problem is further complicated by competing theories within each system. These 
differences all contribute to different understandings and potential misunderstandings 
about absorption. 
 These different levels of analysis reveal two further problems in understanding 
meditative absorption. A second problem in advancing psychological understandings of 
meditation relates to the nature of scientific research as developed in the West. Turning to 
objective scientific measures of absorption during meditation, such as neurophysiological 
data from the brain and body, can help make sense of meditative experience because of 
the universal nature of the discourse that scientific language offers. But there are limits to 
this way of knowing. On one level, while modern Western science has been gathering 
objective data about various meditation techniques and traditions for at least the last 60 
years, major gaps exist in our scientific knowledge about meditation (Cahn and Polich, 
2006). These gaps are related to limitations in research methodology, design, and 
theories, which limit the potential for obtaining replicable data and meaningful 
inferences.  
On another and broader level, however, although scientific research into 
meditative phenomena offers mechanical understandings about the workings of the brain 
and body during and resulting from meditative practice. This standard scientific way of 
knowing does not address meanings and purposes (Taylor, 1985). By definition a 
scientific problem assumes that a phenomenon is observable and measurable, and that 
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collected data pertaining to the phenomenon will either support or refute the theorized 
hypothesis (or possibly be inconclusive). Yet meditative states have everything to do with 
meaning and purpose (Alter, 2004). Thus, perhaps at least some aspects of understanding 
meditation may not be solved through this method. From this perspective, the process of 
gathering and analyzing data about observable phenomenon is limited in its ability to 
account for the meditator’s subjective or interpreted experience that emerges out of 
values, meanings, purposes, and goals. This limitation occurs because the language of 
neuroscience is, by definition, restricted to the structures and mechanisms so far 
discovered by science (Cook, 2002). Moreover, the scientific paradigm by definition 
omits considerations of final causes from its explanans (Olsen, 2004), while causality 
seems to be at the heart of meditation in important ways that cannot be overlooked when 
constructing theories about meditative phenomenon. As Slife and Williams (1995) and 
others have pointed out, not only physical science but social science, as well, suffers from 
problems of abstraction: the scientific method abstracts away meanings, values, and 
subjective experience.  
Thus, the barrier of scientific research in fully explicating meditation is that 
science cannot evaluate (perhaps yet) central aspects of meditative phenomena. How can 
we understand the psychological processes of personal interpretation or appraisal and 
meaning at work that underpin meditative phenomena, especially given the known 
biological constraints assumed by the body? This problem is largely theoretical, entailing 
numerous philosophical issues that all turn on how one interprets the realities of the body 
and mind. Keys to solving this problem might entail looking to emic perspectives of 
meditation with their inherent philosophical and meaning systems; however, not 
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everyone agrees with this approach. For example, when it comes to the particular state of 
consciousness implicated in yogic meditation, Alter (2004) argues that while science 
certainly cannot, neither can philosophy ever explain subjective experience. Alter argues 
instead that this dimension of human life can be known only to the subject. Others have 
turned to phenomenology as a way of linking scientific understandings of cognitive 
phenomena such as meditation with meaningful interpretations (Pekala, Wenger, Levine, 
1985; Pekala, 1987; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Venkatesh, Raju, Shivani, 
Tompkins, and Meti, 1997). The controversies about theories of cognition directly 
influence contemporary psychological understandings of meditation because these center 
on qualities present during an absorptive state, and especially if and how such qualities 
become embodied. These issues are at the center of my efforts here to examine 
meditation. 
Related to problems of meaning, a third problem involves the “truthfulness” of 
any given account of meditation (Alter, 2004). Emic accounts of “mystical” experience 
attempt to describe the moment of the person’s contact with, knowledge, or perception of 
ultimate reality (James, 1902; Proudfoot, 1985). Different emic systems differently 
characterize this reality, with some systems framing ultimate reality in terms of god-talk 
(De Michelis, 2004). Because of an assumption of continuity of consciousness beyond 
normal boundaries of self (Larson, 1969), emic or religious explanations of mystical 
experience tend to treat the body as one part of a person’s reality, but not the whole. 
Within the physical structure of the body exists subtle dimensions of mind and 
consciousness, with conscious awareness tied to the ultimate nature of self and the world 
that are ultimately the same (Feuerstein, 1998).To express embodiment on this “cosmic” 
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level, emic systems often use myth and metaphor to extrapolate descriptions of bodily 
structures and processes that operate during mystical phenomena so as to convey 
meaning (Muller-Ortega, 1992; Campbell, 2001). Such accounts of mystical phenomenon 
draw from traditional religious studies perspectives that are embedded in social and 
historical contexts, which may or may not be fully relevant today (De Michelis, 2004). 
Therefore, to the extent that emic accounts are taken literally rather than symbolically, 
they acquire a limitation, or perhaps a great challenge, in their ability to speak to a 
modern “truth” or evolving scientific understanding of the body and its physiological 
processes. 
 
Central Problem of Explaining Absorption 
In these chapters, I examine these three interrelated problems that all influence 
attempts to explain the phenomenon of meditative absorption. Focusing on a 
psychological question, one might ask whether an emic meditation account of absorption, 
with its unscientifically developed (in the sense of being empirically tested and verified) 
ideas about changes in bodily processes, actually explains the meditator’s personal or 
believed “truth” of meditative consciousness. In his identification of the marks of 
mystical experience, James (1902) names ineffability as a primary quality that marks a 
mystical state, along with a noetic quality of implicit knowing. James explains that 
mystics claim that the experience “defies expression” – they cannot adequately report the 
contents of the experience. Thus the experience is ineffable. In this sense, “mystical states 
are more like states of feeling than states of intellect” (James, p. 371). If ineffability is 
truly characteristic of mystical phenomenon, then one who has never personally 
 10 
experienced the state cannot interpret it. This personal authority essential to meditative 
experience leads Alter (2004) to doubt the validity of scientific attempts to explain the 
“truth” of yogic experience, which often comes from meditation, since ultimately, he 
thinks, science can neither validate nor deny meditators’ claims about personal 
experience. In this sense, one might wonder if the emic account, whether a practitioner’s 
personal account or an account gathered from the emic texts, is the only perspective to 
draw from to gain access and insight into the experience. 
However, Proudfoot (1985) criticizes ineffability as a “mark” or criterion of 
mystical phenomena. Illustrating a basic tension between emic and etic accounts of 
meditative absorption, Proudfoot calls the claim of ineffability a protective strategy 
because by identifying ineffability as a qualifying criterion of emotional states such as 
absorption, emic perspectives “preclude the possibility of a naturalistic description.” For 
Proudfoot (and modernity since it focuses on natural phenomena), this is a problem. 
Instead of focusing on the emotional aspect of mystical phenomenon, Proudfoot draws 
attention to the noetic or cognitive component, which, he insists, cannot be ignored in any 
evaluation of the experience. He argues that, while we often have tacit criteria for judging 
the appropriateness of emotional experiences in different contexts, philosophical and 
psychological analysis can draw out the criteria of the noetic quality.  
Proudfoot (1985) also criticizes the criterion of ineffability on the grounds that 
experience is or can be ambiguous, and that we interpret such experiences in light of our 
beliefs. In fact, he claims, background knowledge and assumptions or concepts and 
beliefs are “constitutive” of experience. In particular, the tacit belief about the cause of a 
perception is integral to one’s experience. Proudfoot (1985, p. 192) explains, “A 
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perceptual act can only be described by reference to its object, [and] a religious 
experience must be identified under a certain description, and that description must 
include a reference to the object of the experience.” He goes on to specify that the cues 
we use to interpret our experience are normally unproblematic, except in the case of 
religious experience when an external observer might be a better judge of the cause of 
one’s experience because such an observer might have access to more information from 
their perspective. Such external or objective observation leads one to arrive at a 
naturalistic explanation. However, in contrast to this observer account, Alter (2004) 
believes that a subjective account is the only valid account of a meditator’s own personal 
truth of meditative consciousness, and that science cannot and, in fact, should not attempt 
to explain such a truth. Objective observation cannot access the very aspects of subjective 
experience that constitute personal truth. Others have alternatively either agreed with 
James’s claim of ineffability but sought to examine the psychological processes that may 
contribute to the ineffability of mystical experience (Braud, 2002), or urged us to 
recognize that there are neural substrates of the conscious processes that are perceived as 
ineffable qualitative experiences (Musacchio, 2005).  
This tension between religious and scientific perspectives regarding the effability 
of meditation has led me to consider the merits and shortcomings of each position, which 
positions are more advantageous towards understanding absorption, and which seem to 
confuse our understanding of meditative phenomena. Is “ineffability” actually a 
protective strategy? Can naturalistic approaches genuinely offer better explanations of 
mystical meditative phenomena? Or is it instead the case, as I argue in this dissertation, 
that both emic and etic accounts contribute significantly to an understanding of the 
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phenomena? Here I argue that, while science examines physiological processes to 
describe what happens in the body during meditative phenomena, and emic perspectives 
uncover the meaning of mystical phenomena by using myth and metaphor to describe the 
world phenomenologically, a perspective that takes into account both of these views 
would offer the most complete explanation of states of meditative absorption. This 
complementary approach views experience and physicality as two sides of the same coin: 
embodied cognition. 
However, I have not come across such a dual perspective of meditation and 
believe that one does not yet exist. Moreover, articulating such a perspective would prove 
to be extremely difficult because of the numerous challenging philosophical and 
empirical questions that would need to be answered to make such a perspective coherent. 
This grand undertaking is not my immediate goal here.  
 
Purpose of the Study 
Instead, in an effort to build some bridges between an emic meditation tradition’s 
and the etic scientific tradition’s understanding of meditation, this dissertation examines 
similarities and differences between the two systems’ perspectives with the goal of 
identifying conceptual areas of overlap and incongruence. I focus on comparing the 
mental processes of the same meditation method through the lens of each system, with a 
special focus on the body (and, by extension, the brain). This includes an examination of 
the boundaries between disciplines and the language problems that arise when engaging 
the discourses of multiple disciplines.  
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I undertake here the theoretical task of conceptually analyzing similarities and 
differences between explanations of meditation that draw from two ways of knowing. I 
attempt to determine to what extent the language of each system characterizes similar and 
different aspects of absorption as a meditative phenomenon. Identifying areas of overlap 
might advance our understanding of meditation, and, in turn, generate new avenues for 
research. Neuroscience might benefit from examining primary emic explanations to see if 
there are some aspects of meditation addressed in the emic explanation that can be better 
understood by neuroscience and also considering seriously the methodology of 
meditation (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). For example, an emic system could 
provide direction for both neuroscience programs of research on consciousness and the 
growing body of research literature showing support for meditation as an evidence-based 
intervention. In addition, emic perspectives might benefit from other terminologies to 
help explain subtle experiences. Therefore, my goal is to clarify interrelationships 
between some of the various conceptual ideas, models, theories, and perspectives that 
currently bear on the problem of explaining absorption during meditation, focusing in 
particular on the mental processes of meditation. By examining these theories and 
evidence of meditation, I hope to contribute to a better theory of mind-body interrelation 
that can address the multiple dimensions of human nature. 
 
Analytic Method: Explicating and Comparing Emic and Etic Interpretations of 
Absorptive Meditation 
In common terms, meditative absorption can be thought of as a concentrated state 
in which one focuses on a single thought or task, and other thoughts seldom arise. The 
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word “concentrated” here could potentially create some confusion with certain kinds of 
open awareness meditation. I refer interested readers to a review article by Lutz, Slagter, 
Dunne, and Davidson (2008) who address this issue of concentration by clarifying that 
open awareness styles of meditation initially use concentration (what Lutz et al. call 
focused attention) “to calm the mind and reduce distractions” (p. 164). Then, according to 
Lutz, as open awareness meditation progresses, the practitioner gradually reduces 
attentional focus on an explicit object while switching over to emphasizing the 
monitoring faculty necessary for open awareness. From this description, we can see that 
concentration is a necessary skill in most if not all forms of meditation.  
In a seminal psychological study of absorption, Tellegen and Atkinson (1974) 
define absorption in terms of an openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences as 
follows:  
[absorption is] a disposition [trait] for having episodes of “total” attention that 
fully engage one’s representational (i.e., perceptual, enactive, imaginative, and 
ideational) resources. This kind of attentional functioning is believed to result in a 
heightened sense of the reality of the attentional object, imperviousness to 
distracting events, and an altered sense of reality in general, including 
empathically altered sense of self (p. 268).  
 
According to this definition, the mental process of attention is centrally involved in states 
of absorption. Therefore the analytical task of this dissertation is to explore how attention 
operates in states of absorption that are induced through one meditation method. It could 
be possible that this analysis will have implications for other meditation methods. 
Attention is intricately interrelated with other major psychological processs, such as 
emotion and memory. For example, attention is modulated by both emotionally valenced 
stimuli and memories (Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert, 1997; Vuilleumier, 2005; Mikels, 
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Reuter-Lorenz, Beyer, and Frederickson, 2008) and attention is shaped and directed by 
memory stores (Sara, 2000; Nader, 2003). Thus a focal point of this study will be to 
examine how each of these three processes – attention, memory, and emotion - bear on 
the absorption phenomenon during meditation. 
Most if not all religious traditions have some version of religious practice that 
leads to absorption (Feuerstein, 1998; Campbell, 2001) and absorption can even be a non-
meditation state. For example, the Buddhist meditative tradition identifies eight states of 
absorption (Feuerstein, 1979, 1998). Christian prayer is thought to lead to absorption into 
God. The whirling dervish dance of the mystical path of Muslim Sufis is thought to lead 
to absorption in trance states. Even drumming is thought to lead to some sort of spiritual 
experience in some traditions such as Russian shamanism (Campbell, 2001; Lutz, Dunne, 
and Davidson, 2007). Even some non-meditative secular activities such as reading and 
playing music may lead to absorption or what Csikszentmihalyi (2000, 2002, 2009) calls 
“flow,” a state similar to absorption in which an individual gains intrinsic rather than 
extrinsic reward from intensive engagement with activities that lead to absorption. 
Meditative absorption is, then, a particular instance of the more general type of 
absorption defined by Tellegen and Atkinson (1974). 
The central focus here is to understand the psychological processes of a particular 
form of absorption: the religious, spiritual, or mystical form of absorption that is 
purposefully cultivated in meditation. Because of the vast number of meditation practices 
and traditions that are believed to lead to absorption and mystical experience (Feuerstein, 
1998), and in the interest of space, I have limited my focus to one particular tradition and 
one practice within that tradition to enable some degree of depth in my comparison of an 
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emic tradition with a scientific perspective. Narrowing the scope of this study to one 
particular contemporary meditation practice leading to the experience of absorption and 
its emic perspectives will make pursuing this research on meditation more tractable. I 
compare this emic perspective with a scientific account of the same meditation method. I 
chose one contemporary tantric yoga meditation practice called ishvara pranidhana for a 
number of reasons.  
  
Why Focus on the Tantric Yoga Practice of Ishvara Pranidhana? 
 Many people may think of yoga as practicing physical postures (De Michelis, 
2004); however, yoga has a long meditation tradition (Feuerstein, 1979; Pfleuger, 2005; 
Connolly, 2007). Eliade (1958, p. 4) explains that the term “yoga” itself indicates 
meditation, but can refer to meditation practices from the many various “Indian 
philosophical currents and mystical movements.” The yogic path of meditation is to turn 
one’s attention from the normal happenings in the world towards an ultimate reality. This 
meditative state leads to “absorption” (or samadhi), a state in which the mind is fully 
occupied with the meditative task (Chapple, 1982; Whicher, 1997). In yoga terms, this 
process is often described as a “withdrawal” (pratyahara) of oneself from the sensory 
world or occupation with worldly concerns during ordinary states of conscious 
awareness. Yogic traditions have not only rich and deep philosophical systems, but also a 
number of multi-layered psychological models that explain the mind’s operations during 
shifts from normal to absorptive or meditative states of consciousness. Feuerstein (1979) 
and others (e.g., Pensa, 1969; Oberhammer, 1989; Whicher, 2005) explain that there are 
two potential goals or outcomes to such practice: (1) to quiet mental functioning 
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(nirodha) or (2) to acquire some sort of existential insight into one’s own nature 
(samadhi). Ishvara pranidhana is a specific practice named in the Classical Yoga 
tradition that has both of these goals (Eliade, 1958; Oberhammer, 1989; Miller, 1995; 
Pfleuger, 2005; Connolly, 2007).   
 Because there are many ways to practice ishvara pranidhana, I chose just one: 
Shrii Shrii Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana. Anandamurti’s method of 
ishvara pranidhana meditation presents an interesting focus for several reasons. First, 
this is a contemporary meditation method with perhaps over a million practitioners 
around the world (Crovetto, 2008). That this is a living daily practice is important in 
terms of analyzing contemporary understandings about meditation from both perspectives 
- the emic perspective as well as scientific or etic understandings. Also, there is some 
brain and physiological data published in peer-reviewed scientific journals regarding this 
exact meditation method (e.g., Elson, Hauri, and Cunis, 1977; Corby, Roth, Zarcone, and 
Kopell, 1978). By examining these studies, it was possible to consider at least some 
empirical data related to ishvara pranidhana meditation. This was especially helpful 
because it is not clear to what extent different types of meditation affect the brain and 
physiological processes. 
Second, though the focus is on ishvara pranidhana, I have found it possible to 
access a broader field of scientific literature by considering meditation methods whose 
effects on the brain and body are likely to be similar to ishvara pranidhana. However, I 
needed a way of distinguishing between techniques and practices that were sufficiently 
similar to and different from Anandamurti's method of ishvara pranidhana, so as to 
better specify the particular meditative mental task and tap into neuroimaging studies of 
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similar methods of absorptive meditation. The key distinguishing criterion I used to 
decide which meditation would be considered as similar to ishvara pranidhana was 
whether the method uses mantra and visualization. These are two distinguishing 
techniques of ishvara pranidhana, which combines the use of mantra and visualization in 
order to focus attention and encourage spiritual introspection, resulting in absorbed states 
of consciousness. 
Third, I chose to focus on ishvara pranidhana because I have the most experience 
with this method of yoga in terms of personal practice, academic studies, and access to 
the community of meditators who practice this method, and therefore have greater 
knowledge about this technique and emic perspective than any other meditation practice. 
I have spent 13 years (since spring 1997) listening to lectures, interviewing teachers and 
practitioners, and reading literature on this particular meditation method, including 
attending a number of retreats (varying from a weekend to six weeks long in length), 
workshops and classes, weekly meditation sessions, and an extended six-month stay at 
yoga retreat center where this is the meditation practice.  
 Another reason for examining this method of meditation relates to the fact that, 
Anandamurti has identified ishvara pranidhana as a particular kind of yoga practice, 
namely tantric yoga. White (2003) explains that tantra is a predominant religious 
paradigm through which to interpret the history of Indian culture and religious 
developments. Yogic theories about absorptive meditation from the tantric tradition 
might offer keys to advancing a dialogue that compares scientific and emic yoga 
perspectives because tantric concepts link the mind with the body in more concrete ways 
than the philosophical and psychological concepts and theories widely understood in pre- 
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and Classical Yoga. For example, unlike some other schools of yogic thought, tantric 
yoga embraces the body rather than the mind alone as a vehicle by which a person can go 
beyond ordinary experience of the world and perceive the unchanging aspect of reality 
(Feuerstein, 1998). From the tantric perspective, this embodied experience represents 
attainment of spiritual knowledge (Alper, 1989; Muller-Ortega, 1992).  
 Science, Tantra, The Body, and The Mind. 
 Over the past three decades, there has been a trend in psychology and 
neuroscience, and cognitive science more widely, towards a biological perspective on the 
mind and psychological processes (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). This 
perspective focuses on the body’s and, especially, the brain’s role in mental functioning. 
Theories of an embodied mind seem to be gaining repute within neuroscience (e.g., 
Valera, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Osbeck, 2009), though 
what mind means and exactly how it is embodied in the brain and body does not seem to 
be fully conceptualized (Roskies, 1999). Because tantric yoga theories of the mind also 
emphasize the body, this commonality provides a focal point for meaningful comparisons 
of theories of body and mind that bear on meditation processes.  
 Tantric yoga texts also advance detailed elaborations and theories of mantra (that 
were developed in earlier historical texts of yoga) that relate the mental processes of 
meditation to the yogic body and its “physiological systems” (Flood, 2006). For example, 
yogic texts conveying information about the field of yogic physiology describe subtle 
dimensions of energy systems within the human organism (Eliade, 1958; Avalon, 
1919/1974; White, 1996). These subtle dimensions are known in yoga as the “subtle 
body.” The “biopsychological” centers (chakras) (Sarkar, 1991) of this subtle body serve 
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as bridges conducting the flow of energy between the body and mind that are believed to 
transform during mantra recitation (Alper 1989; Muller-Ortega, 1992).  
 Furthermore, emic yoga texts posit that there are sheaths or layers of mind within 
this subtle yogic body that indicate levels of consciousness (kosa theory), and, in many of 
the classical Indian texts that deal with yoga, the mind is conceptualized in terms of its 
degrees of material substance (Samkhya theory) (Eliade, 1958; Larson, 1969; Jacobsen, 
2005; Connolly, 2007). Finally, in tantric yoga, consciousness is assumed to be the 
essence of all matter (Muller-Ortega, 1988) - both biological and inert – and the 
psychological implications of this assumption, notwithstanding metaphysical 
implications, are significant. Because tantric yoga meditations, whose primary methods 
are mantra and visualization, grew out of this tantric knowledge of the body, they serve 
as an ideal model for comparison with scientific theories. This comparison pursues 
answers to the question of whether and how views from the emic perspectives on 
meditation are similar to and different from etic neuroscientific accounts.    
 Non-tantric Methods of Meditation. 
As mentioned above, "yogic" meditation covers a vast field of practice in terms of 
techniques and meanings (Feuerstein, 1998). Although meditation techniques of mantra 
and visualization are central to tantric yoga practice, and central to ishvara pranidhana, 
absorptive meditation does not necessitate the use of tantric methods of mantra and or 
visualization. Understanding some basic differences between tantric and non-tantric 
meditation can help clarify methods of absorptive meditation. For example, other non-
tantric object-oriented absorptive meditation methods such as Buddhist samatha 
meditation employ natural objects such as the breath or sensations in the body as a means 
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of concentrating and quieting the mind (Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson, 2007), while 
objectless meditation methods such as Zen meditation simply rely on awareness to attain 
meditative states (Austin, 1998). Further still, some non-tantric absorptive meditation 
methods, such as mindfulness meditation as popularized by Jon Kabat-Zinn (1982; 1985; 
1992) combine an object and objectless method, and draw from Buddhist teachings. 
Absorptive meditation practices that emphasize these non-tantric processes are also 
widely popular in the general population and the subject of current scientific research 
(e.g., Kabat-Zinn and colleagues 1982, 1985, 1992; Davidson and colleagues, 2003, 
2004, 2007; Fredrickson, Coffey, Pek, Cohn, and Finkle, 2008; Tang et al., 2007).  
 I believe that using the method of this dissertation to analyze any of these 
meditation methods to draw out the noetic quality - that is, conducting a comparative 
psychological and theoretical analysis of mental processes of meditation between any 
emic and etic perspective - would be equally valuable and beneficial to undertake, but 
space and scope limits this particular study to just one meditation technique. I have 
chosen tantric yoga not because I feel that Buddhist meditation – or any other meditation 
practice - is less important, or that tantric yoga meditation in someway leads to superior 
or higher states. In fact, I believe that all spiritual teachings could quite possibly lead to 
the same ultimate insights and states of consciousness. However, examining other 
meditation methods in this way would require another dissertation; therefore, I am 
focusing on this one tantric yoga meditation method. 
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Comparative Analysis between Etic Neuroscience and Emic Tantric Yoga Views of 
Meditation 
At the heart of this study is the core idea of yoga that meditation transforms the 
psychology of the practitioner. Anantharaman (2007) writes that the primary aim of yoga 
is to allow the spiritual transformation of the practitioner so that their normal sense of self 
is replaced with a broader identification with god. At the root of this idea is that in yogic 
meditation, practitioners cease to identify with external ordinary identities such as “I am a 
father (student, lawyer, etc.)” or “I am angry (scared, happy, etc.)” and instead get in 
touch with an “I” feeling that transcends all social roles and momentary experiences. 
From this teleological perspective, yoga has a goal; this state of enlightenment is the goal 
of yoga. It is said that suffering is alleviated through the yogic process and reaching this 
end goal (Feuerstein, 1998).  
 Realization of this goal is experienced as "absorption," but explained differently 
in science and yoga. Yoga explains that, during absorptive meditation, the degrees of 
substance - that are manifested forms of consciousness in this theory – undergo subtle 
transformations. The ‘substance’ that is transformed pertains more specifically to the 
meditator’s mental being and, in yoga, it is described in terms of a mental body referred 
to as a “subtle body.” This special transformed state of yoga – embodied spiritual 
knowledge – is understood to have metaphysical significance. However, explanations 
about the transformed state vary among models from the yogic perspective and the 
neuroscientific explanations of meditation. Numerous mental processes are also involved 
in scientific explanations of the shift from an ordinary state of consciousness to a 
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meditative state, but the models of body and mind are distinctly different. Whereas in 
yogic theories, models are claimed to have been developed based on some experiential 
insight and knowledge as well as philosophical discourse, scientific models are developed 
through objective observation and experimentation. Moreover, in scientific accounts, 
changes in physiological functioning of bodily organs and brain activity are the focus of 
explanation rather than advancing an understanding of some metaphysical reality or 
phenomenological state, as in the case of yoga. Physical mechanisms are the primary 
phenomena of experimental interest, and then descriptions of these mechanistic actions 
are interpreted as the causes of mental phenomenon or states of consciousness 
experienced during meditation. Therefore, there are significant gaps or differences 
between the analytic models employed by yoga and neuroscience and the goals of 
analyses. 
Alter (2004) and others (e.g., De Michelis, 2004) have examined such gaps from 
various ethnographic perspectives. Alter focuses his study on emic and etic perspectives 
as opposing myths, and both Alter and De Michelis alert us to a potential confusion that 
occurs through the translation process of concepts with metaphysical meaning from the 
yoga perspective into ones that account for only physiological function from a scientific 
perspective. Alter believes that the hope or belief from the scientific perspective is that 
the scientific study of meditative phenomena will reveal the (or some) “truth” about 
yogic power or human nature. However, he argues that pursuing science to examine these 
particular sorts of phenomena (i.e., absorption) results in a unique confusion.  Because 
the emic and etic perspectives pursue different kinds of knowledge and experience (in 
that science pursues objective facts about the world whereas yoga pursues subjective 
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knowledge about one’s ultimate relationship with the cosmos), the scientific study of 
yogic phenomenon results in a kind of knowledge that is neither subjective nor objective, 
and neither physical nor metaphysical. Therefore, Alter believes that the “truth” of yogic 
experience cannot be known by either scientific, philosophical, or religions paradigms.  
Alter (2004) suggests that an overarching philosophical perspective gleaned from 
twentieth-century literature on Yoga philosophy (e.g., Dasgupta, 1920; Feuerstein, 1998; 
Whicher, 1998) could be used to clarify many of the confusions between Yoga and 
science (although he takes a different course). I have taken a cue from Alter to also take 
account of the differing philosophical paradigms between Yoga and science. However, 
like Alter, I do not take a straight philosophical approach. Instead, I grapple with the 
conceptual understandings from each system that relate most directly to mental processes 
of meditation and analyze ways in which understandings from each system compare with 
the other. A particular focus of my analysis is the modern shift towards viewing yoga 
philosophy epistemologically instead of ontologically (see Bastow, 1980; Chapple, 
1994). This perspective diverges from that assumed in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries by emic thinkers and researchers, such as Vivekananda and Swami 
Kuvalananda who based their work on an assumption of ontological truth (De Michelis, 
2004). As Alter and De Michelis have explained, such attempts have resulted in a false 
(or confused) empirical understanding of the material manifestation of a cosmic principle. 
My approach is an attempt to clarify some of the confusions that have occurred over the 
past century due to efforts to translate yoga into the language of science that has arisen, in 
part, out of this confused cross-paradigmatic understanding.  
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The goal of this dissertation is to examine the tension between tantric yoga as a 
philosophy of knowing (perhaps close to phenomenological intellectual movements) with 
the rationalism of science as a philosophy of knowing, with the stated explicit special 
focus on models of mental processes involved in meditation. A fundamental or guiding 
question of my comparative analysis, then, is to examine this tension between two 
philosophies of knowledge. A basic motive of this project is to further integrate an 
understanding of meditation and Indian psychology into current academic understandings 
of psychological processes by comparing these two perspectives on what happens during 
meditation.  
My method is to first examine neuroscientific evidence from a variety of 
meditation techniques that all can be seen as tantric in some way; that is, they involve 
mantra and/or visualization. This analysis will develop a neuroscientific perspective of 
ishvara pranidhana meditation. Then I will analyze ishvara pranidhana in the context of 
tantric yoga and the problems of understanding ishvara pranidhana as a modern tantric 
yoga meditation practice. These analyses will result in a discussion of the similarities and 
differences I find in a comparison between how the two systems explain how sustained 
attention during meditation leads to a particular emotional state of mental quiet. Thus, 
this dissertation examines the mental processes involved in meditation from within and 
without – from within the linguistic, conceptual, and philosophical frameworks, and 
targeted inner experience of the practitioner from a particular tantra yoga meditation 
tradition, as well as from the outside view of science looking objectively at the brains and 
bodies of people practicing meditation.  
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Overview of Dissertation Chapters 
 A primary aim of this dissertation is to examine the neuroscientific and yogic 
perspectives of the mental processes involved in changes in consciousness and well-being 
associated with meditation. Chapter two begins the process of defining meditation. It 
identifies important features of meditation that help distinguish between different tantric 
meditation techniques, positions the technique of ishvara pranidhana within the set of 
similar tantric yoga meditation techniques that have been studied using neuroscientific 
methods, and further defines the phenomenon of meditative absorption in a way that will 
be analyzed from the emic and etic perspectives throughout the rest of the dissertation. 
 Chapter three views ishvara pranidhana through the lens of neuroscience; it 
presents empirical evidence relating to meditation and about neuroscientific explanations 
of absorption during meditation. In this chapter, I discuss the “facts” about changes 
thought to occur in the body that are associated with meditative states and raise questions 
about how we should consider these characterizations of meditation, especially given 
limitations in research methodology and theories. I examine existing neuroimaging, and 
additional neurophysiological data – such as findings from electroencephalogram (EEG) 
studies - related to meditation and focus on structural and functional perspectives on the 
nervous system most directly relating to absorptive meditation. In the end, I propose three 
mental processes that seem appropriate as focal points for comparison with tantric yoga 
perspectives on meditation processes and discuss theoretical issues of studying 
meditation. 
 Chapter four contextualizes ishvara pranidhana in the classical and tantric 
traditions as a theistic meditation. In doing so, I explicate meditation processes from 
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these traditions that seem conceptually similar, at least in some basic way, to the mental 
processes determined in chapter three. I discuss traditional approaches to yoga and tantric 
views on subtle physiology and raise questions about how we should interpret these 
theoretical and practical methods of understanding yoga today. I argue that we should 
remember and understand these models of meditation in their intended context as tools to 
aid practice. Because of this context I suggest that we see emic models today more as 
phenomenological descriptions rather than as literal propositions about the body.    
In chapter five I discuss modernizing forces and translations that attempt to merge 
emic and etic accounts of yogic absorption and that have contributed to an overall 
confusion regarding the nature of meditative absorption within the modern scientific 
milieu. I analyze ishvara pranidhana within this context and assert that a comparison of 
the two models must focus on the realities depicted by each model. 
In part three, I analyze three key meditation processes by comparing these 
processes from each perspective with the other. I examine conceptualizations of these 
processes and explications of various mechanisms, and consider implications of the 
similarities and differences between the two perspectives. Chapter six focuses on 
understanding the process of concentrating attention on the abstract reality of ishvara; 
chapter seven examines the role of memory and knowledge in emic and etic accounts of 
absorption; and chapter eight examines emotional processes of meditation from both 
perspectives. 
I conclude the dissertation with a discussion of a way forward in efforts to 
theorize meditation given our current culture that values both science and spirituality, 
arguing that we see physical changes in the body as necessary conditions for meaningful 
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experience, but not as causal. Moreover, we must view the transformations involved in 
yogic absorption in terms of an embodied cognition because this perspective has the 
potential to account for both the physical and experiential nature of meditative 
consciousness.  
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Chapter Two 
Defining Absorptive Meditation  
and Anandamurti’s Tantric Yoga Meditation Method of ishvara pranidhana 
 
What is Absorptive Meditation? 
When people practice absorptive meditation, they take actions to reduce the 
mind’s responsiveness to external stimuli that habitually capture awareness and aim to 
experience the present moment. Typically, meditators move to quiet environments, sit in 
specific postures, close their eyes, shift attention to their internal environment, and focus 
their awareness on some aspect of their inner experience. These processes induce a 
mental state of relaxed awareness, or “meditation.” Although there are other types of 
non-sitting meditation, such as t’ai chi moving meditation, and altered “meditative states” 
through practices such as drumming, I do not consider these non-sitting methods in this 
dissertation and instead focus on sitting absorptive meditation.  
Meditation practices from the yoga traditions are practiced and studied widely 
throughout the world. These yoga traditions reach far into history, with Indian religious 
texts and historical eras delineating numerous distinct traditions that all hold meditative 
practice as central to spiritual development. Within the first two sentences of his famous 
text, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, Eliade (1958) identifies yoga as one of the four 
basic and interdependent concepts of Indian spirituality. He explains that the word yoga 
designates any method of meditation while the name Yoga designates a particular Indian 
system of philosophy or school of Indian thought, known as Classical Yoga and famously 
expounded by Patanjali in his Yoga Sutras (the main text of Classical Yoga). Thus, the 
30 
term yoga can be used to indicate any method of meditation. Indeed, in addition to 
Classical Yoga, Eliade (1958, p. 4) explains that there are countless forms of “popular” 
nonsystematic yoga, Buddhist and Jain forms of yoga, and, most importantly for this 
dissertation, there are yogas whose structures are considered “magical” and/or 
“mystical.” I follow this system of using the capitalized term Yoga to refer to the 
Classical Yoga historical tradition throughout the dissertation, while lower case yoga 
indicates yogic meditation generally. 
The term absorptive meditation evokes this broader sense of yoga, the sense that 
“yoga” or meditation encompasses forms of meditative practice that reach beyond the 
scope of Classical Yoga, and includes meditations from, for example, the tantric and non-
Brahmanic yogas of Buddhism. Meditation techniques from these yoga traditions can be 
classified together and typified as absorptive meditation because of their similarity in 
emphasis on the experience of absorption. Absorption is a period of "total attention" that 
modulates how we represent experience, leading to altered perceptions of self and reality 
(Cahn and Polich, 2006). Thus, absorptive meditation techniques lead, ultimately, to first-
person experience of absorption. 
This state of consciousness in deep meditation is known in yoga by the Sanskrit 
word samadhi or absorption (Miller, 1995). The phenomenon of absorption or samadhi 
(meditative consciousness) is the focus of this study. The yogic term dhyana or 
absorptive meditation captures this samadhi experience of the meditator’s mind 
becoming absorbed into a reality that extends beyond the boundaries of what are typically 
conceived as the meditator’s own, an experience yogic literature and practitioners 
contend is attained by employing certain specific meditation techniques of the yoga 
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traditions. Samadhi (meditative consciousness) generally emphasizes the experience of 
the meditator’s consciousness becoming absorbed into an inner object of awareness. 
 
Two Paths of Absorptive Meditation: Object and Objectless 
Of the many techniques for absorptive meditation, these techniques generally fall 
into one of two broad categories: object or objectless meditation. Recently, some scholars 
have adopted the analogous categories of focused attention and open monitoring 
(respectively to object and objectless) to characterize the meditative task (e.g., Lutz, 
Slagter, Dunne, and Davidson, 2008). Both kinds define the mental task of meditation in 
terms of attention and awareness, and have a goal of quieting the mind. 
Object meditation involves concentration of the mind on some specific object, 
such that one actively directs the flow of the mind towards this object. Meditation occurs 
when the practitioner actively concentrates all attentional resources to the object of 
meditation such that his or her mind flows only in that direction, and this action leads to 
absorption. The intention is to let go of all thought so that the meditator can achieve a 
state of concentration by focusing on the object. It is typical in many yogic meditation 
traditions, including Yoga, for this object to be a mentally repeated sound, called mantra, 
or an abstract visualized image, with spiritual meaning such as a concept of god or a 
relationship to some divine source of being (Oberhammer, 1989; Feuerstein, 1998).  
Objectless meditation involves concentration, but not concentrating on any object 
in particular. This meditative state occurs during moments of detached observation of 
(either or both) the external and internal worlds, such that flow of mind is not actively 
directed. Instead, meditators become aware of and detach attention from their own 
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reactions to objects arising in mental awareness or consciousness. Awareness of external 
or internal happenings may come to the forefront of consciousness, but meditators remain 
in a state of simply observing or witnessing these events rather than allowing mental 
processes to engage. In yogic meditation, the central task is the act of witnessing one's 
self in the absence of any objects of experience.   
Meditation is practice; it is a process of training the mind. Such training requires 
concentration on the task, and achieving concentration is central for any meditation 
practice. In this sense, concentration means continuously paying attention though not 
necessarily thinking. Yet avoiding distraction from objects of perception can be difficult 
for either object or objectless tasks, both in terms of the technical aspects of the process 
of concentrating the dissipated mind and in terms of the psychological realities involved 
in concentration on tasks. The mind has objects in the form of thoughts about the past and 
projections into the future, and emotions about these. It has perceptions. The challenge of 
concentration is to focus attention on one thing, even if that one thing is nothing. The 
goal of spiritual yogic meditation is to focus one’s mind on one’s own eternal nature or 
soul. In the case of ishvara pranidhana meditation, the meditation task is dedicated to 
concentration on the thought that one’s self or nature is like that of ultimate reality or 
ishvara (god). But concentrating on one’s soul or “unmanifest nature” can be quite 
abstract for many people, and therefore difficult (Bhagavad Gita 10:5), and this difficulty 
can bolster unwanted thinking. The easier method of meditation can be to focus the mind 
on some object - an external or internal object - with or without spiritual significance. 
Therefore, many meditation practices include stages of object and then objectless 
meditation, because it is difficult to drop straight into objectless meditation – a state of 
 33 
"witnessing" or "observing" - without first concentrating the mind, and using an object 
helps achieve concentration. Thus, many types of meditation each create concentration 
and cultivate the feeling of absorption.  
 
Scientific Study of Meditation and Some Examples of Absorptive Meditation Techniques  
Yogic literature abounds with descriptive accounts from yoga meditation 
practitioners’ experiences in absorptive meditation. Yogananda (1956) describes his 
experience as an “active calm.” Vivekananda (1896) explains that when a practitioner is 
in the absorptive state, there is “no feeling of I, and yet the mind works, desireless, free 
from restlessness, objectless, bodiless.” Countless other examples exist that describe the 
yoga meditative state of mental quiet and mystical experience. Scientific researchers 
examine these phenomena from multiple angles with different research methods. 
In their social-scientific study of the psychological dimensions of meditation, 
Osis, Bokert, and Carlson (1973, pp. 18-19) characterized “self-transcendence” as one 
dimension. In this dimension, meditators may experience “the usual sharp boundaries 
around the self [as becoming] diffuse or even…non-existent.” Their subjects reported that 
they felt “a closeness,” “dissolved boundaries,” and “merger with others.” Osis et al. 
(1973, p. 19) explain that in a spiritual meditative state, "the tight psychophysical unity of 
personality" is said to become radically altered such that the self is suddenly perceived as 
no longer identical with the body. This illustrates the “sense of disembodiment” 
described by people who have had mystical experiences from practicing meditation for 
spiritual purposes. 
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The scientific research literature on meditation also considers several meditation 
practices explicitly aiming towards absorptive meditation, including several forms of 
tantra. I have located numerous (20+) physiological and psychological research studies 
on Transcendental Meditation (TM), three studies of yogic absorptive meditation, two 
studies of Ananda Marga (i.e., Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana), and one 
neuroimaging each on Kundalini and Tibetan Buddhist meditation. These are each 
examples of tantra because of their use of mantra and/or visualization. That these 
techniques are tantric has been established in one of two ways: either the originator of the 
technique has described the tradition as tantric or scholarly work has described the 
tradition as such. Presumably, despite the wide variety of techniques among yogic 
methods of absorptive meditation, any meditation method may be at least a sufficient 
pathway towards the yogic goal of Self-realization (Yoga Sutra 2.4, Miller, 1995). 
Therefore, choosing any one of a number of absorptive meditation practices could 
potentially advance an understanding of the yogic process and ultimate state of 
consciousness. Consequently, throughout this dissertation, I draw from findings about 
these practices to characterize an overall picture of ishvara pranidhana absorptive 
meditation, specifically focusing on similarities between these other meditation 
techniques and ishvara pranidhana itself.  
The yogic meditation practice known as Transcendental Meditation (TM) 
involves quiet sitting and mental repetitions of a mantra. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, the 
founder of the TM method of meditation, describes meditation as the “turning of attention 
inwards towards the subtle levels of a thought until the mind transcends the experience of 
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the subtlest states of the thought and arrives at the source of the thought” (Hjelle, 1974, p.  
623). 
In Kundalini Yoga meditation, a Tantric Yoga practice, practitioners “passively 
observe their breathing and silently [and actively] repeat a mantra (a special sound with a 
specific meaning)” (Lazar et al., 2000, p. 1052). The aim of this practice is to release the 
Kundalini energy from the base of the spine so that it rises to the top of the head. 
One Tibetan Buddhist form of meditation has “practitioners initially focus their 
attention on a visualized image and maintain that focus with increasing intensity…” 
ultimately attaining a “peak experience.” This experience is “described as a sense of 
absorption into the visualized image associated with clarity of thought and a loss of the 
usual sense of space and time” (Newberg et al., 2001, p.  114). As an expert scholar on 
medieval tantra, White (2000) authoritatively writes that Tibetan Buddhism is a tantric 
tradition by definition.  
The Ananda Marga method of tantric yoga meditation, ishvara pranidhana, 
involves “intense concentration of attention and the subjective sense of an ongoing 
struggle to achieve the ultimate union with the object of concentration and total self-
absorption (samadhi)” (Corby et al., 1978, p. 572). This method also involves silent 
repetition of mantra and attention to a visualized ideation. I will elaborate on this method 
in greater detail throughout the following chapters, since ishvara pranidhana is the focus 
of this study. Still, a basic orientation to the technique itself, and the mental processes 
involved in its practice, follows. 
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Anandamurti’s Absorptive Meditation Method of Ishvara Pranidhana 
Moving forward from more general descriptions of tantric yoga meditation 
practices, we will now turn to defining meditation in terms of the specific practice of 
Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana. In developing this description, I drew 
from the literature’s description (the literature on Yoga, tantric yoga, scholarship 
specifically on ishvara pranidhana, and Anandamurti’s own writing) as well as my own 
interpretative description of these sources informed by my practitioner perspective of the 
instructions as they are taught within Ananda Marga. This approach yields a sort of 
phenomenological description of the ishvara pranidhana practice that will then be 
analyzed throughout the rest of the dissertation from the emic and etic perspectives. 
According to Anandamurti (Sarkar, 1959), who also goes by the name P. R. 
Sarkar, the purpose of yoga is unification. In this view, the meditator aims to unite his or 
her individual self or consciousness with that of god, or ultimate reality. To achieve yogic 
unification, ishvara pranidhana meditators are instructed to shift their attention away 
from awareness of happenings in the external environment “outside” of oneself, and turn 
awareness inward. Meditators attempt to perceive their inner nature. This mental process 
leads to the yogic experience of “merger,” “absorption,” and “oneness.” Anandamurti 
(1959, p. 63) writes that "unification of the unit self with the Cosmic Self is yoga. When 
your little ‘I’ becomes one with your great ‘I,’ that state is the state of yoga.” The tantric 
elaboration of yogic meditation practice grounds psychological transformation and 
experience of “absorption” - that is, of the individual’s consciousness merging or 
becoming one with “the cosmos” - in the body. The biopsychological processes of this 
experience are explored in depth thoughout this dissertation. As a starting point, what 
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follows is a description of further basic mental processes of ishvara pranidhana 
meditation. 
The yogic concept of cittavrtti, translated as mind’s “turnings of thought” (Miller, 
1995), “fluctuation of consciousness” (Feuerstein, 1979), or as mental “propensities” 
(Sarkar [Anandamurti], 1959), is central to understanding meditation. In waking states, 
the mind is constantly active in cittavrtti (mental fluctuations or activity). Attention 
moves from object to object, both sensory objects of perception as well as mental objects, 
for example, in terms of thoughts and memories. This movement is the mind’s propensity 
for activity. During meditation, this propensity, or these mental ‘turnings,’ cease as the 
activity of mental processes quiets. The main point here is that overcoming the 
propensities of mind and their modes of fluctuation in mental processes is at the heart of 
yogic practice and ishvara pranidhana meditation, and constitutes what Whicher (1997) 
calls “yogic praxis” or the transformation of the self. In this praxis, cittavrttis are states of 
consciousness, and the states of consciousness of the various cittavrttis (mental activities) 
become restricted and the mind no longer operates in its normal modes. Thus, the yogic 
experience begins with a state of nirodha (cessation), a state in which the normal states of 
consciousness are suppressed or suspended. 
The yogic word for meditation is dhyana, though a more precise meaning of 
dhyana is a unidirectional mental flow towards the object of meditation (Anandamurti, 
1962; Anantharaman, 2007). Yoga assumes that the nature of the mind is to move; it 
takes the form of whatever object or objects are in its field of awareness. So when the 
meditator moves attention away from awareness of the external happenings and instead 
turns to perceive internal events, the mind is still active because it moves in the various 
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directions of whatever internal objects continue to drive the mind, such as thoughts and 
memories. However, during the yogic meditation of ishvara pranidhana, when the 
meditator focuses all of one’s attention on the object of meditation, this concentration 
process moves the citta (mind) in that single direction. Complete concentration is thus a 
means of quieting the mind from any distractions, external or internal.  
Anandamurti bases his method of ishvara pranidhana meditation not only on the 
notion that meditation on an object is the best route to achieving concentration, but also 
on the pivotal teaching that the object of meditation is crucially important. For any 
practice of ishvara pranidhana, the object of mental focus and awareness is ishvara or 
god (Pfleuger, 2005). In addition to its translation as lord or god, Anantharaman (2007, p. 
xi) describes the concept of Ishvara or ishvara (at least in Yoga) as “analogous with the 
Supreme Reality, the Absolute, or Brahman,” and asserts that this reality is “both material 
and spiritual, under different aspects, and that ultimately these two aspects (material and 
spiritual) are identical.” These ideas about ishvara, as the object of meditation, in terms 
of the Absolute or Ultimate Reality are central to understanding the non-dual and 
mystical associations attributed to ishvara pranidhana.  
During normal mental states, the mind takes in or perceives a vast spectrum of 
finite objects, events, ideas, and more. However, during meditation when the object of 
perception is ishvara, the mind contemplates an infinite reality. Because the mind has its 
own limits and boundaries, the act of contemplating this infinite idea (of ishvara) gives 
the mind some object bigger than itself to move towards during meditation. Anandamurti 
asserts that focusing on something bigger than itself is the only way the mind can expand. 
During meditation as the mind continues to contemplate this infinite reality of ishvara, 
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eventually the limits of the individual mind dissolve and what is left over is the contact: 
the merged or mingled reality between the individual’s self and ishvara. In this moment, 
the object becomes the subject. It is this “subjective” knowledge that is recognized by 
some as mystical. An examination of this moment, its processes and state, could help 
bridge representational approaches for orienting to, describing, and explaining the world 
with non dualistic approaches. Let us look more closely at the meditation processes 
involved in ishvara pranidhana. 
The goal of realization to be attained during ishvara pranidhana meditation is this 
essential identity between individual consciousness and god consciousness. Encountering 
knowledge of Ishvara (god) is the primary goal of ishvara pranidhana meditation.  
To gain this knowledge, the book Yoga The Way of Tantra (1983) prescribes that 
to practice ishvara pranidhana, meditators should focus on the spiritualized meaning of 
the mantra as they continuously repeat it and also concentrate attention on a specific 
visualization process that culminates at a particular chakra (energy center). These actions 
are thought to withdraw or decouple the mind from perception of both external and 
internal happenings and “purify” it from residual mental experiences left over from prior 
perceptions (later we will examine what exactly purification means in this context).  
More specifically, there are five stages of Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana: 
proper asana, bhutasuddhi, asanasuddhi, cittasuddhi, and then samadhi in dhyana 
(meditation) (Yoga the Way of Tantra, 1983). To put it another way, the meditator must 
be in a meditative posture and achieve three stages of mental purification before actually 
attaining any degree of absorption (samadhi).  
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The first stage of Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana meditation begins after 
practitioners place their bodies in comfortable meditative postures when they focus 
attention to the mental task of reciting the mantra. Practitioners recite their personal 
mantra over and over as a way of focusing and concentrating the mind. This way of using 
mantra is the extent of the technique considered by much of the scientific literature on 
meditation that uses mantra (e.g., Lutz, Dunne, Davidson, 2007). However, according to 
Anandamurti, the practice of ishvara pranidhana takes conscious awareness beyond this 
basic stage of concentration.  
The next stage of ishvara pranidhana involves the practice of bhutasuddhi 
(purification of the elements), a practice which aims to withdraw the mind from the 
external world.  It begins as a visualization of oneself seated on top of the planet, which 
involves gathering worldly thoughts or propensities of the mind and pulling them inward. 
Essentially meditators identify each thought with the mantra as the focus of meditation. 
Soon, the visualized image of the globe dissolves into a visualization of oneself floating 
alone in the universe. Mantra recitation continues in one’s consciousness to further focus 
and concentrate the mind, leading to deeper absorption. Finally, the visualization of 
oneself dissolves into a point of white light. As the mind continues to concentrate, 
thoughts, energy, and the general “flow” of mind begin to flow in a unified current. After 
the visualization turns to a point of light, practitioners move into the second purification 
practice: asanasuddhis.  
In the practice of asanasuddhi, meditators withdraw the mind from its attachment 
to the body by visualizing the point of light moving through each part of the body, 
starting from the toes and moving upwards through the legs and up the spinal cord. This 
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purification practice highlights a uniquely tantric facet of transformation. Tantra 
elaborates on Samkhya-Yoga philosophy by prescribing practice techniques built on 
Samkhya’s idea that universal elements are located in the body (Rastogi, 1992). As will 
be elaborated in later chapters, in Samkhya-Yoga philosophy the mind evolves from the 
interaction of purusa (consciousness) and prakrti (matter). Anandamurti (1962, p. 32) 
explains these universal elements in Samkhya-Yoga’s evolutionary philosophy that are 
manifested in each individual’s body as follows:  
By further crudification the citta [mind] gets metamorphosed into five 
fundamental factors, namely, ethereal [space], aerial [air], luminous [fire], liquid 
[water], and solid [earth]… [thus] … as the subtle elements give rise to the gross 
elements, so the gross or physical body can be seen as an emanation of the subtle. 
… As in the Upanishads (e.g., Chandogya Upanishad 8.1.3), the universe is here 
contained within the body. 
 
These five elements are located within the body, specifically within the spine, and are 
central in ishvara pranidhana. The visualization continues as the mind’s focus moves 
from element to element as it moves up the spine. To complete asana suddhis, the mind 
focuses and localizes inner attention to a specific chakra called the ista chakra, so as the 
meditator raises the mind up the spine, the mind comes to rest on this ista chakra 
(personal energy center). In Anandamurti’s system, the ista mantra (personal mantra) and 
ista chakra (personal energy center) are assigned by the meditation instructor according 
to the particular propensities of the meditator. Once the mind rests on this spot, the 
meditator begins the third and final purification process: cittasuddhi. 
With the mind finally concentrated on this particular spot of the ista chakra 
(personal energy center), the meditator practices the deeper purification of citta suddhi by 
withdrawing the mind from thoughts. Here the mind becomes absorbed in its object of 
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meditation – the thought of the mantra: ishvara or parama purusa (god); essentially, 
when the mind rests on its ista chakra (personal energy center for meditation) it becomes 
absorbed into cosmic consciousness. Anandamurti’s meditation method involves 
sublimating the thoughts by consciously identifying with ista or ishvara (god). Focusing 
mental activity at the specific chakra center helps the meditator to internalize 
consciousness and that this internal focusing process clarifies one’s perception of ishvara 
within. Eventually this sublimation of thoughts during dhyana (meditation) leads to 
“samadhi” – or absorption, the goal state of consciousness during meditation. Numerous 
stages of samadhi have been described in yogic literature (Feuerstein, 1979; Miller, 
2004). Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana contends that his method of ishvara 
pranidhana leads to one of the highest states of samadhi (meditative consciousness), and 
this is the state of meditative absorption that is the focus of this study.  
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Chapter Three 
Neuroscience Perspectives on 
Absorptive Meditation and Ishvara Pranidhana 
 
In this chapter I pursue two questions about meditation. What knowledge about 
meditation have we derived from studying the meditating brain? What are the limits to 
this kind of approach to studying meditation and its knowledge for explaining 
meditation? First, this discussion focuses on studies that have examined brain or body 
changes in ishvara pranidhana or similar meditation practices (in technique and/or goal 
of a meditative state of absorption). In addition, some consideration is given to 
limitations of various neuroscientific research methodologies and resulting limitations in 
inferences about mental processes of meditative phenomena.  
 
Introduction to the Neuroscientific Study of Meditation 
Recent reviews of neuroscientific studies of meditation (e.g., Cahn and Polich, 
2006; Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson, 2007) have noted that despite the large number of 
scientific studies and theoretical proposals that have been made (a PubMed search of the 
term “meditation” in late 2009 turned up over 1700 results dating back to 1951), still little 
is known about the neurophysiological processes of meditation. These reviews cite 
problems in the heterogeneity of meditative states studied and the lack of adequate 
control conditions, as well as the lack of scientific rigor of many early studies. Perhaps it 
is the case that the research methods and measurement devices have yet to identify what 
needs to be measured to learn more about meditative absorption. Despite these problems, 
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I argue here that the evidence from neurophysiological and imaging studies of meditation 
practices similar to ishvara pranidhana seem to support the idea that the shift to the 
meditative task functionally activates specific structural connections or circuits in the 
brain during the meditation period, although evidence suggests that there are not uniform 
circuits active throughout various stages of each meditation methods. These changes 
catalyze the downstream effects (those effects that are observable in lower brain regions 
and throughout non-neural tissues in the body). Such neural activation may also form 
new structural connections in the brain because of long-term effects that persist over 
time, and regular meditative practice might enhance these long-term effects.  
Scientific study of changes in the body during meditative practice started in the 
west around the mid-twentieth century. Some earlier attempts at scientific study of yogic 
practice, including meditation, were made in India starting as early as the 1920s, but 
these studies have a somewhat different character than the Western study of meditation 
(see Alter, 2004, 2005). This topic is discussed in chapter five on the phenomenon of 
Modern Yoga. However, both approaches have the common theme of theorizing yoga (or 
meditation) in terms of rational, scientific principles, and have some objective to prove 
the efficacy of yogic practices. Here we focus on drawing out this rational objective 
perspective on what happens in the brain during meditation. 
Early studies of meditation in the west aimed to characterize physiological 
changes in bodily functions such as heart rate and respiration (e.g., Bagchi and Wenger, 
1958) and also used electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings to infer qualities of mental 
states during meditation (e.g., Das and Gastaut, 1955; Wenger and Bagchi, 1961). These 
lines of research continued in the 1970s, with many psychological and physiological 
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studies on meditation attempting to replicate and extend earlier findings, including further 
study using EEG methodology. A number of studies from this period used yogic or 
Buddhist meditations similar in technique and desired meditative state to tantric ishvara 
pranidhana practice or used the ishvara pranidhana technique itself. 
In recent years, a renewed interest in the empirical scientific study of meditation 
has grown, with this new wave of science focusing especially on the brain through 
refined use of the EEG and imaging methods. For historical perspective, note that the 
EEG was first used in 1929 by Hans Berger who reported the presence of several brain 
rhythms in the EEG signals, while magnetic resonance was theorized as early as 1946. 
However, the first fMRI machine only became a method of mapping the function of the 
brain in the early 1990s (Cacioppo, 2007) and this new technology has revealed 
knowledge about the brain that was previsously not available. Imaging methods are used 
to help identify structural areas of the brain that are functionally activated, both 
electrically and hemodynamically, during meditative practice.  
However, even with this emerging line of knowledge regarding brain areas whose 
activity is associated with meditative practice, there is still no brain-based theory of 
meditation. For example, one of the primary unresolved questions about neural activity 
during meditation is whether it reflects a unique state, some underlying trait related to 
awareness or consciousness, or perhaps both (see Cahn and Polich, 2006). Related to this 
state versus trait problem is the paradoxical subjective reporting of both calm/relaxed and 
alert/ecstatic qualities present during meditative states. A brain-based theory must 
account for the physical evidence that supports each of these states and the more stable 
features of the brain that might be associated with regular meditation practice. Moreover, 
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if meditation is a state, theorists must explain if meditation ought to be understood fully 
in terms of a physical state because whether a brain-based theory of meditation could 
explain the supposed psychological traits remains controversial.  
For background information readers may refer to Appendix A for a general 
orientation to the structure and organization of the nervous system. This appendix 
identifies specific cortical and subcortical structures, provides a basic introduction to 
nomenclature, and presents a brief overview of the operations at the synapse between two 
neurons.  
 
Imaging Evidence for a Neurocircuit of Ishvara Pranidhana 
Even though, at this point, neuroimaging studies on meditation are typically more 
exploratory than hypothesis-driven, some progress has been made in identifying changes 
in the activity of multiple brain regions during meditation using imaging methods (Lutz 
et al., 2007). This progress should be viewed as extending neuroelectric findings on 
meditation because the imaging methods are able to more sensitively detect and localize 
brain activity (Cahn and Polich, 2006).  
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 
(and related methods such as single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)) are the primary imaging methods used in 
neuroscience research settings to study meditation (these research methods are reviewed 
in Cacioppo, 2007). PET scans produce images of the distribution of chemicals 
throughout the brain and body using various radioactive tracers. For example, PET can 
reveal blood flow, oxygen and glucose metabolism, and neurotransmitter concentrations 
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in different regions of the brain and all of these measures reflect brain activity in these 
regions. Like PET, SPECT uses tracers injected into the body to produce images of 
neurochemical function in the brain, but with less spatial resolution than PET. Rather 
than using tracers, MRI relies on magnetic fields to produce detailed anatomical images 
of both surface and deep brain structures. FMRI methods generate images of both brain 
structure and its activity while the brain functions in real-time (by detecting its use of 
oxygen), thus helping researchers determine which structures are involved in various 
tasks. A new image is captured every second or two with fMRI whereas PET images are 
formed every several dozen seconds. Thus, MRI/fMRI can be more accurate than 
PET/SPECT because of better anatomical and temporal clarity, but PET can pinpoint 
which neurochemicals are involved in functional brain alterations.  
It is also important to bear in mind that neuroimaging methods have a number of 
limitations that make interpretation of findings complicated, as discussed in a recent 
review by Logothetis (2008). For example, with fMRI/MRI imaging methods there is an 
implicit or explicit presumption that a change in the activity of neurons in the imaged 
region underlies behavior. For example, when scientists find area X to be activated by a 
task at hand, they might presume that the activity of the neurons in area X causes the task 
behavior. But such findings are correlative rather than causal and there is considerable 
discussion about what BOLD signals actually reflect. FMRI measures neuronal activity 
indirectly (as a result of oxygen use) and its relationship to neuronal firing patterns is 
rarely clear. In addition (and especially important for interpreting data from studies of 
meditation) it is not possible to infer actual mental function from human fMRI images. 
For this reason, a number of authors (e.g., Cacioppo, 2007; Logothetis, 2008) have 
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argued that findings from fMRI imaging of humans need to be interpreted in conjunction 
with animal model studies that identify cognitive and behavioral function relating to 
fMRI signals. Similar limitations exist for PET and SPECT methods (see, for example, 
Cacioppo, 2007). Therefore, although interpreting studies of meditation in conjunction 
with animal studies may prove less conclusive because of the nature of the meditation 
task, in part III of the dissertation I will consider some interpretations of animal studies as 
they may relate to human cognition. This avenue of anlaysis may lead to at least some 
useful discussions of brain function during meditation. All of the limitations discussed 
here need to be considered when interpreting results from imaging studies of meditation, 
and when attempting to use these interpretations to generate hypotheses about ishvara 
pranidhana.  
Several imaging studies pinpoint numerous cortical and subcortical areas of the 
brain whose activity levels change during meditation practices similar to ishvara 
pranidhana. Because of the similarities in practice technique between ishvara 
pranidhana and the methods chosen for discussion here, namely mantra and 
visualization, the brain activity associated with these other various meditative tasks are 
likely to change in similar ways during ishvara pranidhana. Table 1 below shows the 
numerous cortical and subcortical areas of the brain active during different absorptive 
meditation practices and these data suggests that there are no uniform circuits activated 
throughout various stages of practice during similar, or even the same, techniques. 
Various regions are activated and deactivated depending several factors, including the 
phase of meditation, the type of meditation method, the participants’ degree of experience 
in meditation, etc. Yet there are some commonalities across most studies. For example, 
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most studies report activity in at least some area of the frontal lobes, especially the 
prefrontal cortex, for concentrating attention. Also, at least two studies report activity in 
the midbrain for motor behavior associated with motivation and emotion, hippocampus 
(whether for memory formation or recall is not always clear), and striatum for reward 
saliency. Below I briefly describe the results of individual studies followed by a synthesis 
across studies, focusing on ways in which the various meditation techniques at the heart 
of the studies are similar to the absorptive meditation of ishvara pranidhana.  
Table 1: Findings from eight neuroimaging studies of different techniques of absorptive meditation 
(adapted from Newberg, 2003). 
Study Meditation Method Findings 
Newberg et 
al. 
(2001) 
Tibetan Buddhist 
Meditation 
** subjects each had 
15+ years daily 
meditation training 
with this technique 
SPECT – 
changes in 
regional 
cerebral 
blood flow 
baseline vs. meditative state: a significant 
increase in regional cerebral blood flow 
(rCBF) in the cingulate gyru, inferior and 
orbital frontal cortex, dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), midbrain, 
sensorimotor cortex, dorsomedial cortex 
and thalamus 
Brefczynski-
Lewis et al. 
(2007) 
Tibetan Buddhist 
focused attention 
meditation (Tse-cig 
Ting-nge-dzin) 
** experienced 
meditators had 
greater than 10,000 
hours cumulative 
meditation practice; 
control subjects had 
no prior meditation 
experience but given 
instruction and 
practiced meditation 
daily for one week 
before fMRI scan 
Block design 
fMRI 
controls: greater activation of anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) compared with 
experienced meditators;  
experienced meditators: more activation, 
especially in the frontal parietal network;  
both groups (experienced meditators and 
controls): activation of common areas of 
attention network, including intraparietal 
sulci, frontal eye fields (FEF), thalamus, 
insula, lateral occipital, and basal ganglia 
Lazar et al. 
(2000) 
Kundalini yoga 
Meditation 
**subjects each had 
4+ years daily 
Kundalini meditation 
training 
fMRI – 
changes in 
regional 
brain activity 
and blood 
flow 
control vs. meditation state: increases in the 
putamen, midbrain, pregenual anterior 
cingulate cortex, and 
hippocampal/parahippocampal 
formation; increases were also found in the 
septum, caudate, amygdala and 
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hypothalamus in at least three subjects; 
early versus late stage: increases in 
prefrontal, parietal and temporal 
cortices, motor and somatosensory 
cortex, and 
hippocampal/parahippocampal 
formation, also increases in the 
amygdala, hypothalamus, and septum 
Lou et al. 
(1999) 
Yoga Nidra 
**subjects each had 
5+ years meditation 
training: Yoga Nidra, 
Kriya Yoga, and 
other yoga techniques 
15O-H2O 
PET 
cerebral 
blood flow 
meditation on sensation of weight of limbs 
and other body parts: increased activity in 
the parietal and superior frontal lobes;  
abstract sensation of joy and happiness: left 
hemisphere, parietal, and superior 
temporal (Wernicke area) activation;  
visual imagery: strong activation of the 
occipital lobe sparing V1 (not part of visual 
awareness), and parietal lobe;  
symbolic representation of self: bilateral 
parietal activity;  
most: strong bilateral hippocampal 
activation, parietal and occipital sensory 
and associated regions, again with 
exception of V1;  
resting state: orbital and dorsal lateral 
prefrontal, anterior cingulated, temporal, 
inferior parietal lobule, caudate nucleus, 
thalamus, pons, and cerebellar vermis 
and hemispheres 
Lutz et al. 
(2008) 
Buddhist compassion 
meditation 
**8 experienced 
practitioners (with 
between 10,000 – 
50,000 hours over 15-
40 years practice) 
compared with 8 age-
matched healthy 
control volunteers 
with no meditation 
experience 
fMRI common activation: striatum, anterior 
insula, somato-sensory cortex, anterior 
cingulated cortex, and left-prefrontal 
cortex;  
deactivation: right interior parietal;  
activation of this pattern was enhanced in 
adepts as compared to novices.  
Lazar et al. 
(2005) 
Buddhist Insight 
meditation 
**meditators had on 
average between 7-9 
years of practice 
experience; controls 
had no meditation 
experience 
MRI increased cortical thickness in prefrontal 
cortex and right anterior insula in 
meditators 
Table 1: continued
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Kjaer et al. 
(2001) 
Yoga Nidra 
**subjects had 7-26 
years daily 
meditation practice 
PET –
pathway of a 
tracer 
through 
blood flow in 
the brain 
significant decrease in the binding 
(potential) of C11 raclopaide to D2 
dopamine receptors in the ventral 
striatum 
Herzog et al. 
(1990-91) 
Yoga  
Meditation 
**subjects trained in 
meditation for at least 
one year 
PET – rate of 
regional 
cerebral 
glucose 
metabolism 
no intrahemisphere asymmetry;  
significant increases in the ratios of regional 
cerebral metabolic rate of glucose 
consumption (rCMRGlc) between the 
frontal vs. occipital lobes and  
between the frontal vs. parietal lobes 
(anterior regions increased more than the 
posterior regions);  
overall global change of pattern of 
rCMRGlc 
Visualization: Tibetan Buddhist Meditation 
Newberg et al. (2001) 
performed a SPECT study of one 
Tibetan Buddhist meditation 
technique similar to ishvara 
pranidhana in that both methods 
focus attention on a visualized image 
as the object of meditation and lead 
to the “peak” experiences of 
absorption. This state of absorption 
is described as, “a sense of 
absorption into the visualized image 
associated with clarity of thought 
and a loss of the usual sense of space 
Figure 1: Tibetan Buddhist Meditation. The colored 
areas (*) of the brain represent brain areas activated 
during "peak" experiences during the visualization 
meditation, as measured by increased blood flow 
through the brain areas. Source: Brain image adapted 
(photoshop to highlight brain areas) from The 
University of Washington Digital Anatomist Image 
Collection Manager website: 
http://imagemanager.biostr.washington.edu accessed 
6/15/06. (*) Note that this figure and the following 
figures in this chapter have different brain regions 
highlighted with different colors and that these colors 
are used only to define distinct brain regions and 
highlight those areas activated during specific studies, 
with no meaning of the colors beyond this.   
Table 1: continued
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and time” (Newberg, 2001, p. 214; see also chapter two, pp. 32-35). The study imaged 
eight experienced Tibetan Buddhist practitioners who practiced daily for at least 15 years 
and underwent several three month retreats. Participants were scanned after about an hour 
of meditative practice when the subjects provided a signal to the researchers that they had 
entered the deepest phase of meditation. Baseline scans were also taken of nine normal 
subjects in the control condition. Newberg reported increases in the orbitofrontal cortex, 
dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex, motor and somato-sensory cortices, cingulate cortex, 
thalamus, and midbrain. Figure 1 highlights in color these brain areas, thus representing 
the functional circuit during this “peak” experience.  
Lutz et al. (2007) point out the lack of “descriptive precision” given in the study 
by Newberg et al., arguing that this limitation makes it difficult to compare with other 
studies because of uncertainty as to the exact state of the measured “peak” experience. 
They argue that a number of different states could potentially fit the description of 
“clarity of thought.” Descriptive precision is necessary for developing a brain-based 
theory of meditation because it provides necessary information about the phenomenon 
from which one can draw a hypothesis.  
In a more recent study of a Buddhist meditation requiring focused attention to an 
external visual object (Tse-cig Ting-nge-dzin), Brefczynski-Lewis et al. (2007) 
conducted an fMRI experiment on experienced practitioners with greater than 10,000 
hours of cumulative meditation practice. A control group that had no meditation training 
before the study received instruction in concentration meditation a week before being 
scanned. Both groups showed activation of common areas of attention network, including 
intraparietal sulci, frontal eye fields (FEF), thalamus, insula, lateral occipital, and basal 
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ganglia. However, Brefczynski-Lewis et al. report that experienced meditators showed 
more activation, especially in the frontal parietal network, and suggest that this activation 
pattern may be a neural correlate for these participants’ expertise in sustained attention. 
In addition, the controls showed greater activation of anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) 
compared with adepts. Because the ACC has been implicated in conflict monitoring and 
error detection (Van Veen and Carter, 2002), the researchers make the reverse inference 
that this brain activation could reflect greater error proneness (i.e., distraction) and 
conflict monitoring in the controls than the adepts (conflict between instructions to focus 
and the difficulty in complying with such a request).  
Mantra: Kundalini Yoga Meditation 
Lazar et al. (2000) used fMRI 
neuroimaging technology to study 
early and late stages of Kundalini 
Yoga meditation in meditators with 
at least five years of meditation 
experience. This meditation 
technique is similar to ishvara 
pranidhana in that both involve 
observation of the breath and 
ideation on a mantra. Because of this 
emphasis, Lutz et al. (2007) refer to 
Figure 2: Kundalini Yoga - control vs. meditation. The 
colored brain areas represent areas of the brain active 
that became active from the control to the early stage of 
meditation: putamen, midbrain, pregenual anterior 
cingulate cortex and the hippocampal/parahippocampal 
region. Source: Brain image adapted (photoshop to 
highlight brain areas) from The University of 
Washington Digital Anatomist Image Collection 
Manager website: 
http://imagemanager.biostr.washington.edu accessed 
6/15/06. 
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this meditation practice as an example of focused attention. A total of five subjects were 
scanned for 42 minutes with 12-minute meditation periods and 6-minute control periods 
before each meditation period and early versus late meditation periods were compared. 
During the control conditions, subjects silently generated a random list of animals and did 
not observe their breathing.  Figure 2 shows the brain areas that became active in the 
early stage of meditation when compared to a control state, while Figure 3 shows the 
brain areas actived in the late stage of meditation when early-stage meditation is 
compared to late-stage meditation. The shift from early to late stage meditation reveals a 
shift away from activation of more sensory and movement oriented areas (such as the 
putamen and midbrain) towards directing attention to more abstract processing 
(prefrontal, parietal, and temporal cortices). 
There were some important 
differences between the brain areas active 
in the early versus the late stage of this 
meditation. One main difference is that the 
striatum (the caudate and putamen) is 
active during the early stage of Kundalini 
meditation but not active during the late 
stage. The caudate is known to assess 
stimuli, especially reward stimuli. So it 
could reflect that this assessing of stimuli 
function is more active in early stages of 
Figure 3: Kundalini Yoga - early vs. late stage 
meditation. The colored brain areas represent 
areas of the brain active when early stage 
meditation was compared with late stage 
meditation: prefrontal, parietal and temporal 
cortices, precentral and post central gyri, and the 
hippocampal/parahippocampal region. Source: 
Brain image adapted (photoshop to highlight 
brain areas) from The University of Washington 
Digital Anatomist Image Collection Manager 
website: 
http://imagemanager.biostr.washington.edu 
accessed 6/15/06. 
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meditation until the mind quiets its stimuli-related activity in later stages of meditation. 
Additionally, Lazar reports that in the later stage of meditation other areas become active, 
specifically the sensorimotor, parietal, temporal, and DLPF cortical areas. These areas are 
known to be involved in attention, sensory perception, and memory, especially the 
parietal and DLPFC (Posner and Snyder, 1975; Posner and Petersen, 1990). 
A likely explanation of these differences in brain area activity between early 
versus late meditation phases relates to experiential differences between them. For 
example, in an earlier stage of meditation, practitioners might not yet be fully established 
in the meditation, reflecting the nuanced meaning of the term “meditation.” To be “in 
meditation” could mean either that someone is actively practicing a meditation technique 
– but maybe not yet quite in a meditative state - or it could also mean that not only is
someone actively engaged in the technique itself, but that the person has also achieved 
some target “peak” state of practice – concentration and quietness of mental activity. To 
the extent that it reflects mental states, neuroimaging evidence suggests that achieving a 
meditative state most typically occurs in later stages of meditation after the meditator has 
spent some time getting “into” the practice. This transition can often involving shifting 
the body and arranging oneself into a comfortable posture. So the measured differences in 
this study between early and late phases of meditation could indicate this further subtle 
shift between initial states of meditation and later “deeper” states. In an early stage of 
meditation, the mind is still restless and attention is jumping from object to object 
sometimes involving the body (putamen and midbrain). In later stages, sustained 
concentration is paid to contemplating and feeling the meaning of the mantra while the 
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mind and attention become selectively focused on this task (prefrontal, parietal, and 
temporal cortices), to the exclusion of attending to other stimuli.  
Cahn and Polich (2006) describe fMRI findings from a conference presentation 
by Lazar et al. (2003) that examined Kundalini Yoga meditation and mindfulness 
meditation (Vipassana). These were compared with a control group, and the researchers 
also compared meditation with a non-meditation cognitive task (random number 
generation). These comparisons underscore the importance of understanding what state is 
the goal of any meditation, because small variances between meditation practices seem to 
differently affect the brain and non-meditation cognitive tasks may involve similar 
functions and brain areas as are involved in meditaiton. These sublties are all important to 
uncover. Lazar et al. reported that both meditation groups showed cingulate activation, 
the mindfulness (Vipassana) group showed right temporal activation, and there was a 
different activation of networks between the two groups. These findings support the idea 
that there is no single neurocircuit of meditation; rather, the neurophysiological correlates 
relate to specific aspects of particular meditative tasks.  
Altered State through Visualization and Deep Relaxation: Yoga Nidra 
Lou et al. (1999) studied the effects of several different components of the Yoga 
Nidra meditation by using PET. This study examined nine normal yoga practitioners with 
at least five years of experience in practicing various yogic techniques including Yoga 
Nidra. For two hours before arriving at the testing center, the participants practiced an 
intense form of a tantric yoga concentration meditation that is believed to detach the mind 
from thoughts of daily life and make the mind more susceptible to meditation. The first 
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measurement occurred during an 
awake state without meditation. 
Subjects then performed Yoga Nidra 
according to taped instructions for 45 
minutes during which time several 
measurements were taken at 
appropriate junctures as the 
meditation activity switched from 
task to task. The sequence of 
measurements was not 
counterbalanced, and only the quiet 
non-meditation periods between 
meditative tasks were considered as 
control conditions. Figure 4 shows highlights of several areas of the brain that are active 
in the resting state. Although different activation patterns correlated with the timing of 
different phases of the shifts in the meditation practice, it is not possible from this study 
of brain states to verify whether the mental states theoretically attributed to the 
meditation technique were actually present in the person at the time of the activation.  
Yoga Nidra is a meditation in which the practitioner is said to disassociate 
consciousness of the sensory world from consciousness of action such that the mind is no 
longer associated with the emotions or will. However, there are some important 
differences between this yogic technique and ishvara pranidhana. Both techniques 
employ visualization; but while Yoga Nidra removes imagery with emotional content, 
 
Figure 4: Yoga Nidra Resting State. This figure shows 
the brain areas active during the resting state of Yoga 
Nidra: the orbital and dorsal lateral prefrontal cortices, 
anterior cingulate, temporal, inferior parietal lobule, 
caudate nucleus, thalamus, pons, and cerebellar vermis 
and hemispheres. Source: Brain image adapted 
(photoshop to highlight brain areas) from The 
University of Washington Digital Anatomist Image 
Collection Manager website: 
http://imagemanager.biostr.washington.edu accessed 
6/15/06. 
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ishvara pranidhana channels emotions from memories and latent experiences towards the 
visualization throughout most stages of the meditation. Visual imagery is evoked in 
Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana while getting into the full state of meditation. In other 
words, ishvara pranidhana employs visualization throughout the initial attention focusing 
practice, throughout the suddhis (purification practices), and during the visualization of 
self as ishvara. Lou reported strong activation in the occipital cortex, though not in the 
V1 or the primary visual cortex involved in lower-level visual processing of raw data 
from the visual field, and the parietal cortex during visual imagery. See Figure 5, which 
highlights this general activation pattern (note that the figure highlights the entire 
occipital cortex in blue shading, but 
V1 is not part of this pattern). 
Therefore, these main areas of the 
brain activated during visual imagery 
tasks of Yoga Nidra, or perhaps 
more specialized subregions of these 
large general areas, could also be 
involved in visualization in ishvara 
pranidhana. 
Interestingly, during the 
visual imagery in Yoga Nidra 
meditation, prefrontal and cingulate 
activity was not found, even though these two areas were found to be active in the 
visualization of Tibetan Buddhist meditation and the mantra practice of Kundalini Yoga 
Figure 5: Yoga Nidra - visual imagery. The figure shows 
general brain areas active during the visual imagery 
portion of the meditation: occipital cortex (minus the V1 
cortex); primary visual cortex; parietal cortex.  Source: 
Brain image adapted (photoshop to highlight brain 
areas) from The University of Washington Digital 
Anatomist Image Collection Manager website: 
http://imagemanager.biostr.washington.edu accessed 
6/15/06. 
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meditation. This discrepancy in the activation of higher cognitive centers could 
potentially be explained by differences between the specific meditation techniques: these 
two brain areas are highly involved in emotional processing, and the Yoga Nidra imagery 
removes imagery with emotional context. Because ishvara pranidhana is a devotional 
state in which one channels emotional experiences to the visualized and contemplated 
image is ishvara (and the self merged with ishvara), ishvara pranidhana differs from 
Yoga Nidra in this regard. Ishvara pranidhana shifts emotional processing; therefore, we 
might likely see neurophysiological activity more like that during the Tibtetan Buddhist 
meditation – that is, in the PFC and ACC – than during Yoga Nidra. 
Other stages of Yoga Nidra 
meditation revealed some different 
areas of activation. Lou et al. 
reported that during the meditation 
on abstract sensations of joy and 
happiness, activation is almost 
exclusively limited to the left 
hemisphere, specifically the left 
hemisphere parietal and superior 
temporal lobes, left hippocampus 
(indicated in most states in this 
study), and left occipital activation as 
shown in Figure 6 (left side temporal lobe not highlighted in the figure). Since 
experiences of joy and happiness can occur during “peak” experiences of ishvara 
Figure 6: Yoga Nidra - abstract sensation of joy and 
happiness.  This figure shows areas of the brain active 
during the meditation on abstract sensations of joy and 
happiness (except some left-sided activation not visible 
from this angle). Source: Brain image adapted 
(photoshop to highlight brain areas) from The 
University of Washington Digital Anatomist Image 
Collection Manager website: 
http://imagemanager.biostr.washington.edu accessed 
6/15/06. 
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pranidhana (Corby et al., 1978), these areas could also be expected to be active during 
ishvara pranidhana as well. As noted in Table 1, Lou et al. (1999) also reported bilateral 
parietal activity when the subject meditated on a symbolic representation of self (no 
figure). In ishvara pranidhana, both visual imagery and mantra are symbolic 
representations of self; therefore, parietal activity could also occur during ishvara 
pranidhana. Taken together, these findings suggest further evidence that even a single 
meditation practice does not have a uniform neurocircuit active throughout every stage or 
moment of practice.  
Contemplation and Cultivation of States of Being: Function and Structure 
Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, and Davidson (2008) used fMRI to study 
functional brain activity in a self-generated state of compassion during a Buddhist 
meditation alternating with a resting state in 8 experienced practitioners (with between 
10,000 – 50,000 hours over 15-40 years of practice). These were compared with 8 age-
matched healthy control volunteers who were interested in learning to meditate. During 
this meditation, the practitioner is not focused on any particular object but rather 
exercises an open-awareness in which attention is directed to moment-to-monent 
awareness on the ongoing activity of the mind. Lutz et al. (2008) reported common 
activation in the striatum, anterior insula, somato-sensory cortex, anterior cingulate 
cortex, and left-prefrontal cortex and a deactivation in the right interior parietal, thus, 
similar regions of activation as the studies just presented. In addition, activation of this 
pattern was enhanced in adepts as compared to novices.  
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Lazar and colleagues (2005) had previously conducted an MRI study of the brain 
structure of Insight meditation practitioners, a meditation practice to the Buddhist 
meditation discussed above (Lutz et al., 2008), that compared MRI measurements of the 
thickness of the cortex of meditators with the thickness of the cortex of non-meditators. 
Lazar et al. (2005) showed that the prefrontal cortex and right anterior insula were thicker 
in subjects with extensive meditation experience than matched controls. The twenty 
subjects had on average between 7-9 years of practice experience, with participation in at 
least one week-long Insight meditation retreat, which entails 10 hours of practice per day. 
Fifteen control participants with no meditation experience were matched on a number of 
variables. The meditation practice in this study is similar to ishvara pranidhana in that to 
evoke contemplation during meditation both require focused attention to internal 
experiences. Attentional focus is thought to be mediated, at least in part, by activity in the 
prefrontal cortex. Thus, it is possible that ishvara pranidhana might also be associated 
with increases in cortical thickness in this region over the course of long-term practice. 
More generally, since the idea of experience-dependent plasticity - i.e., that any 
experience can modify the structure of the brain - has become well accepted, this report 
of changes in cortical thickness during meditation is not surprising. What is important 
about studies measuring changes in brain structure related to specific experiences is that 
changes in specific brain areas can be consciously induced through careful selection of 
behavioral or mental tasks. In this case, consciously performing meditation leads to 
changes in the prefrontal cortex, a main area involved in executive functions. What 
remains to be examined is whether the prefrontal cortex is bigger to begin with in those 
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choosing to become serious long-term meditators; correlation does not suggest any 
directionality regarding causality. 
Cellular Level Activity during Meditation 
To date, only one study has been conducted measuring neurotransmitter 
conductance in the nervous system during meditation. Kjaer et al. (2002) did a PET study 
of the relaxed yoga meditation state induced through the tantric yoga practice of Yoga 
Nidra (also discussed above as the meditation technique in Lou et al., 1999) in order to 
access possible synaptic mechanisms for the regulation of conscious states. Kjaer’s study 
is significant since it identifies a neurotransmitter that correlates with the meditation task. 
They examined scans of eight highly experienced practitioners during the relaxation 
meditation and during rest. Meditators had practiced meditation on a daily basis for 7-26 
years. Kjaer et al. (p. 259) reported definite correlations between the meditative task and 
neurotransmitter release, showing, “increased dopamine release in the ventral striatum … 
during relaxation meditation, as evidenced by reduced 11C-raclopride binding, seems to 
be associated with the observed reduction in readiness for action during meditation.” This 
decrease in binding is thought to correspond to an increase in endogenous (produced in 
the brain) dopamine release. To explain this finding, Kjaer et al. suggested that Yoga 
Nidra causes a suppression of the cortical activation of striatum relative to fMRI findings 
of striatal decreased activity, which could in turn increase activity of dopamine input to 
the striatum. However, whether a specific aspect of Yoga Nidra is associated with this 
change is not clear.  
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Finally, although there are similarities between Yoga Nidra and ishvara 
pranidhana, some significant differences in types of mental imagery and in attentional 
deployment makes it difficult to predict whether these specific changes found in Yoga 
Nidra would occur during ishvara pranidhana as well. The increases in dopamine release 
in this study were also associated with loss of executive function during meditation, 
defined in terms of attention (or readiness) to action. Because ishvara pranidhana and 
other meditation practices at least seem to maintain use of executive function throughout 
most of the stages (although at some advanced stage this function might be lost, too), this 
point needs to be carefully analyzed further with respect to specifics of different 
meditation practices. A major benefit of this study is that Kjaer provides some evidence 
regarding effects of meditation at the synaptic level. 
Summary of Neuroimaging Studies of Tantric Absorptive Meditation 
Similar to Ishvara Pranidhana 
Although as of yet there are only a small handful of neuroimaging studies on 
different meditation techniques, there are still several common findings evident among 
the studies. First, almost all of the studies reported at least some area of the frontal lobe 
active during different aspects of these meditation techniques, and the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) in particular. Specifically, visualization activated PFC regions including the 
DLPFC, I/OFC, and DMC (Newberg et al., 2001); mantra activated the PFC (Lazar et al., 
2000); and deep relaxation activated the frontal lobes generally (Lou et al., 1999). 
Contemplation also activated the PFC and this activity, as measured in long-term 
practitioners, was found to be associated with increased cortical thickness in that area 
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(Lazar et al. 2005). Second, there are several subcortical areas that were activated in at 
least two of the studies. For example, both visualization and mantra activated the 
midbrain (Newberg et al., 2001; Lazar et al., 2000), which is an area that produces 
dopamine, while both mantra and deep relaxation activated the hippocampal areas 
involved in memory and the parietal areas involved in sense of self in space (Lazar et al., 
2000; Lou et al., 1999). Mantra and deep relaxation also both activated areas of the 
striatum - the putamen /caudate sub-areas of the striatum (mantra) and the ventral 
striatum (deep relaxation). Table 2 summarizes the functions of different brain regions 
that have been shown to be active in meditation, indicating whether the region is active 
during the default mode of non-task orientation and during what specific aspect of 
meditation the region is active.  
Table 2: Shifting brain activity during different mental states 
Brain region General function when active default 
mode 
Meditation task oriented state 
CORTICAL 
REGIONS: 
Frontal cortex, 
including 
prefrontal cortex 
(PFC), dorsal 
lateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), 
medial prefrontal 
cortex (MPFC), 
and 
Inferior and 
orbital frontal 
cortex (I/OFC) 
PFC: attentional control system of 
working memory – retrieving and 
encoding memories - and other 
executive functions.  
DLPFC: “executive” cognitive 
functions (Kandel et al., 2000). 
MPFC: integrate (evaluate) 
emotional and cognitive processes 
by incorporating emotional 
biasing signals or markers into 
decision-making and emotional 
processing. 
I/OFC are thought to be 
responsible for the perception and 
discrimination of odors, 
connections with amygdala and 
hypothalamus thought to mediate 
emotional and motivational 
aspects of the behavioral (Kandel 
et al., 2000). 
Medial 
prefrontal 
cortex: 
active 
* PFC strongly active (mantra)
*PFC active early to late stage (mantra)
*superior frontal lobes: active (body
sensations – YN) 
*dorsomedial cortex: active
(visualization) 
*DLPFC: active (visualization)
*I/OFC: active (visualization)
cingulate cortex General monitoring functions; Posterior *cingulate gyru: active (visualization) 
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evaluates salience of information. 
Posterior cingulate cortex and 
adjacent precuneus areas 
continuously gather information 
about the worlds around us and 
possibly within us (Raichle, 
2000). 
cingulate 
cortex and 
adjacent 
precuneus
: tonically 
active 
*pregenual ACC: active from control to
meditation (mantra) 
*pre and post central gyri: active early
to late stage (mantra) 
Parietal cortex, 
including 
posterior 
superior lobule 
(PSPL) 
PSPL has a role in generating a 
sense of the body in space (R-
PSPL) and a boundary between 
self and other (L-PSPL). 
Appears 
to be 
involved 
in default 
system 
* parietal cortex strongly active early to
late stage (mantra) 
* parietal lobe active (body sensations
– YN)
*parietal lobe active (sensation of joy
and happiness - YN) 
* parietal lobe active (visual imagery -
YN) 
*bilateral parietal activity
(representation of self - YN) 
*parietal sensory and associated
regions barring V1 active (body 
sensations; sensation of joy and 
happiness , visual imagery,  
representation of self - YN) 
Temporal cortex Temporal lobe is involved in 
hearing and high level auditory 
processing, speech, 
comprehension, verbal memory, 
naming (category knowledge) and 
other language functions, visual 
processing (for example, faces and 
scenes), and episodic/declarative 
memory. 
*active early to late stage (mantra)
*superior temporal active (sensation of
joy and happiness - YN) 
*temporal
Occipital lobe The occipital lobe is the main 
visual processing center of the 
brain. 
*Strong activation sparing V1 (visual
imagery – YN) 
*occipital sensory and associated
regions barring V1 active (body 
sensations; sensation of joy and 
happiness , visual imagery,  
representation of self - YN) 
Sensorimotor 
Cortex 
The sensorimotor cortex is the 
primary cortical processing center 
for sensory and motor signals. 
*active (visualization)
SUBCORTICAL 
REGIONS: 
Midbrain Midbrain controls many sensory 
and motor functions, including 
eye movement and coordination 
of visual and auditory reflexes.  It 
contains the substantia nigra 
(voluntary movements) which 
produces dopamine and plays a 
role in motivation and habituation, 
and also contains the ventral 
tegmentum area (Kandel et al, 
The 
midbrain 
is highly 
intercon-
nected 
with 
MPFC, 
which is 
active in 
default 
*active (visualization) *active control
to meditation (mantra) 
Table 2: continued
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2000). mode. 
Caudate The caudate is a major structure of 
the basal ganglia, and an 
important part of the brain’s 
memory and learning system 
especially during feedback 
processing; it also provides 
inhibitory input to the substantia 
nigra (midbrain) in eye 
movements. Together with the 
putamen forms the dorsal 
striatum.  
--- (not 
mentioned 
in 
literature 
on default 
mode) 
*active control to meditation (mantra)
Putamen The putamen is a part of the basal 
ganglia and is an important site 
for integration of movement 
related and sensory feedback 
information related to movement; 
and plays a role in reinforcement 
learning. Together with the 
caudate forms the dorsal striatum. 
--- (not 
mentioned 
in 
literature 
on default 
mode) 
*active control to meditation (mantra)
Striatum 
(consisting of 
caudate, 
putamen, and 
ventral striatum 
(which includes 
the nucleus 
accumbens) 
The striatum is required for 
operant conditioning; assessing 
saliency of stimuli, especially 
reward stimuli; planning and 
modulating of movement 
pathways and other cognitive 
processes involving executive 
function. 
The 
ventral 
striatum is 
highly 
intercon-
nected 
with 
MPFC, 
which is 
active in 
default 
mode. 
*ventral striatum: decreases in binding
in dopamine receptors (YN) 
Septum *active control to meditation (mantra)
*active early to late stage (mantra)
Amygdala The amygdala is located deep 
within the temporal lobe and is 
part of the limbic system. The 
amygdala mediates autonomic 
expression and cognitive 
experience of learned emotional 
states, particularly fear and 
anxiety, and mediates both 
unconscious emotional states and 
conscious feeling. It also plays a 
role in arousal and conscious 
perception of emotion, and the 
formation and storage of 
memories associated with 
emotional events.  
The 
amygdala 
is highly 
intercon-
nected 
with 
MPFC, 
which is 
active in 
default 
mode. 
*active control to meditation (mantra)
*active early to late stage (mantra)
Hippocampus The hippocampus is located in the 
medial temporal lobe, forms part 
of the limbic system, and plays a 
part in long-term memory 
formation and spatial navigation. 
--- (not 
mentioned 
in 
literature 
on default 
*active control to meditation (mantra)
*active early to late stage (mantra)
*bilateral hippocampus active (body
sensations; sensation of joy and 
happiness, visual imagery,  
Table 2: continued
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It forms explicit memories 
(people, places, and objects), and 
has an indirect role in emotions. 
mode) representation of self - YN) 
Hypothalamus The hypothalamus links the 
nervous system to the endocrine 
system via the pituitary gland, and 
through this link, the 
hypothalamus coordinates the 
peripheral (physiologic) 
expression of emotional states 
through autonomic and somatic 
responses. 
The 
hypotha-
lamus is 
highly 
intercon-
nected 
with 
MPFC, 
which is 
active in 
default 
mode. 
*active control to meditation (mantra)
*active early to late stage (mantra)
Thalamus The thalamus is a processing and 
relay station for sensory 
information to the cortex. It has an 
important role in regulating sleep 
and wakefulness, regulating 
arousal and level of awareness and 
activity, and in circuits involved 
in consciousness. 
--- (not 
mentioned 
in 
literature 
on default 
mode) 
*active (visualization)
Applying Neuroimaging Studies to Ishvara Pranidhana 
Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana centers on several aspects of the 
techniques discussed above: mantra, visualization, and contemplation; therefore, it seems 
reasonable to think that cortical and subcortical brain areas found to be active during the 
neuroimaging studies of these techniques could also be active during ishvara pranidhana. 
Taken together, these studies reflect a general pattern suggesting activation of 
attention networks with possible modulation from memory and emotion networks.  
Almost every study reported frontal cortical activation of some sort, especially in the PFC 
and ACC. These two areas are important for shifting and sustaining attention. The 
parietal cortex was also often activated during these different forms of meditation, 
including visualization and mantra meditations. Interestingly the right parietal cortex 
showed deactivation in fMRI during the Buddhist compassion meditation. This could 
indicate decreased attentional processing during the advanced state of practice in which 
Table 2: continued
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the meditator has self-generated a particular state of compassion rather than focusing on 
any one thing. That the hippocampus was activated during some meditations on visual 
imagery, including symbolic representation of the self, and during mantra meditation, but 
not active during other forms of meditation suggests that memory functions may vary 
with meditation technique. Brain areas important to emotion regulation and reward 
circuits, such as the midbrain and striatum are also implicated in some of the studies, with 
dopamine suggested as a potential neurotransmitter involved in certain meditation circuits 
and possible in ishvara pranidhana. See also reviews by Lutz et al. (2007) and Cahn and 
Polich (2006) for discussion of the psychological functions of these brain regions and 
their potential roles in meditative states.  
A number of these brain areas are also connected to the autonomic nervous 
system, and could therefore participate in its regulation in terms of either activation or 
deactivation. Thus, changes in brain activity during meditation may generate shifts in 
autonomic nervous system (ANS) relaxation or arousal (“ecstatic”) effects that have been 
differently reported. This model of frontal activation, with downstream effects in lower 
brain areas and the body (e.g., body chemistry and physiological functioning) potentially 
clarifies biological characteristics of meditation states, because the frontal area is 
believed to be important to conscious control and higher cognitive function. This higher 
cognitive control of ANS activation differs from the early model of ANS activation in 
meditation, which held that changes in the ANS drove “peak” experiences in meditation, 
i.e., absorption (Benson, Beary, and Carol, 1974). These newer data on higher brain areas 
active during absorption suggest a revised model, which includes higher cortical areas. In 
addition, any explanation of these changes must also contend with the idea that, in 
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addition to higher areas regulating lower areas, but that lower areas also modulate higher 
areas, too. This reciprocal causality must be accounted for in theories of meditation, since 
the reciprocal influences of the ANS and central nervous system on each other are now 
well accepted. 
 
 
EEG: Evidence for Oscillatory Neural Synchrony in a  
Neurocircuit of Absorptive Meditation 
By means of tiny electrodes placed on various locations on an individual’s scalp, 
an electroencephalogram (EEG) measures the electrical signals (voltage differences) 
from large numbers of neurons across different brain areas (Cacioppo, 2007). The 
electrical activity is characterized as waves that reflect the rhythmicity and synchrony of 
neuronal firing, which is described in terms of frequency per second. Faster waves are 
called gamma, with the range moving to slower waves reflecting lower frequencies: 
gamma (fastest) involved in conscious attention, beta associated with alertness and 
activity, alpha associated with both awake and relaxed states as well as falling asleep, 
theta involved in both motor behavior and REM sleep, and delta (slowest) associated with 
deep sleep. EEG is capable of detecting changes in electrical activity in the brain on a 
millisecond level, and it is one of the few techniques available that has such high 
temporal (time) resolution.  
A long line of research on meditation starting from the first-known EEG 
recording of meditation in the mid-twentieth century has shown a predominance of alpha 
and theta activity in the EEG during yogic meditation, along with evidence of 
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hypometabolic relaxation (Das and Gupta, 1958; Wenger and Bagchi, 1961; Anand et al., 
1961; Elson, Hauri, and Cunis, 1977; Corby, Roth, Zarcone, and Kopell, 1978; Arambula 
et al., 2001; Aftanas and Golocheikine, 2001, 2002, 2005). This research, including two 
studies of ishvara pranidhana (Elson, Hauri, and Cunis, 1977; Corby, Roth, Zarcone, and 
Kopell, 1978), supports the view that meditation leads to a state of relaxation. Much of 
the methodological variation in these studies reflects efforts to clarify the specific role of 
meditation to this state and whether meditation itself is distinguishable from relaxation 
alone, with some evidence challenging and refining this relaxation view.  
For example, Elson et al. (1977) matched ishvara pranidhana meditators (referred 
to as Ananda Marga meditators in this study) with non-meditating controls to investigate 
whether relaxing non-meditators achieve similar effects on the physiological state as 
those attained during meditation. Controls had no experience with meditation. Meditators 
were not assessed for proficiency, but researchers noted that 10/11 meditators had on 
average 18.8 months experience practicing meditation at least twice per day. The 
eleventh meditator was a teacher with advanced training and 54 months of meditative 
experience. Controls were instructed to remain “wakefully relaxed,” that is, sitting 
comfortably in a chair without doing anything or falling asleep and remaining relaxed, 
while meditators meditated sitting on the floor for the same amount of time. EEG 
recordings were taken during the meditation task for the meditators and the wakefully 
relaxed state for the non-meditators, and during an eyes-open non-meditation period 
following the test session for both groups. The results indicated that while non-meditators 
tended to fall asleep during the task, all the meditators were able to remain in alpha-theta 
activity during the meditation session, a state defined as physiologically different from 
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both relaxed wakefulness and sleep.  Also, the amount of time spent in theta was longest 
for the meditation teacher and this subject was the only one who maintained some theta 
during the eyes-open period following meditation. This study concluded that ishvara 
pranidhana meditation resulted in a physiologically different state from both relaxed 
wakefulness and sleep.  
In another example, Corby et al. 1978 studied the state of ishvara pranidhana 
meditation in proficient (an average of 2.1 years experience in meditation with 3.1 hours 
a day) and expert meditators (an average of 4.4 years experience in meditation and 3.4 
hours a day). This study conceptualized the meditation as the ability to concentrate 
attention and direct its focus either outward or inward. A third control group had no 
experience with meditation or any attention training, and were instructed to perform 
meditation techniques similar to techniques used by the experienced meditators. All 
subjects were asked to rate the quality of their subjective experience during their session, 
and all groups similarly reported no difficulty staying awake, increased euphoria, and a 
continued state of relaxation as they shifted from normal consciousness into meditation.  
Results indicate that 17/20 meditators increased EEG alpha and theta power during 
meditation, with the more proficient meditators having higher theta. Meditation decreased 
time in sleep, with meditators spending less time in sleep than controls. In all, this study 
reports that the findings that meditators became physiologically activated while controls 
became relaxed discounts the view of meditation as only inducing deep relaxation. This 
study attributes differences between groups that emerged during meditation to the 
prolonged effects of practice rather than the technique itself.  See Cahn and Polich (2006) 
for further discussion of studies of other types of meditation techniques showing that 
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meditation produces increases in alpha beyond that obtained from reducing general 
arousal.  
While alpha rhythms are thought to characterize a relaxed, “unoccupied brain” or 
psychological state (Klimesch, 1999), that meditation shows alpha greatly combined with 
theta deserves some discussion, especially since a number of previous studies have 
reported that proficiency in meditation shows more theta power (Elson et al. 1977; 
Corby, 1978). The alpha and theta rhythms of TM (Transcendental Meditation) correlate 
with brain activation spreading into the frontal channels (Wallace, 1970), with global 
frontal-central increases in alpha (e.g., Delmonte, 1984). Some more recent studies have 
demonstrated that more proficient meditators have increased theta in the frontal midline 
area (the region where the hemispheres meet), as well as in the general midline area (i.e., 
Yoga Nidra meditation) (Lutz, 2007; Cahn and Polich, 2006). However, the theta at 
midline has also been associated with sustained attention. There is also consideration that 
drowsiness or some sleep-like conscious awareness might be the source of theta, but 
results are mixed (see Cahn and Polich, 2006). In a careful consideration of what EEG 
reveals about sleep states, Elson et al. interpreted alpha-theta as a transitional phase 
between waking and sleep.  Thus theta waves are not like, though not necessarily unlike, 
simple relaxation. Yet whether meditation produces these effects or people who have a 
natural proclivity to be in these states are drawn to meditation remains unresolved.  
Moreover, neural activation recorded through EEG studies needs to be understood 
in relation to other findings of changes in autonomic activity and relaxation. While a 
number of studies have shown that lowered autonomic arousal characterizes the EEG 
pattern of yogic concentration practices including TM (e.g., Fenwick et al., 1977; Shapiro 
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and Walsh, 1984; Delmonte, 1985), two early studies recorded the opposite finding of 
increased autonomic arousal in advanced yogic practitioners (Das and Gastaut, 1955; 
Wenger and Bagchi, 1961). Similarly, Corby et al.’s (1978) controlled study of ishvara 
pranidhana revealed that more experienced advanced practitioners exhibited increased 
autonomic activation during meditation while less experienced meditators demonstrated 
autonomic relaxation (see also review by Lutz et al., 2007). These findings raise 
questions about whether meditation induces simply relaxed states or some other state of 
consciousness. There is also some physiological evidence that the goal state of yogic 
absorption or samadhi differs functionally from a relaxed non-meditative state. Findings 
of increased autonomic activity during absorption have been reported (Wenger and 
Bagchi, 1961; Elson et al, 1977; Corby et al., 1978; Das and Gastaut, 1955), although this 
is a rare state and there are mixed findings as to whether there is concomitant EEG 
activation in yogic samadhi (Das and Gestaut, 1955). Neither Wenger and Bagchi nor 
Corby found any EEG activation in this goal state. We will discuss this issue of 
autonomic activation more in a later section that explores downstream effects of 
meditation through different brain-body dynamics. 
The EEG measurement of alpha blocking has been proposed as a possible 
measure of deautomatization, in which subjects refrain from the normal habituation to 
stimulus recurring in the environment. EEG alpha blocking is thought to measure an 
individual’s ability to deautomatize. Alpha blocking refers to the loss of alpha waves as a 
scale of increased synchronized neural activity during the period of deautomatization. In 
one study, alpha blocking was exhibited in normal persons practicing the simple yogic 
meditation technique of Transcendental Meditation (TM) (Wallace, 1970). In another 
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study, long-term meditators were found to exhibit greater alpha activity earlier in the 
session and with less habituation compared to controls during a stimulus response task 
(Williams and West, 1975). To the extent that these EEG patterns reflect mental states, 
meditators appear to be able to maintain constant conscious awareness of their 
environment while simultaneously maintaining a state of deep concentration. If so, this 
simultaneity represents remarkable attentional control and that manipulation of the 
mental process of attentional functioning is one way in which meditation practice 
achieves altered consciousness.  
Two early EEG studies showed a difference in alpha blocking between two 
different types of meditation. Zen or Zazen meditation is a Buddhist practice of sitting 
meditation in which practitioners maintain an open-eyed, downcast gaze about a meter in 
front of their bodies, while yogic meditation, as discussed previously, is a closed-eyed 
meditation to turn attention inwards. Kasamatsu and Hirai (1966) found an alpha pattern 
similar to the pattern of EEG activity discovered in multiple other studies and showed 
consistent alpha blocking to auditory stimuli that did not habituate throughout Zen or 
Zazen meditation, while Wenger and Bagchi (1961) showed no alpha blocking in yoga 
meditation. The consistent activity during Zen led the researchers to conclude that, for 
advanced practitioners, there is almost no adaptation to alpha blocking during the Zen 
meditation, meaning that Zen meditators continue to perceive stimulus consistently 
throughout the meditation. These findings are consistent with subjective reports of 
meditative states of deep emersion in the present moment because of withdrawal from 
distractions (yogic) or mindfully present of ongoing moment-to-moment sensory 
experience. 
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It is actually quite profound that the Zen masters exhibited fairly constant alpha 
blocking throughout the test of response to stimulus. In normal wake state, subjects who 
do not practice meditation “habituate” to stimulus. This tendency means that when 
presented with a constant sound or light stimulus (as was the case in this study), subjects 
have an initial reaction to the stimulus and then eventually cease to respond to the 
stimulus. This cessation can be thought of in the sense that the stimulus somehow goes 
“off the radar” of what the nervous system will respond to, or no longer remains in 
conscious awareness.  
Some issue might be taken with the claim of “constant conscious awareness” of 
the environment while in a state of absorption as to whether this sort of state reflects the 
true goal of tantric yoga, and whether alpha blocking or desensitization applies during 
ishvara pranidhana. As I claimed earlier, TM has some aspects of the meditative 
technique and goal state in common with ishvara pranidhana. Thus I think that this 
phenomenon of no alpha blocking may very well apply during ishvara pranidhana 
practice when meditators remain in a state of conscious awareness of the environment. 
But the end state of ishvara pranidhana is not the penultimate of traditional tantric yoga 
meditation (see chapter four), or of Anandamurti’s system. The yogic technique of 
Wenger and Bagchi’s study was not specified clearly enough in their report to be able to 
evaluate whether this technique is similar to ishvara pranidhana. It could be that this 
unspecified technique is closer to the more advanced meditation methods taught in 
Anandamurti’s system, and therefore that more advanced technique would also lead to a 
state in which no alpha blocking occurs. Such a state could be one in which one loses 
conscious awareness of the environment while entering into deeper states of absorption.  
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Advanced EEG studies assess EEG coherency and high frequency gamma band in 
attempts to characterize mechanisms of conscious awareness and perceptual binding 
(Cahn and Polich, 2006). For example, in a recent study Lutz et al. (2004) reported high-
amplitude gamma oscillations in the EEGs of long-time practitioners that were not 
present in the initial baseline, and the amplitude of the gamma oscillations increased over 
time of the practice. They characterized the ratio of gamma to slower waves, finding that 
the ratio was initially higher at baseline for practitioners than controls. Also, baseline 
differences increased sharply during meditation in comparisons between gamma activity 
and both theta and alpha activity for practitioners. They found a higher ratio of fast versus 
slow oscillations for long-term practitioners versus controls in the initial baseline over 
medial frontoparietal electrodes (relative gamma power), a finding that suggests that 
practitioners and controls had different electrophysiological spectral profiles in the 
baseline and that meditation could be associated with a trait.  
The researchers further analyzed the on-going gamma activity itself to find a 
common topographical pattern of activity bilaterally over the parietal, temporal, and 
midfrontal electrodes (absolute gamma power) for practitioners but not controls. Thus, 
they concluded that, in general, the meditative state was associated with gamma 
oscillations that were significantly higher in amplitude for practitioners than for controls. 
Findings from a long-distance synchrony analysis between four regions within the 
bilateral area of the parietal, temporal, and midfrontal regions showed a greater size of 
the synchronous pattern for practitioners than controls, suggesting that large-scale brain 
coordination increases during mental practice. Finally, researchers obtained data 
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suggesting that the degree of training, i.e., number of hours spent in formal sitting 
meditation, can influence the spectral distribution of the ongoing baseline EEG. 
In their review of neuroelectric correlates of meditative states, Lutz et al. (2007) 
argue that there is an important link between the activation pattern of brain states and the 
patterns of consciousness. Lutz explains oscillatory synchrony as a mechanism for 
coordinating communication between spatially distributed neurons, or neurons that are 
located in different areas of the brain, and points out a number of authors who have 
proposed that the mechanisms of synchrony could mediate various features of 
consciousness. They go one step further to explain that the emergence of a specific 
coherent assembly underlies the operation of any moment of experience. The transition 
from one moment to the next could be subserved by desynchronization of some coherent 
neural assemblies and the synchronization of new ones. In some way, then, every state 
reflects some degree of synchrony. What distinguishes functionality appears to be the 
particular regions and circuits activated and involved in the synchrony occurring in a 
particular moment. For example, alpha desynchronization reflects cognitive processes 
such as attention, memory, and emotion or active inhibition of non-task relevant cortical 
areas (Lutz, 2007 from Klimesch, 1999). If this view of synchrony as a mechanism of 
consciousness is correct, then the alpha or theta rhythms associated with the task during 
the last phase of ishvara pranidhana of turning one’s awareness inward to focus on the 
source of consciousness and cultivating this experience as a state of being would be 
associated with the synchronization of attention networks and other structures that 
contribute to the sorts of mental activity that occurs during this meditation. 
Lutz et al. (2004) attribute the difference in findings between their study and other 
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EEG studies that found slow wave activity to differences between the particular 
meditation techniques, explaining that most of these previous EEG meditation studies 
“investigated different forms of voluntary concentrative meditation on an object (such as 
a mantra or breath).” Lutz (2004) characterizes the concentration techniques as a “form of 
‘top-down’ control that may exhibit an important slow oscillatory component (22).” In 
contrast, Lutz describes the objectless meditation at the center of the study as cultivating 
a state of being in which the “object-oriented aspect of experience appears to dissipate.” 
In fact, this very “dissipation” of object-orientation is also at the essence of later phases 
of Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana, even though ishvara pranidhana 
initially employs the use of mantra and concentration. Lutz reasons that this evidence of 
synchrony suggests that various meditative states may be associated with different EEG 
oscillatory signatures. Because of this similarity, long-term practitioners of 
Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana meditation might also exhibit some similar 
sort of high amplitude gamma synchrony. Assuming this theory is correct, ishvara 
pranidhana might exhibit a range of oscillatory signatures throughout the course of the 
meditation as the practitioner progresses through the phases of the practice. 
To summarize, yogic meditation generally leads to a special state of relaxed 
awareness distinguishable from both sleep and wakefulness that is characterized by alpha 
and theta waves that move towards frontal areas. Effects seem to carry over after 
meditation period officially ends, with no alpha blocking. These findings all support 
claims of yogic meditators remaining in a state undistracted by external stimuli. Greater 
proficiency in meditation produces more theta waves. Expertise defined in terms of 
attaining the goal of samadhi (absorption) is not well studied, but EEG may not be an 
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adequate measurement approach to this method. Innovations on typical EEG 
methodology that characterize gamma activity may lead to more understanding of the 
kind of awareness associated with meditation, illustrating, for example, how neural 
synchrony might be applied to meditation as a mechanism of conscious awareness and 
perceptual binding. However, it is not yet clear whether and how meditation practices 
produce increased alpha beyond that obtained from reducing general arousal; however, 
this understanding may become clear only when combined with other neuroimaging 
methods (Cahn and Polich, 2006). Finally, although meditation influences EEG 
measures, it is also not clear how meditation affects cognitive states and alters CNS traits. 
 
Effects of Meditation on Brain-Body Relationships 
While much of the current research on meditation is focused on the impact of 
meditation on the brain, earlier studies of meditation began the line of research by 
looking at the body and physiological responses to meditation (some earlier research also 
looked at the brain via EEG methods, as discussed above). I think that the evidence from 
studies on the physiological effects of meditation supports seeing three brain-body 
relationships that are affected by meditation. Here I discuss evidence of changes in the 
autonomic nervous system, the neuroendocrine systems, and even the peripheral nervous 
system. I see all this evidence together as further support for a “downstream effects” 
view. Earlier I discussed research that suggests that higher brain activity affects activity 
in lower brain areas, and suggested that activation in higher brain areas might have a 
downstream effect on lower brain areas, a relationship that can also be reciprocal. Here I 
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suggest that the evidence from studies of the effects of meditation on the body supports 
the notion that downstream effects of the brain extend into the body.  
One of the most important insights from the early studies on meditation that 
continues to impact the field today was Benson’s (1974) assertion that meditation causes 
a “relaxation response” during practice sessions, an effect that may continue after 
practice and become entrained as a trait over time. The relaxation response during 
meditation is characterized by decreased heart and respiration rates (Bagchi and Wenger, 
1958; Wallace, 1970 and Wallace and Benson, 1972), decreased oxygen consumption 
and carbon dioxide elimination (Anand et al., 1961; Wallace, 1970; Wallace and Benson, 
1972). Decreases in heart rate mean subsequent decreases in blood flow and blood 
pressure. These decreases are significant because they bring the role of the autonomic 
nervous system (ANS) in affecting change in the state of consciousness further into focus 
(Wallace and Benson, 1972): the ANS regulates changes in blood flow and pressure and 
changes in heart rate. The measurable changes in the cardiopulmonary system can be 
used either as an indicator of how meditation affects the brain and thus the ANS 
indirectly, or how meditation affects the ANS directly.  
Demonstrating a second brain-body relationship, a number of studies of various 
techniques of meditation have reported changes in body chemistry that result from 
neuroendocrine changes, including regulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary axes. For 
example, Infante et al. (1998) reported that the hormones of the hypothalamic-pituitary 
axis are modified with regular practice of Transcendental Meditation (TM).  Specifically, 
meditation has been reported to result in an increase in dehydroepiandrosterone sulfate 
(DHEAS) (Glaser et al., 1992), an anti-aging stress hormone produced in the adrenal 
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glands and elsewhere, and an increase in night-time plasma levels of melatonin (Tooley 
et al., 2000), a hormone produced in the pineal gland that is thought to be not only an 
anti-stress and antiaging hormone but also to have anti-cancer effects and positive effects 
for immune functioning (Tooley, 2000). The pineal secretion of melatonin has a central 
role in regulating the circadian rhythm, a body rhythm that causes changes in behavior 
and shifts in consciousness relating to sleep and wake states.  
What is significant about the hypothalamic-pituitary chemical cascade through the 
bloodstream and nervous system is that these chemical cascades have specific 
associations with and implications for psychological phenomena and behavior. For 
example, people with anxiety may develop an excessive rise in blood lactate 
concentration with stress (Cohen and White, 1950; Wallace et al., 1971) and 
experimental results show decreased levels of lactate in the blood of meditating subjects 
(Wallace, et al., 1971; Wallace and Benson, 1972). A lower level of lactate in the blood 
of meditators correlates with decreases in anxiety and may be associated with the 
subjective feelings of relaxation (Wallace et al., 1971). While a cause for the fall of 
blood-lactate level is unknown (although some speculate the lower levels are due to 
relaxation of skeletal muscle tissue, which is the main site of lactate production (Wallace 
and Benson, 1972), it is known that a lower lactate level relates to a lower heart rate, one 
of the physiological measures of meditation practice. In addition, lower serum lipid 
peroxide levels are found in meditators (Schneider et al., 1998) and are thought to be 
associated with reduced stress. Note that lipid peroxides cause toxic effects and are 
considered a pathological process, and refer readers to the “purification” concept 
associated with meditation from the emic perspective. Another example of the association 
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between hypothalamic-pituitary chemical cascades and psychological phenomena is the 
chemical cascade of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal stress hormones secretions (such 
as cortisol) into the bloodstream.   
In addition to changes in the autonomic nervous system, at least one change 
during meditation has been measured in the peripheral nervous system. Meditation has 
been found to increase skin resistance (Wallace, 1970; Wallace, Benson and Wilson, 
1971; Wallace and Benson, 1972; Bagchi and Wenger, 1958). Efferent pathways from 
higher cognitive centers, down the nervous system to motor centers and through to the 
motor neurons, connect to the skin in the body. These pathways affect the level of tension 
of muscles. Skin resistance (a measure of the electrical resistance of the skin) is thought 
by some to reflect the level of anxiety (Wallace and Benson, 1972) or some other type of 
emotional arousal. A decrease in skin resistance represents greater anxiety while an 
increase in resistance signifies greater relaxation. Thus, this physiological measure can 
also be taken as a correlate, indicator, or measure of the psychological effect meditation 
has on practitioners. That motor control and movement - and thus posture, behavior, and 
action - relate to psychological experience should be understood because the meditative 
posture undoubtedly plays a significant role in the body’s ability to signal changes 
leading to meditative consciousness.  
These findings are suggestive of changes in three brain-body relationships: the 
brain stem and autonomic nervous system, the spinal cord and the peripheral nervous 
system, and neuroendocrine interactions. Whether all these are effects on the body of 
maintaining a physical state or whether they involve the brain, or perhaps have a 
psychological dimension, remains to be clarified. The recognition that meditation induces 
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relaxed states of the body has gone far to both draw attention to meditation as a method 
to aid in clinical practice and to foster further research to clarify the nature of  meditative 
relaxation, especially as it may relate to the mind. Questions on this latter issue revolve 
around clarifying whether meditation is a unique state of consciousness that differs from 
both wake and sleep states and examining whether meditation is better characterized as a 
state or as an enduring trait, or as both, as a number of researchers suggest (e.g., Cahn 
and Polich, 2006).  
Based on these early findings, a number of scientists and scholars have theorized 
about the operations of the brain during meditative practice to address the seemingly 
contradictory reports that meditation leads to both a deep sense of calm but can also lead 
to yogic ecstasy, culminating in peak experiences (see chapter four for elaboration on 
tantric theories of yogic ecstasy). Fischer (1971) and others (e.g., Gellhorn and Kiely, 
1972) have argued that autonomic arousal could be used to explain a range of experiences 
in meditation. They suggested that autonomic arousal during meditation occurs on a 
continuum from parasympathetic or hypoactivity (less activity) that induces feelings of 
relaxation and calmness to sympathetic or hyperactivity (more activity), which could 
explain the intensity of some mystical or “peak” experiences in meditation. Thus, this 
model can be useful for reconciling peak experiences with more commonly observed 
hypoarousal in meditative practice (Davidson, 1976). More recently, D’Aquili and 
Newberg (1992) proposed a detailed elaboration of this autonomic arousal model of the 
neurophysiology of meditative absorption, integrating earlier findings of frontal cortical 
activation associated with deeper states of meditation by positing that higher brain areas 
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involved in focusing attention during the meditation task such as the prefrontal cortex are 
necessary to understand variability of subjective experience.  
 
Analyzing Neuroscience Perspectives on Meditation:  
Positioning Claims for Comparison with Yoga 
This chapter has shown how neuroimaging and neuroelectric methods provide an 
avenue to examine ways in which the meditation task is organized in the brain. This 
chapter also argues that while specific mental processes involved in the meditation task 
cannot be correlated with brain activity, these methods can extend and expand on earlier 
research on meditation regarding body chemistry and physiological functioning by 
identifying specific brain areas that correlate with specific stages of the task. This 
discussion has focused on the shift from the normal mental process to absorptive 
meditation. This shift in mental states requires mental processes including attentional 
shift, sustained and selective attention, much concentration, and a balancing of cognitive 
and emotional processes; these processes are associated with activity in the prefrontal 
cortex. Because various regions of the brain that are activated during meditation are 
intricately connected to the rest of the body, activation of the higher brain areas are 
thought to lead to downstream effects in the limbic system, autonomic nervous system, 
peripheral nervous system, and endocrine system. Thus, activation of a functional circuit 
could possibly induce the experience of an altered sense of self variously felt as calm and 
peaceful, joyful and ecstatic, etc., at least in part, through downstream effects of upstream 
neural activation that reverberate throughout the body. In this case, both physiological 
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and biochemical changes in the body seem to support the overall functional state of 
meditation, but it is not clear how or if this activity includes a psychological dimension.  
Despite this accumulation of some tentative and initial knowledge about the brain 
processes of meditation, Lutz et al. (2007) think that the evidence is not conclusive as to 
whether meditative consciousness is better characterized as a unique state or some well-
defined mental wake state involving focused attention, contemplation, or some other 
cognitive qualities depending on the goals of the particular practice. The recent advances 
in methodology that allow scientists to image bodily organs including the brain have 
advanced knowledge about meditation somewhat in terms of identifying brain areas of 
interest, yet to date there still have been only a limited number of neuroimaging studies. 
There is still a sense that we do not know a great deal about the neurophysiological 
processes during meditation, and therefore cannot explain meditative consciousness, and 
this growing but still very sparse body of knowledge indicates a clear need for more 
research given the current climate of science driving funding and establishment of 
evidence-based treatment protocols. Perhaps this failure to establish this level of 
knowledge about meditation stems from a more fundamental problem: there is still no 
neuroscientific or brain-based theory of meditation.  
Empirical knowledge about any natural phenomenon is derived from experiments 
that test theoretical propositions. This method of developing theory stands at the 
foundation of modern psychology. But as Gazzaniga and colleagues (1998) point out in 
their textbook on cognitive neuroscience, psychological theories are often derived from 
other methods. An important example is the set of current theories of attentional 
processes that originated from James and Helmholtz at the turn of the twentieth-century 
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and were derived largely from introspection. Therefore, it seems reasonable to use 
introspection to help develop psychological theories about meditative consciousness that 
could be translated into neurobiological terms for the purpose of hypothesis generation 
and experimentation. 
Yet the question remains: even if we knew more empirically, would this 
knowledge satisfactorily explain the meditative consciousness of absorption? What type 
of theory about the mind can lay the groundwork for a brain-based theory of meditation?  
Neuroscientists typically assume an identity between mind and brain; the most 
accepted idea is that these mental functions and mental states are neurobiological activity. 
Thus, mind is a property of brain activity. Put differently, Kandel et al. (2000) defined 
mind as “the entire set of operations of the brain.” Thus a major challenge of cognitive 
neuroscience is to develop methods to test hypotheses that demonstrate relationships 
between mental functions and processes and the brain.  
Moreover, the language of “the brain and the rest of the body” (i.e., neural versus 
non-neural tissue) implies some special status of the brain as different in some 
fundamental way from the rest of the body. This status generates from a popular 
neuroscientific understanding of brain as identical with mind (Churchland, 1988). 
Identity theories of mind characterize the neuroscience perspectives of mind-body 
relationships and interactions of the human being, and seem to give the foundation for the 
neuroscience premise of a mind-brain identity. But this premise is an assumption that 
presumes knowledge about the functional organization of the mind, i.e., that the mind is 
modular like we assume the brain to be (Logothetis, 2008). But what really is the 
functional organization of the mind? 
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In his discussion of the limitations of fMRI neuroimaging technology, Logothetis 
(2008) acknowledges potential ontological and epistemological issues with these 
assumptions necessitated by neuroimaging methods, pointing especially to the 
widespread assumption in neuroscience that the mind can be subdivided into modules or 
parts, whose activity can then be studied with fMRI. Yet he further acknowledges that the 
long history of philosophy of mind has proved that a theory of a unified mind with 
component parts is difficult to explain. This difficulty from a materialist perspective is 
perhaps the primary reason that theories of consciousness have largely been taken on in 
philosophy but mostly left alone by empirical science. Can function truly be localized in 
the brain? Neuroscience assumes that most mental functions can, but perhaps the most 
prominent exception – or at least challenge - is explaining consciousness. At the very 
least, neuroscience frequently assumes a functional modularity of the mind.  
Theories attempt to explain the world, and so far this functional modularity type 
of explanation is the working hypothesis, the one that makes sense based on what we 
know about the brain. Although there is some limited work in neuroscience to explore 
possible mechanisms that explain a global unifying principle of mind, such as oscillatory 
neural synchrony as a mechanism of consciousness, the field of neuroscience takes the 
modular organization of many brain systems as a well-established fact: even modular 
organization can be consistent with neural synchrony as the foundation of consciousness. 
Thus, neuroscience findings support localization of function, at least if by “localization” 
one includes neural networks that extend across anatomical brain regions. The wealth of 
evidence in support of this from studying tractable functions (sensory systems, learning, 
etc.) creates a tendency to generalize to less defined functions (consciousness, etc.). 
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As indicated in chapter one, and as we will see further in the following chapters, 
in contrast to science, emic systems abound with theories of meditative consciousness. 
The problem with these theories, though, as with other psychological models and 
theories, is that they often lack empirical support to establish whether they explain the 
phenomena of interest. The case in point here is the tantric yoga theory that assumes a 
unified theory of mind-body, through the principle of oscillating consciousness. Yet there 
is neither evidence nor, perhaps more importantly, any reasonable translation of the 
theory into scientific terminology. It seems that such work that collaborates between emic 
theories and science is needed to advance understandings of meditation. 
A complementary approach to studying meditation - one in which incorporating 
the emic perspectives becomes a valued approach to elucidate descriptive data - can help 
carve out hypotheses that can then drive further research. Drawing from the latest 
advances in understanding neurophysiological processes and combining these with tools 
of theoretical and philosophical psychology seems to provide a strategy to address 
questions about the highest levels of abstract mental functioning. 
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Chapter Four 
Meditative Consciousness and the Yogic Body of Tantra 
 
In the Introduction to his book, Theory and Practice of Yoga, Jacobsen (2005) 
proposes that different ideas of yoga, its practice, and goals are competing in scholarship. 
Eliade (1958) in his seminal work on yoga, Yoga, Im mortality, and Freedom, 
demonstrates chapter by chapter various ways that yoga is practiced and theorized in a 
number of Indian religious traditions throughout various historical eras and social 
contexts. My exposition will follow this precept, considering select yoga traditions with 
the explicit purpose of understanding the mental processes of ishvara pranidhana 
meditation within the context of tantric yoga.  
In chapter three, I examined the neurophysiological correlates of meditative tasks, 
attention, memory, and emotion. In this chapter, I turn to an examination of these three 
mental processes from the tantric yoga perspective. In this chapter, I explicate ishvara 
pranidhana in strictly emic terms within traditional understandings of tantric yoga. I do 
this by analyzing key mental processes within classical ideas of yoga that seem to best 
correlate with the cognitive science concepts of attention, memory, and emotion. The 
processes of meditation from the emic perspective of yoga are ekagrata (concentrated 
mind), samskara (memory trace), and samadhi (absorption). Significantly, tantric yoga 
does not necessarily characterize these as “mental” processes. Instead, these terms are 
more like categories that describe experiential phenomena. There is a special focus on 
explicating how yoga sees these meditation processes in relation to the body. I argue that 
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we should interpret the yogic body as depicting an experiential reality that functions as an 
embodiment of consciousness.  
Throughout this analysis, it should be understood that these three mental 
processes are synergistic. Just as attention, memory, and emotion may all seem to be 
static, serial, sequential and distinct processes because we draw these distinctions among 
them, the processes of meditation are likewise confluent. A practitioner moves among 
these three processes during any meditation session, and each of the first two processes of 
ekagrata and samskara (concentrated mind and memory trace, respectively) catalyze 
deeper states of absorption (samadhi). 
  
Methodological Considerations 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, ishvara pranidhana as currently practiced today 
is claimed to be explicitly based on tantric yoga principles, thus its choice as the focus of 
this dissertation: tantra provides the most elaborated ideas concerning the yogic body on 
which tantric meditation practices are based. The meditation method of ishvara 
pranidhana and its theories thus can be seen to constitute the emic perspective that I 
compare with the etic neuroscience perspective in part three.  
 There are two steps needed to explain this emic perspective on the tantric body. 
First, I explicate traditional tantric yoga in this chapter with an emphasis on experiential 
or phenomenological interpretation of the yogic body as a model of reality. However, 
Anandamurti’s claim that his meditation technique is tantric yoga must be separately 
evaluated and put into perspective within the context of modernity and the modern 
phenomenon of yoga because his method of ishvara pranidhana is a twentieth to twenty-
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first century practice. This second step is undertaken in the next chapter. Thus, part two 
sets the stage for the comparison of the two perspectives in the chapters of part three. 
That comparison requires an explication of the emic perspective on Anandamurti’s 
method of ishvara pranidhana, and for this I needed to choose primary and secondary 
sources that would help me analyze and contextualize this meditation as a modern day 
tantric yoga meditation.  
 Given that extant literature pertaining to yoga spans at least 2500 years, I needed 
to identify material that would best describe traditional tantric yoga understandings of 
absorptive meditation as a reference for allowing me to analyze modern interpretations of 
the tantric yoga ishvara pranidhana meditation. I consulted with Asian Studies experts in 
the areas of Sanskrit and Indian religious literature about what sources to read and how to 
choose fundamental and comparison criteria. As I began reading primary material, I 
surveyed Indian literature for texts known to deal specifically with yoga and searched 
these texts for relevant data to yield a perspective on traditional and classical 
understandings of yoga, including tantric yoga. 
I narrowed my selection to yoga material that emphasized mental or cognitive 
processes which could help me locate yoga practice and theory in the body. The main 
criterion for the selection of the evidence presented in this chapter was whether the data 
or information from the texts could potentially relate either obviously to the body, or 
perhaps less clearly relate to the body, but nevertheless to psychological processes 
studied in cognitive and related neuroscience fields pertaining to meditative 
transformation. In other words, when examining the sources I searched for evidence 
within these texts that suggested me ways of localizing yoga philosophy and practice in 
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the body and/or in psychological processes having possible neurobiological substrates. 
For example, since evidence from neuroimaging studies of the brain during meditation 
suggest that brain areas underlying attention, memory, and emotion play a significant role 
in meditation, I looked for evidence of yogic processes and experiences relating to these 
functions. I also analyzed how the yoga literature uses the terms “yoga,” “meditation,” 
and “tantra.” In addition to primary source material, I gathered scholarship on traditional 
and modern perspectives on tantric yoga that met my selection and analytical criteria. The 
overarching focus remained on theories of mind and body that elucidate mental processes 
of tantric yoga meditation. 
This chapter focuses on what the tantric philosophy of nondualism means in terms 
of understanding the mind, body, and meditation, thus on the cognitive processes 
involved in the shift from a normal waking state of awareness to meditative 
consciousness. Specifically, this chapter draws from traditional yogic psychological 
theories that localize ishvara pranidhana in the body, and thus elaborates on the theme of 
embodiment. Because this practice of ishvara pranidhana is claimed to be a tantric yoga 
practice, discussions of psychological transformations most prominently draw from 
Classical Yoga and Tantra to shape the practice and theory of meditation. For example, 
Anandamurti’s modern concept employs the yogic concepts of cittavrtti (mental 
fluctuation or propensity), samskara (reactive momenta or subliminal impression), klesha 
(force of corruption), and gunas (binding forces) from Classical Yoga, and tantric 
concepts of the yogic body including kundalini (dormant spiritual energy), chakra 
(energy centers), tattvas (elements), and nadis (energy channels). As these elements 
derive from Patanjali’s classical Yoga Sutra and medieval tantric yoga texts, I have 
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selected the latter as my primary Classical Yoga text; I will also draw selectively from 
scholarship on a small number of tantric texts that are particularly useful for further 
clarification.  
Because “the rudiments” (Eliade, 1958, p. 102) of many of these Classical Yoga 
and tantric concepts derive from Vedic and especially Upanishadic (including Vedantic) 
traditions, my exposition on Classical Yoga includes an examination of a number of 
Upanishads (in particular, the Principal Upanishads and the Yoga Upanishads) and the 
Bhagavad Gita, including the Svetasvatara, Katha, Maitri, and Taittiriya Upanishads 
(Principal Upanishads) because they directly treat yoga.  Most of the scholarship 
presented on Classical Yoga pertains to the Yoga Sutra and Samkhya philosophy insofar 
as Samkhya forms the philosophical basis for yoga. While the Gita is perhaps the most 
famous and well known text about yoga, it is not of much concern to my discussion as 
meditation does not form the emphasis of the Gita.  
My examination then moved to tantric yoga perspectives. For this aspect of the 
process, I drew from contemporary secondary scholarship and not primary sources, 
except as quoted in the secondary works. Effectively then my discussion indirectly draws 
from a number of medieval tantric texts: the Patnatika (around 900 A.D., a Pasupata 
text); Pasupata-sutra (a Pasupata Saivite text); Pancarthabhasya (written by Kaundinya 
around the same time as a commentary to the Pasupata-sutra); Abhinavagupta’s 
Tantraloka (TA) and Tantrasara (both tenth-century Kashmir Saivite texts); the 
Malinivijayottara (MVT) (the source of the TA and also a Kashmir Saivite text); 
Ksemaraja’s Sivasutravimarsini (SSuV) (an early eleventh-century Kashmiri Saivite text 
on the science of mantras); Yoginihrdaya (YH) (Kashmiri Tantric tradition); Bhutasuddhi 
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Tantra (a Nath Siddha text); and the Hatha yogapradipika (a fifteenth-century text 
written by Svatmaraman).  
The classical models of tantric yoga also appear in contemporary scholarship on 
the phenomenon of modern yoga as translations of traditional interpretations of yoga 
from the late eighteenth century to the present. Subsequently, the complete English 
translations of discourses and writings by Anandamurti were also examined for evidence 
concerning meditation concepts and mental processes to explain ishvara pranidhana. I 
considered how these concepts relate to primary texts through direct references or 
conceptual links, and I also had numerous interviews and conversations with teachers 
initiated into Anandamurti’s method of tantric yoga principally for the discussion in the 
next chapter, on the emic perspective on ishvara pranidhana as a modern day tantric 
yoga practice. In this chapter I focus on traditional understandings of the yogic body in 
tantra. 
 
Ishvara Pranidhana in Patanjali’s Yoga Sutra and Classical Yoga 
A number of scholars highlight the prominence of ishvara in the Yoga Sutra (YS) 
(after this I will refer to the Yoga Sutra as YS) (e.g., Eliade, 1958; Oberhammer, 1989; 
Pfluger, 2005; Connolly, 2007). Several sutras in this text refer to the practice of ishvara 
pranidhana as a means to the transformational undertaking of the yogic praxis (Whicher, 
1997). Pfleuger (2005, p. 32) provides support for investigating ishvara pranidhana in 
this regard, suggesting that “we may judge that attaining pure consciousness through 
ishvara is the means par excellence [of yoga], due to the unusual attention of [seven 
sutras to] this one meditative technique.” This means that a person meditating (yogin) 
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who relates to ishvara (god) participates in a critical action or event (though there are 
also others) needing analysis for understanding absorption through meditation.  
In Yoga, Immortality, and Freedom, Eliade (1958) writes that unlike Samkhya, 
the Classical Yoga of Patanjali accepts the existence of god. Pfleguer (2005) concurs that 
theism in the form of ishvara in the YS is the cornerstone of its worldview. Also 
recognizing the theism in the YS, Oberhammer (1989) describes the method of ishvara 
pranidhana as a theistic yoga practice. Eliade (1958, p. 75) tells us that Patanjali, by 
admitting ishvara (god) into his explication on yoga, acknowledges “a whole series of 
experiences that had been made possible by the single process of concentration on 
ishvara” that he could not neglect. Connolly (2007, p. 37) further explains that ishvara 
(god) provides the ideal focus for the attention of yogins because by contemplating 
ishvara (god) the meditating yogin “will gradually realize his own nature is just like that 
of ishvara [god].” This sort of single minded concentration in yoga is called ekagrata 
(Eliade, 1958). Thus key to yogic absorption is the mental process central to ishvara 
pranidhana meditation or the cultivation of ekagrata on ishvara. 
The caveat, though, is that such a realization comes by the “grace” of ishvara 
(god). Thus Eliade (1958) identifies experiences of ekagrata as “mystical,” and goes on 
to contrast this “mystical” tradition of yoga against the “magical” liberative path by 
which the practitioner attains the samadhi by will and personal power alone. The project 
at hand is to explicate the “mystical” process(es) found in YS that lead(s) to an 
experiential (as opposed to empirical) insight into the nature of reality and the nature of 
one’s own self. In this spiritual context, ishvara pranidhana is conceptualized in terms of 
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self- or god-realization, depending, to some extent, on the socio-historical era of yoga; 
more is said about this in the next chapter.  
This understanding, it should be clarified, while accepted for the present 
argument, is not trying to represent the idea of meditative consciousness having a 
“mystical” quality as universally accepted. Phillips (1985), for example, questions 
Eliades’s mystical reading of the YS, asserting that some of the ideas could not be 
empirical, even mystically empirical. He goes on to argue that even if the mystical 
psychology of YS were phenomenologically sound, the character of many YS claims are 
concerned (wrongly) with supporting the dualistic theory. In this sense, the claims seem 
to more reflect the nature of yogic “experience.” Thus, there are arguments that the YS 
should be regarded more as a work of speculative metaphysics, or at least equally as a 
work of mysticism.  
However, mystical accounts of meditative absorption could be interpreted as 
experiential or phenomenological rather than asserting veridical claims about the 
empirical nature of self and reality. Along these lines, Flood (2006) argues that tantric 
texts, especially those with instructions regarding yogic practices, were intended to be 
used and interpreted in the context of praxis and not for philosophical insights into the 
nature of the world. This alternative interpretation – that is, that the yogic model reflects 
the phenomenological reality of meditative phenomena – is the view I wish to develop 
here. This is not to say, however, that experiential knowledge should bear no 
metaphysical implications. Quite to the contrary; and theories of the mind in the 
intersections between science and meditative absorption carry an implication central to 
my comparison between these same two systems. 
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Relational Dynamics and Gaining the Qualities of Ishvara 
To understand the mental processes involved in the phenomenology of yogic 
trance induced through the practice of ishvara pranidhana (and the underlying 
neuroscience) the mental processes of meditation and yogic praxis must first be seen, as 
explained above, to occur in the context of the yogin relating to ishvara. First of all, what 
value and benefit this relational dynamic might have for the practitioner should be 
examined to understand what motivates practitioners to enter into such a relationship.  
Chapple (1994), and others (e.g., Eliade, 1958; Whicher, 1997; Connolly, 2007), point to 
YS 2.15-2.17 as a pivotal and defining feature of the meditation process. This passage 
highlights how life is suffering, and by practicing yoga (e.g., the practice of ishvara 
pranidhana) one can overcome suffering. Thus, overcoming suffering is the liberative 
goal of yoga. Furthermore, the mental processes of ishvara pranidhana meditation can be 
understood as something that happens within the person through this relational dynamic, 
because it is by relating to ishvara the person gains the qualities of ishvara. Thus, it is by 
gaining these qualities that the person is relieved of suffering.  
Pfleuger (2005) points to YS 1.24 to define what these qualities are and how one 
relates or develops them, as a special or particular kind or instance of Self or purusa. This 
purusa is distinct and separate from all other individual purusa-s because ishvara is 
neither ignorant, nor bound. In Eliade’s (1958, p. 74) words, “ishvara is a purusa that has 
been free since all eternity.” Pursuit of ishvara and the concomitant freedom from 
constraints of materiality thus plays a central role in the goal of yoga.  
In a metaphysical sense, the individual purusa (personal spirit or consciousness) 
practices yoga to be free from the bonds (gunas) of prakrti (matter) because they create 
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suffering. It seems possible therefore to analyze the relational dynamics between the 
meditator and ishvara as the object of meditation on at least two levels: the psychological 
(or personal) and the cosmological, roughly analogous to normal concepts of self and 
world, or self and god. The psychological level pertains to the mental processes of 
meditation that come from concentrating one’s attention and all of one’s mental and 
emotional resources on ishvara, while the cosmological level relates to the reality of 
ishvara.  
However, a closer consideration of the reality of ishvara and the state of 
absorption as understood from the yogic perspective suggests that seeing the meditator 
and ishvara on these two levels (personal and cosmological) is not consistent with the 
worldview of yoga, and especially the nondualism of tantric yoga. The reality of ishvara 
is subjective, and not an objective “element” or “being” that is “out there.” The reality of 
ishvara is omnipresent. This means that ishvara also exists within each person and any 
distinctions between the self and an “other” (e.g., ishvara) do not exist except for 
experientially in a moment when a person is unaware of the presence of ishvara. What it 
means for the meditator to gain the qualities of ishvara is to gain this state of freedom 
from the normal boundedness that, in of itself, generates the separations and distinctions 
that yield the sense of self and cosmos.  
Being in a state of a certain quality of unboundedness reflects the yogic state of 
absorption (samadhi) and the unbinding process is tied into the mental processes of 
memory (samskara) that will be explored throughout this chapter. A third process of 
Samadhi, or how mantra recitation generates the “mystical” effect in the mind, is then 
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discussed and explicated through the lens of tantric yoga to analyze this process in terms 
of how the technique itself works.  
In addition to examining the context of the individual relating to ishvara, there is 
the socio-historical context that shapes how mental processes of meditation are 
understood, another important context. The qualities and reality attributed to ishvara as 
the particular purusa at the focus of ishvara pranidhana depend on the stream of yoga 
under consideration.  
The point of this discussion is that the relational dynamic between the meditator 
and the object of meditation, i.e., ishvara (god), generates the basis of the meditator’s 
perceptions about his own experience (that can be constituted in suffering or not) and 
identity. Specifically, the idea is that ishvara pranidhana in the Yoga Sutra is about 
concentrating the mind on ishvara or god, and generally that concentration is a vital and 
necessary step in any meditation method.  
Naturally, questions arise about the reality of ishvara and how meditation 
processes help the meditator gain qualities of ishvara by the meditative act of relating to 
ishvara, thereby alleviating suffering. At the least, ishvara pranidhana leads to a state 
characterized by qualities (or feelings) of freedom, unboundedness, purity, and 
knowledge.  
In the next chapter, Anandamurti’s particular method of ishvara pranidhana will 
be explored, particularly for its definition and analysis of mantra, which lies at the heart 
of his method. The role of mantra in concentrating the mind and enabling access to the 
reality of ishvara also will be treated later in this chapter, and then again as a theme in 
part three where it is discussed in the tantric yoga tradition in comparison with the 
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neuroscience concepts of attention, memory, and emotion. First, the reality of ishvara and 
thus the state of absorption that one enters into during ishvara pranidhana must be 
examined in tantric yoga meditation as presented in the classical literature.  
 
Traditional Views of Tantric Yoga Meditation and States of Absorption 
Anandamurti claims that his twentieth century meditation method of ishvara 
pranidhana is a tantric yoga practice. Elements or strains of traditional tantra and yoga 
that appear identifiable in ishvara pranidhana practice have been found in Classical 
Yoga’s main text, the Yoga Sutra. To understand the second mental process, samskara 
(“memory trace” or memory from the etic perspective), and then the third mental process 
of samadhi (“absorption” or what parallels emotion from the etic perspective in this 
comparison) it is necessary to examine these tantric yoga perspectives. This section is 
thus dedicated to the mental processes involved in tantric yoga meditation from 
traditional perspectives: samskara and samadhi.  
Readers might note that this sort of approach that examines different streams of 
the yoga tradition can leave one wondering what it is that makes yoga “yoga.” Is there 
some aspect of yoga that transpires or remains recognizable among the various yoga 
traditions? I believe that the mechanical transformations of yogic praxis as described in 
the Classical Yoga literature come about during any method that is yogic in nature. 
Because of this extension, we can infer that the mechanisms described in the Yoga Sutra 
are there in any yogic practice, potentially regardless of socio-cultural and historical 
contexts in which yoga is practiced. If we accept that there is this enduring timeless 
quality or condition, then this recognition gives my analysis of tantric yoga some 
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continuity, and thus illuminates our understanding of what makes yoga “yoga.” Thus one 
might assume that some core yoga processes apply regardless of what yoga tradition is 
being examined. 
Now that we have understood that there are certain mechanical happenings that 
function as the enduring quality of yogic praxis embedded within any socio-cultural or 
historical rendering of yoga, we will turn to examine the basic mechanistic dynamics of 
yogic praxis in greater detail with a special focus on explicating the second yogic process 
of samskara (memory trace). 
 
The Mind 
To understand meditation from the yogic perspective, one must see the function 
of mind (citta) as reflecting consciousness within the material world. This view draws 
from the Samkhya metaphysical philosophy (Larson, 1969). In any mental state, citta 
(mind) fluctuates reflecting how purusa (consciousness) interacts with or permeates the 
phenomenal world. These mental fluctuations are known in yoga as cittavrtti or mental 
processes (Eliade, 1958; Miller, 1995). They (cittavrtti) may be like waves in a storm, 
ripples on a lake, or the stillness of a pond; the degree of fluctuation differently affects 
the perceptual processes because such activity of the mind colors how an individual 
perceives the world. Whereas with a totally clear mind one will recognize the reflection 
of consciousness (purusa, or ishvara as a special type of purusa) as one’s true identity, 
during fluctuations, one will identify with those objects or qualities as perceived. By 
practicing yogic techniques, an individual can quiet the fluctuations to the point where 
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the citta (mind) can clearly reflect purusa (consciousness). Thus Eliade explains that in 
yogic states, one recognizes one’s own ultimate identity, the spiritual goal of yogic life. 
 
The Mechanisms of Meditation: Yogic Praxis in the Yoga Sutra of Classical Yoga 
Chapple (1994, pp. 97-98) suggests that Patanjali “substitutes his own philosophy 
of kleshas, samskaras, and vasanas [a type of samskara]” for the subtle body or mind so 
clearly emphasized in Samkhya. Because this subtle body is subsequently further 
developed in tantra and elaborated with notions of chakra, nadis, and kundalini, it might 
be inferred, too that these “subtle body” features described by Patanjali (e.g., kleshas, 
samskaras, etc.) could operate during practice within the tantric body. Thus, these 
“mechanics” – that is, the transformation or change processes of yoga praxis - are what I 
have in mind when I talk about the mechanics of the tantric yoga meditation method of 
ishvara pranidhana.  
These mechanical transformations of the mind are the description of the yogic 
process. The YS implies that this process applies to any yogic method; therefore, logically 
this includes ishvara pranidhana and it follows that any tradition that integrates yoga into 
it necessarily imports these mechanics, since these mechanics are what constitute the core 
of yogic transformation. The only question would be whether the technique or method at 
issue was “really” yoga. When I talk about the tantric tradition of yoga later in this 
section, I am building on the basic mechanics of yoga, and assuming that the tantric yoga 
methods of medieval India were, indeed, yoga. The philosophy and methods changed in 
important ways, but this basic core mechanical process of the mind remains as yoga, 
meant here in the “process” sense.  
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Whicher (2005) offers a detailed explanation of the samskara process in which he 
explains that for yoga, mind (citta) is where all the cognitive, affective, and emotive 
processes take place. According to Samkhya-Yoga philosophy (Eliade, 1958; Larson, 
1969), all of the manifestations and mechanical activities of the mind (citta) come within 
the realm of prakrti or matter, and thus because they occur within an individual mind 
during meditation, we can imagine that they occur within citta within the matter of the 
body. According to yoga (Eliade, 1958), an individual’s collection of samskaras plays a 
major role in individual identity and sense of self. This collection of mental impressions 
that drives actions is regulated through the production of different kinds of samskara 
through any action including meditation. Whicher (2005) explains that the Yoga Sutra 
(YS 3.9) asserts that there are two kinds of samskara: externalizing samskara, which 
leads to an afflicted sense of self-identity, what Whicher calls one’s karmic identity, and 
interiorizing samskaras, which lead to nirodha (cessation) of the externalizing processes 
of the mind and to liberative states. Ultimately nirodha leads to realization of one’s 
intrinsic identity as purusa. Because people engage in most actions in ordinary states of 
mind in which one perceives oneself as separate from the world, most actions generate 
karmic samskaras, or those samskaras that bind and constrict the mind, as opposed to 
liberating it. In contrast to ordinary states of awareness, states of absorption generate 
liberative samskaras, and, as explained below, this alleviates suffering.  
 
Patterns of Mental Fluctuation and Quiet 
The Yoga Sutra 1.5-1.11 enumerates five patterns of mental fluctuations that all 
operate to color yogic perception (Feuerstein, 1979). Valid cognition (pramana), error 
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(viparyaya), conceptualization (vikalpa), sleep (nidra), and memory (smrti) are the main 
cittavrttis or modifications (processes) of the mind. These are the modes through which 
the mind reflects pure consciousness. While this list is not exhaustive of all possible 
mental processes, it does outline major or broad categories within which most if not all 
mental processes would fall (Whicher, 1998). These processes reflect consciousness and, 
according to yoga, individuals identify with these reflective mental activities in ordinary 
waking consciousness.  
Valid cognition is central for understanding both ordinary states of mind and 
yogic perception attained in meditation - it is the mental process that must be attained to 
achieve yoga. Perception, inference, and valid testimony are all different forms or ways 
of knowing when one has valid cognition (YS, 1.7). More is said later in this chapter 
about valid cognition. 
Error, a second main mental process (cittavrtti), occurs when one’s cognition or 
understanding does not correspond to reality. According to yoga, the primary cognition at 
issue is an individual’s identification with the activity of the mind. This is because 
identification with mental activity (rather than some deeper reality) engenders a false 
sense of self. In such a state of (false, according to yoga) identification, one’s identity is 
incorrectly defined within the individuated psychophysical being or personality complex 
and not according to the unbound nature of the spiritual self (atman) (Whicher, 1997). 
The important yoga concept of mental affliction (klesha) comes into play under this 
mental process because Vyasa (YB 1.8, as described by Whicher) equates this sort of 
cognitive error with ignorance (avidya). Avidya is the fundamental affliction of the mind 
(klesha), and most basic error of wrongly identifying with reflected consciousness. This 
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“ignorant” perception of separateness between the phenomenal world and spirit is a 
cognitive error of a mistaken conviction about one’s identity. It is from this core 
affliction that other kleshas (mental afflictions) arise, including our mistaken identity as 
an individual, egoic the sense of “I-am-ness” (asmita) (Whicher, 1998). From a mistaken 
identity one develops three other afflictions, as well: attachment, aversion, and the desire 
for continuity. Together, these five conditions, both singularly and collectively, are all the 
basic groundwork of the afflicted personality. More will be said shortly about these 
afflictions (kleshas). 
A third cittavrtti is the mental process of conceptualization. Conceptualization 
occurs when an idea rooted in verbal knowledge does not correspond to an actual object, 
but is different from error because it can serve a useful function for cognition. De Wit 
(1991) writes about the conceptualized experience of me in a way that I think shows a 
nuanced relationship between the affliction of “I-am-ness” with cognition. When 
operating out of egoic consciousness, one considers oneself in ways that might not match 
with reality. De Wit also writes about “two types of knowing” conceptual vs. non-
conceptual, supporting the notion of yogic perception existing outside of the normal 
mental processes since, Patanjali suggests, during yoga, such as the practice of 
meditation, conceptualization processes cease to function. In addition to this core 
epistemological value, vikalpa (conceptualization) is also important in meditation for 
strengthening and focusing the mind; for example, during meditation one focuses on the 
concept of a higher or spiritual self.  
Sleep (nidra) is also named as a primary cittavrtti (YS 1.6; 1.10). Feuerstein 
(1998) explains that for yoga, the transcendent self witnesses the contents of 
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consciousness that occur even during sleep states. Thus, meditation must somehow 
“intercept” the flux of ordinary mental activity even in this state. Feuerestein, like others, 
also explains that sleep is due to a prevalence of tamas the guna (or binding force) 
dominated by the quality of inertia that is overcome through meditative practice. 
Lastly, Patanjali names memory (smrti) as one of the five main types of mental 
activity that cease to function during yoga. Smrti is a recollection of past events or 
experiences. One of the important relevant notions about cognition in the form of smrti is 
that in yoga, memory is not considered as a valid source of pramana (knowledge) 
because, as Larson (1993) explains, the causal conditions that produced the previous 
experiences – which are stored as memories - are not necessary for a reproduction. 
Although not pramayana (knowledge), smrti (memory) plays a crucial role in cognition, 
such as, for example, in determining the nature and range of cognition (Larson). This 
mental process deserves close examination because of its “sameness in form” with mental 
impressions (samskaras) (YS 4.9), and samskara is in a reciprocal causal relationship 
with all mental processes. 
 
The Build-up of Mental Impressions 
Of central importance to understanding meditation is the idea that experience 
created through activity of any cittavrtti (mental process) leaves impressions in the deep 
structure in the mind (citta), where they await fruition in the form of volitional activity 
(Whicher, 1997). These impressions are known as samskaras and are central to our 
analysis because meditative absorption affects this collection of impressions and thus 
their effect on individual experience and action. Thus the processes surrounding 
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samskara comprise the second mental process. Memory (smrti), one of the patterns of 
cittavrtti (mental processing), plays a special role in the generation and extinction of 
mental impressions, because mental impressions (samskaras) result in memories (smrti), 
and memories themselves generate their own impressions (samskaras) (Whicher, 2005; 
YB 1.5 p. 10 Vyasa). Whicher explains that a cyclical causal relationship exists between 
memories (smrtis) and mental impressions (samskaras), and, in fact, between samskaras 
and all mental processes. Each generates and feeds the other, thereby sustaining mental 
life. 
 
The Cycle of Mental Impressions and Pain 
Another idea that is central to understanding the soteriological purpose of ishvara 
pranidhana meditation is that cittavrttis can be either painful (klista) or non painful 
(aklista), depending on whether the impressions (samskaras) internalize or externalize 
consciousness. The cittavrttis (mental processes) involved in sustaining an ordinary sense 
of self are known in yoga as klista-vrtti because pain and affliction characterize these 
mental processes. In contrast to these, aklista-vrttis are characterized by the absence of 
pain. YS 2.15-2.17 claim that yoga can alleviate the suffering of klista-vrttis. How can 
one understand the nature of non-painful mental states within the yoga system, and 
especially how meditation aids in the creation of unafflicted mental conditions that are 
essential for psychological well-being?  
Vyasa explains that painful mental processes (klista-vrtti) are caused by kleshas 
(Whicher, 1998). The concept of kleshas has been translated as both the “forces of 
corruption” (Miller) and the “causes of affliction” (Feuerstein), and kleshas express 
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themselves in any of the five modes of consciousness (cittavrtti). Patanjali (Yoga Sutra 
2.3) identifies and defines five kleshas: ignorance (avidya), egoism (aham or asmita), 
attachment (raga), aversion (dvesa), and the will to live (abhinivesa) (Miller, 1995). 
These kleshas encapsulate the psychological behaviors leading to suffering. Feuerstein 
(1979) explains that kleshas are basic motivational forces that prompt or motivate a 
person to act, think, and feel. Whenever any of the forces of corruption operate, this 
activity creates the five modes of mind (cittavrttis), and activity of cittavrtti is precisely 
what yoga seeks to quiet during meditation and other yogic means.  
The first klesha, known as avidya, or ignorance, is “the field where the other 
forces of corruption develop, whether dormant, attenuated, intermittent, or active” 
(Miller, 1995). The Sanskrit word avidya means ignorance. In a waking state, a person is 
in a state of consciousness whereby the mind is having a thought or, often, many 
thoughts. As will be reviewed in chapter five, neuroscience agrees with this concept. 
Numerous studies of subjects in waking states reveal that ordinary perception is often 
quite flawed, and the yogic concept of avidya reflects this state of mistaken perception. 
The mind is aware of objects in the world, and has the consciousness of self as separate 
from those objects. Thus in a state of avidya, the individual exists within the 
epistemological condition of a subject-object duality. Avidya (ignorance) of the nature of 
one’s mind as material and that Brahman (ultimate reality) exists as the principle of 
consciousness, which guides movements from the subtle to the crude (Anandamurti, 
1959). In other words, the force of avidya (ignorance) pulls away from the “cosmic hub,” 
instead of moving closer to it, which is the movement of meditation’s spiritual progress 
(Anandamurti). So whereas Brahman as the cosmic hub is an attractive force, avidya 
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(ignorance) is the repelling force. The mind’s pulling away from experiencing absorption 
in and cognitive identification with Atman is caused by its attraction to the sensory and 
phenomenal world. The experienced state of avidya causes the perception of separateness 
since the person identifies with the turnings of his or her own thoughts instead of with the 
Atman as the true core self.  
When attention is turned out into the world, this worldly input can overwhelm the 
nervous system and can also bind the mind with rajas and tamas, leading to negative 
psychological experiences and psychological “blocks.” An individual’s feeling of “I-am-
ness” results from one’s ego and this sense of self is constructed by the mental processes. 
Resulting from the wrong identification with phenomenal consciousness, the sense of “I 
am-ness” carries with it the false belief that one exists as a conscious being in separation 
from other entities. Meditation seeks to sublimate the “I” feeling, by concentrating on the 
spiritual nature of oneself, rather than the perceptions of separateness that mark one as 
distinct from the rest of perceived reality. This perceptual experience of separateness 
from purusa, or spirit, stems from a false identification with the phenomenonal world is 
based on sensory experience because sense contact with objects perturbs the mental field 
of citta creating impressions (samskaras) deep within the mind, and this vibratory 
perturbance creates samskaras, or subliminal impressions. These subliminal impressions 
(samskaras) are central to any cognitive experience. 
Two further kleshas arising from errant mental process and from the mind 
existing in a state of spiritual ignorance are attraction and aversion. Misidentification 
with the phenomenal world (avidya) leads to core affective processes of attachment to 
and aversion from objects in the perceived realm, and both cause suffering (avidya) 
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(Miller, 1995; YS 2.24). These afflictions occur when an individual’s “I-am-ness” 
controls action. Whicher (1997) points out that attraction and aversion are the “emotive 
core” of the yogic concept of affliction, signifying an affective dimension to thought 
(vrtti). 
Lastly, the final affliction arising from this state of spiritual ignorance (avidya) in 
which an individual perceives one’s self as separate from the rest of the world, is an 
existential anxiety that occurs when one feels vulnerable to extinction. The will to live 
(the fifth klesa) is one’s desire for continuity (abhinivesa), stemming from avidya – a 
misunderstanding of spiritual identity – and egotistical attachment to one’s life in the 
form of the present body and conditions. One notices all around oneself the 
impermanence of worldly existence, that objects in the world do not last. When one’s 
own identity is individuated in an egotistical sense of I-am-ness rooted in worldly 
existence, a gripping sense of anxiety overcomes the mind because one recognizes that 
one’s self will come to an end. Prajnana (insight) or yogic perception of one’s eternal 
inner nature satisfies this desire and allows one to let go of the fear of extinction. 
Together, these afflictions (kleshas) provide a cognitive-motivational framework for the 
ordinary person enmeshed in a conditioned existence and unaware of purusa. 
 
Meditation Eliminates the Cycle of Mental/Emotional Pain 
As the core affliction, avidya or identification with the “turnings of thought” is the 
cause of any of various cittavrttis; however, through yoga, awareness of the mind’s 
activity is cultivated so that the yogin “awakens” to the reality of purusa (spirit or 
consciousness) and this awakened awareness counters the (false) perception of 
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separateness of self from the world. Anandamurti (1962) explains this relationship 
between the concepts of klesha and cittavrtti in terms of dependence, in that the kleshas 
are dependent on various psychic propensities (vrttis), especially the propensity of 
defective cognition. For example, kleshas can arise in memory, sleep, cognitive error, 
conceptualization, or valid inferences, thus there is also a cyclical relationship between 
kleshas and cittavrttis. 
Whicher (1998) takes issue with Feuerstein’s assertion that all mental activity is 
ex hypothesi engendered by the kleshas, and proceeds through a careful analysis of 
classical writers Vijnana Bhiksu, Vacaspati, Vacaspati Mishra, Ramananda Yati, and 
Bhoja Raja who all support the position that Whicher argues: that aklista-vrttis do not 
result in affliction. Whicher shows that this insight into the unafflicted nature of aklista 
(non-painful) mental processes comes from recognition of “the soteriological purpose of 
vrtti,” which is to lead to liberated knowledge (jnana) (YS 2.28). Thus, while klista 
(affliction) characterizes ordinary mental states, the cycle of causality between klesha - 
klisti vrtti – klesha can be shifted to the generation of aklista-vrttis (unafflicted mental 
processes).                   
The central tenet of yoga’s path to psychological well-being is that mere 
awareness that cittavrttis are impermanent states of consciousness and not central to 
one’s identity liberates one from attachment to the mind’s destructive activity (Eliade, 
1958; Feuerstein, 1979). In this way, the mind is freed from its afflictions and 
consequently resides in a state of peacefulness. Whicher (2005) explains that overcoming 
klista-vrttis (painful mental fluctuation) of an afflicted identity and sense of self is the 
process of yogic transformation and this path begins when one attempts to recognize 
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one’s own real identity. Thus, he argues, samskaras are centrally important to identity not 
only because they contribute to the mechanism of our karmic identity (and its 
entanglement within prakrti or matter), but because they have a role in spiritual liberation 
as well.  
Directing the Mind Inward. 
Suffering also relates to a causal relationship between the samskara (or 
impressions stored in the mind) and cittavrtti (or the mental processes of the mind). For 
yoga, the cyclical causality of afflicted mental processes is driven by mental impressions 
(samskaras) accumulated through phenomenal consciousness, that is, when 
consciousness is directed outward into the world, impressions in these states of 
consciousness generate karmic samskara. This cyclical causality usually produces karmic 
samskara when the samskara drives consciousness outward, or produces liberative 
samskara, as is the case for ishvara pranidhana during states of absorption when the 
samskaras drive consciousness inward. Thus, impressions that externalize consciousness 
lead to afflicted self-identity while impressions that internalize consciousness lead to 
mental quiet and recognition of one’s own intrinsic identity as ishvara (a special type of 
purusa). 
Whicher (2005) goes on to note that, once generated, impressions or samskaras 
also have internal currents or a flow of their own, currents that influence or affect a 
person’s intentional and volitional nature. This idea supports Anandamurti’s definition of 
samskara as “reactive momentum.” Feuerstein (1990, p. 309) calls samskaras “highly 
dynamic forces … [that] constantly propel consciousness [i.e., an individual] into action.” 
Thus Feuerstein’s description of mental impressions similarly evokes the idea of 
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samskaras as having movement. What propels this movement (from externally to 
internally directed consciousness, and vice versa)? To explain this aspect of mental 
functioning, Anandamurti draws from yoga’s metaphysical system. 
Whicher (1998) explains that the concept of samskara is explained by the notion 
of seed or bija, which can denote the afflictions (klesas). According to Anandamurti 
(1959), the primary affliction avidya (ignorance) guides movements from the subtle to 
the crude. In other words, the force of avidya (ignorance) pulls the mind away from the 
“cosmic hub,” which is purusa (spirit) or Brahma (ultimate reality), instead of moving 
closer to it. The mind’s pulling away from experiencing absorption in and cognitive 
identification with atman is caused by its attraction to the sensory and phenomenal world; 
i.e., its drive to experience the world. In contrast to the externalizing movement of 
samskara drawn by the affliction of ignorance, the movement of meditation’s spiritual 
progress is a centripetalization, a movement towards the center. So whereas avidya 
(ignorance) is the repelling force away from consciousness, Brahman as the “cosmic 
hub” is an attractive force, that is, Brahman attracts the mind (Anandamurti). As for the 
location of this cosmic hub, for yoga, Anandamurti explains that there is no one single 
permanent location of Brahman (ultimate reality) purusa or consciousness bounded by 
time and space. Instead, consciousness is believed to be everywhere always existing. 
Consciousness is an attribute of reality, of existence itself. The extent that an individual’s 
mind clearly reflects consciousness in its processes (in the sense of pure or cosmic 
consciousness) determines the degree of freedom from the klista-vrttis of suffering, or, in 
other words, the degree of psychological well-being. 
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Binding and Freeing the Mind. 
 This whole psychological process of yogic praxis is grounded in a Samkhya-Yoga 
metaphysical emanation theory that is differently interpreted in various yoga traditions.  
A main idea to glean from this theory as it bears on understanding the mental processes 
of samskara during meditation hinges on Samkhya’s idea that there are three cosmic 
forces that variously bind matter (prakrti): the gunas (binding forces) (Larson, 1969). 
Like all aspects within the realm of prakrti, Whicher (2005) explains that samskaras are 
under the influence of the three binding forces (gunas) that regulate the qualities of 
worldly existence as they operate within the person’s mind: sattva guna, rajas guna, and 
tamas guna. The Bhagavad-Gita (chapter 14, especially 14.5-14.18) describes various 
qualities of the gunas. Swami Rama (1972) explains that sattva is the quality of clarity 
and luminosity, bringing peace, calm and serenity; rajas is the quality of activity, it is 
active and full of desires, attachments, and enjoyments; and tamas  is the quality of 
dullness and staticity, producing inertia, confusion, delusion, and ignorance. These forces 
rule every quality within the realm of prakrti (Larson, 1969), and this includes the 
qualities of mental states. In the realm of the mind, for example, Whicher (1997, 1998, 
2005) explains that tamas and rajas gunas dominate the externalizing samskaras 
(impressions) and mental processes (cittavrttis), while internalizing impressions and 
mental processes are under the influence of sattva guna – the sentient quality that brings 
clarity. He explains that the binding forces of the three gunas generate the painful or 
pain-free states associated with klista or aklista cittavrtti (mental processes). As discussed 
above, the goal of yoga is the cessation of the kleshas that operate within an afflicted 
identity and are held in place by the forces of the gunas (Whicher, 2005). Yogic practices 
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such as ishvara pranidhana meditation cultivate the cessation of the tamasic and rajasic 
influence over the meditator’s psychophysical being, such that the sattvic qualities of 
clarity and luminosity come to dominate the mind. Anandamurti explains that this is the 
purificatory dimension of practice. Yogic techniques purify the mind of the klista-vrttis 
(painful mental processes), vasanas (habit patterns), and samskaras (reactive momentum) 
that all hold in place the worldly identification via the binding force of tamas and rajas. 
No longer under the tamasic and rajasic forces, the mind ceases its externalizing 
direction, and, under the sway of sattva, switches course to instead move “inwardly” 
towards Brahma, the “cosmic hub.” In this way, the mind is brought to a state that can 
clearly reflect the light of consciousness (purusa). In this purified state, the mind is 
rooted in knowledge; knowledge of oneself as essentially spiritual permeates awareness. 
Thus, for yoga, psychological well-being is tied into cosmic processes and depends on 
how the gunas bind an individual’s worldly or spiritual experience within the mind 
(citta).  
According to Samkhya-Yoga philosophy, these cosmic forces rule “the 
emergence or process of evolution of the manifest world [prakrti]” that occurs only by 
“the fact of the presence or proximity of purusa [spirit or consciousness]” (Larson, 1969, 
pp. 192-193). Larson explains how the gunas regulate the successive emergence from 
prakrti of the various aspects of the mind, intellect, etc., and then the five tattvas 
(elements), all forming the progressively cruder forms of the material substance of 
prakrti (matter). The Classical Yoga literature picks up from this point to explain the 
involution process of enlightenment whereby each of these entities progressively 
withdraws from “cruder” matter or absorbs into the more subtle forms of prakrti. Miller 
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(1995, p. 47) explains this idea as it is expressed in YS 2.10: ‘Reversing their course’ of 
the subtle forces of corruption is a kind of involution, the opposite of evolution.”  
One of the challenges of understanding Classical Yoga scholarship is to reconcile 
the predominantly interpreted dualism of Samkhya that results from the distinction and 
separation between prakrti and purusa, and the phenomenological claims of oneness 
during yogic mystical transcendence of individual consciousness with purusa. One 
potential avenue towards understanding both the metaphysical and phenomenological 
claims is to see Yoga philosophy as non-dual. Anandamurti takes this perspective, for 
example, by claiming that ultimately purusa and prakrti are two sides of the same coin, 
that Brahman is a composite of these two. Thus for Anandamurti, mahat  (a subtle aspect 
of mind) emerges from Brahman (as the composite of both prakrti and purusa) rather 
than from prakrti alone; the rest of the process is similar except that Brahman is 
understood to be merged with all manifested forms rather than just in close proximity. 
From this perspective, which is explored in greater depth in the following pages on tantra, 
the emergence of mahat from Brahman occurs as sattva guna, and comes into dominance 
over the other two gunas.  
In the section on tantra below, we will see that the Samkhya interpretation of 
dualism that posits prakrti (matter) and purusa (spirit) as two separate ontological 
categories contrasts with the medieval tantric yoga interpretation of purusa, called Siva 
(although there are a number of prominent deities in tantra, Siva stands as the highest or 
most predominant (Flood, 2006)), as the singular primary ontological category with an 
emanational relationship to prakrti. Matter emanates or emerges from god (Siva) but is 
never separate from it, instead, there is a “continuous cosmogony” that exists as the 
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manifest world emanates directly from Siva and flows back again (Muller-Ortega, 1992, 
p. 227). Thus, for tantric yoga, the feeling of oneness in samadhi is a state of relatedness 
within the world whereas in Classical Yoga the state of samadhi has been interpreted as a 
state of separateness from the world. 
Another way of focusing the metaphysical system of yoga on psychological 
processes is to examine the shift from discursive to discriminative mental processes. 
Whicher (1998) explains that ordinary mental states, in which consciousness is externally 
directed so as to apprehend the world, are characterized by discursive cognitive mental 
processes. This discursive nature of such processes means that the individual perceives a 
separation between self and the world, what Chapple (1994) calls a subject-object 
epistemology, and this perception underlies suffering. However, shifts in perception of 
self-identity brought about by yogic practice lead to discriminative mental processes in 
which the individual comes to recognize the continuity between self and the world 
(Chapple). Feuerstein (1979, commentary on YS 1.41) explains that these sorts of 
identification processes underlie absorption (samadhi). YS 3.54 suggests that this 
recognition of non duality liberates one from all conditions (Chapple, 1994). Chapple 
explains that when the mind’s processes are more discriminating, perception of reality 
becomes clearer and it is only in such states can the mind discriminate or discern ultimate 
reality. In yoga, this insight of non duality is experienced as oneness because the 
individual sense of self has become absorbed into the sense that one is identified with the 
whole cosmos. Discursive and discriminative mental processes are two types of knowing 
that are examined within each of the mental processes examined in chapter five. Now we 
will examine how various tantric streams view yogic praxis. 
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Tantric Embodiment of Yogic Praxis:  
Explicating Samadhi and Stages of Embodied Absorption 
A central question of this chapter is to examine yoga praxis from the tantric 
perspective. This section has the goal of identifying what makes a yoga practice tantric, 
and what absorption or samadhi means from this perspective. These issues are important 
because the typical interpretation of Classical Yoga is that it is a dualist system, and this 
contrasts with the non dual philosophy of tantrism though this is not always the case as 
Yoga is also interpreted in nondualistic terms. What does non dualism mean for the 
cognitive processes of ishvara pranidhana meditation? Here we focus on examining the 
tantric yoga state of samadhi first by probing into the function of mantra. I then consider 
the tantric elements of visualized meaning of mantra in the tantric subtle body by 
examining selected streams of tantric mysticism that all advance an understanding of the 
third mental process of meditation: samadhi or absorption. 
 
Turn to Tantra for Explication about Mantra 
Oberhammer (1989) explains that one of the primary processes of theistic 
meditation is typically mantra recitation (though not always), and, as we have been 
discussing, mantra is a central process to Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana. 
Therefore, let us examine the role of mantra in ishvara pranidhana to see how it helps 
our understanding of the yogic process of samadhi. Samadhi in the YS is about the 
recognition that one’s self is the same as separate consciousness, and the state in which 
the individual consciousness resides in that separateness (Eliade, 1958; Chapple, 1982; 
Whicher, 1997; Feuerstein, 1998); like other yogic practices, Timalsina (2005) explains, 
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the purpose of mantra is to bring the citta (mind) to rest in its true nature of awareness 
(cit). The individual endeavors to transcend the individuality residing in the body and 
mind, and this effort results in one’s ability to perceive as a witness, to freely roam the 
different mental states without becoming engaged (Timalsina, 2005). Yet mantra is 
thought to intensify yogic practice (Oberhammer, 1989). How do these processes of 
mantra bringing the mind to rest and intensification of practice occur? Perhaps because 
Patanjali’s Yoga is largely a non theistic system, the YS offers quite a limited discussion 
of mantra (Oberhammer, 1989).  
The little that is said about mantra and theistic samadhi in the YS is given in two 
sutras: YS 1.27-1.28. In these two sutras, Patanjali explains that the function of the 
pranava (OM) mantra is to denote god, thus many scholars argue that this is not a 
linguistic function (e.g., Oberhammer, 1989; and see Alper, 1989). Oberhammer (1989, 
pp. 204-205) highlights this issue and claims that “the whole mantra problem and its 
meaning for the act of meditation is brought into focus” in these two sutras: he argues 
that interpreting pranava (the mantra OM or cosmic vibration) as a trivial linguistic 
denotation (as he thinks is the case in the YS 1.27), though, is a mistake. 
Alper (1989) highlights the unresolved issue of the linguisticality of mantra, citing 
Staal as a long time proponent of the position that mantras are alinguistic – that is, 
utterances whose meaning comes from the ritual act rather than any prescribed linguistic 
meaning. However, Alper points out that others, for example himself and Wheelock 
(1989), assume that mantra generally is a linguistic phenomenon, though none argue for 
this position directly and, furthermore, that until someone argues that mantra should 
count as a language then it is futile to demonstrate that any act of mantra is a speech act.  
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Oberhammer (1989, p. 205) highlights the linguistic problem with mantra in the 
YS, that “the relationship between the mantra and god, who is to be realized in the 
meditation … cannot be identical with the linguistic relation between word and its object 
in human language and has to be prior to any linguistic convention.” Thus the pranava 
(OM) has a unique function that differs from the normal function of language in the fact 
that mantra denotes or indicates, rather than predicating, god.  
Pranava (OM mantra), he argues, is actually central to attaining the transcendent 
experience. Perhaps mystical transcendence occurs because, as YS 1.28 indicates, 
repetition of a mantric syllable reveals its meaning (Miller, 1995). Similarly, Timalsina 
(2005, p. 214) suggests that recitation is “nothing less than a means for self-realization.” 
Timalsina clarifies that the issue here is whether japa (mantra recitation) and reflection 
upon its meaning are two separate acts. Timalsina (p. 215) points to YS 1.28 as evidence 
that they are “sufficiently proximate to support the argument that these acts are 
performed together.” Miller’s (1995, p. 36) translates YS 1.28 is as, “Repetition of this 
syllable [AUM] reveals its meaning.” Thus, I agree with Timalsina that in ishvara 
pranidhana that the speech act of mantra comes together with contemplative or reflective 
activity and therefore also with Oberhammer (1989) that the denoting function of mantra 
in the YS is not trivial. Given that ishvara pranidhana is a theistic meditation, the 
contemplation is contemplation of god; the nature of one’s self as god. Oberhammer 
explains that for tantric yoga theistic meditation, muttering mantra is a means for 
constantly thinking of god, and this results in samadhi. Thus one effect of mantra is 
concentration of the mind, and this effect can be understood psychologically in terms of 
concentration as discussed above.  
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However, while at one level the power of mantra can be ascertained as a 
psychological one at the level of purifying the mind, Oberhammer (1989) contends that 
tantra (i.e., the Pasupata tantric text Tatatika 900AD) implies that mantra has an 
objectively operating power. Because, as the YS claims, pranava is not just predicative 
but indicative of god, there is also a mediating factor to mantra. Oberhammer’s reading of 
the Tatatika leads him to see mantras as meditational structures whereby mantra 
meditation affects an actual encounter with god. Thus to some extent samadhi must be 
analyzed theologically (Oberhammer, 1989). But if one interprets the function of mantra 
linguistically, Oberhammer (1989, p. 205) argues that “although not negated,” the 
specific function of mantra cannot be grasped “under the horizon of the understanding of 
purusa in Samkhya.” 
That there are just two sutras in the YS of Classical Yoga that pertain to mantra 
suggests that there is a lack of focus on mantra in the YS. Oberhammer (1989) asserts 
that the YS is limited in its discussion of mantra, especially regarding this denoting 
function and elaborating the alinguisticality of mantra. Similarly, the YS does not address 
the multifold meanings and visualization of mantra, most especially visualizations of 
chakra   within the body while chanting mantras as a specific aspect of ishvara 
pranidhana practice (Timalsina, 2005). Although the orgins of the mystical subtle 
physiology can be found in the late classical Upanishads (White, 1996, p.185), the YS 
does not say anything about chakras. Nor does the YS categorize japa (mantra recitation) 
(Timalsina). Oberhammer (1989) wonders whether Patanjali even made “use of the 
particular function of mantra for the process of meditation.” Thus for our purposes, the 
YS is silent about how mantra catalyzes or propels and sustains the continuance of the 
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meditative (yogic) process – not just the process of using mantra to focus and concentrate 
the mind, but also the process of linking mantra to samskaric liberation during yogic 
practices such as ishvara pranidhana. Therefore, we must turn to tantra to learn more 
about the function of mantra.  
To understand theistic meditation and the deeper meaning and function of mantra, 
Oberhammer (1989) turns to the tantric tradition of the Pasupatas; Timalsina (2005) 
discusses the meditative aspects of mantra-recitation and meaning in Kashmiri tantric 
texts; similarly, Alper (1989) also examines the function of mantra by examining a tantric 
Kashmiri Saiva text; and Muller-Ortega (2005) comments on Abhinavagupta’s 
comparison of his tantric approach to yoga with Patanjali’s Yoga. In his examination of 
Abhinavagupta’s tantric approach to yoga, Muller-Ortega (1989) shows that 
Abhinavagupta directly criticizes Patanjali’s Classical Yoga as an incomplete form of 
spiritual attainment and argues how his own tantric approach to yoga is superior. Thus, 
Muller-Ortega’s analysis reveals ways in which the meaning of yoga changed as a result 
of “theological innovations” of Kashmiri Saivism. He shows that in contrast to the 
dualism of Classical Yoga, Abhinavagupta emphasized not only the theistic nature of 
tantric yoga, but also its proposition of nondualism and devotional intentions, and that 
these are necessary for true attainment of yoga.  
However, I am not sure that Abhinavagupta’s “criticism” of Patanjalian Yoga 
fully applies to Anandamurti’s yoga method of ishvara pranidhana. It has already been 
discussed that Oberhammer (1989) recognizes the theistic pathway of yoga contained in 
the Yoga Sutra via the method of ishvara pranidhana. Bastow (1980) also recognizes the 
theistic nature of ishvara pranidhana in the Yoga Sutra, and goes further to point out the 
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possibility for understanding Classical Yoga as nondual when considering this meditation 
avenue to yoga’s goal of liberation. Note that other scholarship does interpret the Yoga 
Sutras and even Samkhya/ Samkhya-Yoga as nondual (see Larson, 1969 and Feuerstein, 
1979, 1998). Abhinavagupta’s rejection of classically understood yoga seems to be, then, 
more of a rejection of other non theistic aspects emphasized in the Yoga Sutras (perhaps 
such as ashtanga yoga) and the most prevalent interpretations of Classical Yoga as 
presented in commentarial literature. Therefore, I think that Muller-Ortega’s insights 
from Abhinavagupta’s writings about tantric yoga may very well help explicate 
Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana. Later I draw from this tantric yoga 
especially to elucidate the mental processes of meditation. 
Timalsina (2005, p. 221) explains that with tantric meditation, the individual 
endeavors to transcend the individuality residing in the body and mind, and this results in 
his ability to perceive as a witness, to “freely roam the different mental states without 
becoming engaged.” Further, in tantra the non dual state in samadhi “envelops all other 
cognitive modes and is considered beyond mind and speech.” Therefore, in his 
comparison of the relationship between Tantric and Patanjalian Yoga systems that 
focuses on mantra practice, Timalsina concludes that the result of mantra practice is the 
same in both Yoga and tantra: in both systems, practice culminates in self-awareness and 
the end of suffering. He contends that internalization of pranic forces (the prime moving 
forces of the body and universe) and reflection on meaning through inner visualization 
brings the tantric concept of mantra into yogic meditation.  
Timalsina (2005) focuses more on the psychological level in his analysis of how 
the meaning of mantras functions in meditation. In this view, Timalsina draws out the 
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expansion of self-awareness when the meditator’s “I” sense becomes a “mingled form of 
the world and whatever is beyond.” Timalsina notes that in absorptive states, mantras are 
inseparable from reflective awareness, but he does not take his analysis beyond the 
assertion that mantras interact with subjective awareness. I think that this perspective is 
helpful because it takes a broad view of tantra and yoga, focusing on overarching themes 
and goals of practice, but is also limited since it does not penetrate specifics about ritual 
meditation of tantric practice that involves mantra, but not discussed in Yoga texts. 
Although Timalsina recognizes that the meditation practitioner experiences himself as the 
deity because of the act of visualization, it is unclear from his writing how this experience 
occurs. By delving into tantric texts, we are offered more explicit ideas about this 
process. 
Oberhammer (1989) suggests that the mantra possesses an objective power that 
cannot be explained psychologically. He argues that mysticism presupposes that the 
meditator has purified his mind and character from impurity of emotional turmoil and 
moral deficiency by means of conduct and ritual practice, and once this preparatory work 
has been accomplished, the meditator is ready for further events. Timalsina (2005) 
explains that the purpose of japa is to recollect the pure awareness described above in the 
state of samadhi. He builds on the idea that mantras have the nature of expansion and 
contraction to describe expansion as leading to development and blossoming of the 
complete “I” sense, which is “the mingled form of the world and whatever is beyond,” 
(Oberhammer, 1989, p. 217) whereas contraction protects the person. This emersion and 
return supports the elevation of the mind so that it can eventually attain the purest form. 
While the meditator reflects on the true nature of mantra, this action dissolves the power 
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of action into the power of knowledge, then into the power of will, and then back again 
(Timalsina, 2005). 
Oberhammer (1989) speculates that mantras get their effective power only 
through the positive act of god, arguing that power is neither inherent in the nature of 
mantra or can it be treated as a sakti of Siva. Thus mantra is capable of transforming the 
potential of liberation into an event of samadhi, with the caveat that what is mediated has 
a transubjective nature (Oberhammer, 1989). Thus, another effect of mantra is that it 
mediates an individual’s encounter with god.  
Such an encounter is meaningful for the practitioner. But meanings are not 
conveyed by a proposition that is articulated and based on rational reflection, rather, by 
“indications” of god. As we saw above, denotation or indication is the function of a 
mantra; thus, Oberhammer (1989) asserts that mantras (themselves) merge in the concrete 
identity of Siva. This occurs because Siva being OM is his only way of being an object of 
contemplation, which is the cause of the end of suffering. Thus, OM equals god insofar as 
god is present as the OM mantra in the act of contemplation and thus out of his grace 
comes the end of suffering (Oberhammer, 1989). Here it must be restated that ishvara 
pranidhana meditation does not call for the OM mantra to be used, but rather other 
mantra(s). An individual mantra is given to each meditator at the time of initiation. That 
alternative mantras are used during ishvara pranidhana does not matter, because 
Oberhammer (1989) explains that the various forms of mantra meditation successively 
mediate the experience of increasingly subtle, less objective forms of Siva’s presence.   
In summary, we have established here that while the theistic tradition of YS uses 
mantra, the YS is largely silent on important questions about the function of mantra. 
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Because both mantra recitation and its visualization are enfolded into Anandamurti’s 
tantric yoga approach to ishvara pranidhana, analyzing tantric theories and practices 
pertaining to mantra could likely help us advance an emic view of meditation. Alper 
(1989), however, points out the vast number of tantric texts addressing the “science of 
mantra.” To explicate the particular method of Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana 
method of tantric yoga, and because Anandamurti’s system is Saivite, I will therefore 
limit my analysis to three strains of tantra that seem most relevant to the method and 
theoretical orientation of Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana. I begin by tracing a few 
important points from the Pasupata tradition as an early example of a tantric Savite 
tradition of yoga practice of theistic mantra meditation to better understand the Pasupata 
yoga claim that contact with god helps purify the mind. I then focus more carefully on the 
mystical tradition of the Kashmir Saivite recognition school, especially considering 
tantric emanation theory in the context of mysticism and meditation. I will also briefly 
discuss the changes in yoga practice that came about through the Siddha yoga tradition 
because of its innovation in developing practices that purified the body as well as the 
mind as a means to mystical spiritual liberation that are especially relevant for modern 
yoga practice today.  
 
“Second Order” Hermeneutical Interpretation of Tantric Yoga 
However, before we enter this next discussion, I must mention a caveat regarding 
examinations that focus on tantric yoga mysticism. White (2003) has argued that much 
scholarship on Tantra – in particular, the transcendent mysticism of Abhinavagupta and 
Siddha yoga alchemy - has focused on “a thin slice” of what is a broader view of tantra, 
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and that the practices of this thin view look much different from a broader range of tantric 
practice. According to White and others (e.g., Flood 2002, 2006); Muller-Ortega 1988, 
2005), both cremation ground ascetics and a mingling of sexual fluids between the yogin 
(male) and yogini “goddesses” (females) are examples of early tantric means to 
“becoming Siva” (for this was always the goal of tantra). However, White explains that 
these early practices were “cleaned up, aestheticized, and internalized in different ways” 
by tenth- and eleventh-century “reconfigurations” of tantra by Abhinavagupta and others: 
this marked a paradigm shift.  
In this “second order interpretation,” various aspects of sexual practice became 
internalized into the chakra system through which the kundalini (spiritual energy stored 
in the base of the spine) would rise, a system that became the basis of hatha yoga practice 
(White, 2003). This tantric description of yoga, combined with the tantric sphanda 
philosophy of an oscillating universe, completes the mystical explanations of tantric 
yoga. In other words, when the kundalini (spiritual energy) reached its destination at the 
highest chakra (energy center in the head), this was experienced as an orgasm-like 
ecstasy that also took on a mystical quality. White believes that scholarship on the 
mystical elements (both theory and practice) of tantra marks a secondary development of 
a hermeneutical transformation of an earlier body of practice into a mystical metaphysics. 
The common body of mystic doctrines and practices involving sexual fluids that changed 
during this time became reinterpreted and now understood in terms of internalized 
“alchemical” transformations of the body into divine fluids and substances, not unlike the 
alchemical process of turning metal into gold (White, 1996). This intricate metaphysics 
of the subtle body relates the brute matter of the gross body to the universal divine life 
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force that resides within each person as well as permeating throughout the cosmos, and 
the “bipolar dynamics of its male and female constituents, etc. was developed in every 
tantric school” (White 1996, p. 5).  
Thus this model of the tantric subtle body developed into an elaborate system 
whereby the chakra system seemed to take on a reality within the structure of the body 
through its use as a visualized model of meditation. As we will see, such a translation of 
earlier into later transformed theory and practices was not anomalous and has repeated 
itself more recently to bring tantric yoga into modern times. Despite the fact that tantric 
mysticism seems to constitute such a “thin slice” of tantrism more broadly, examining 
this aspect of tantra in the context of yogic practice is called for in this analysis because 
of its relevance to understanding the modern day tantric yoga ishvara pranidhana, and 
may offer new insights into mental processes associated with psychological well-being. 
 
Mantra as Ritual Practice 
 White (2003) writes that the “textual pedigree” of tantra’s long history goes back 
before the fifth-century B.C.E. and continues as a living tradition today, with the heyday 
of tantra peaking during medieval times approximately as early as seventh-century C.E. 
through the fifteenth-century. Although Tantric practitioners originated as cremation-
ground ascetics (a wandering class of outcastes who meditated on corpses), by the 
eleventh-century the tantric tradition of Kashmiri Saivism had influenced not only 
popular religion but also brahmanical circles, or members of the highest priestly caste 
(Flood, 1996; White, 2000, 2003). This was due largely to the work of Abhinavagupta, a 
main theologian of the Kashmir Saivite tradition who transformed “extreme tantric 
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ideology into a more respectable religion of the higher castes” (Flood, 1996, p. 161) by 
aestheticizing and internalizing the sexual practices. In fact, after the eleventh-century all 
of Hinduism was influenced by Tantrism and “all forms of Saiva, Vaisnava, and Smarta 
religion … [had] absorbed some elements derived from the Tantras” (Flood, 1996, p. 
159).  
 Although there is great complexity in defining tantra, Padoux (2002) explains that 
Tantra has come to be widely understood as meaning “ritual practice” with the goal of 
liberation defined as harmony of the microcosm and macrocosm (see also White, 2003). 
But both liberative knowledge and power were accepted as goals of yoga by tantra 
(Jacobsen, 2005, p. 7; Lidke, 2005). Thus tantra is defined in terms of both transcendence 
or enlightenment and worldly success, with the specifics of ritual varying according to 
particular goals and cultural beliefs (Harper and Brown, 2002). For example, mantra was 
practiced widely throughout tantric circles and the practice of mantra was a common 
form of yoga in the Saiva traditions (Timalsina, 2005, p. 214 note 4). Therefore, because 
Anandamurti identified himself with Saivism, my focus will be on tantric Saivism 
generally to help explain mantra, with Pasupata as a Saivite tradition and Kashmiri 
Saivism being of special interest.  
 While the goal of more mainstream mantra practice was to accrue power and 
pragmatic control over supernatural entities, the goal of “tantric mysticism,” which is the 
focus of this dissertation, was liberative – that is, spiritual (White, 2003). Spiritual 
meditations involving mantra and visualization that were believed to be “mystical” 
because of the feeling of identification of one’s self with the cosmic entity were thought 
to awaken the kundalini or mystical spiritual energy located within the body and to help 
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attain this goal (Jacobsen, 2005). Mantras were also used because they are thought to 
contain seeds (bijas) of the gods and to correspond to parts of the subtle body and awaken 
divine forces in the body (Jacobsen). Thus, for some strains of tantra, yoga as meditation 
becomes ritual practice to attain mystical encounters with god.  
Flood (2006, p. 106) describes several stages in “the ritual pattern that the 
initiated practitioner must follow in his daily practice.” Here Flood (p. 101) draws from 
the Jayakhya-samhita, “one of the most important texts of the tantric Vaisnava” tradition. 
Although I am not discussing the Vaisnava tradition and instead focusing on the Kashmir 
Saivite tradition, but both claim an emanationist cosmology identifiable in Anandamurti’s 
explanations of ishvara pranidhana and Flood observes that this ritual pattern or structure 
is found in all tantric traditions. (For more on tantra as a ritual framework, White (2006) 
refers readers to Brian K. Smith.1989. Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual, and Religion. 
Oxford University Press. p. 126 citing Asvala Srauta Sutra 1.1.3.) Namely, “purification 
of the elements within the body (bhutasuddhi), the divinization of the body through 
imposing mantras on it (nyasa), [and] internal worship of the deity (antara yoga) 
performed purely in the imagination” (White, p. 106) are all aspects of the pattern of 
tantric ritual practice that are identifiable within the ishvara pranidhana meditation 
taught by Anandamurti (among a couple others not listed here that are not identifiable in 
the actual ishvara pranidhana meditation itself, though identifiable within the whole of 
Anandamurti’s prescribed practice). For example, initiation is a critical process of tantra 
that needs to occur to learn ishvara pranidhana, but is not dealt with in this dissertation 
because of space limitations. Mantra is used explicitly though out the stages of ishvara 
pranidhana, until the final stages of deeper states of absorption. Therefore, the remainder 
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of this section on tantra explicates these aspects of the ritual framework of mantra, 
visualization, and contemplation relevant to ishvara pranidhana. The goal here is to 
explicate samadhi, the goal state of absorption, from a tantric perspective. 
 
Meaning and Visualization:  
The Chakra System of the Tantric Yoga Subtle Body 
Timalsina (2005) explains that mantra practice rests upon two essential aspects: a) 
an inward vocalic practice, which moves mantra from external utterance to inner feeling 
and b) realization of the mantra’s multiple meanings, which requires more and more 
complex visualizations. Thus, he emphasizes that in tantric yoga meditation, visualization 
is a crucial aspect of properly using mantra. Tantric practice shifted the audible chanting 
from the Vedic era to silent mantra recitation, and this shift deepens the power of mantra. 
For tantra, japa (mantra recitation) is “identical” with reflection on the meaning of 
mantra, and visualization is part of the very meaning of mantra (Timalsina). According to 
this theory, practitioners are able to transform the energy flows and the expression of 
phonemes within the body (this is explained shortly) by visualizing the mantra(s); in 
tantra, visualization of mantras centers on the chakra or energy system within the body 
that is linked to cosmic vibrational sounds. Thus, visualization of the chakra system 
within the body while chanting mantras leads to the goal of yoga: a psychological or 
“semiotic insight of one’s essential identity with the deity” evoked during meditation 
rituals (Timalsina, p. 215). This link between a particular technique and theories about 
the body and the cosmos gives tantric yoga its special status.  
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The literature on tantric meditation describes different models of the tantric yoga 
subtle body and chakra system as the focus of tantric meditation (Eliade, 1958; White, 
2003). Perhaps the most well-known model is the six-plus one chakra system popularized 
in the West during the twentieth century by Avalon’s (1919/1974) translation of the 
Satcakra-nirupana and Paduka-pancaka texts composed by Purananda in 1577 C.E. As 
described by Avalon and others (e.g., Eliade, 1958, pp. 241-244) this “standard model” 
(White, 2003) consists in six energy centers associated with specific locations in the body 
such as the base of the spine, the navel, and the heart. References to these body parts are 
also made in several Upanishads, especially the Yoga Upanishads, for example the 
Dhyanabindupanisad (Ayyangar, 2006, p. 159). The “plus one” chakra is located in the 
head, and thought to expand beyond the body. Avalon explains that the chakras are 
linked within the body to a nadi (channel) system of energy channels that circulate 
throughout the body, with the three main energy channels – the ida, pingala, and 
sushumna - vertically arising and spiraling along the spinal column and important for 
meditation. A latent spiritual energy called kundalini sakti is said to lie dormant in the 
base of the spine during normal states of consciousness that is awakened during spiritual 
practices. When the mental and bodily energies begin to flow through the three main nadi 
channels, then the kundalini sakti arises up from the base of the spine and moves up 
through the vertical length of the sushumna nadi, piercing each chakra as it moves up the 
column. The piercing of each chakra signifies entrance into a deeper state of absorption.  
White (2003, p. 151) explains that in the Kubjikamata, we encounter a notion of a 
process of yogic refinement or extraction of fluid bodily constituents, which is 
superimposed upon the vertical grid of the subtle body, along the spinal column. He 
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explains that this text identifies a “phonematic energy,” which is taken to be kundalini 
imagery but without the exact name, and that the earliest appearance of the term 
kundalini occurs in the tenth-century Jayadrathayamala, and this text directly relates 
kundalini to the phonemes.  
According to Abhinavagupta’s chakra model of Trika Kaula tantra, which I will 
summarize below, the “charkas of the Trika Kaula subtle body are whirling spoked 
wheels which, in the body of the non-practitioner, become inextricable tangles of coils 
called knots (granthis) because they knot together spirit and matter” (White, 2003, p.  
147 cited from Silburn, 1988, pp. 25-26). In this model, White explains, phonemes are 
“projected upon the grid of the subtle body” (p. 152) and therefore chakras (energy 
centers) exist in this model as “phonematic” expansion and contraction. White explains a 
shift in the theory about the constitution of the chakra when in the later Rudrayamala 
Tantra and other later hathayogic classics attributed to Goraksanatha the kundalini 
becomes the vehicle for fluid rather than phonematic “transactions and transfers” (p. 
152). 
White has shown that in the Kaulajnananirnaya there is a hierarchization of 
energies that are identified with the five elements (and a number of sub-evolutes); this 
hierarchization is identified with the ordering of phonemes within the subtle body. This is 
reflective of later subtle body mapping to exhibit this identification of the five lower 
chakras with the five elements, thus showing a relationship to the Samkhya-Yoga theory 
of emanation (White). These theories are important because in ishvara pranidhana one 
visualizes the chakras, and some of the purification processes of ishvara pranidhana also 
center on withdrawing one’s mind from identification with the five elements as aspects of 
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one’s self in an effort to identify with only the deepest or spiritual aspect of one’s being. 
Thus these theories tie the body to psychological processes in important ways that define 
practice techniques.  
The main idea here is that the chakra model of a yogic subtle body proposes a 
system of energy centers that are transformed through yogic meditative practice. These 
transformations are thought to implicitly include transformations of the mind as 
increasingly subtle states of awareness emerge with practice. What becomes a defining 
issue in twentieth-century interpretations of yoga is how one is to understand the 
ontology of this model. 
Flood (2006) explains that although descriptions of this subtle body structure have 
variability among tantric texts, one must recognize that descriptions of the yogic body 
always appear within a context of ritual and visualization. In this context, the rising of 
energy in the body of the serpentine energy kundalini - asleep in the lowest chakra until it 
awakens during meditation and rises to the highest center - is associated with mantra and 
levels of speech. This system of tantric physiology, then, derives its meaning and form 
only in the context of yogic practice. Tantric physiology must, therefore, be understood 
within the yogic tradition and within specific forms of practice that intend to eventuate in 
the experience of kundalini. The image and meanings of the yogic body are constrained 
by its texts and traditions, and therefore meditative states must be understood within this 
context. Flood (p. 162) argues that to seek to understand these centers outside of this 
context (of text and tradition) “as if they are intended as extra-textual, ontological 
structures is incoherent.” In other words, the conflation of the yogic physiology with the 
physicality of the body as depicted in the modern research programs of locate the 
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experience of kundalini within the nervous system, rather that within its traditional 
textual context of visualization and ritual, confounds the logic of transcendence. Yet, as 
we will see, this is exactly what we have in the case of modern interpretations of yoga. 
The centeral question here is what can we make of emic claims that purusa is real 
(Fererestein, 1979, p.9)? 
 
Experienced Mysticism of Samadhi: the Phenomenology of Absorption 
Traditionally, chakra models are considered to be based in the yogin’s actual 
experience of the subtle body (White, 2003). This belief is significant because it directly 
relates the chakra model of the subtle body physiology with tantric yoga practice and the 
various experiences of absorption reported during meditation.  
Anandamurti elaborates on the changes in inner feelings associated with the more 
complex visualizations of mantra practice leading to higher states of consciousness. He 
does this by describing the progress made in meditation from ordinary states into higher 
and higher states of consciousness during absorption. These increasingly subtle states of 
absorption are the levels of samadhi and are directly associated with the kundalini as it 
rises up the sushumna and crosses the chakras. The rising of the kundalini is thought 
about in terms of relational experience. With the kundalini crossing subsequently higher 
thresholds of energy centers, the individual “I feeling” changes in relation to purusa 
(consciousness); that is, the . Individual consciousness is said to become more expanded 
and the experienced cognition becomes that of one’s self being closer and closer in 
identity to purusa, Atman, or Brahma.  
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Anandamurti (Sarkar, 1959) describes these stages or levels of samadhi in terms 
of the relational experience of the meditator’s increasingly complete identification with 
the ideational object of meditation, i.e., ishvara. As has been stated, the kundalini 
(spiritual energy of consciousness) lies dormant in the muladhara chakra during normal 
mental states. During meditation when the kundalini rises and crosses the svadhisthana 
chakra, the meditator enters the first stage of samadhi. In this stage, the meditator feels 
that “he or she is not alone; … [god] is also there” and this feeling “gives the person very 
much pleasure.” When the kundalini “crosses the manipura chakra, just near the hub, the 
controlling point, of the pancreas, the person enjoys another sort of pleasure.” This 
second sort of pleasure is the next stage of samadhi. During this samadhi, the yogi feels 
one’s own “proximity” to god. The third stage of samadhi brings a feeling of being in 
“close contact, just side by side, just touching” god as the kundalini crosses the anahata 
chakra (energy center). As the kundalini crosses the visuddha chakra (throat energy 
center), the meditator experiences the feeling that “I am one with Him [god].” Thus, the 
feeling of oneness, and not just close contact, occurs in the fifth stage of samadhi. With 
further meditation, the meditator experiences “another sort of … [spiritual experience], 
still more high… [and] at that point, the feeling is that ‘I am He;’ that is, ‘I’ and ‘He,’ 
these two entities, have become one.” In this stage of samadhi when the kundalini crosses 
the ajna chakra (the energy center between the eyebrows associated with the pituitary 
gland), the “other” and “I” have coincided. There is no difference in feeling between self 
and other, and the other of god in particular. This stage represents the highest stage of 
attainment through ishvara pranidhana meditation. In the final stage of samadhi, attained 
by practicing Anandamurti’s sixth meditation lesson of guru dhyana, the kundalini 
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crosses the sahasrara chakra (the crown point associated with the pineal gland) and the 
meditator feels only “existence.” This “is the supreme stage of yogic [practice].”  
Thus, Anandamurti clearly associates the third mental process of samadhi with 
the different chakras. These stages describe the feeling practitioners have as they develop 
a closer relationship with Parama Purusa (god) when progressing through meditation. As 
the kundalini (spiritual energy) rises through each chakra, it grows closer and closer to 
encountering purusa (consciousness) located in the head. In conclusion, Anandamurti’s 
stages of samadhi reflect relational experience – that is, between the meditator and the 
world - encountered en route to experiencing absorption into god. 
 
Explicating Ishvara Pranidhana through Three Strains of Tantra 
As mentioned above, there are a number of different streams of tantra that were 
practiced especially in medieval India and some that continue in parts of India and 
throughout the world today (Lamb, 2005). I have selected three streams to discuss here 
that exemplify medieval tantric yoga with the purpose of understanding what is classical 
Hindu tantric yoga mysticism and explicating absorption or the process of samadhi in this 
view. These three traditional tantric streams seem to be the concepts and practice 
techniques most visible within Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana. Each of these streams 
is itself an illustration of “tantric mysticism,” albeit, as mentioned above, a “revised” 
tantra. Here the focus is on understanding what makes a yoga practice tantric in the 
mystical sense. 
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Pasupata Tantra: Contact with God. 
Pasupata meditation is “fundamentally different” from Patanjali’s yogic 
meditation, because as a tantric tradition, Pasupata meditation rests on the ideas of non-
dualism and contact with god (Oberhammer, 1989). Hara (1992) explains that for 
Kaundinya (the author of the primary Pasupata text), the idea of yoga in the Pasupata 
tradition is the contact between the meditator’s individual soul and god (isvara), and that 
Kaundinya believes that this contact is the intended meaning of the “technical” term 
yoga. Rastogi (1992, p. 249, see note 8) concurs, defining yoga in Pasupata (as presented 
in the Tantraloka, an tenth- and eleventh-century C.E. text written by Abhinavagupta) as 
“linking self with God through mind” and noting the “imprint of attainment” in this 
notion of yoga.  
A second theme in Pasupata meditation is purification. Oberhammer (1989) 
explains that the Pasupatas believe that mantra has the power to purify the mind and 
remove adharma (anything sinful). As mentioned above, the effective power of mantra 
exists by the intention of Siva. In other words, Oberhammer (1989, p. 219) explains that 
mantra recitation is the only way for Siva to be an object, and therefore mantra holds an 
“inherent transubjectivity.” This means that the mantra has the power to make the 
transcendent present to the subject. Mantric utterance is a form of worship in 
contemplation and a special knowledge develops from contact enabled by mantric 
utterance, because contact “purifies” (Oberhammer, 1989). Because of this denoting 
function, using mantra during meditation enables contact with ishvara. Most importantly, 
it is a kind of contact that “purifies” the mind and yields a special knowledge 
(Oberhammer, 1989). Thus in Pasupata meditation, samadhi is about attaining a purified 
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state through contact with god. Ishvara pranidhana is a practical means to achieve or 
attain contact with god and Anandamurti similarly believed that there is a purifying effect 
on the meditator’s mind because of the contact.  
Later tantric traditions, especially the Kashmir Saivite recognition school of 
Abhinagavupta and others, prominent around the tenth- to eleventh-centuries, expounded 
significantly on this belief in mantras and their denoting power (Muller-Ortega, 2005). 
Let us turn now to their teachings to further explicate ishvara pranidhana. 
Kashmiri Shavism: Recognition of God. 
Alper (1989, p. 345 and note 1) identifies Kashmir Shaivism as “a living variety 
of Hinduism” connected with tantric sadhana in Northern India, and has influenced 
modern 19th and 20th century teachers. The main claim of tantric Kashmir Shaivism is 
that during samadhi, practitioners have a “recognition” of the truth that “subjects and 
objects of language and experience are both appearances of an absolute or pure 
consciousness” (Flood, 2006, p. 203). This means that during practice of tantric yoga, 
practitioners come to recognize themselves as a manifestation of god (Siva). This 
recognition or insight is also the goal of ishvara pranidhana meditation. The recognition 
is a psychological phenomenon (albeit a mystical psychological phenomenon) since this 
“recognition” has to do with the psychological process of identity. Moreover, it is a 
cognition, and specifically in this context a liberating cognition.  
Abhinavagupta is the most prominent and with the greatest impact on our current 
understanding of tantric yoga. The main contrast of Abhinavagupta’s tantric yoga to 
Patanjali’s yoga is the prominence of intellectual knowledge (tarka) in Abhinavagupta’s 
system, a feature of the six-fold yoga that is absent from the Yoga Sutra. For 
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Abhinavagupta, the “recognition” or insight is a special kind of intellectual process called 
tarka (Muller-Ortega, 1989). Abhinavagupta’s definition of “intellectual knowledge” 
differs from usual connotations of intellectualism, as Muller-Ortega points out, because 
the state of tarka embraces both transcendent mysticism and an “illuminated” 
intellectuality. The intellectual nature of such an insight becomes clarified by the feeling 
of oneness, and it is from this perspective that the subjects and objects are recognized as 
of the same consciousness. Thus the particular feeling associated with the recognition (or 
intellectual state tarka) is what marks this state as special. It is not purely rational. As 
mentioned above, Chapple (1994) argues that the Yoga Sutra (3.53) transmits the belief 
that yoga brings about realization of the sameness between two objects, and that those 
two things are prakrti and purusa, or matter (such as the matter that forms the body) and 
consciousness. The tantric text Malinivijayottara (MVT) echoes the Yoga Sutra’s 
assertion that the practice of yoga leads to a realization of the identity between two 
objects (Rastogi, 1992). Abhinavagupta also spends time integrating this state of mind 
(tarka) into an understanding of an active mind and the senses. One might suggest that 
such a realization characterizes the nature of yogic samadhi in tantra as well.  
In this view, even though we have been focusing on the psychological state, 
cosmology is central to ritual practice (Flood, 2006). Muller Ortega (1989) points out that 
Abhinavagupta’s insistence that in the journey of mystical yogic praxis this state (tarka) 
i.e., the lived experience of liberation, is the goal of yoga is based on a bias towards the 
Samkhyan emanationist doctrine that leads to the hierarchical tantric view of reality. 
Alper (1979) clarifies this position in his argument for a process (understood as 
oscillation) understanding of god as consciousness or illumination (prakasa): he sees 
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consciousness as the process of coming into existence in the world in manifest form. This 
view is often identified in primary and secondary tantric literature as oscillation (spanda). 
In this tantric view, there is a “continuous cosmogony” in which the purpose of yoga is 
not just the immersion, but the return in a state of heightened awareness as well (Muller-
Ortega, 1992). The result is that consciousness oscillates between pure and manifest 
states. Thus expansion is also a major theme. Whereas Classical Yoga was all about 
withdrawal, the ritual practice of tantric yoga adds the phase of expanding consciousness 
during both meditative practice and “wake” states, though transformed, as well. Thus, in 
this view of samadhi, the psychological and cosmological processes merge within the 
practitioner.   
This view establishes the philosophical basis of Abhinavagupta’s and others’ 
recognition school. The Pratyabhijna (recognition) school represents the highest point of 
philosophical self-awareness reached by nondualistic Kashmir Saivism (Torella, 1992). 
We have discussed this Kashmir Shavite perspective because these processes of tantric 
yoga’s state of tarka – that is, oscillation and recognition of oneness - seem discernible in 
Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana process of samadhi and are therefore examined more 
closely in the next chapter. 
Siddha and Hathayoga: Alchemical Transmutation of the Body as a Path to God-
Realization. 
White (1996) explains that the widespread (but not complete) death of tantrism 
was brought about because of a sea change in tantric theory and practice. Through 
Abhinavagupta, tantrism had become transformed into an elite mystic path, “too 
complicated, refined, and cerebralized for common people to grasp” (White, 1996, p. 7). 
143 
Instead, the worldly powers offered by the tantric yoga sect of the Siddha Yogis 
(meaning “perfected being”) became more appealing. The Siddha yogins originated out 
of “earlier and more heterodox Saiva orders, … [including the] Pasupatas in particular” 
(White, 1996, p. 7) and flowered in twenth- through thirteenth-centuries (p. 2) even 
though Siddha traditions were “more ancient than those of tantrism itself” (p. 2) (i.e., 
before the sixth-century C.E. (p. 1)). White (1996) explains that in addition to worldly 
powers (siddhis), sometimes considered “magical,” Siddha practice also aimed for bodily 
immortality (jivanmukta). White (1996) further describes this tradition as identified with 
a particular body of practice – including hath yoga - and indicates that it forms a visible 
part of the Indian religious landscape today. Their most important innovation was their 
“concrete and coherent method” for attainment of status through tantric, yogic, and 
alchemical practice.    
The Nath Siddha tantric purification ritual of bhutasuddhi conjoins practices of 
alchemy, hatha yoga, and tantric ritual (White, 1996, p. 335). In this practice, yogins 
recite mantras while visualizing the dissolution of the body down to the chakric elements 
of the tattvas. Each tattva successively dissolves, starting from the most manifest tattva 
in the base of the spine and moving upwards. Because of this emphasis on the tattvic 
structure of the person, the Siddha alchemical method of bhutasuddhi relates greatly to 
the tantric version of Samkhya emanation theory. Building on this perspective, the 
psychological functions associated with the chakric centers tied to each tattva are 
believed by some to simultaneously transform as its tattvic element dissolves. Thus this 
practice is believed to have a purifying effect on the body and mind, and cultivates a state 
conducive to experiencing samadhi consciousness. In this way, bhutasuddhi furthers the 
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purification theme and the Pasupatas’ claim that the function of mantra is to purify the 
mind (White, 1996). White (1996, p. 6) asserts that Natha Siddhs continue to be revered 
today as India’s masters of yoga.  
Similarly, physical practices of hatha yoga were elaborated in the Siddha tradition 
that were also believed to purify the body (and mind, too) (White, 1996). In hatha 
practices, raising the kundalini is thought to prepare the body for spiritual, perhaps 
mystical, experience. These practices build on yogic metaphors for the mastery of the 
forces that sleep in the lower part of the body, forces that, when awakened, transform the 
yogin’s body completely (White). We can draw from these practices to understand 
Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana since his method of ishvara pranidhana includes a 
few select elements of hatha yoga. Hatha yoga grew from this tradition, expanding or 
elaborating on two of Patanjali's ashtanga yoga angas: pranayama and asana. As we will 
see, the hatha yoga stream of the Siddhas came to have an extremely influential role in 
the development of modern yoga practice. 
Both these specializations of siddha practice – bhutasuddhi and hatha yoga (yoga 
postures, breathing practices, and other physical practices) - are identifiable in the yoga 
system of Andandamurti, with only the meditation postures along with the bhutasuddhi 
as part of the full ishvara pranidhana meditation practice (the hatha yoga practices of 
numerous postures and breathing practices are not part of the actual ishvara pranidhana 
meditation, though they are part of the wider yoga system).  
We have been talking about samadhi throughout this section on tantra; in some 
important sense it seems that these techniques or approaches to practicing yoga 
(bhutasuddhi and hatha yoga) help explicate samadhi because these techniques lead to an 
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embodied consciousness. However, it seems that they relate on a more basic level to 
fostering a concentrated mind and samskaric transformation as intermediary processes. 
The combined actions of bhutasuddhi visualization and mantra recitation culminate in the 
concentration and then withdrawal of the mind; in this phase ishvara pranidhana then 
leads to burning samskaras. These practices help concentrate the mind in the sense of 
gathering and withdrawing the projections of the mind from the world, and then focusing 
the mind in such a way that the mind expands and consciousness permeates oneself.  
This tantric view resonates with yogic theory of the layers of the mind, but differs 
from the Classical Yoga view of mysticism because in this view there is a bidirectional 
transmutation of spirit and matter. As we will see later, this view of bidirectionality has 
led to modern interpretations of tantric yoga emanation theory and understanding of 
evolution because the evolutionary process occurs through a transmutation of matter into 
spirit and back again. As we will see next, the hatha yoga stream of the Siddhas came to 
have an extremely influential role in the development of modern yoga practice. 
In summary, the alchemical process of bhutasuddhi occurs within the body - that 
is, within cosmic elements believed to be at least symbolically located within the 
meditator’s body. Analyzing this view of the Siddha alchemical method of bhutasuddhi 
along with the other streams of tantric practice provides a new lens through which to 
process and interpret tantric yoga samadhi.  
Specifically, this analysis of tantric practice and theory takes the classical yoga 
philosophy and psychological theory, which was a theory of the mind, into the body, and, 
importantly, also relates these “physiological” processes to cosmological processes. In 
this chapter, we have revealed the three mental processes that will be the focus of the 
 146 
comparison in part III (one-pointed attention, memory, and absorption). But now that we 
have understood the processes of meditation from the emic perspective, the question still 
remains regarding how we are to understand the mental processes involved in this 
process given the clashes in worldviews that traditional understandings of yoga have with 
modern ways of understanding reality scientifically. 
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Chapter Five 
Rethinking Modern Yoga 
 
Modernity has seen an exchange of ideas about cognition and embodiment 
between India and the West. In particular, the intersection of ideas between traditional 
Indian yoga and western ways of thinking empirically about the natural world has 
infiltrated contemporary interpretations of yoga and resulted in the reinterpretation and 
translation of classical and traditional ideas about yoga (Alter, 2004; De Michelis, 2004). 
As a result, modern authorizers of yoga have come to problematically theorize yogic 
phenomenon such as meditation in physical terms of western science. I shall now analyze 
the problems these translations have created for understanding the mental processes of 
meditation. 
 
How Ishvara Pranidhana fits into the Modern Yoga Framework 
Scholars (e.g., De Michelis, 2004; Hardy, 1984) have noted that the eighteenth 
century marked an important shift in the religious traditions of India: they met modernity. 
This meeting of Indian traditions with the rationality of scientific, philosophical, and 
theological ideas and methods that had emerged in the West during the Enlightenment 
period significantly influenced the content and form of yoga traditions. Thus these 
changes, De Michelis and Hardy argue, denote a break from classical interpretations of 
Indian yoga discussed in the previous chapter. Note that De Michelis (2004, p. 37) uses 
the term “classical” (with a lowercase “c”) to mean the pre-18th century context, which 
encompasses both Classical and Medieval periods as more typically understood. Because 
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they are defined by date, the terms “classical” and tradition include the period of the 
ninth- through the fifteenth-centuries in which tantric yoga flourished. My use of the 
terms classical and traditional follows her usage.  
During the Scientific Revolution the Western intellectual and cultural tradition 
turned away from exclusive interest in transcendent phenomena and towards nature 
(Olson, 2004). Via means of reductionism, the scientific method of observation, 
experimentation, reasoning, and elimination of Aristotelian final causes, mechanistic 
modes of explanation became favored. These changes that have all operated in the past 
two centuries in the West have also taken root in both Indian and western approaches to 
yoga. Thus the theories and modes of yogic practice that dominate mainstream yoga 
today in its global context forms what De Michelis (2004) and others (e.g., Alter, 2004) 
have begun to talk about as “Modern Yoga.” This concept of yoga contrasts in important 
ways with traditional understandings of yoga discussed in the previous chapter.    
De Michelis (2004) describes four developmental trends that have all been shaped 
by Western influenced Neo-Hindu thought, the first of which, in her view, leads to the 
other three. These four typologies together aim to characterize the scope of yoga as 
people practice it today, especially in the West. This is a typology which she presents as 
speculative and a tentative first effort, one which further scholarship by her and others 
may refine and change based on further intellectual insight and new fieldwork findings. 
Analyzing Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana within this typology will help further our 
task of delineating an emic perspective on meditation that we can then compare with etic 
views.  
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The first typology or category is Modern Psychosomatic Yoga (MPY), a typology 
that is shaped directly by Swami Vivekananda’s Raja Yoga (1896). The yoga schools that 
fall into this category are dedicated to mind-body-spirit ‘training’ because they employ 
methods that seek to transform both mental and physical processes. The next two 
typologies emerged out of the first: Modern Postural Yoga (MPY), which focuses on the 
performance of yoga postures (asanas) and breathing (pranayama), and Modern 
Meditational Yoga (MMY) that relies on techniques of concentration and meditation. 
Both MPY and MMY stress participation with a classroom or session type framework, 
and limit themselves to very basic religio-philosophical underpinnings of their practice.  
In contrast to these, the last typology is Modern Denominational Yoga (MDY) and 
describes groups that emerged during the 1960’s that “retain active links with the cultic 
milieu from which many of the [Indian] recruits come” (De Michelis, 2004, p. 189).  
De Michelis (2004) explains that some modern systems of yoga may overlap into 
one or more categories. This is especially characteristic of MDY whose groups who draw 
from the whole range of MPY, MPY, and MMY. This is the case with Anadamurti’s 
ishvara pranidhana: it seems to be aligned with all four categories in unique ways. For 
example, there are aspects of his program of yoga that make it fit in with the Modern 
Postural Yoga (MPY) typology because Anandamurti prescribes daily asana practice. 
Thus, like other systems of hatha yoga, Anandamurti’s system aims for transformation 
through the body. Anandamurti’s system could be criticized, though, or contrasted with 
other MPY schools for its lack of emphasis in explicit detailed teaching of postures and 
lack of scheduled time for postural practice during collective sessions. Instead, the focus 
of the collective practice sessions is on meditation as the central and primary practice. 
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Thus Anandamurti’s system also aligns with the Modern Meditational Yoga (MMY) 
typology because of Anandamurti’s emphasis on concentration and meditation 
techniques, and because of the emphasis on the importance of participation in weekly 
collective meditation sessions and quarterly retreats for overall self-development. 
Anandamurti’s system also emphasizes that understanding will come through first hand 
experience, a general feature of Modern Psychosomatic Yoga (MPY) that extends to both 
MPY and MMY. This encompassing nature of his yoga system can possibly be explained 
in that Anandamurti’s system of spiritual development is actually a much more 
comprehensive system of yoga than indicated by my focus on ishvara pranidhana.  
Anandamurti’s system most obviously aligns with De Michaels’s category of 
Modern Denominational Yoga (MDY) because of its central focus on guru and 
Anandamurti’s own teachings, recorded discourses, and discourse notes from his 
disciples. Anandamurti created an organizational structure, Ananda Marga that requires a 
large commitment on the part of its members, and cultish obsession on the part of some 
of the members with the guru. Thus Ananda Marga has a strong organizational system 
and requires a lot from its members. Anandamurti asserts that the path he provides for his 
initiates, while centering on the practice of spiritual meditation, is primarily a path of 
Bhakti Yoga (yoga of devotion). Surrender and devotion to Anandamurti as the guru are 
primary in the practitioner’s experience. But the deeper and ultimate significance of guru 
and its role in the meditation practice is that the belief in Anandamurti as the embodied 
form of guru merges with the existence of the formless inner guru located within each 
individual person. These are all features of MDY, thus working within this analytic 
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framework of De Michelis’s (2004) typology I conclude that his system would be best 
characterized within this category within the typology of Modern Yoga.  
However, when considering how to analyze Anandamurti’s method of ishvara 
pranidhana against the backdrop of Indian thought and traditional forms of yoga, some 
additional factors need to be considered. Regardless of the authority of guru and the 
personal practice of practitioners, Anandamurti’s writings and his teachings clearly aim 
to link his spiritual practices of yoga to the lineage of Siva, Tantrism, and the Raja Yoga 
articulated in Patanjali’s Yoga Sutra. His writings extensively articulate how the religio-
philosophical and psychological underpinnings of these traditions form the basis of the 
practices. Moreover, even though it falls within the historical time period of Modern 
Yoga, and has much in common with the MDY category of Modern Yoga, 
Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana and entire system of self-development does not seem 
fit wholly within these definitional boundaries.  
The precise claim that De Michelis (2004, p. 2) asserts about modern forms of 
yoga is that “most of the yoga currently practiced and taught in the West, as well as some 
contemporary Indian yoga falls into this category” of Modern Yoga. Thus she implicitly 
acknowledges that not all forms of yoga practiced today may be classified in terms of the 
formal category Modern Yoga. Importantly, though, for our examination of 
Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana meditation, De Michelis (2004, p. 189) 
also observes that MDY  groups (such as Anandamurti’s) “have not been instrumental in 
shaping, defining and elaborating more ‘mainstream’ forms of Modern Yoga theory and 
practice, and yoga [the physical practice of asanas] is not their primary concern.” These 
clues about what does and does not fall into the “mainstream” of Modern Yoga theory 
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and practice should guide our further elucidation of an emic perspective on 
Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana meditation. 
 
“Yogic Science” and the “Science of Yoga” 
De Michelis’s (2004) typology of four categories can be more simply delineated 
into two basic streams of modern yoga. One is concerned with the physical practice and 
the body while the other is concerned with meditation, consciousness, and the mind. 
Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana aligns with the latter. Alter (2004) calls these two 
streams the “science of yoga” and “yogic science.” These names reflect the fact that the 
modern discourse of science is central to both streams, but in different ways.  
Problematically theorizing yogic phenomena – both experience and its structure, 
although their conflation is exactly the issue - within the philosophy of materialism has 
been done especially by translating traditional models of tantric physiology (Alter, 2004). 
Although these have traditionally been understood as empirical realities known through 
yogic practice and experience (Flood, 2006), Alter explains that emic efforts have 
translated this understanding into the language and conceptual system of the body’s 
physiology as understood through the empirical methods of observation and measurement 
used in the modern sciences.  
Emerging scholarship on Modern Yoga suggest that modern authorizers of yoga 
from both streams problematically theorize the empirical reality of cognition in ways that 
obfuscate to varying degrees the transcendent goals of practice, that is, in the narrow 
terms of the physicality of the body (De Michelis, 2004; Alter, 2004; and others). There 
are two points here. First, modernity has seen a shift from the philosophy of 
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transcendence to the philosophy of materiality. Second, it is within this context of a 
changed theoretical landscape that an accompanying conceptual shift has translated the 
yogic body from the tantric imagery of chakras and nadis to the physicality of the nerves. 
Here I will start by illustrating the two streams of emic discourse on yoga today and then 
analyze the problems with translated modern interpretations of cognitive states 
experienced through yogic practice. 
 
“Yogic Science” 
 
Emic literature in the genre of yogic science reinterprets traditional theories and 
practice through the discourse of scientific terminology and concepts. Although yogic 
science does contend with the body, the main focus is the mind and explication of 
meditative phenomena. Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana fits most closely within this 
line of literature because of the focus on spirituality and meditation. The problem with 
this is that in its attempts to engage the discourse of science, yogic science interprets 
literally the traditional models of the body that had previously been intended as guides to 
meditation. 
Problematically theorizing yogic phenomena – both experience and its structure, 
although their conflation is exactly the issue - within the philosophy of materialism has 
been done especially by translating traditional models of tantric physiology (Alter, 2004), 
which have traditionally been understood as empirical realities known through yogic 
practice and experience (Flood, 2006), into the language and conceptual system of the 
body’s physiology as understood through the empirical methods of observation and 
measurement used in the modern sciences. This is done especially by interpreting the 
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yogic body in terms of modern discourse about the brain and nervous system. This effort 
has continued throughout the twentieth century. For example, Alter describes 
Yogeswarananda’s (1997) assertion that there is a direct correlation between the spinal 
cord and the axial, sushumna nadi. Similarly, Swami Satyananda (1984) conceptualizes 
kundalini as electrochemical energy. Yet these conceptual conversions are not clear cut 
and do not necessarily capture the full meaning of the Indian ideas. Even claims from 
within the translations themselves are not always coherent. Alter notes that 
Yogeswarananda contradicts himself by both referring to the chakras as sensory motor 
nerves which pervade the entire body and alternatively declaring that it is a incorrect to 
identify the nadi channels as the spinal cord, giving the reason that these structures are 
not perceived without special meditation. Anandamurti follows this avenue, as well. For 
instance, he locates sahasrara chakra in the pineal gland. He describes the chakras in 
terms of nerve complexes and the vritts as glands.  
Alter (2004) explains that the genre of Orientalist literature is a predecessor to the 
emic yogic science. Examples of this type of literature include Eliade’s (1958) seminal 
text Yoga, Immortality, and Freedom and Avalon’s (1917/1974) text on Kundalini 
Tantra. Swami Vivekananda’s Raja Yoga (1896), a reinterpretation of the Yoga Sutra, is 
the seminal work that catalyzed the Modern Yoga movement. In this text, Vivikananda 
reinterprets the Yoga Sutra using the discourse of science and presents this version of 
yoga in two related models that he calls the prana model and the samadhi model. De 
Michelis (2004) argues that these models are the foundation of modern theories of yoga. 
From a theoretical psychology perspective, there are big problems with this 
approach because it results in dualisms: the two realities of the subjective meaningful 
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dimension of the mind and the objective physical mechanical body. The problem is that it 
is not clear from emic texts on yogic science how these two dimensions interact within 
the person and result in such multidimensional experiences as meditative absorption. That 
this is a problem within emic theories of yoga is not surprising because a number of 
implications of dualisms operate problematically within the field of psychology today.  
 
The “Science of Yoga” 
In a second, related strain of Modern Yoga, we see emic authorizers of yoga turn 
away from concerns about mysticism, consciousness, and even the mind, and instead 
focus on the body (Alter, 2004). This “science of yoga” proceeds by implementing the 
scientific method of experimentation to generate “data” about physical changes in the 
body that these scientists associate with yogic practice. The main problem with this 
approach is that it “objectifies” yoga (Alter, 2004, p.65). It interprets what, in traditional 
interpretations of yoga, is a subjective experience of the mind and consciousness into a 
quantified change in the physicality of the body.  
Alter (2004, 2005) explains that the earliest empirical scientific research attempts 
to understand yoga were conducted by Indian yogis in the 1920’s and 1930’s who studied 
the physiological processes associated with yogic practice. Swami Kuvalayananda and 
Shri Yogendra are central examples of emic authorizers of yoga who contributed to the 
stream of the “science of yoga.” They both established modern medical clinics in the first 
half of twentieth century within which they conducted scientific experiments to prove the 
efficacy of yogic practices. They used science to “anchor” their worldview in yoga. 
These practitioner-researchers sought to find by way of scientific methods “the precise 
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points of convergence between gross anatomy and the subtle power manifest in yogic 
physiology” (Alter, 2004, p. 84). In another example, Udapa (1989) builds on the science 
of yoga goal of using yoga in the treatment of various physical and mental health 
problems by specifically investigating various uses of yoga for stress management. He 
wanted to know exactly how yogic practices decrease a person’s sensitivity to 
environmental stimulation. Alter (2004, p. 66) explains that Udupa exemplifies the emic 
approach to scientific on yoga because he, too, “was in search of that illusive point of 
transformation between subtle and gross domains.” Udupa’s central hypothesis centered 
on the physical body: he thought that yoga reduces stress by way of controlling the 
cerebral cortex and the production of neurohormones. Yet he still wrote in terms of both 
systems, for example, in terms of supplying oxygen to each chakra (Udupa, 1989, p. 
215). These examples illustrate the way in which the emic science of yoga, almost 
certainly unknowingly, enacts confusion between two realities.  
Alter (2005, pp. 119-120) argues that even though emic scientists worked to 
“purge yoga practices … of all things esoteric, mystical and magical and establish 
practice on the basis of pragmatic, rational, scientific principles,” the modern emic 
science of yoga and modern theories about yoga are “intimately linked” to esoteric ideas 
from tenth and eleventh-century discourse and practice of yoga. Be this as it may, what 
the term and concept of “yoga” means today throughout the popular culture of 
mainstream Modern Yoga is the physical practice of asana. De Michelis (2004) 
emphasizes that the Iyangar method of yoga is probably the most widespread form of 
yogic today, and it along with many other forms of modern postural yoga, emphasized 
the body in theory and practice.  De Michelis goes so far as to analyze the “healing ritual” 
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of a modern yoga practice session that is focused on the physical practice of asanas and 
moving the body. This ritual in bears little resemblance, at least outwardly, to the 
practices of medieval yoga. However, contained within the practice of ishvara 
pranidhana is a practice called bhutasuddhi, a practice that bears the same name as a 
medieval tanric ritual (White, 1996). The science of yoga seeks to investigate the 
structures proposed in traditional models as if they embodied the same reality as the gross 
body of science today. This approach cannot stand. 
This emic perspective closely resembles the etic approach of science in many 
ways because it values the scientific method as a means of obtaining the truth (Alter, 
2004). Yet there is a subtle distinction between the emic approach to the science of yoga 
and the etic approach to studying yogic techniques. This difference hinges on two aspects 
of the scientific method. First, either the phenomena of interest in the science of yoga is 
still yoga, that is, something subjective, or it is not clear what is the phenomena of 
interest, and second the “data” are interpreted from the theories of yoga rather than 
scientific theories. 
Alter (2004) describes the limitations in the early days of the science of yoga in 
terms of misattribution of yogic concepts as identical with scientific concepts, the failure 
to operationalize or make significant distinctions, and inappropriate application of 
scientific methodologies. These limitations led to further research efforts in both India 
and the West to resolve the methodological problems, but also to broader non empirical 
questions about the purpose of using science in the study of yogic practices such as 
meditation. 
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Alter (2005, p. 39) convincingly shows how “the methods of modern science 
transform the nature of the [yogic] experience and the kind of truth to which it is linked.” 
In other words, scientific study of meditative phenomena reveals only the effects or 
material traces of meditative practice, and these are not the whole experience. He argues 
that this type of pursuit results in the kind of translational mistake whereby, for example, 
the yogic concept of a mystical cosmic energy or life force known as prana is given 
agency in scientific discourse. Even philosophic concepts and religious tenants, though, 
he argues, still do not convey the “ineffable” truth that becomes known to a practitioner.  
Thus this meeting between these two types of knowing, he believes, results in a 
confusion between two realities. “Yogic science” and the “science of yoga” differ both in 
the kind of knowledge they produce and also in the way they “authorize” different 
conceptions about what Yoga is; that is, the confluence of these two streams of 
knowledge produces a “hybrid trajectory of knowledge” that is neither objective nor 
subjective. This sort of convergence of two types of knowing is, he contends, a 
translational mistake.  
However, when critiquing the emic science of yoga, we must also recognize that 
the theoretical approach of etic science from western science is problematic, too. First, it 
is more explicitly reductionistic than the emic science of yoga. This approach does not 
encounter the problems of dualisms that yogic science did that are also faced in the emic 
science of yoga; this is because it ignores the mind and focuses exclusively on the body. 
This approach fits into the eliminative materialist trend of what Williams (2001) calls the 
“biologicalization” of psychology that is a mainstay view in cognitive science. To 
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understand how this approach is woven into modern theories of yoga, it is necessary to 
understand some of conceptual changes that have been made in yoga. 
 
Key Translations of Traditional Interpretations of Yoga 
Importantly, translations in modern emic theories of yoga reflect many of the 
wider shifts in the western intellectual tradition throughout the nineteenth- and twentieth-
centuries. Here I analyze a few key translations that together brought about modern 
theories of yoga to see whether these apply to ishvara pranidhana. This analysis points to 
some ways in which these translations of modern yoga theories, which center on the 
translation of the concept of realization, give rise to some of the same theoretical 
problems that cognitive science faces today; however, it is not so clear whether ishvara 
pranidhana faces all of these problems because it does not assume all of these 
translations. 
 
Changing the Intellectual Milieu: East and West 
Modern yoga operates along the lines of wanting to ground philosophy, practice, 
and yogic truth in empirical truths. De Michelis (2004) explains that towards this goal, 
there have been a number of translation themes that have occurred slowly over time since 
yoga met modernity that are evident in this genre. These translations occurred within a 
framework of secularized spiritualism (Alter, 2005). Copeland (1967, p. 200) argues that 
“secularism,” defined broadly as the Western phenomena of emphasizing worldly values, 
especially achievements of science and technology, with the tendency to “deny, blur, 
ignore, or depreciate the dimension of the transcendent,” began making its way into 
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Indian culture in the late eighteenth century. Over the next century, the dominant thinking 
about Vendantic yoga was subtly overhauled by the romantic spiritualism of Roy, Tagor 
and Sen, all leading figures in the Bengali Renaissance, as they assimilated ideas of 
western modernity (De Michelis, 2004, chapter two).  
Meanwhile in the West, by the early nineteenth century the Victorian crisis of 
faith that had grown out of increasing tensions between science and religion over the past 
two centuries led masses of Protestants out of the churches and to seek alternative forms 
of spirituality (Olson, 2004). One outcome led American Transcendentalists to explore 
Eastern forms of spirituality including yoga (Bevir, 1994; Dazey, 2005; Singleton, 2007). 
Singleton (2007) explains that the New Thought Movement revived ancient perennial 
esoteric wisdom of India, but reworked these ideas so that they fit with the streams of 
Christianity and scientific thinking that held primary sway over the American mind. 
These changes secularized the spirituality of yoga in important ways that remain evident 
today.  
Dazey (2005, p. 423) points out that one of the reasons that yoga appealed to 
Americans was that “yoga resonated with psychological and philosophical strains already 
present in American culture from as early as 1800.” Others (e.g., Jackson, 1975; Bevir, 
1994; De Michelis, 2004) have made this and similar points about the philosophical, 
intellectual, and spiritual leanings of early American interest in meditation and yoga 
(although, remember that traditionally the word yoga implies meditative practice). 
The late nineteenth century brought new challenges to the reigning rationalism 
that had been growing though out modernity. The scientific revolution had brought a 
philosophy of positivism earlier in the century that impressed into the discourse of 
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science a greater interest and precision in generating law-like descriptions about natural 
phenomena (Soskice, 1985). The parallel movements of phenomenology (Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch, 1991) and pragmatism each considered new criteria for truth 
claims, straying away from empiricism. Functionalism, too, stepped away from the 
“universal laws” doctrine of positivistic empiricism in its quest for the truth. These 
“isms,” each in their own ways, set the stage for the emergence of a cognitive science in 
the mid-twentieth century – a science devoted exclusively to the study of the mind. And 
each influenced to different degrees the discourse of science that has so thoroughly 
shaped modern theories of yoga. 
 
The “Psychologicalization” of Yoga: Translation of the Realization Concept 
The analysis of yogic praxis in chapter four explained that what characterizes 
absorption during ishvara pranidhana is the meditator’s realization or cognition that he 
or she exists, at least in some dimension, in the same essence as ishvara (god). 
Alternatively expressed, the meditator has the realization that some facet of ultimate 
reality is present within one’s own individual self. De Michelis (2004) suggests that 
translational shifts of this realization concept from classical Hinduism or Vedanta into 
Modern Yoga are at the heart of modern yoga theories the “psychologicalization” of 
yoga. Central to realization is yoga’s goal of spiritual knowledge: by the act of 
meditating, an individual aims to gain knowledge about the true nature of one’s own self. 
Gaining such insight constitutes the spiritual realization and marks success in meditation. 
As we have seen, traditional classical and tantric yogic explanations of this realization 
frame it as a mystical phenomenon. As discussed above, the yogic method of ishvara 
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pranidhana is a theistic practice that focuses the mind on the single entity of ishvara 
(god), and the mystical nature of the phenomenon is that the realization is had only by the 
“grace” of god (Eliade, 1958).  
Translating or “psychologizing” this god-talk from both these traditional streams 
has involved a number of interrelated conceptual changes (De Michelis, 2004) that all 
result in realization being a cognitive rather than mystical event, from a rationalized 
scientific perspective. Here I focus on four changes drawn from De Michelis’s discussion 
of the history of modern yoga and also supported by the work of other authors (e.g., 
Copeland, 1967; Alter, 2004; Singleton, 2007). Of greatest importance for my analysis of 
ishvara pranidhana are Vivekananda’s emphasis on an experiential epistemology and his 
translation of the concept of purusa, which both led to Vivekananda’s claim that yoga is 
scientific. Thus, these key translations paved the way for yoga’s translation into the 
discourse of science.  
 Brahman as an Experiential Reality. 
De Michelis (2004) explains how the chain of translational shifts starting from 
Roy and moving through Tagore and Sen, and culminating in Vivekanada’s translation of 
purusa into “mind,” all worked to bring the idea of Brahman into modernity as an 
experiential reality. In this new and translated view of yoga, Brahman became an aspect 
of reality to be known through direct experience rather than from knowledge gained by 
belief in textual authority, as was the case in pre-modern Vedanta. De Michelis (2004, p. 
81) explains that Sen was the first to introduce into Neo-Vedanta the idea that there is a 
“diffuse but personally accessible dimension of the divine” and that there is “a direct 
point of access to the metaphysical [i.e., this dimension] in each individual’s psyche.” 
 163 
This point of access is the focus of concentrated attention during ishvara pranidhana, and 
helps explain variations between individual experiences during meditation. Moreover, it 
also seems in line with traditional forms of tantra, which recognize the experiential reality 
as more authoritative over textual sources. De Michelis (2004, p. 83) goes on to point out 
that this “transcendentalism-inspired concept of individual experiential revelation [has 
become] defined psychologically as ‘a state of mind’.” In this sense, we can study the 
state of mind scientifically. De Michelis concludes that this shift of authority from an 
external to an individually validated source is at the core of the “scientific religion” (of 
Sen) and the empirical or “scientifically worked out” method to access such an 
experience. However, this method constitutes a different way of knowing from those 
ways that are externally and socially validated; thus, at least two distinct perspectives 
bear on the same phenomenon. The emphasis on an experiential epistemology that is 
prominent for Vivekananda is also evident in Anandamurti’s writings and teachings such 
that each person is instructed to aim for their own samadhi experience. 
The reworking of the recognition of Brahman into terms of a “state of mind” 
illustrates what Singleton (2007) argues is part of the shift to fit the doctrine of divinized 
self-hood and cosmic healing. In this new (or translated) experiential plane, the abstract 
ultimate reality Brahman has been translated into a field whereby the self, by the act of 
relating to the cosmos, becomes divinized. This divinized state is healing by nature; it 
alleviates suffering. Recall from the previous discussion of the mechanisms of liberative 
samskara, the second mental process of meditation (explained in Patanjali’s Yoga Sutra), 
that alleviating suffering, which involves removing the kleshas (afflictions) of the mind 
and establishing aklista (non-painful mental processes), is a claimed effect of yoga. In 
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light of this view, we might better understand the state of absorption (samadhi) in the 
following way. One might agree to believe that samadhi helps explain meditation if we 
interpret “healing” in the sense that the act of entering samadhi actually divinizes the self 
during ishvara pranidhana and in this process relieves the meditator of the mental 
afflictions (kleshas). 
Pursusa Translated into Mind. 
Swamin Vivekananda translated the yogic concept of purusa, what was a cosmic 
level entity, into mind, an entity at the level of the individual (De Michelis, 2004). De 
Michelis explains that Vivekananda’s samadhi model follows the Samkhya-Yoga 
cosmological process of purusa mysteriously influencing worldly manifestations, but 
only to a point. She argues that “most of the time” Vivekananda reinterprets the classical 
concept of purusa in psychological terms. Thus, she cleverly makes the case that in this 
turn-of-the-century understanding of yoga that is still predominant in yoga today, purusa 
“is both the deepest ontological core of human beings and the ultimate spiritual source 
vivifying and pervading the whole of the cosmos” (De Michelis, 2004, emphasis hers, p. 
169). This view also seems closer to the non dualist view of tantric yoga’s continuous 
cosmogony (Muller-Ortega, 1992). This translational move parallels similar 
philosophical and theological shifts during that time of removing final causality and a 
metaphysical reality (Olson, 2004). In this way, yoga can be understood from the 
perspective of rationalistic science.  
Vivekananda’s translation of purusa into mind poses a problem for understanding 
ishvara pranidhana, however, because without a distinct concept of purusa, ishvara 
pranidhana meditation simply does not make sense in its goal of god-realization. The 
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recognition of the reality of purusa is necessary for ishvara pranidhana because this is 
the reality that a meditator must come into contact with in order to experience the deeper 
states of absorption or samadhi. The goal of ishvara pranidhana is to establish oneself in 
ishvara; if there is no purusa, then, since ishvara is a type of purusa, there is no ishvara.  
Somewhat different from this translated interpretation, Anandamurti, like 
traditional tantra, maintains a distinction between the traditional concepts of atman and 
purusa, with the concept of atman constituting the ontological human core referred to by 
De Michelis, thus maintaining the cosmological status of purusa in full. This view is 
conceptually similar to traditional tantra even though the categories of atman (an 
individual yogin) and purusa (or Siva) are differently named. What is realized during the 
state of samadhi from this perspective is the fundamental identity between the individual 
person and the cosmic entity. Like Vivekananda, too, Anandamurti also employs the idea 
of attunement or resonance. For Anandamurti, attuning or resonating one’s individual 
“vibration” (or self) to that of parama purusa is widely taught as part of the goal of 
ishvara pranidhana: one must break through the bonds of the mind to get through to – or 
resonate with - atman, Self, parama purusa, or Siva. It seems that perhaps Vivekananda’s 
and Anandamurti’s two descriptions result in the same phenomenological event, i.e., 
realization of this essential oneness between self and cosmos at the core level, despite 
conceptual differences.  
Liberation into Evolution. 
One of the key steps in this translational process was Tagore’s “exposition” of 
human teleology that resulted in an “evolutionary spirituality” (De Michelis, 2004, pp. 
59-60). De Michelis explains that in this view, the soul becomes “infinitely progressing” 
 166 
and “overcoming” on its spiritual journey to cast off its animal nature and reach sacred 
spheres where it can attain infinitely higher states of love, wisdom, and virtue and thus 
overcome sin and sorrow. These translations reflect an affinity for the evolutionary idea 
of adaptation. However, unlike the modern secular theory of evolution, De Michelis 
explains that in Tagore’s view the journey of spiritual evolution occurs through the grace 
of god rather than only via mechanical forces. Because of this strong theistic foundation, 
she concludes that this evolutionary spirituality still maintains some coherence with 
classical Hinduism.  
Anandamurti uses the notion of spiritual progress, too, as we saw earlier, asserting 
that god is an attractive force such that it pulls the mind toward itself (i.e., a centripetal 
force). Progress here is defined in terms of moving closer to god. Because this view is 
theistic, like Tagore’s view, and spiritual progress is caused by the grace of god, then 
according to De Michelis’s reasoning, this view also maintains coherence with classical 
Hinduism. This perspective informs how we understand the mental processes of ishvara 
pranidhana. Thus, concentrating on god, burning samskaras as a result of attraction to 
god, and the mind merging with god in samadhi all appear coherent with classical Hindu 
perspectives on this issue. 
De Michelis (2004) shows that later after Tagore, however, the evolution theme 
was carried even further through occultist secular and mechanistic influences such as 
those by Sen and Viveknanada such that these ties to classical Hinduism were lessened. 
She explains that in the second half of the nineteenth century the “science of religion” 
became relevant and Sen and then Vivekananda believed that the Indian tradition of yoga 
held the key to the science of religion. De Michelis (2004, p. 64) quotes Kopf (1967, p. 
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67) who asserts that what was meant by a science of religion was “the discovery of 
natural laws about religion” and the modern study of evolutionary ideas played an 
important part in this process. She elaborates that to accomplish this goal, as the basis for 
the other translations of the realization discussed above, Vivekananda applied the basic 
approach of contemporary physics to Samkhya-Yoga cosmology, and built on this 
method to explain samadhi and other aspects of yoga. Thus, he translated the Samkhya-
Yoga concepts of prana and akasa into energy and matter, respectively, both 
linguistically and also in some way conceptually, and affirms “that they interact on the 
basis of recurring and knowable “natural laws” (De Michelis, 2004, p. 157). De Michelis 
stresses that this is as scientific as Vivekananda’s model gets, arguing that after that, his 
theorizing becomes natural philosophy rather than science. This is his Naturphilosophie 
focused on the agency of the gunas (binding forces), a seemingly impossible yogic 
concept to articulate in the discourse of science. 
This last shift of realization into a secular and mechanized framework means that 
traditional concepts must be even further translated to fit into the modern view. For 
example, burning samskara, an aspect of the second mental process of meditation, must 
be translated into an efficient cause-effect framework, rather than existing in its 
traditional paradigm of being linked to final causality in which a theistic meditation 
makes sense. Recall, though, that the volitional activity of samskara is related to the 
intentional nature of action. One of the major obstacles to reconcile from these 
translational shifts, then, is that adaptation within the rational scientific theory of 
evolution is not purposeful while spiritual practice including ishvara pranidhana is, and 
this type of dilemma has yet to be solved. 
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Translation of Magico-Religious Beliefs about Mantra 
As we have seen, in the cultural milieu of Enlightenment rationalism and the 
empirical standards of science, a range of yogic beliefs and practices could not be held 
tenable, and a foremost example among these was the magico-religious beliefs and 
practices involving Indian mantra (Alper, 1989). In the traditional tantric yoga 
explanation, the function of mantras was explained through the ritual framework of the 
Hindu tradition and it is this framework that gives mantra its meaning (Singleton, 2007). 
In this framework, Singleton explains, “magic” was embodied in the gunas (binding 
forces of reality) and the mystical physiology of the yogic subtle body. As described in 
the tantra section above, mantric utterance during ritual practice is traditionally thought to 
activate aspects of the mystical physiology, most importantly the latent or “sleeping” 
kundalini sakti (spiritual energy), and in this way catalyze transcendent states of 
consciousness. However, modern translations of the ritual function of mantra moved 
away from belief that an “irrational” sound could have a meaningful impact and effect on 
the mind and person. Significantly, Urban notes that omissions were conscious for 
political capital to appeal to modern scientific minds. 
In contrast to a traditional tantric view, in the rationalistic culture of modernity 
mantras were seen as “bizarre and unintelligible phonemes” – they were not considered 
to be rational language; therefore, emphasis turned to the meaning evoked during mantric 
utterance and the mantric sounds were replaced with words that carried understandable 
meaning to the hearer (Singleton, 2007). Singleton explains that this translation of 
practice from using sanctified mantras to using any word as if it were a mantra was 
highly influenced by the use of autosuggestion and affirmations as means to spiritualize - 
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and ultimately “heal” - the body. This notion of healing differs markedly from the yogic 
notion of healing due to divinization, since in divinization there is actual contact with a 
spiritual entity whereas spiritualizing oneself through affirmation connotes a feeling state 
but not necessarily contact with another source. Emphasis in the late nineteenth-century  
on the meaning rather than the sounds reflected the trend of James’s functionalist 
prevalence over ritualism and the overall shift towards a framework of secularized 
spiritualism (Singleton, 2007). Thus, the concept of mantras became “psychologicalized” 
along with other aspects of yoga.  
On this point, then, the use of mantra during ishvara pranidhana does not 
resemble modern translations of its practice and function(s) because Anandamurti adopts 
a tantric mystical explanation of the function of mantra in terms of the mantric phoneme 
as a part of the body, rather than the modernized view of a psychologicalized function. 
However, as indicated above, this perspective is viewed as mystical rather than magical. 
Urban (2003) highlights the observation that one of the ways in which modern 
translations occurred was apparently through conscious omissions of tantric teaching by 
modern authors. Above we saw evidence of translations of traditional yoga authored by 
Vivekananda. Urban (p. 135) extends this claim by specifically arguing that Vivekananda 
consciously “sought to cover over and deny” the tantric teachings of his master Swami 
Ramakrishna, suggesting that Vivekananda censored tantra for a political agenda of 
constructing a new national identity within the socio-historical context of a colonized 
India embedded in modernity. Lidke (2005, p. 154, note 40) asserts that Ramakrishna 
was “heavily influenced” by Sakta Tantra. Urban suggests that Vivekananda distanced 
himself from the often “embarrassing” teachings of the tantras embodied in his 
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“enigmatic Sakta mystic” teacher. This distance is significant because Ramakrishna is 
considered to be the primary spiritual teacher of Vivekananda, but De Michelis says that 
Vivekananda drew more from the neo-Vedanta Brahmo-Samaj than Ramakrisna’s 
teachings and tradition.  
This socio-political insight is interesting for my analysis on translations of 
modern yoga because it seems that there might be more similarity between Anadamurti 
and Ramakrishna than Vivekananda and Ramakrishna in terms of their similar 
identifications with tantrism. The implication is that the modernization of yoga could 
have taken a trajectory that has less affected tantric yoga than Vedanta-like yoga.  
In parallel to this, Urban (2003) goes on to argue that although Woodruff (the 
author of a number of translated books on tantra that are popular in the West who went 
by the pen-name Avalon because he did not want his real name to be associated with the 
“embarrassing” subject matter of tantra) defended tantra, he also “censored” and 
“covered up the more scandalous and even immoral aspects of tantra.” In particular, 
Urban (p. 141) argues that “Woodruff’s interpretations involve an odd mixture of 
Western scientific terms” – such as evolution, matter, energy, etc. – and Sanskrit 
philosophy and language. 
Within this new translated framework, Western followers could try to undo 
dogmatic or “magical” beliefs and oppressive external authority, and see religion as a 
cultural system within which to obtain grounding in rationalism and science (De 
Michelis, 2004). This new frameworks fits within the overarching goal of synthesizing 
science and religion by de-emphasizing “magical” aspects of tantric practice such as 
mantra, authority aspects of tantric practice such as guru, and metaphysical “truth” ideals 
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that cannot be explained by rational science such as mystical experience in meditation. 
De Michelis suggests that this all contributed to the eventual trend towards physical 
practice and emergence of scientific experimentation investigating yoga, which was by 
this time seen more as a physical practice (i.e., the performance of asanas) rather than the 
traditional understanding of yogic practice as meditation.  
 
Reconsidering Ishvara Pranidhana 
Anandamurti’s discourse on ishvara pranidhana falls into the stream of yogic 
science because even when he talks about the body, he does so with a focus on 
spirituality and mysticism, and explicates the occult. While he does value asanas and the 
body, his central practice and philosophy concerns meditation. 
So far in part II, we have seen that modern reworkings of yoga came from a 
scientific mindset often within emic practitioners, and that this has been important for 
“rationalizing” yoga and shifting explanations away from its traditions. At this point one 
might now question exactly what is yogic science and the science of yoga really. And 
also ask how much of all this translation applies to the contemporary tantric yoga 
meditation practice of ishvara pranidhana. The answers to these questions form the emic 
perspective on ishvara pranidhana that we have been seeking.  
We have seen that there are identifiable strains of traditional interpretations of 
yoga, especially Classical Yoga and tantric yoga, in Anandamurti’s method of ishvara 
pranidhana. First and foremost, we have seen that concentration on ishvara as a concept 
or theorized reality and ishvara pranidhana as a practice technique are visible in the 
Classical Yoga text, the Yoga Sutra. We have also seen that the process of use of mantra 
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is a defining feature of Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana, especially as 
articulated through certain tantric Saivite schools and their non-dual theories of the 
emanation of worldly objects from consciousness. Thus the tantric Siddha practice of 
bhutasuddhi that is also visible in ishvara pranidhana stems from such a cosmological 
perspective. These aspects of classical and traditional yoga are all visible in 
Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana. 
But in addition, some of the translations that have occurred to generate Modern 
Yoga also apply, and help to locate Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana within the 
contemporary yoga milieu. Thus, while the emic framework of ishvara pranidhana holds 
mysticism and mystical accounts of absorption as central to explanations of meditation, at 
the same time it adopts the framework of health and disease, and, I argue, continues the 
classical “liberation from suffering” theme in modern language. Although ishvara 
pranidhana still holds onto the concept of purusa (instead of becoming translated into 
mind), this realm is brought, like Brahman (ultimate reality), into view as an experiential 
reality. Like the rest of Modern Yoga, ishvara pranidhana advances notions of divinized 
self-hood as a result of practice, as well as the possibility for cosmic healing. Finally, 
although purposeful spiritual liberation from embodied suffering is still the goal of 
ishvara pranidhana, this goal is put into an evolutionary context like other streams of 
yoga practiced today, although the details may not yet be fully coherent. Thus in 
important ways, the emic model of ishvara pranidhana represents a mix of both 
traditional and modern practice methods and interpretations. This is the model that we 
will carry into a comparison with the etic model of the meditating brain. 
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In part III, we will no longer deal with socio-historical and cultural movements. 
Having set out these two perspectives, we will instead move on to comparing the same 
and similar concepts of mental processes at various analytical levels with the goal of 
understanding how they contribute to this very interesting phenomenon of meditative 
absorption. We have seen that some of the same or similar concepts seem to be 
interrelated, and now we will see if we can draw out the similarities and differences and 
clarify any existing confusions about the types of knowledge each perspective 
contributes. Thus we will engage in a somewhat more detailed examination of these 
concepts as a way of drawing them together. But before we turn to these questions, let us 
conclude part II with a discussion that brings into focus our central problem of comparing 
emic and etic models of meditation.  
 
The Central Problem of Reference and Reality Depiction 
What we have before us today in the field where science and yoga intersect one another, 
is two competing views of reality. On the one hand, scientists are interested in what 
happens in the brain during meditative states. On the other hand, practitioners seek to 
raise their own kundalini so as to encounter for themselves a transcendent state. Looking 
at these two characterizations of meditation, it is evident that scientists use their data and 
theories to describe what we can known about the physical architecture, while 
practitioners use the “data” from their own perceptions and experience along with 
culturally passed theories to describe experiential realities. The central problem that 
occurs when these two depictions come into contact is that there is a question as to the 
reference depicted by each model. As we have seen throughout this chapter, further 
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problems ensue when one attempts to use the discourse of science to characterize a 
transcendent state. Is it possible, then, for people talking from each perspective to be 
talking about the same thing, the same state or condition? What sort of authentic dialogue 
is possible? 
Alter (2004, p. 64) argues that metaphors function in the science of yoga to bring 
these realities into proximity with one another (i.e., science enables a metonymic 
understanding of mind, body, and transcendence). He explains, “Science enables a 
metonymic understanding of what might otherwise be read as an elaborate analogy. It 
forces the question of empirical correspondence [which might otherwise be seen as an 
elaborate analogy] into the domain of metaphor, producing multiple level of mimesis 
within and across the divide between epistemology and ontology.”  Alter is saying that 
science allows for a certain kind of understanding that forces the question of empirical 
correspondence between subjective truth and physicality into the domain of metaphor, 
and that this produces multiple levels of representing or reflecting nature or reality. 
Soskice (1985) also argues that metaphor help us understand something we do not 
understand, in both science and religion. The problem of reality depiction occurs when 
the referent of the reality depicted is not literal. This is the case of our emic perspective, 
and our etic perspective, too. Emic perspective the referent of samadhi or “That” as 
indicated by the mantra AHUM “I am that” (Muller-Ortega, 1989) is not at all clear. In 
neuroscience, he referent “brain” is literal, as is biochemical activity; however, there is 
also the machine model that depicts the mind, which underlies the science of the mind. It 
is difficult to describe these realities because they take us into unfamiliar and unknown 
territory.  
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Soskice (1985) compares the models in science and religion on the question of 
how they are used as a way to get beyond superficial comparisons. She compares on two 
points, but I discuss only the first one here, and that is the (false) belief that the models of 
science are explanatory and those of religious affective. Instead, Soskice argues that there 
is a cognitive function for the use of metaphor in religion. This cognitive approach to 
metaphor takes the place of using the narrative unit as a ‘language’ or speech event (p. 
109). In this view, imagery and structures of theistic reflection (i.e., religious models) are 
to be understood as reality depicting. In the chapters that follow, we will assume this 
cognitive stance on the use of metaphor in both science and religion. Because from this 
point of view one cannot cling to a realist position, this will be our starting point from 
which to inquire wider problems of the nature of explanation.  
In light of these modern puzzles, this type of inevitable flowing together of ideas 
about the same phenomenon of meditation requires further analytical consideration, but 
with a different kind of translational focus. Rather than trying to overlay a “scientific” 
interpretation onto the yogic model, I will compare each system on its own terms with the 
other. Whereas “yogic science” of ishvara pranidhana has the purposeful goal of 
liberation and alleviation of suffering, the science of yoga has the pragmatic goal of 
knowledge of the body. This difference motivates a comparison of how each views the 
mental processes of meditation in an effort to clarify existing and potential confusions 
resulting from the intermingling of these two ways of knowing meditative absorption. 
Specifically, in part three we will compare the three tantric yoga processes of 
concentrated mind, samskara, and samadhi examined in this chapter with three 
seemingly similar categories determined by my analysis of the latest neuroscience and 
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physiological research literature on meditation from chapter three, namely attention, 
memory, and emotion. Admittedly, scientific study of meditation has so demystified and 
translated meditation into concepts and processes of health and disease, stress, etc., that 
comparison of the processes that so dominate current cognitive psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience with the three central cognitive processes from the emic meditation 
perspective of tantric yoga may prove to be quite difficult. Perhaps the concept of 
mysticism, and the way that each of these three mental processes (especially the last one 
of samadhi) ties in to mystical phenomena, is the most difficult aspect to understand 
about tantric yoga. But mysticism is still out there, although it is not in the new (and now 
dominant) matrix – that is, this is not just a historical concept from medieval tantra or 
older yogic eras but rather a living phenomenon that is written about and talked about, 
and possibly even experienced by contemporary practitioners. Therefore, we will revisit 
this notion of mysticism in part III even though it does not exactly fit in with the modern 
scientific paradigm because mysticism is central to tantric yoga. 
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Part III 
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Chapter Six 
Concentrated Attention 
 
A number of neuroscience studies have shown that meditation impacts 
neurophysiological processes of attention (Valentine and Sweet, 1999; Slagter, et al., 
2007; Tang, et al., 2007; Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, and Richardson, 2008). Many of the 
executive functions that involve attention are relevant to meditation, such as attentional 
shifting, working memory, focusing, and cognitive flexibility (Levine, 2000; Lutz, 
Slagter, Dunne, and Davidson, 2008). Similarly, Yoga recognizes one-pointed attention 
(ekagrata) as fundamental to meditation and attainment of absorption (YS 3.2, 3.11.3.12; 
Miller, 1995). A number of techniques or strategies are given in traditional yogic texts 
aimed to help practitioners focus and concentrate attention as a necessary phase of the 
meditation process, and ishvara pranidhana is one such technique (YS 2.32, 2.45; 
Miller). In this method, practitioners concentrate all of their attentional resources, 
including all of the sensory apparatuses, on ishvara (god). Thus, the task in this chapter is 
to compare the neuroscience and tantric yoga perspectives on the processes of attentional 
focus.   
 
1. Types of Attention 
I begin this comparison with a consideration of how the two systems 
conceptualize attention. This comparison shows that the two systems conceptualize 
attention in largely similar ways, according to the “types” of attention that manifest in 
different moments. However, although the two systems come to almost the same 
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conclusion about the kinds of attention the mind can “enact” (Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch, 1991, p. 173 and chapter three), or perform, there is one “type” of attention 
articulated in the emic literature that is not well formed in the neuroscience literature on 
attention: nirodha (cessation) or quieted attention. According to Yoga, this type of 
attention is specific to meditative states of consciousness. Neuroscientific research on 
meditation addresses this question of conceptualizing meditative attention, but such 
conceptualizations of attention are not recognized in the field of attention more generally. 
In this section I focus the comparison on explicating this type of attention and 
highlighting what it means in terms of self and environmental contexts. Then, in the 
following two sections on mechanisms of attention, I extend the analysis to consider 
more fully the similarities and differences between the two perspectives’ 
conceptualizations of meditative attention. 
 
Tantric Yoga: One-pointed and Quiet as Types of Attention during Meditation 
In his commentary on the Yoga Sutra 1.1, Vyasa defines the following five types 
or stages of attention: (1) ksipta (wandering), (2) mudha (forgetful), (3) vikshepa 
(distracted), (4) ekagrata (one-pointed), and (5) nirodha (cessation) (Prasada, 1912). The 
first three of these types of attention (i.e., wandering, forgetful, and distracted) are types 
of attention active during normal mental states of consciousness and are the kinds of 
attention that draw the mind outwards, while the last two, ekagrata and nirodha, are the 
types of attention important for meditation (Eliade, 1958).  
Prasada writes that vikshepa (tossing) is a state in which attention is occasionally 
steady or distracted. In this state, one is able to attain some concentration but there is no 
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ability to sustain attention. This state is marked in contrast to a state in which 
concentration is sustained and “one-pointed” (ekagrata). Ekagrata, one-pointed or 
concentrated attention, is the foundation for absorption in yogic meditation. Swami 
Yogabhakti (1990) characterizes ekagrata as “the attentive mind,” and he calls this state 
the “finest aspect” of dharana (or concentration). One practices concentration (dharana) 
to attain the one-pointed type of attention. Thus, ekagrata (one-pointed concentration) is 
the type of attention that is necessary to shift the mind into meditative states, and this 
type of attention leads to nirodha (cessation of mental function), the type of attention that 
characterizes the goal state of meditation. 
Patanjali’s Yoga Sutra YS 1.32 asserts that “concentration on one principle” 
(Swami Satyananda, 1976) or focusing on “the single truth” is the means to prevent 
distractions (Miller, 1995). Similarly, YS 3.2 defines meditation (dhyana) as “focusing 
on a single conceptual flow.” Miller elaborates that meditation involves “unwavering 
attention” and “a continuous flow of attention.” YS 2.1 identifies ishvara pranidhana as 
one of the main methods to achieve this type of attention and we have seen that the 
method of using mantra during ishvara pranidhana serves as this single point of 
concentration. By practicing this technique, one may develop ekagrata or one-pointed 
concentration.  
The last type of attention, nirodha, is the meditation process in which all thoughts 
and all the kleshas (mental afflictions) become absorbed into or return to their origin, that 
is, the object of thought (see Miller, 1995, YS 1.41-46) (see also YS 2.10). When the 
meditator sustains attention to the objects representing god during ishvara pranidhana 
meditation, integration occurs and one attains a state of nirodha; in this attentional state 
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the meditator may enter deeper and deeper levels of absorption (Feuerstein, 1979) or 
samadhi (Chapple, 1982).  
Finally, ekagrata can be a complex form of concentrated attention in which the 
meditator is paying attention to multiple things at once. During ishvara pranidhana, for 
example, the meditator attends to a particular posture, the breath, and to a complex 
visualization all while reciting the mantra. In this sense, concentrated attention during 
meditation is a matter of expanding awareness to multiple aspects of the single task, with 
the task being contemplation of or striving to feel the meaning of the mantra. Sustaining 
attention to the mantra as the object of meditation relates to the specific belief that 
oneself is identical at a core level to the whole of existence or reality of ishvara. This 
belief comes from the tantric emanationist theory or cosmology that resonates with the 
Samkhyan categories of all the elements of reality coming from the same source. Rather 
than shifting attention from one small task to another (paying attention to each aspect of 
the meditation one after another), the meditator learns to coordinate attention to all of the 
objects at once and remain attentive for longer and longer periods, and this coordination 
is what requires such concentration.  
 
Neuroscience: Selective and Sustained Attention as the Types of Attention during 
Meditation  
The neuroscience literature on attention described a number of different types of 
attention. The main ones are wandering, divided, selective (or concentrated), and 
sustained attention. For example, Raichle and colleagues (e.g., Raichle et al., 2001; 
Gusnard and Raichle, 2001) identify what they call a “default mode” in which attention 
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diffusely “wanders” when the mind is not engaged in any particular task. In this state, the 
mind wanders towards internal private thoughts, feelings, and memories (Smallwood, Mc 
Spadden, and Schooler, 2007). As one aspect of mind-wandering, Mason et al. (2007) 
recently found evidence that brain areas of the default network (e.g., medial temporal 
lobe, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulated cortex) are involved in generating 
stimulus-independent thought when attention is distracted or tosses from one thought to 
the next.  
Until recently, the concept of mind wandering has been buried within various 
related lined of research such as stimulus-independent thought, task-unrelated thought, 
and task unrelated images and thoughts (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). Smallwood and 
Schooler (2006) seek to integrate mind wandering into mainstream models of executive 
attention because it helps explain controlled processing, such as the shifting of executive 
control. The shift of attention away from sensory sources that occurs in these types of 
processes was originally described as “decoupling.” When the mind wanders, the content 
of working memory is “decoupled” from the attentional task, which interrupts retrieval 
and recollection processes (Smallwood et al., 2007). In this state, attention may become 
divided between internal and external information when some attention remains on the 
intended task. Alternatively, research on divided attention suggests that subjects can 
place attention on multiple objects or ideas at once (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006), the 
kind of attention required for multitasking. Divided attention will be related to the kind of 
multitasking necessary for ishvara pranidhana in the comparison section, which involves 
intentionally decoupling all attention from the environmental surroundings. Other forms 
of internally focused attention include mental imagery, reasoning, and autobiographical 
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memory recall (Smallwood and Schoolar, 2006) and internally focused attention is also 
linked to awareness. 
When the mind wanders, people are often unaware that their attention has drifted 
away from the intended object of attention (Giambra, 1995). Awareness or lack of 
awareness (or attention) to an intended task is also an important aspect of attentional 
processes because the ability to sustain attention can fluctuate. In the paragraphs below I 
discuss the ability to sustain attention as conceptualized in attention research. Because 
this aspect of attention is examined in memory research as well (i.e. the tendency for 
attention to fluctuate conceptualized in terms of “forgetfulness”), I will discuss it again in 
the memory chapter. In both sections it must be emphasized how intertwined attentional 
and memory processes are when it comes to this aspect of conscious experience.  
Neuroscience literature on attention defines two further types of attention: 
selective attention and sustained attention. Both of these types of attention are at the heart 
of research on attentional processes in meditation. In a recent review article on 
meditation, Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, and Davidson (2008) characterized these two types of 
attention as two distinct “styles” of meditation, calling these styles, respectively, focused 
attention (in which meditators direct their attention to a selected object) and also detect 
mind wandering from the meditation task), and open monitoring (in which the meditator 
sustains attention to the content of experience). Both of these types of attention require 
monitoring skills to detect distraction or wandering of attention away from the task.  
The main difference between these two styles of meditation or types of attention 
is the object of attention. In the case of selective attention (or focused attention) the 
person attends to a specific object or activity. In the case of sustained attention (or open 
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monitoring), the object of attention can potentially vary over time. In this case, attention 
is held or sustained to the single task of observing the mental content, even though this 
content shifts. As we will see, during ishvara pranidhana, selective attention on mantra is 
required as the sole object of attention during the preliminary purification stages, but the 
task also requires sustained attention because the process is lengthy and the selective 
attention shifts to a contemplative act over time.  
 
Comparison: Types of Attention and Concentration 
Yogic and neuroscientific perspectives both describe a number of similar types of 
attention. Both identify the wandering type of attention in which no task captures 
attention; forgetfulness in which one loses track of the attentional task; distracted or 
divided attention in which the mind attends intermittently to a task; selective attention in 
which the mind is wholly focused on some selected target, task, or focal point; and some 
sort of sustained attention in which the mind attends for some time to that selected task 
and may become quiet. Both systems indicate that these types of attention are common in 
everyday life during waking states. The similarities between these types of attention may 
be obvious with few differences between them.  
In particular, the yogic ksipta (wandering) seems to be the same concept as the 
wandering mind discussed in neuroscience literature that has been linked to the default 
mode of attention. Wandering in both perspectives includes the yogic notion of vikshepa 
(distracted attention) and the neuroscience notion of divided attention; both of these 
concepts convey a sense of sometimes distracted and sometimes focused attention.  
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Mind wandering is similar to meditation in that in both processes attention is 
shifted internally and in these states attention is no longer driven by an external stimulus. 
However, mind wandering occurs in the absence of explicit intention (Smallwood and 
Schooler, 2006) and in the case of ishvara pranidhana, the mind consciously directs itself 
away from peripheral stimuli and towards one single abstract idea of the infinite. 
Therefore, these processes are distinct because when the mind wanders there is little 
controlled attentional processing, yet in ishvara pranidhana meditation, attention is 
purposefully and intentionally held to the selected object.  
Neuroscience research on divided attention suggests that attention actually moves 
from one thing to another very quickly rather than attention actually being divided across 
multiple things at the same exact moment (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006), and this 
notion supports the yogic senses of wandering (ksipta) and distracted (vikshepa) 
attention. Note, though, that the idea of attention to multiple objects or events in the same 
moment is more reflective of expanded awareness (Walsh and Shapiro, 2006). Expanded 
awareness is thought to be an important quality or resultant state of meditation. This 
sense of attention is not like the yogic wandering or distracted attention or the 
neuroscience divided attention. Also, forgetfulness that arises from inattention, and can 
be stress-related, seems to be exactly what is meant by the yoga concept of forgetfulness 
(mudha).  
These types of attention that are shifted during meditation – i.e., wandering 
(ksipta), forgetful (mudha), and distracted (vikshepa) - suggest the yogic sense of 
dispersiveness. The neuroscientific concept of automatic or exogenous stimulus-driven 
attention and yogic dispersive attention are similar because both concepts have the idea 
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that the environment captures attention. The neuroscience concept of controlled or 
endogenous attention means that the person shifts attention so that it is intentionally 
focused and brain activity is internally generated rather than being stimulus-driven 
(Vogels, Rajan, and Abott, 2005). This concept is similar to the yogic notion of 
introversial attention because, in both, the person controls attention rather than outside 
stimulus. However, there is a difference between these ideas, too, because implied in the 
neuroscience notion of controlled attention is that one directs attention towards an 
“external” stimulus as a means of attaining some goal. In this view, the stimulus is often 
located out in the worldly environment. In contrast, the yogic introversial attention by 
definition means that attention is directed towards some “transcendent” reality that 
embedded in both the self and the environmental context, in which the distinction 
between self and the world does not exist.  
There is little difficulty in recognizing concentrated and sustained types of 
attention as similar between both yoga and neuroscience. Both systems identify a 
concentrated mental state akin to absorption, which involves sustained attention to a 
single field. Eliade (1958) points out that these two types of attention, formulated in yoga 
as ekagrata and nirohda, are important for yogic meditation, and Lutz et al. (2008) 
suggest that in neuroscience research there is a focus on these types of attention in studies 
of meditation. To achieve the yogic ekagrata (or one-pointed concentration) requires that 
one first attains selected attention to an object or task as described in neuroscience; by 
definition the neuroscientific concept of selective attention implies concentrated 
attention. Yet the concentration of yoga intimates some sort of physical process in that 
the mind is an ontological structure that itself seems to become concentrated, whereas in 
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neuroscience the notion of concentrated attention intimates a functional process whereby 
the physical processes that shifted are blood, electricity, and biochemicals. But there are 
no exclusively “mental” structures. This point will be further explored in the next section 
on mechanisms.  
Despite these great conceptual similarities between types of attention, another 
main difference is that while neuroscience applies both the attention concepts relevant to 
meditation to different contexts generally, this is not the case for yoga. While yoga may 
consider ekagrata as a general state of attention, nirodha is a very specific type of 
attention defined only in the context of yoga. The nirodha type of attention in which the 
mind is quiet has meaning only as the goal state of yoga. Nevertheless, this concept as a 
type of attention has meaning in the neuroscience context, too, in the line of research that 
examines attentional processes during meditation. 
In sum, both systems recognize several types of attention that are conceptually 
similar and both identify selection and sustained focused attention as requisite for a 
meditative type of attention. However, this comparison has shown that the concept of 
nirodha (in which states of absorption are entered into) is a type of attention with 
meaning only in the context of the emic system’s broader account of identity. Now I turn 
comparing the mechanisms of attentional processes unique to yoga and neuroscience with 
the goal of furthering this exposition on the realities depicted by these competing models 
of meditation.  
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2. Mechanisms of Concentrated Mind and Attentional Processes 
 The analysis now shifts from considerations of conceptualizations of attention to 
an examination of the mechanical operations of the mind’s attentional processes. As we 
saw in part II, both yogic and neuroscientific accounts assume that the mind is constituted 
in materiality. This is largely a philosophical question because it addresses the 
metaphysics of the mind and its reality in the world. However, recent advances in 
cognitive neuroscience over the past 60 years (Varela, Thompson, and Roasch, 1991, 
chapter three) have made it possible to examine this question what what scientists 
consider to be great empirical vigor. Thus, the question of the physical mechanisms of the 
mind is currently a matter of great debate amongst professional philosophers and 
cognitive scientists who focus on theoretical and empirical questions of mental 
phenomena.  
Theories matter for what kinds of assumptions we make about material reality, which in 
turn shapes hypotheses about observable phenomena, especially regarding the kinds of 
methods practitioners can use to observe those phenomena. What we are comparing here, 
then, are descriptions about the mechanical operations of attention processes that are 
derived from the differing methods. On the one hand the emic account comes from 
practitioners’ observations about the mind drawn from the mind observing its own 
processes, while on the other hand the etic is shaped by scientists observing biochemical 
and electrical activity in the structures and processes of the brain. These two methods 
emphasize different aspects of embodied reality. In both systems, practitioners make 
inferences based on these observations about causality that shape their theories about the 
mind.   
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Tantric Yoga: Intentionality as the Self’s Mechanism of Concentrating and Focusing the 
Mind   
When in a normal state of mind, people pay attention to worldly events and 
objects, but in meditation people try to pay attention to their experiential realities by 
introspecting on their own mental processes. Chapple (1982, p. 113) explains that when 
one is in the state of nirodha and absorption (samadhi) arises, “attention cannot be 
separated from the intended; awareness is both subject-free (anahamvahi) and object-free 
(nirvastuka).” He explains that this state of awareness (i.e., absorption) is neither a union 
of an “appropriating” self with objects of appropriation nor a Cartesian separation of 
thought and thinker, but rather a non-separation of knower, knowing, and known. In 
ishvara pranidhana, what is intended is that practitioners penetrate their awareness into 
the essence of their own identity, free from any worldly or mental conditions. 
Practitioners take on this intention as their own. This intention to concentrate the mind 
and gain “spiritual” knowledge (gained from entering this state of awareness) operates as 
the primary process, or what I will call here a “mechanism” that brings the mind to the 
one-pointed ekagrata state of attention, and hence enables absorption. Here we examine 
intentionality as a mechanism of meditation and the driving force that develops ekagrata 
(one-pointed concentration) and the emergence of absorption. 
Yogic techniques require a “restructuring” of the thought from mundane thinking 
to what Wheelock (1989) calls a responsible intention. It matters what new thoughts are 
put in place to take the place of the old ones. If one’s intention is to experience the 
ordinary objective world, or at least an outward perception of worldly objects and events, 
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for example, to attend to an object in the kitchen and see a table or to sit in a chair and 
read a particular book, then one’s attention will follow this intention; the attention (or 
mind) is directed to the intended goal. But if what is “intended” is realization of ishvara 
or ultimate reality, especially within oneself, then thoughts cannot be directed towards the 
worldly level of objects (Chapple, 1982). What is required from a tantric perspective is to 
see non-separation in the nature of all worldly objects (Muller-Ortega, 2005). Thus, 
thoughts are directed beyond the mundane level of normal worldly appearance so that 
one can perceive what Anandamurti calls a “subterranean” flow. For proper meditation, 
thoughts must be directed by means of the particular use of mantra towards the intended 
object or goal (YS 3.2; Feuerstein, 1979; Chapple, 1982; Wheelock, 1989; Miller, 1994; 
Miller, 1995), which, in the case of ishvara pranidhana meditation, is ishvara (god).  
By definition meditation requires a singularity of intention (Chapple, 1982; 
Miller, 1995, YS 3.2). Singularity means that not just one or some of the thoughts must 
be directed towards ishvara, rather, all of the thoughts are. Feuerstein (1979) explains 
that in yogic theory, in the phase of dhyana (absorptive meditation), “the presented-ideas 
are consistently associated with the object of concentration until no foreign thoughts 
intrude and complete restriction (nirodha) is achieved.” This process of sublimation is the 
means of restructuring thought. Numerous sources of scholarship on yoga (e.g., 
Feuerstein, 1979; Chapple, 1982; Wheelock, 1989; Miller, 1994) refer to this intention 
that mantra creates within the meditating subject.  
As we have seen in chapter four, ishvara is a special case of purusa (Pfleuger, 
2005). When practicing ishvara pranidhana the meditator holds the “singular” intention 
of seeing, perceiving, or coming into contact with ishvara or purusa. In this state, the 
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mind is fully absorbed in the thought of ishvara, as the mind’s “truest” nature, and the 
meaning of the mantra: “I am that (Siva)” (Ortega-Muller, 1992). Because the person is 
paying attention only to the flow of thought surrounding the contemplated meaning of 
“I,” yoga theorizes that the self (atman) becomes aware of itself at the level of 
consciousness (purusa) or ultimate reality. The act of meditation takes individual 
perception beyond a subject-object relationship.   
 As Chapple (1982, p. 114) elaborates, “Yoga is concerned with reality as 
presented by and arising from the intention and attention of the particularized 
consciousness” with the purpose of yoga to “break through to the point of consciousness 
where there is no distinction between seer and seen.” The “particularized consciousness” 
Chapple refers to relates to cultivating liberative samskara or the conscious cultivation of 
the intention “I am that (Siva).”  
Once one concentrates one’s mind into an attentional state of ekagrata or one-
pointedness, the mind’s intentions contained within that focal point become the sole 
reality. In other words, this complex of intentions is what is “seen” by the seer. This is 
why Anandamurti insists that the mantra or focus of attention matters, (a position taken in 
tantric yoga, but not necessarily in Yoga of non-tantric persuasion). In this theory, then, 
sustaining attention to this focal point during meditation is what eventually dissolves the 
perceived boundaries or the mind’s cognitive distinctions between the entity that is seen 
and the seer who witnesses that entity. This is a state of “existential unity” (Chapple, 
1982).  
While intentionality can be seen as the psychological mechanism of meditation, a 
number of scholars relate mantric utterance to intention in a way that could lead one to 
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see mantra as the physical mechanism of concentration. For example, Alper (1989) 
suggests seeing mantra as a “mechanism” for accessing a certain class of thoughts 
necessary to enter the desired state. Similarly, Timalsina (2005) underscores the 
significance of the act of joining japa (mantra recitation) with meaning as a primary 
tantric means by which the mind turns attention inwards and comes to rest. During 
ishvara pranidhana, practitioners use mantra as the means of sublimating (or associating) 
thoughts to (or with) ishvara. 
Wheelock (1989) explains that the particular significance of mantra is that its 
proper usage requires feeling the meaning of the mantra, and utterance is precisely what 
effects the “restructuring” of thought because properly using a mantra requires a specific 
intention (or ideation). The silent utterance affects an embodied feeling throughout the 
various layers of the person. Wheelock views the function of language as a speech act 
and this function is significant because utterance does not merely express some idea, but 
involves accomplishing some purposeful act. In other words, by activating mantric 
utterance as a speech act, the tantric meditator implicitly intends some effect.  
The effect of speech acts is usually to convey information. However, rather than 
communicating some information, Wheelock (1989) argues that the purpose of mantric 
utterance is to create and allow participation in a known and repeatable situation. Silent 
rehearsal is the means by which the tantric yoga practitioner participates in spiritual 
reality. Tantric theory holds that it is through such participation that the meditator comes 
to recognize the identity between the inner and outer realities of self and cosmos, 
respectively. In his examination of the relationship between the mantra and god, 
Oberhammer (1989) maintains that the presence of god is mediated by mantra; thus, only 
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mantra provides concentration with its natural content. Timalsina (2005) concurs by 
explaining mantra signifies the totality, and simultaneously refers to all aspects that the 
totality of the mantra embraces. This view rests on Oberhammer’s inference that the 
relationship between the mantra and god cannot be identical with the linguistic 
relationship between word and its object in human language – it must be independent of 
linguistic conventions. This non-linguistic nature to mantra is critical for analyzing the 
cognitive reality of mantric utterance.  
Along the lines of identifying mantra as a mechanism of attending to thoughts, 
Alper (1989) also calls mantra a “machine” of thoughts, since rather than being 
something that one uses to express a thought, mantras actually generate a thought. In this 
sense, Alper sees mantra as a cognitive tool, arguing that the mantra works as a 
mechanism to tune the mind to the object of attention. He shows that mantra recitation 
calls to conscious awareness the referent of the mantra – i.e., Siva, god, or ishvara – and 
as concentration on this object continues, one’s mental state becomes absorbed in this 
thought. This means that because the mantra denotes god, during ishvara pranidhana 
when the meditator uses mantra the individual’s subjective awareness becomes attuned to 
only that one object: god (ishvara.) The repetition of mantra is important but one cannot 
just mechanically perform the act. During the course of practice, mantras interact with the 
subjective awareness of the practitioner (Timalsina, 2005). During absorptive meditation 
practitioners consciously associate all the thoughts of the mind with the referent of the 
mantra – the reality of non-dualism or non-separation between subject and object - which 
is the object of meditation. Thus, the goal of tantric ritual is realized when consciousness 
of the practitioner blends with the thought-power represented by the mantra. More will be 
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said about silent rehearsal as a mechanism of attentional processing in the next chapter 
that links attention and memory.  
There is another aspect to the theory of mantra being a generator of thought. 
Muller-Ortega (1989) explains that tantric mantras indicate the intention of Siva to 
emanate into worldly form, and the simultaneous intention that Siva and the entirety of 
the world – and this means the practitioner, as well - experiences becoming united as 
“one.”  Thus, the meditator’s ability to cultivate a spiritual intention by uttering the 
mantra is due to the very nature of the mantra as intention born of Siva’s will.  
Wheelock (1989) explains that the tantric mantra is the “ritual terminus” or end 
game of the mantra and divine realm. In other words, actually feeling the intended 
meaning of the mantra is the end game for tantric yoga. This feeling is an embodied 
feeling because the goal of mantra is founded in the tantric conception of language that 
the “seeds” or bija mantras are fundamental constituents of the universe, and thus their 
utterance has a special effect within the practitioner’s body. This link between the reality 
of the mantra and the practitioner’s body is at the heart of understanding the physical 
mechanisms of absorption from the tantric yoga perspective. Therefore consideration of 
this point is continued in the next two chapters on the mental processes of memory and 
emotion in meditation on the issue of the basic evaluation of the mantra and how its use 
and resultant state shapes tantric theories of mantra that focus on how it leads to 
absorption. 
In tantric theory, the mind is embodied within the physicality of the body. The 
Samkhya system that is assumed by Yoga provides ideas about the how the physical links 
of this attunement process becomes enacted in the body. Such links are embedded in 
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Larson’s (1969) explanation of the mind’s constitution in physical substance. According 
to Larson’s explanation of Samkhya, the mind (citta) extends through sensory organs 
(indriyas) to actually make contact with worldly objects, and it is through this contact of 
the mind with the world that objects are known. In the tantric translation of this account, 
consciousness is continuous with the citta (mind) (Muller-Ortega, 1992); that is, 
consciousness exists within and not separate from the material substance of the world. 
Therefore, in tantric practice, it is also the individual consciousness imbedded within the 
citta that makes contact with the world. In states of wandering or unfocused attention, 
then, the citta becomes scattered about many worldly objects. The citta vibrates with the 
colors (or light energy), sound patterns, etc. of the world and this vibrational or resonant 
state is important for psychological functioning because the vibrational state of the citta 
(mind) plays an important role in determining the objects that attract the mind. But the 
resonance of the mind does not wholly determine the attentional focus of the person; as 
we have seen, individuals have the power to set intentions.  
During meditation, the practitioner attempts to withdraw the citta from the world 
and concentrate the citta within one localized area (i.e., the ishta chakra) within the body. 
This involves the practitioner intentionally turning attention inward, focusing attention on 
the mantra recitation and visualization of its meaning, and consciously withdrawing the 
mind from the sense organs (indriyas), and from all the material layers of the body. Then, 
the practitioner further withdraws the citta from the tantric subtle body system of chakras 
and nadis described in chapters two and four. (See the section on tantric yoga 
mechanisms of emotion in the chapter on emotion for further elaboration on the tantric 
body systems that the citta moves through during the yogic withdrawal process.) Finally, 
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the mind becomes so focused on its object that it ceases to function in its normal modes. 
In this way, the mind becomes quieted from its activity of perceiving objects in the world 
and from the mental-emotional content of the mind associated with worldly perceptions 
and cognitions. This is the state of quiet the YS calls nirodha, the goal of Patanjali’s 
Yoga, or what Abhinavigupta calls a state of “illuminated intellectuality.” This is 
absorption and the state of consciousness existing during this period is the subject of 
many of the controversies between emic and etic views of meditation. Now let us 
continue our comparison of attentional processes by turning to examine the neuroscience 
mechanism of attention. 
 
Neuroscience: Selection as the Brain’s Mechanism of Shifting Attention 
As we have seen, attentional focusing is a primary action that begins and sustains 
the practice of ishvara pranidhana meditation. Ishvara pranidhana meditation requires 
that the practitioner engage a number of attentional processes, starting with switching the 
attentional task from whatever task was previously at work and focusing attention to the 
meditation task. This may also include switching to the meditation task from the default 
mode in which the mind is not engaged in any particular task. 
A number of lines of research all converge to indicate that selection is the brain’s 
mechanism of attentional control as the brain switches between tasks and from object to 
object. Posner (1994) explains that the decision of what to select and where to focus is 
modulated by executive attention instantiated in the frontal lobes, and that the prefrontal 
cortex influences the parietal areas, which carry out the attention shifting and selection 
processes. Thus at least two coordinated processes are involved in enacting selection. On 
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the one hand, higher decision processes of goal orientation, values, etc. enacted through 
activity of frontal brain areas of executive attention, especially in the ACC and OFC, 
determine or set search properties and select tasks. On the other hand, the parietal areas 
receive all the incoming information and shift attention to selected properties according 
to the importance of incoming information and what needs to be encoded for higher brain 
processing of the task. These two systems are related in that the PFC modulates activity 
in parietal areas by supervising or recruiting posterior brain areas that modulate attention 
(Posner and Dehaene, 1994; Posner and Peterson, 1990), and the PFC affects excitability 
of neurons encoding the features of the “to be attended” or “to be ignored” stimuli during 
both perceptual and higher processing (Posner and Dehaene). 
In the early phase of selective attention during any mental task, attentional 
networks are primed or tuned - a sort of programming process - to select for certain 
features of reality over others. These features are called attentional “targets.” Attention 
networks can be primed or tuned to different targets or features of spatial, visual, and 
auditory stimuli over others. Tuning involves sensory systems reacting to external stimuli 
or energy in the form of light for the visual system, sound for the auditory system, or 
other forms of energy for other sensory systems.  
Tuning is important because this process amplifies attentional processes. One 
study of attentional amplification of focused attention to color, form, or motion showed 
evidence for activation of a frontal attentional system, but no parietal activation was 
found (Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Schulman, and Petersen, 1991). Evidence such as 
this suggests that priming to different features of targets seems to occur through activity 
in at least two different areas of attention networks in the brain: frontal areas process 
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color or form while parietal areas process location, although Corbetta et al. (1991) note 
that both might enter and amplify activity within the visual system at the same site in 
cases when the target is a visual target.  
Posner and colleagues (Posner and Dehaene, 1994; Posner and Peterson, 1990) 
explain that guided search implemented in the brain by the anatomically distinct system 
of the anterior (or executive) attention system supervises the recruitment and control of 
posterior brain areas that modulate perception. The implication is that neurons extending 
from attentional control systems (executive system) in frontal areas to lower perceptual 
centers affect the excitability of neurons encoding the features of the “to-be-attended” or 
“to-be-ignored” stimuli during both perceptual and higher processing (Posner, et al. 
1994).  In ishvara pranidhana meditation, the “to-be-attended” stimuli are the mantra 
(discussed above) and imagery of the visualization; the location features are represented 
in the image of oneself sitting on the planet while form and motion are represented 
through the relationship of oneself to the cosmos. 
By examining attention shifting processes from the perspective of thinking about 
how humans relate to the environment “out there,” is becomes apparent that the 
environments some degree of control over cognition. This is because orienting is a search 
behavior that can be either voluntary (a self-regulated or controlled process in which the 
subject consciously controls the search processes) or involuntary unconscious orienting 
(an automatic process in which outside events solicit attention) (Posner, 1994, 1990). 
Involuntary orienting occurs when environmental stimuli automatically command a 
person’s attention by overriding conscious orientation processes. In instances of 
automatic orienting, as when exogenous sources of stimuli capture one’s attention, search 
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is automatically tuned to those exogenous properties. For example, automatic attending 
might occur in stressful situations where there is an overwhelming amount of stimuli 
occurring in the environment. In such cases, the mind that was previously either attending 
to another task or in the default mode mentioned in the previous section as a wandering 
type of attention in which a default network is active in the brain (in this state, there is no 
selected task and therefore no focused attention) switches to automatically attend to the 
exogenous source of stimulus. During internally decided-on or goal-oriented tasks, such 
as meditation, however, specific instructions are imbedded within the idea of the task. In 
these instances, the executive system takes over control of attention (Posner and 
Dehaene, 1994).    
It is not difficult to see that orienting requires attentional shifting. During the 
search process, attention moves from location to location until the target is detected. 
Shifting attention back to the selected task during meditation is an important and 
necessary skill because the mind has a natural tendency to wander and to be drawn to 
attend to competing stimuli in the environment. PET data collected by Corbetta, Miezin, 
Shulman, and Petersen (1993) showed that when attention is shifted from location to 
location, either voluntarily or as a result of being summoned by external events, the major 
focus of increased blood flow is in the superior parietal lobes.  
Once one selects an attentional task, the process of covert attention shifting can 
carry out selection of important aspects of how we decide where to focus. Changes in 
attentional focus change the priority given to a stimulus (Posner, 1988; Posner and 
Peterson, 1990). Covert attention shifting moves attentional focus without moving the 
eyes or head, and is correlated with increased cellular activity in the parietal lobe 
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(Triesman, 2006). At the network level, attentional shifts correspond to changes in 
oscillatory patterns of brain activity between frontal and posterior areas. PET data 
support the clinical observation that the two hemispheres are not symmetric in blood flow 
increases in each hemisphere during attention shifts (Corbetta, Miezin, Shulman, and 
Petersen, 1993). PET studies also suggest that the anatomical circuitry that enables the 
parietal areas to selectively modulate brain activity in other pre-striate areas passes 
through the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus (LaBerge and Buchsbaum, 1990). 
Importantly, activity in these parietal fibers is regulated by frontal areas (especially the 
PFC) thought to mediate executive attention. 
A number of neurotransmitters are involved in the regulation and modulation of 
attention and it is likely that they all work together. For example, norepinephrine (Aston-
Jones, Foote, and Bloom; 1984; Clark, Geffen, and Geffen, 1989; Posner, 1992; Bouret 
and Sara, 2004), glutamate (Bouret and Sara, 2004), dopamine (Ashby and Casale, 2003; 
Calabresi, Picconi, Tozzi, and Di Filippo, 2007), and acetylcholine (Clark, Geffen, and 
Geffen, 1989; Sarter and Bruno, 1997) have all been implicated in attention processes. 
However, it is difficult to tie specific neurotransmitters to specific functional features of 
attention and it is not clear whether particular neurotransmitters are involved in specific 
aspects of attention. It is almost certainly the case that all these neurotransmitters work 
together and can influence cognition by disturbing any one of the cortical functions.  
Selection is aided by cues that help the primed brain selectively orient and attend 
to a particular stimulus in the environment over others (Fernandez-Duque and Posner, 
1997). By tuning attention to certain features of reality, cues help a person pay attention 
to selected targets or tasks by guiding attention to the intended object. Cues can be or 
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become emotionally conditioned, and in this way emotion cues help define search 
boundaries by drawing attention to emotionally salient targets. 
Widespread consensus exists that emotion modulates attentional processes. This is 
because in waking states, the mind either consciously or unconsciously searches for 
attentional targets that are presumably of some sort of adaptive value and emotion 
modulates adaptive processes (Treisman, 2006). Both frontal and posterior brain 
attentional systems are thought to work together to select tasks and targets that maximize 
adaptation.  
A number of studies on the interaction between attentional and emotional 
processes have shown that the emotional salience of different stimuli can potentiate 
selection processes and command attentional resources (for review see Vuilleumier, 
2005). Attention is directed to emotional stimuli especially during later processing stages 
of perceptual processing (Schupp et al., 2007). Schupp and colleagues (Schupp et al., 
2004; Schupp, Flaisch, Stockberger, and Junghofer, 2006; Schupp et al., 2007) have 
proposed that data showing heightened attention to emotionally valenced stimuli might 
be interpreted in terms of a motivated attention model of emotional perception.  
In this model, emotional perception is related to adaptive significance of stimuli. 
Support for this idea can be found in several studies that have shown that processing of 
emotionally arousing pictures such as erotica and mutilation engage motivational circuits 
in the brain (e.g., Lang, Bradley, Cuthbert, 1997); note that these images have meaning 
that is significant to survival. That negative pictures rated higher in arousal are often 
more correlated with a greater magnitude of ERP (e.g., Lang et al., 1997) (ERP is an 
electrophysiological measure of brain responses to an internal or external stimulus) 
 202 
supports the idea of a general negative or threat bias. In this view, emotional bias to 
attend to threatening or otherwise emotionally stimulating cues presumably relates to 
survival needs. However, some data suggests that arousal rather than valence might be 
the dominant factor (for greater discussion of this point see Vuilleumier, 2005). This 
interpretation of arousal could help explain the longstanding controversial findings of 
arousal during yogic meditation instead of relaxation; thus, this positive arousal during 
meditation might be seen as an indication of meditation’s adaptive value.   
Emotional attention can also be conditioned (Stormark, Hugdahl, and Posner 
(1999; Vulilleumier, 2005). However, Sapolsky (2003) cautions that automatic responses 
can be conditioned to the point of producing too much stress reaction such that one 
automatically experiences motivated action as if responding to stress, and this 
conditioning results in plastic changes in the brain that can impair learning.  
 Understanding how the mind makes contact with the world from the 
neuroscience perspective is important because these mechanisms are basic to attention. 
Perceiving any object in the environment (whether it is the intended object or not) 
requires the transduction of energy by specific sensory organs, and the encoding of that 
energy into neural signals. That is, the person makes contact with the world when the 
energy outside of the person becomes integrated within the person. For example, to 
perceive a visual stimulus, light energy is chemically transduced into neural signals 
through the photoreceptors in the eyes, and then these signals are processed throughout 
the brain through various pathways involved in cognitive and emotion processes linked to 
attention. Similarly, detecting an auditory stimulus requires that the sound energy is 
mechanically transduced into neural signals as it travels through the physical structure of 
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the ear. Other types of stimulus also have energy transduction processes. These different 
forms of energy (sound, light, etc.) are what flow between the body and the environment 
and what the brain transduces into information about the world. This is the basic level of 
interaction that a person has with the environment from with to generate knowledge 
about the world. 
Although these are sensory rather than attentional mechanisms per se, it is 
important to at least mention these here because it is by way of these mechanisms that the 
person is able to attend to some object in the environment. It is by way of these 
mechanisms of sight, sound, touch, etc. that a person comes to perceive some object in 
the world. However, during meditation, the mind turns attention “inwards” towards the 
subtler aspects of experience. Because the selection that happens in these states has to do 
with mental content rather than stimuli from the environment, we might infer that these 
normal mechanisms of transducing energy no longer dominate the basic level of mental 
processing.  
This “quieting” of mental processing in relation to one’s environmental context 
raises the question of how one would maintain the sense of separation between self and 
environment that normally exist. We concluded in the last section on types of attention 
that cognitive scientists who study and theorize about meditation have not yet 
conceptualized the “quieting” type attention; therefore, it is not clear how one might go 
about answering this question. It is important, however, since it bears on our question of 
what reality neuroscientific understandings of mental processes depict. Therefore, it is 
one we will return to in the last chapter when we step back from specific mental 
processes to take a broader look at cognition. In conclusion, it seems that the 
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neurophysiological mechanisms of attention are not well understood, unless selection is 
defined very narrowly.  
 
Comparison of Intentionality and Selection as Mechanisms of Concentration  
There are a number of similarities in how yogic and neuroscientific systems 
describe the functional processes of attention. One primary similarity is that both systems 
emphasize the central importance of tuning attention to a chosen target or object. In the 
neuroscientific model, sensory targets guide attention so that a person knows where to 
orient. The process of searching and orienting toward a target operate within the yogic 
model as well. In this model, the act of ishvara pranidhana meditation begins with an 
intention to search for ishvara (the target), especially ishvara located within oneself. 
Because ishvara is theorized as being located within oneself, the meditator directs search 
activities inwards.  
We might also think of mantra and visualization as “cues” that help orient and 
guide attention to the target of ishvara. However, in yogic theory mantra does not just 
represent ishvara. Rather, tantra elaborates the theory of mantra by suggesting that 
mantra in some way constitutes ultimate reality. According to tantra, mantra is of the 
same nature or essence as its “target” ishvara. Because of this sense, it seems more 
accurate to think of mantra and its visualization as the target or goal of meditation.  
Another issue is the way in which each system employs the concept of “feature” 
in describing various aspects of reality to which attention may be directed. According to 
the neuroscientific model, in early phases of attention the brain selects for certain features 
of reality over others. These may be features of location, form, motion, etc. Thus features 
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provide some orientation to objects of attention. We can see that the imagery involved in 
the visualization of the mantra during meditation indicates these features. Location, for 
example, is designated by way of the visualized image of oneself sitting on top of the 
planet. Form and motion are also conveyed through the visualization as the visualization 
transforms the image reflected as oneself. 
In addition to indicating an ordinary sense of each of these features (location, 
form, etc.), the yogic intention provides a meaningful sense of reality. For example, 
imagining oneself on top of the planet gives a present moment sense to reality. Also, the 
changes in form and motion that occur throughout the course of the visualization provide 
a meaningful understanding of one’s relationship to the cosmos. These meanings are 
suggestive of the nature of reality – an experiential nature in addition to the physicality. 
The difference between neuroscience and yoga on this point is that this nature can 
become known through the observational methods of meditation but not through the 
methods of neuroscience.  
A second way of comparing the mechanisms of intention from tantric yoga and 
selection from neuroscience is to say that they either differ or just have different 
language. This point raises the question of whether the concept of selection and intention 
are really just two ways of talking about the same thing – or whether these two 
mechanisms really reflect two different processes or perhaps aspects of attention and the 
mind. In one sense, these two are similar concepts. Both intention and selection are about 
or of objects and have a particular purpose or goal. Both also involve decision making 
and choice, and some action, and therefore explanations of each of these mechanisms 
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must deal in some way with agency and determinism. Both models provide ideational 
definiteness, conceptual unity, and overall coherence. 
The issue here is whether intention can be naturalized in terms of the language of 
the brain. Current neuroscientific discussions of selection formulate the concept of 
attention in terms of brain processes in a way that make it difficult to locate the agency of 
a person within this account. Such attempts seem to lose some important element of 
agency that cannot be captured by descriptions of neurochemical and neurobiological 
processes. As of yet, it is not possible to derive a full account of intention within this 
framework. 
In a third sense, the two systems differ in terms of how they each theorize the 
physicality of attention mechanisms. In neuroscience, the attention mechanism of 
selection is theorized in terms of the brain’s activity, whereas in tantric yoga intention is 
theorized in terms of the physical structures of mantra. In the neuroscientific model, it is 
by way of activity in frontal areas of the brain that decisions are made concerning tasks 
and objects of interest that require attention. Likewise, it is by way of activity within and 
between parietal and frontal areas that the brain enacts further attention processes. In the 
tantric model, intention is theorized within the person in terms of a nexus of mental 
qualities, including a person’s beliefs, desires, and will regarding meaningfully 
understanding the nature and purpose of one’s existence. But intention is also theorized in 
terms independent of the person him or herself. In tantric theory, intention is attributed 
not just to an individual person, but also to ishvara. This intention signifies a cosmic 
purpose to evolutionary processes: that ultimately these processes have the aim of 
returning matter to its natural state, that is, primordial consciousness. This could be 
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understood as a subjective reality of attention. However, tantric yoga also theorizes a 
physical mechanism. Intention for both an individual and ishvara is theorized in terms of 
sound: mantra. This physical mechanism differs quite significantly from the 
neurobiological and chemical physical mechanisms of selection in the brain. This 
difference highlights the different models of the body between the two perspectives.  
This comparison highlights a crucial difference in the approach each system takes 
to understanding meditation. The physical processes of the brain can be observed and 
analyzed through laboratory methods whereas the subtle processes of mantra that are 
expressed within the subtle body system of the tattwas (elements), chakras (energy 
centers), and nadis (channels) are difficult, if not impossible, to observe and measure 
with scientific instruments. 
 
3. Ways to Sustain Concentrated Attention 
Tantric Yoga – Purifying the Mind Helps Concentrate It  
As we have seen regarding the role of mantra in the intentional process of 
focusing attention during meditation, mantra functions at one level as an object to which 
one can direct attention, with japa as an ongoing task to perform. However, on another 
level mantra functions as a mechanism for purifying the mind as a means of sustaining 
attention to the meditation task. In this sense, the mantra is recognized as part of the deep 
structure of the person’s body/mind physicality. Mantra is the physical mechanism of 
attentional focus and intentional processes. 
The act of shifting attention to the object denoting ishvara (god) during ishvara 
pranidhana – that is, shifting attention to the mantra – begins what yoga literature calls 
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“purification” of the mind and body (Pensa, 1969). This purification allows the meditator 
to continue focusing on the intended spiritual goal. Thus purification processes are a 
means to sustain concentrated attention, and, reciprocally, the process of sustaining the 
state of absorption “purifies” both the body and mind. But what about the mind is really 
purified? In other words, what does purification mean when we talk about mental states? 
Scholars have written about vikalpa-samskara as a process identified within 
Kashmiri Saivite tantric yoga practices that purifies or refines mental states and logical 
constructs (Rastogi, 1992; Muller-Ortega, 2005). Muller-Ortega (2005, p. 204) explains 
that by means of this process, “the fundamental constitutive and even axiomatic 
presuppositions or ‘holdings’ of the yogin’s mind are systematically transformed and 
refined.” This refinement or purification allows the mind to enter states of awareness in 
which the flawed and limited prepositional understandings are “expanded, illuminated, 
and refined to a great degree.” Muller-Ortega defines this liberated state of knowledge in 
contrast to the ordinary “unenlightened” state in which “the reality of the perceived or 
conceived object of perception is incompletely or only superficially disclosed or revealed 
to the mind” (Muller-Ortega, 2005, p. 197). In this ordinary state, when attention falls 
upon an object, the mind perceives the object only incompletely or superficially such that 
it appears as a distinct and separate thing. In non-meditative states, the deeper structure or 
reality of the object is not perceived. Instead, what is perceived are the “axiomatic 
presuppositions” or the mind’s “holdings” related to the object. For example, when 
attention falls to a table, what is seen is “a table.” The concept of table becomes known 
when one perceives the form of a separate object. Even the concept expressed in a 
particular language is experienced. The functionality and superficial form of the object 
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are seen. However, with sustained attention to objects, such as during yogic practice, 
tantric yoga theory asserts that a deeper reality becomes perceived. If one continuously 
concentrates attention on silently repeating a mantra and contemplates the meaning of 
that sound, some deeper reality of the object denoted by the mantra will engulf the mind, 
and this is what Muller-Ortega means by a “refined” mental state. Rastogi (1992) 
explains that according to Abhinavagupta, for yogins a loss of mental states results in 
blissful inner experience. The mind becomes refined in the sense that the mind penetrates 
into the essence of the object rather than remaining in the mental constructions. But it is 
only with this sustained focused concentration on the object that such deeper 
understanding can become illuminated.  
Turning to the Yoga Sutra can help advance a better understanding of the yogic 
perspective on what needs to be refined or purified in the mind. In his essay On the 
Purification Concept in the Indian Tradition, with Special Regard to Yoga, Pensa (1969) 
defines the concept of purification in yoga in terms of kleshas (afflictions) and the gunas 
(binding forces). He (p. 204) explains that the cittavrtti (mental processes) may be 
affected to a greater or lesser extent by “impurities” or klesha. The kleshas were 
identified in chapter four: ignorance, ego, attachment, aversion, and the will to live. Also 
mentioned in chapter four was that others have translated klesha as “affliction” 
(Feuerestein, 1979) or “force of corruption” (Miller, 1995). Both these translations also 
convey a sense of “impurity.” Any time one or more of these kleshas operates in the 
mind, this is an “impurity” since, as the point has been well made in yoga literature (e.g., 
Pensa; Whicher, 1997), the operation of any of the kleshas colors the mind’s perception 
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of objects and the world.  Conversely, removing the influences of the kleshas on the mind 
through refinement processes leads to the mind’s purification.  
Pensa (1969) also develops the notion of purity as mental sattva, with sattva being 
the sentient force of the cosmos that operates to regulate the mind (Eliade, 1958). Pensa 
(pp. 207-208) writes, “Purity generally stands for purity of the mental sattva 
(sattvasuddhi) even if the yogin’s final step is that of freeing himself from the gunas 
(binding forces) in entirety and hence also from the sattva.” When under the influence of 
tamas (static force) or rajas (active force of the passions), the mind expresses kleshas. 
Individual mastery over these cosmic forces that bind the mind is thus part of the 
liberating path of yogic practice that eliminate all impurities and suffering. As the mind 
becomes less under the influence of tamas and rajas, the quality of sattva comes to 
dominate it. When under the influence of sattva as the dominant guna (binding force), the 
mind expands and begins to vibrate at purer levels of sattva and beyond (with the final 
step being to free one’s self entirely from all the gunas). It is in this refined state that the 
mind undergoes the yoga process of cessation or quieting of mental processes: the 
purification process known as nirodha.  
There are a number of means to enact purification, including ishvara pranidhana 
(Pensa, 1969; Chapple, 1982). Aside from the physical practices of hatha yoga and 
astanga yoga such as asana and pranayama that have a purifying effect on the body, 
ishvara pranidhana incorporates within its process mental practices of tantric meditation 
that are defined by their supposed purifying effect on the mind and body because these 
processes are believed to refine the underlying material elements. In Anandamurti’s 
method of ishvara pranidhana, these purification practices are the suddhis. These 
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practices are said to withdraw the mind from its attachments to objects of the world. 
Among the suddhis described in chapters two and four is the well known tantric practice 
of bhutasuddhi elaborated in chapter four. This practice involves a visualized dissolution 
of the objects or elements (tattvas) of the yogic subtle body (White, 1996), the theorized 
elements taken from the Samkhya system that constitute physical embodiment. In the 
Samkhya-Yoga process of cosmic evolution, citta evolves into denser manifestations that 
give rise to human form (Larson, 1969). During meditation, a reversal process occurs 
whereby the evolutes “dissolve and sublimate” systematically in the reverse order of their 
manifestation (Muller-Ortega, 1992). This reversal process is intimately linked with the 
shift in domination of the gunas (binding forces) on the mind. It seems that these 
purification processes of dissolution and sublimation support meditation by sustaining 
concentration and intentional focus on the goal of ishvara, because as the mind’s 
manifestation in the form of various evolutes dissolves, its attention is no longer drawn to 
these worldly objects. The pull of worldly attachment sublimates to attraction to the new 
“object”: ishvara.  
After completing bhutasuddhi so that the mind has become withdrawn from 
bodily attachment, ishvara pranidhana meditators then proceed to the purification 
process of citta suddhi, in which they purify the mind and its mental states.  During this 
phase, the meditator continues to focus attention on the object of the mantra and to 
contemplate its meaning through visualization. This sustained attention to the objects of 
meditation purportedly allows the mind to penetrate into “the true nature…of the 
perceived, conceived, or mediated object of knowledge” (Muller-Ortega, 2005). As 
mentioned in the previous section on mechanisms of attention/concentration, for 
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purification of the mind, Timalsina (2005) explains the function of mantras is to interact 
with the subjective awareness of the practitioner. Whatever thoughts, conceptions, 
presuppositions, or ideas held in the mind, the mantra interacts with these to purify the 
mind from them, so that they are dissolved and no longer there. Timalsina (p. 216) goes 
on to say that in expansion, “mantra is … of the nature of reflection in which all words, 
thoughts, imaginations are enveloped in an awareness that is identified as that experience 
which permeates all instantaneous cognitions.” Timalsina explains that mantra recitation 
removes in-the-moment identification with the outer layers of self, and thus allows 
awareness of one’s inner nature to emerge. When mantra is fully resonant, the meditator 
gains awareness of divine consciousness. By illustrating purification in the three levels of 
identity and individuality - the body, a social awareness as self-identity, and an inner 
sense of “I-ness” – Timalsina develops the complete “I” sense purportedly experienced 
during meditation as the “mystical” or “transcendent” feeling. 
One of the vital tools of purification and refinement of mental states is the set of 
new intentions one cultivates to establish contact with ishvara and thereby attain 
liberation. Muller-Ortega (1989) focuses in part on the need for the yogin to entertain an 
opposite vikalpa [samskara] to purify or concentrate the mind. Let us again draw from 
the Yoga Sutra and scholarship on it to explicate yogic processes that involve samskaras 
(memory traces) and, in particular, the cultivation of liberative samskaras, since both 
classical and tantric yoga traditions connect on this point. Pensa (1969) and Whicher 
(1997) both discuss this process of cultivating “liberative samskaras” revealed in YS 
1.50. In this sutra, we learn that the subliminal impression “generated by wisdom stops 
the formation of other impressions” (Miller, 1995, p. 35). Pensa points out that by the act 
 213 
of meditation, meditators change “the mental coloring … by inverting the more usual 
course of samskara” (p. 205). To explain this process, he (and others; e.g., Whicher) 
emphasizes the important point that the goal of liberation, that is, the intention to attain 
the goal of liberation, must be “‘sown’ continually” (p. 205). Pensa explains that 
liberation is achieved on the condition that through adequate purification, the mind (citta) 
produces “the necessary amount of karmic impulses endowed with the specific quality of 
giving rise in their turn to liberation” (p. 205). New samskaras arise from yogic 
knowledge attained in various states of samadhi. In his article The Liberating Role of 
Samskara in Classical Yoga, Whicher (2005) talks at length about this process of 
generating the proper samskara that supports purification and sustains attention in a state 
of meditative absorption. Pensa notes that the nirodha or “halt” of mental activities itself 
still continues to produce “constantly renewed impulses” because they are samskaras 
with a “halting” purpose or seed. These are samskaras with an inward turning impulse or 
drive rather than one going out into the world. Pensa explains that the main point of 
reaching a state of “irreversible” purity (in addition to destruction of negative karma) is 
cultivating a set of intentions and guaranteeing that they are sufficiently clear and precise 
to produce the right quality and quantity of samskaras required for attaining the final 
goal. These are samskaras of higher knowledge.  
A deeper lesson of tantric yoga (one that distinguishes it from Classical Yoga) is 
to dwell in this state even while the eyes are open (Lidke, 2005), i.e., out of the 
“meditation,” and perceiving the outside world. In this state, mantra is inseparable from 
reflective awareness: the individual recognizes himself in the form of the mantra – this 
experience is what mantra means. Lidke explains that this is an extroversive process and 
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the ultimate culmination of practice, wherein the tantric attains a state of consciousness in 
which the inner and outer become united in the singular continuum of consciousness. The 
idea is that the consciousness is always there permeating our bodily self, but that we just 
need to attend to this consciousness continuously.  
 
Neuroscience: Sustaining Attention to the Meditation Process  
In addition to the ability to focus attention on intentionally selected objects, 
meditation requires continuous concentrated attention to the selected task: that is, the 
mental process of sustained attention (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, and Davidson, 2008). Posner 
and colleagues have explained that a state of sustained attention is attained through 
activity of fronto-parietal regions. Sarter, Givens, and Bruno (2001) explain that 
sustained attention is a top-down process activated by the executive attention system and 
facilitated by basal forebrain cholinergic inputs to the cortex. For a review, see Sarter and 
Bruno (1997), especially regarding the role of cortical cholinergic inputs in a person’s 
ability to detect and select stimuli, and allocate resources to these functions. 
The PFC is the primary structure associated with sustained attention (Goldman-
Rakic, 1987). For example, the ventrolateral PFC plays a role in resolving distracter 
interference, and the medial PFC filters out distraction (Jha, Fabian, and Aquirre, 2004). 
Also, the dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) sustains attention to task relevant targets, but can be 
deactivated by emotional distracters, while the ventral PFC is activated by emotional 
distracters but deactivated by task relevant neutral targets (Yamasaki et al., 2002; 
Fichtenholtz et al., 2004). To help explain how the brain filters out distractions during 
periods of concentrated attention, Chen and Triesman (2008) suggest a gradient 
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mechanism of increasing attentional suppression from the periphery to the center, and 
propose that this mechanism explains the finding that distracters interfere less when in a 
central rather than peripheral location.  
To keep attention focused on a mental task or to maintain continuous orientation 
to the selected target over time, the brain monitors task performance. The monitoring task 
has a number of names because research over time has distinguished several aspects of 
the monitoring process. Task monitoring, target monitoring, error monitoring, action 
monitoring, inhibitory monitoring, conflict monitoring, reward monitoring, and 
expectation monitoring all describe discrete monitoring processes. In early work 
characterizing a brain mechanism dedicated to monitoring task performance and 
compensation for errors, Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, and Donchin (1993) describe 
EEG evidence for an error detection and correction system. Specifically, they identify a 
particular error signal as a component of the human event-related potential, a signal they 
called error-related negativity (ERN). Activity reflected by ERN is interpreted as 
inhibition and correction of an error as soon as an error is detected.  
Gehring et al. (1993) and others (e.g., Dehaene, Posner, Tucker, 1994) have 
shown event-related potential (ERP) evidence suggesting localization of the error 
detection and compensation system in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
supplementary motor areas (SMA), as well as in the midline or medial PFC. More recent 
EEG (Van Veen and Carter 2002 a, b) and imaging studies (Marco-Pallares, Muller and 
Munte, 2007; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, and Nieuwenhuis, 2004) corroborate 
findings that ERN, and thus error signaling, emerges in the ACC. 
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At the cellular level, Holroyd and Coles (2002) attribute changes in ERN 
amplitude (the signal of sustained attention) to phasic changes in the firing of dopamine 
projections to the cortex. It is well known that the ACC receives inputs from 
dopaminergic midbrain areas (involved in emotion processing), so some interpret ERN as 
a consequence of affect-related changes in dopamine levels. This is supported by the 
evidence that the ACC and OFC are related to reward and reinforcement information 
from the striatum and amygdala, and that the cingulate is sensitive to pain as well as 
reward. Thus, reward may be related to error monitoring and help to predict daily stress 
regulation (Compton, Robinson, Ode, Quandt, Fineman, and Carp, 2008). The 
noradrenaline system also plays a modulatory role to ACC via the locus coeruleus 
projections to the ACC. The locus coeruleus is the brain’s principal site for synthesis of 
noradrenaline, and through the regulation of this biochemical, the locus coeruleus 
mediates sympathetic effects during stress in the brain (while the spinal cord controls 
sympathetic effects of stress through release of epinephrine from the adrenal glands). 
Furthermore, the ACC is a key structure of the autonomic nervous system and regulates 
attentional and affective as well as autonomic (including sympathetic), resources related 
to response selection (Wiswede et al., 2008).  
At a theoretical psychological level, Reason (1990) distinguished between two 
types of errors: slips and mistakes. Slips occur when an error is made while executing a 
selected motor or action program. Mistakes reflect selection errors when, for example, 
one selects inappropriate intentions based on faulty knowledge. Dehaene, Posner, and 
Tucker (1994) suggest that ERN reflects slip-type error, and indicate that no ERN was 
observed in their experiments after mistakes. Thus, task monitoring during ishvara 
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pranidhana should, at least initially when the meditation is object oriented, indicate a 
slip-type error when attention wanders from conscious orientation to the meditation 
objects of mantra and visualization, thus establishing whether attention is being sustained 
on these processes. Attention shifting to any distractions would presumably trigger an 
error signal. 
Marco-Pallaarres, Camara, Munte, and Rodriguez-Fornells (2008) suggest that an 
inhibitory mechanism increases cognitive control after slips. Right-sided frontal 
activation in the DLPFC and other frontal areas was correlated with adaptive action after 
the error. Thus, activation of right sided frontal areas could indicate fluctuation of 
attention away from the task as the meditator tries to gain focused attention. But as 
meditation moves past its purification stages and settles into the phase of absorption 
(dhyana), the meditation objects dissolve into subjective experience. What happens to the 
monitoring process in this phase of ishvara pranidhana?  
A number of studies have shown that emotion can modulate ERN amplitude (an 
indicator of the executive process of error monitoring or detection). For example, several 
studies have examined the correlation of ERN with emotion in groups with long-standing 
negative emotional conditions. Hajcak, McDonald, and Simons (2003) showed that ERN 
amplitude increased in subjects with increased anxiety. Luu, Collins, and Tucker (2000) 
showed that college students with high negative affect and emotionality displayed higher 
ERN amplitude than those with lower negative affect and emotionality. Also, several 
studies have reported an increased ERN amplitude in obsessive-compulsive patients with 
high negative affect (e.g., Hajck and Simons, 2002). More recently, Wiswede, Munte, 
Goschke, and Russeler (2008) demonstrated that even short-term affective modulation 
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impacts ERN amplitude by showing emotionally valenced pictures to normal subjects. 
Taken together, these studies all demonstrate that emotion interacts with executive 
processes of sustained attention, particularly in action monitoring. 
In addition, recently Brazil et al. (2008) discovered that error monitoring has two 
phases, and that the second phase plays an important role in the ability to modify 
behavior. This study showed that psychopaths show proper functioning in the early stage 
of error processing in the form of automatic behavioral adaptation, but that they have 
deficits in the later stage of error processing when controlled (i.e., conscious) behavioral 
adaptation is required. Brazil et al. asserted that this second phase correlates with a 
second component of ERN, termed error positivity, which in the case of the psychopaths 
examined in their study, corresponds to the inability to effectively use error information 
to change behavior adequately. This finding helps explain the observation that 
psychopaths have a reduced ability to successfully learn and adapt overt behavior. Thus 
although the monitoring process required for sustaining attention can be modulated by 
emotion, emotion is also necessary for the brain to translate error signals into action 
impulses and adaptive behavior. However, while it is clear that emotion plays an 
important role in modulation of action monitoring and initiating adaptive behavior, a 
precise understanding of the role of emotion on generating adaptive action impulse still 
remains to be shown. 
Lastly, I found that there is growing evidence suggesting alternative 
interpretations of ERN as an error signal within the context of action monitoring. For 
example, ERN could be seen as a reflection of response conflict rather than detection of 
errors (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen, 2001) and as a negative reward 
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prediction error signal (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). Moreover, Oliveria, McDonald, and 
Goodman (2007) argue that ERN is not limited to error signaling, but can also signal a 
change in expectation. Thus, they interpret ERN as a more general performance 
monitoring system that is activated by violations in expectancy. Thus, a number of 
studies show that monitoring is not always about error, but also about conflict, reward, 
and expectancy (e.g., Van Veen and Carter, 2002; Jha, Fabian, and Aguirre, 2004); these 
themes all indicate that emotion plays a role in executive monitoring processes of 
sustained attention.   
 
Comparison: Ways to Sustain Concentrated Attention 
When comparing tantric yoga and neurophysiological processes of sustaining 
attention, I noticed that the two accounts had different levels of discourse. Tantric yoga 
accounts of purification deal with content in the mind such as conceptual content while 
neurophysiological accounts focus on what occurs in the physical operations of the brain. 
Thus, neuroscience accounts of sustaining attention are primarily causal accounts of the 
process of filtering distractions. Tantric yoga elaborates on what is being refined during 
periods of sustained attention while meditating in terms of perceptions that distract an 
individual from sustaining focused attention. 
Both yogic and neuroscietific perspectives suggest that emotion modulates the 
ability to sustain focused attention, and especially that negative emotion inhibits the 
ability to sustain attention. This could be because neuroscience studies of emotional 
modulation of monitoring processes deal with emotion in terms of its content. The 
categories of emotion targeted for investigation are those of everyday emotions. Thus, 
 220 
comparison at this level of content shows a similarity. Studying the effects of emotional 
states during meditation on the ERN would thus be one way to bring these two 
perspectives into closer dialogue. In this way one could determine the impact of 
meditation-type content on the physical processes of the brain. 
There could also potentially be a comparison at the level of physical mechanisms 
because tantric yoga does offer some account at the physical level - this view indicates 
that meditation causes purification of material structures. Tantric theory holds that 
changes in the formation and dissolution of the material principles of the cosmos (i.e., the 
tattvic elements) operate in the body and affect the ability to enter and remain in purified 
states. This embodiment is theorized even though the gunas (binding forces) and tattvic 
(elements) are cosmological principles. Therefore, to the extent that these forces and 
structures operate within the head and penetrate within the nervous system of the body, 
then this activity would logically converge with the activity studied by neuroscience. 
According to the inductive logic advocated by Whewell (1840), this scenario provides a 
“consilience of inductions” because in this case explanations about one class of facts 
(from neuroscience about brain processes during states of absorption) coincides with an 
induction obtained from a different class (tantric yoga about mystical phenomena). 
However, even though these structures are talked about in yogic texts as principles or 
elements of materiality, we should understand these as experiential categories rather than 
as indicating some ontology about materiality.   
Because the comparison is difficult to make on this point because the two 
accounts of the physical body are so different, further examination of these two different 
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models of the body is necessary. This further comparison is made in the next section as 
we develop further understanding of the processes of meditation. 
 
4. Implications: Amplification  
and the Overlap between Imagery and Perceptual Processes 
Much empirical data about attention, including the research discussed above, is 
based on studies of perception of environmental stimuli – perception of the “outside” 
environment. But in yogic meditation, the meditator limits sensory input by turning 
attention inward, aiming to perceive “inner” realities. The yogic practice ishvara 
pranidhana uses visual and auditory imagery as vehicles to meditate, with these 
meditation cues operating in the meditator’s mind rather than being objects located 
“outside” the physical boundaries of the meditator’s body. In the beginning phases of 
meditation, the meditator’s perception of the cues is that they are internally located 
because of a perceived awareness of a separation between one’s self and the world. Thus, 
these perceptual cues form mental images.  
Research on imagery may be particularly helpful, then, in efforts to understand 
attention processes of meditation. Imagery research closely ties into attention literature, 
since both address perceptual processes and their mechanisms in the brain. Since much is 
known about perceptual processes, and since many of the same processes used in 
perception are also used in imagery, many of the insights gained from perceptual research 
can be used to advance understandings about imagery processes. (For a review of 
evidence that supports this inference from perception research to imagery, see Kosslyn 
(2005) and Finke (1985)). Significantly, studies of imagery suggest that imagery operates 
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in each sensory modality. Thus, for ishvara pranidhana meditation, both the visualization 
and mantra fall into the scope of research and findings about imagery, since they operate 
in both the visual image modality and in the auditory modality, respectively.  
Therefore, there are two implications of this analysis of the similarities and 
differences between yogic and neuroscientific models of attention as cognition: 1) we are 
challenged to examine more closely what reality is depicted by each model and 2) we 
need to acknowledge our uncertainty about the role that amplification has in describing or 
explaining this reality. 
One fact about the brain that has come to light from my discussion of attention 
processes is that amplification processes in the brain help tune attention to particular 
features of reality over others. This perspective implores us to consider ways in which the 
brain’s ability to select for certain features of reality over others (such as our mind’s 
observations of its own patterns) might be involved in generating perceptions supposed 
during meditative states of absorption. We have also established that the methods of 
ishvara pranidhana – that is, mantra and visualization - help to tune attention to the 
reality of ishvara.  
These results are especially important in terms of defining an individual person’s 
relationship to this reality of the mind’s patterns of thought. The thought about the 
essence or nature of the “I” feeling or the self takes on particular importance because the 
process of selecting for features of reality that match this target suggest the need for some 
perspective that can convey to us the intended depiction and thus the state involved in its 
perception.  
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Let us now consider the implications of the situation in which attention is being 
attuned to the reality depicted by the yogic model. This bears directly on a consideration 
of the question of the limits of the scientific knowledge regarding amplification of certain 
features of reality over others. In part II I argued for an experiential or phenomenological 
interpretation of the yogic model. I also discussed how past efforts to bring together the 
two models of science and experience often attributed the findings of science to the yogic 
model without consideration of the conceptual challenges in doing so. Thus in this 
comparison, we must take these kinds of challenges seriously.  
One of the challenges is that the scientific knowledge about amplification of 
certain features of reality over others in one’s perceptual awareness during periods of 
sustained concentrated attention is derived from studies of sensory stimulation. This 
challenge relates to whether this scientific knowledge could apply to the situation when 
we attend to some non-physical dimension of experience, such as the case of 
visualization or recitation of silent or inaudible sounds, even if we attribute certain 
meanings to that non-physical dimension. We have already seen evidence in 
neuroimaging studies of meditation that this sort of experience can have specific effects 
on the functioning and structure of the body. I suggest that the implications are that we 
can attend to some dimension of experience and that if we attribute certain meanings to 
that dimension, it can have specific effects in the structure of the body. However, we 
must recognize that the attention used in the amplification studies pertained to observable 
features of reality. Thus, we are left wondering about features of reality that we cannot 
observe. Does this situation pose a conceptual challenge to the assumptions about the 
reality that we attend to?  
 224 
 
 What we are asking here is about the features of reality that one attends to, rather 
than about the effects of such attention on the brain, such as experiential realities that we 
cannot observe by the methods of neuroscience. Sensory objects can be measured. For 
example, we can measure the effect that different sounds or different visual stimuli have 
on the activity of the brain. But a mantra is inaudible; therefore, it is not possible to 
measure its sound frequency or level. The same is true for a visualization. Under 
experimental conditions, a scientist would need to be able to track the visual stimulus so 
that the trial could be replicated with the exact same sort of visualization, so that the 
measurements of the associated brain activity could be accurately correlated.  
Studies of imagery can help here, since these studies examine the kind of 
phenomena involved in tantric visualization. But these studies are limited, too, when it 
comes to generalizing findings to the type of imagery involved in ishvara pranidhana 
because this meditation imagery involves multiple features of reality all at once, 
including features of meaning. This meaning dimension is what gives the meditation its 
experiential reality.  
The issue here is the tension between the representational theory of cognition that 
underpins the model of the brain and the non-dualistic theory of tantric yoga. The 
representational model holds firm to the idea that there is some objective reality “out 
there” and that the brain’s activity works to represent that reality, through the signaling of 
brain synapses. This model of the brain suggests that the activity of the brain corresponds 
to or represents the objects, events, and realities of the world. Even connectionist and 
emergent theories of cognition hold to representation (Osbeck, 2009). The problem with 
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representational theories of cognition is that this view (symbolic computation) yields a 
narrow conception of cognition. For example, this conception is limited in the sort of 
semantical representations it can make (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). In reality, 
meaning changes for human cognition depending on different context and from person to 
person. The representational model of attention assumes that there is a world “out there” 
that is independent of our cognition. Thus, the function of cognition is to accurately 
represent this separate world. My comparison and analysis of attention processes of 
meditation challenges the epistemology and ontology underlying this perceptual 
experience. 
The task of meditation involves paying attention to features of reality that are 
more abstract, such paying attention to the activity of subconscious or unconscious mind. 
This attention process involves the ability to infer one’s relationship to the world beyond 
the boundaries of the skin, not just to an object, person, or event, but to the world at large, 
and is rather abstract. The self of neuroscience is usually seen as the “epicenter of 
knowledge, cognition, experience, and action” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991, p. 
xvii) that is bounded by the body and contained, or coded (i.e. represented) somewhere in 
and by the nervous system. However, the tantric model suggests a reality of the self that 
transcends the normal bounded self: a self that extends the bodily boundaries, into the 
environment to the farthest reaches of the cosmos.  
This tantric idea is not so very different from Merlu-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
perception (see Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991, chapter two) in which the world is 
inseparable from the subject. Varela et al. (1991) explain that a main insight from the 
philosophy of phenomenology is that we must recognize that the structure of the world is 
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something that we are, at least to some degree, structuring in our own mind. In this sense, 
the reality of ishvara, even though it depicts the cosmological reality, is not entirely “out 
there.” The meditative process of conscious attentional refocusing on mantra counters the 
tendency to think of attention as being drawn into a dualstic objective world in which 
embodiment normally delineates separation between entities.  
This conceptualization of cognitive experience necessitates that we consider 
alternative forms of cognitive behavior (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). We need 
to come up with a way of talking about reality and the mind that honors both the facts 
about the brain and the phenomenological dimension that is embedded within the 
(theorized) potentiality of attention, and other facets of cognition. We have seen that the 
representation model depicts the cognitive behavior of attention in terms of the activity of 
parietal and frontal regions, and we have seen that this characterization of attention 
cannot capture higher functions such as intention. Varela et al. (1991, p. 102) explain that 
alternative conceptualizations of cognition offer potential avenues for bringing together 
the objective and subjective realities depicted by each system. For example, one could 
see the behavior of entire neural networks as cognitive and possibly even see that “non-
neuronal networks” such as immune systems display cognitive properties. Describing the 
integrated functioning of the entire attention network that operates broadly across many 
anatomically and physiologically distinct regions of the brain on a moment to moment 
basis might achieve at least some intermediary step in the sort of conceptualization 
necessary to describe the autonomous functioning of the kind of attention involved in 
meditation. But accurately characterizing the dynamics of attention networks as they 
respond to the body’s continuous engagement with “the world” as well as the brain’s 
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other cognitive systems is a daunting task, to say the least. Let us now turn to examine 
another cognitive process: memory. 
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Chapter Seven 
Memory and Knowledge 
 
 
Storing impressions of the world in the mind is a basic process for normal mental 
functioning, as is the ability to draw from past impressions to aid in one’s navigation of 
present circumstances. These memory processes and the learning that underpins them are 
important in both tantric yoga and neuroscience accounts of meditation. For example, 
Miller (1995) stresses that memory is “basic” to Yoga’s epistemology and much is said 
about memory in yogic literature. Most prominently, memory (smrti) is given as one of 
the five main processes of the mind that is quieted during meditation and a particular kind 
of memory trace (samskara) must be cultivated during meditation (Whicher, 1997). A 
recently adopted perspective of neuroscience in the past three decades is that the structure 
of the brain changes with experience and that learning and memory processes are central 
to the brain’s plasticity (Butz, Worgotter, and van Ooyen, 2009; Holtmaat and Svoboda, 
2009). As discussed in chapter three, neuroimaging studies of meditation consistently 
show activation in the hippocampus during meditation (Lou et al. 1999; Lazar et al., 
2000), whose main function is memory formation (e.g., Squire, 1992), as well as 
activation of memory networks such as the PFC, the ACC, and the parietal and temporal 
cortices (Herzog et al., 1990; Lou et al., 1999; Newberg et al., 2001; Lazar et al., 2000; 
Lazar et al., 2005; Brefcznski-Lewis et al., 2007; Lutz et al., 2008). 
Therefore, based on tantric yoga’s theoretical understanding of memory processes 
during meditation, and coupled with empirical evidence from studies showing that brain 
structures of memory and memory itself are influenced by meditation (Sreenivasan and 
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Jha, 2007), memory seems to be an important function to examine in this comparison of 
mental processes of meditation. The purpose here is to discuss the role of memory in 
ordinary and meditative states, focusing especially on understanding how meditation 
transforms memory processes during meditation and resultant effects on subsequent 
states, especially knowledge. 
 
1. Types of Memory and Resulting Types of Knowledge 
Memory is characterized best for explicit memory, or conscious intentional 
recollection. Unconscious non-intentional forms of memory are far more difficult to 
access experimentally. This difficulty in characterizing implicit memory relates to the 
challenges we have been discussing in theorizing meditation for two main reasons. First, 
meditation is an action that implicitly reflects meaning, and this makes it different from 
actions and behaviors that tend to be more instrumentally useful (Taylor, 1985). 
Instrumentality is the case for many behaviors chosen within experiments designed to test 
memory.  Nevertheless, one way in which researchers do study implicit memory is by 
observing behaviors that enact or reflect procedural learning. For example, studying 
reaction time in controlled studies where meditation practice is the independent variable 
is one way to access knowledge about the effects of meditation. Yet we cannot infer from 
these kinds of studies much (if anything) about the state of meditation. This observation 
attests to the difficulty, or perhaps impossibility, in designing basic science studies that 
capture or correlate with the experiential events of meditative absorption. However, the 
basic and fundamental point of the investigation in this dissertation is to explicate the 
reality of meditative absorption. Thus, as we move through this comparison, one must 
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bear in mind the limitations that exist in terms of what kinds of memories and types of 
knowledge can be known through using the methods assumed by the emic and etic 
systems.  
 
Tantric Yoga: Memory Traces in Yogic Praxis 
There are many senses of memory conveyed in the Yoga Sutra. Perhaps most 
important is the type of memory (smrti) that is named in YS 1.11, as one of the five 
mental proceses (cittavrttis) that are to be quieted in yogic practice. In this context, smrti 
is the type of memory that recollects or brings to mind information about events or 
experiences from the past, as well as “learned ideas” (Miller, 1995). Yet there are other 
senses of memory that do not all fall under this concept of smrti; rather, we find a cluster 
of similar concepts that all have to do with smrti in a more general sense of remembering. 
For example, in YS 1.20, the word smrti is used again, but here, along with the sense of 
remembering, the sense of mindfulness is also conveyed (Miller, 1995; Feuerstein, 1979). 
In her commentary on this sutra, Miller (1995) points out the parallels of this sense of 
smrti (memory) with the Buddhist usage of smrti as mindfulness. And in her glossary (p. 
96), she uses both memory and mindfulness as English translations of smrti, stating that 
“Patanjali’s usage of the word seems to combine the ordinary sense of ‘memory’ and the 
Buddhist notion of ‘mindfulness.’”  
A person can remember or become mindful of many different types of things, and 
this cognitive flexibility becomes centrally important for the type of “remembering” that 
occurs during yogic absorption in samadhi. For what is “remembered” or brought into 
mindfulness during meditation is the sense of self that is not identified with past events or 
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experiences, which formulate the ordinary sense of self. As we saw in the previous 
section on concentrated attention, YS 1.3 declares that the refined or purified yogic states 
are ones in which one “abides” (Feuerstein, 1979) or “stands” (Miller, 1995) in one’s true 
“essence” (Feuerstein) or “identity” (Miller), without the operations of memory or any 
other normal mental process including conceptualization. Thus, memory in the sense of 
smrti has to do with phenomenal experience in the sense that contemporary philosophers 
of mind such as Ty (1995) use it to indicate experience of the world. It is this experiential 
sense of smrti, the quieting of normal memory processes through yogic practice, along 
with the quieting of other mental processes or cittavrtti, which is the essence of 
transformation, and what leads to absorption in meditative states. 
Another type of memory conveyed in Yoga is the sense of storage. To remember 
an experience requires some supply of “stuff” from which the mind can draw to 
reconstitute the experience. For example, Miller (1995) writes that past impressions are 
never lost, but rather “preserved” as memory traces (YS 1.11). This sense of memory 
does not convey remembering in the sense of recall but is more like storage or retention. 
This sense of memory reveals another dimension to smrti (memory), one that the Yoga 
Sutra introduces in YS 1.18 as the concept of samskara (memory trace).  
Even though smrti and samskara retain a “sameness” in form (YS 4.9), these are 
distinct mental process: samskaras are subliminal impressions (Miller, 1995) that are 
present in “residuum” (Feuerstein, 1979) even after the quieting of the mind and normal 
memory processes (smrti) from yogic practice. Whicher (2005) explains that samskara 
(memory trace) has an obvious psychological significance. Samskara evokes the notion 
of the subliminal in relation to memory, as indicated by translations of samskara from 
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Miller (1995) as subliminal impression and Feuerstein (1979, 1998) as subliminal 
activator. Along these lines, Anandamurti emphasizes the causal nature of samskara in 
his translation of the term as reactive momentum. This translation is helpful because 
momentum taps into the connection that samskara (memory trace) has to action, since 
samskaras (memory traces) are formed as a result of any action.  
In tantric theory, the ritual action of mantra recitation cultivates certain types of 
samskaras that are beneficial towards the goal of liberation from the bounded sense of 
self. During meditation, interiorizing (the mind focusing inward) as opposed to 
exteriorizing (the mind focusing outward into the world) samskaras are generated as 
memory stores in the mind. In this sense, samskaras act as “highly dynamic” (Feuerstein, 
1998) or driving forces. 
The concept of samskara as subliminal memory or stored reactive momentum is 
further broken down into two types of samskara: vasana or habit patterns and karmasaya 
or active samskara (memory trace). Whicher (2005) explains that karmasaya are the 
causal or active samskaras (memory traces) of one’s present embodiment; these are a 
subset of samskara that are formed under the influence of kleshas or forces of affliction 
and impurity. According to yoga’s doctrine of reincarnation, samskaras are carried over 
from life to life and thus accumulate from past lives; they can come to fruition in a 
present life even though the action that cultivated the reaction occurs in a past life. This is 
a very complex issue here that I will not address in the dissertation (see e.g., Feuerstein, 
1998). Karmasaya are important for understanding absorption during meditation because 
they combine into a storehouse of habit patterns (Whicher) or memory traces (Miller, 
2005), which dictate personality. Whicher declares these habit patterns as the 
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characteristic traits of the self’s personality that are changed during meditation. In 
ordinary states when we operate from the normal sense of self, samskaras (memory 
traces) in the form of karmasaya or active samskaras and vasanas or habit patterns of 
samskara shape and determine how we “see” reality. Samskaras color the interpretations 
of events in terms of how we appraise our own feelings and to what we attribute emotions 
or describe causal influences.  
During meditation, the mind counters the storage and expression of samskaras by 
becoming aware of its own patterned movements, and intentionally channeling all of the 
thought forms in the same direction (i.e., sublimates them to the mantra), and this 
movement changes habituated patterns. With this shift, the cognitive insight resulting 
from meditative absorption becomes relatively free from samskaric coloring, with some 
samskaras (memory traces) remaining depending on the level of samadhi entered. One of 
the characteristics of ishvara, with whom contact is made during meditation, is the lack 
of any store of “asaya” (YS 1.24), which Miller (1995, p. 35) translates as subliminal 
intention. In a sense, then, we might also view samadhi or absorption as a “type” of 
memory because samadhi is the instance of remembering one’s true self or one’s deepest 
essence. However, this sense of “memory” is closer to the yogic concept of knowledge, 
and knowledge has a special status in yoga.  
Knowledge of ishvara is gained during tantric yoga meditation through three 
paths. Classical Yoga names pramana, translated as valid cognition (Feuerstein, 1979) or 
valid judgment (Miller, 1995), as one type of mental process (cittavrtti) of consciousness 
(YS 1.6), and identifies three types of pramana (YS 1.7): direct perception, inference, 
and authoritative statement. These can also be considered as types of knowledge in tantric 
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yoga (Hara, 1992). Hara identifies at least six other types of pramana (cognition or 
knowledge) from tantric texts, such as identification and intuition. He notes that these are 
all included in the three main types of knowledge discussed more widely in yogic 
literature, so my discussion will focus on the three standard types of perception. In tantric 
yoga, the particular type of cognition or knowledge sought after is the insight gained 
from contact with purusa or Siva, which is, as we have seen, is a type of ishvara or 
particular purusa.  
In the beginning, the meditator takes on authority from the meditation teacher 
instructions about the technique and beliefs about the goal state. With personal practice, 
though, this knowledge is gained through direct perception of ishvara. However, as we 
have seen, such perception is not had through normal cognitive processes of memory, 
conceptualization, or even language, since the highest stages of meditative consciousness 
are beyond access through the act of mantra repetition: the mantra itself take hold of the 
mind. Thus the third method of gaining knowledge about absorption is the inference 
made following contact with ishvara. Inference about the passage of time and that one’s 
conscious awareness was sustained beyond normal mental faculties leads the meditator to 
an insight that this was, in fact, the type of experience that occurred: a recognition or 
remembrance of one’s essential nature.  
Enumeration of these different types of knowledge is important for understanding 
absorptive meditation in the context of a discussion of memory because the YS explicitly 
names memory, as well as conceptualization, as mental processes that are not considered 
to be knowledge in yoga’s sense of correct cognition. Yet according to yoga, knowledge 
to be gained during meditation is free from memory processes: it is a discriminative kind 
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of knowledge, an “in-the-moment” knowing not shaped by past or learned experience 
(Whicher, 2005). Thus, the cognitive realities of memory and knowledge have some 
discernable difference.  
 
Neuroscience Types of Memory 
Memory is classified into several different types of memory, depending on the 
defining characteristics of the original experiences. In the most basic distinction, there are 
two main types of memory, called explicit/declarative and implicit/non-declarative 
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, Mangun, 1998). There are also several categories within these two 
main distinctions. Explicit memory refers to the kinds of knowledge that we have 
conscious access to, such as personal experiences (episodic memories), and worldly 
knowledge (semantic memories) (Tulving, 1989). Implicit memory refers to knowledge 
that we have no conscious access to such as procedural knowledge and skills (Tulving, 
1985; Lewicki, Hill, and Czyzewska, 1992). These different types of memories have at 
least somewhat distinctive processing and storage pathways. Explicit memories include 
self-referential or autobiographical knowledge, and are concept-based knowledge, either 
related to or not related to a specific experience. Many learned behaviors involve both 
implicit and explicit forms of memory such as learning languages and culinary skills.  
The mental skills like other skills are a type of long-term implicit memory that is 
established with practice (Karni and Bertini, 1997). In other words, developing cognitive, 
perceptual, and procedural skills is practice-dependent, and is this is conceptualized as 
learning (Fahle, 2005). Moreover, practice dependent skill learning leads to plastic 
changes in the brain (e.g., Ziemann, Muellbacher, Hallett, and Cohen, 2001). The 
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procedural learning system is considered to involve the encoding, storage, and retrieval of 
the procedures requiring perceptual, motor, verbal, and cognitive skills (Tulving, 1985). 
Often multiple types of skills are involved in any given behavior (Kellman, and Garrigan, 
2009). Therefore, learning a mental task such as meditation can potentially involve 
learning a variety of skill types, all of which likely interact. Furthermore, skill learning at 
least sometimes generalizes to other tasks (Fahle, 2005). For example, learned skills of 
reflective awareness transfer across domains of knowledge, and are not wholly context-
bound (Perkins and Salomon, 1989). Thus the kind of cognitive skills learned during 
meditation might be seen as both specialized and general knowledge that transfers into 
other cognitive, perceptual, and action-oriented domains.  
Studies of memory and meditation tend not to overly distinguish between these 
types of memory, instead focusing on either recall of explicit memory or some sort of 
performance skill. However, it seems possible that each of these different types of 
memory could be involved in meditation. I suspect that meditation necessitates episodic 
memory, as well as semantic and autobiographical features of the meditative experience, 
and implicit/procedural knowledge. For example, according to these definitions, personal 
mystical experience is an episodic memory, as are personal identifications, and self-
representations (or self-schemas). Similarly, the steps and procedures of a meditation 
technique, for example the visualization and the mantra recitation processes, can be 
considered to be implicit memories, which improve with practice.  
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Memory Stages. 
From the moment a person has an impression (whether conscious or not), memory 
processing is involved. Thus in neuroscience, memory is also conceptualized in terms of 
stages. The ones characterized here are best for episodic declarative memory: sensory, 
short-term or working memory, and long-term memory (Cowan, 2008). Cowan explains 
that the primary distinction between these stages is the time variance of the memory 
event: sensory memory is stimulus information from any sensory tract held in working 
memory for milliseconds to several seconds; working memory holds representations of 
stimuli in conscious awareness for seconds to minutes; and long-term memory holds 
information for days, weeks, or years. 
Sensory memories decay when the physical stimulus is no longer present (Cowan, 
2008). Some research suggests that meditation has an enhancing effect on sensory 
memory. For example, Srinivasan and Baijal (2007) found that concentrative meditation 
enhances preattentive processing (or sensory memory). However, because this type of 
processing has a short time of activation (sensory memory is more like attention in this 
sense) and because mantra and visualization operate as imagery during meditation rather 
than as physical stimulus in the ordinary sense, the focus here is on working memory and 
long-term memory processes.   
Working memory has been conceptualized loosely as the maintenance and 
manipulation of information in conscious awareness (Funahashi, Bruce, and Goldman-
Rackic, 1989; Sara, 2000). Working memory focuses on salient selected focal points of 
attention. Via working memory, perception of these selected events becomes translated 
into knowledge stored in long-term memory. This transference of information occurs 
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because shifts in attention impact memory processes and vice versa (Cowan, 1995; Cole 
and Schneider, 2007). Because memory influences attentional shifts, when meditation 
brings on attentional shifts this also impacts memory processes during meditation. 
Working memory and attention depend on one another in the sense that objects that are 
held in the focus of conscious sustained attention are maintained in working memory. I 
briefly overview aspects of working memory that seem to bear the greatest relevance to 
meditation. (For a more detailed review see Baddeley, 2000, 2001, 2003; Baddeley and 
Hitch, 1994; Smith and Jonides, 1999.) 
We can assume that, because mantra and visualization are also held as the objects 
of sustained attentional focus, they are held in working memory during meditation. 
Similar to other executive functions, working memory operates at least in part via activity 
in the frontal lobes. Specialized cells within the PFC fire in instantiated fashion during 
working memory tasks (Funahashi, Bruce and Goldman-Rakic, 1989), and this 
coordinated sustained firing of these prefrontal regions is thought to be the neural 
instantiation of working memory operations (Chafee and Goldman-Rakic, 1998, 2000). 
In an early model of working memory, Baddeley (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 
1992, 2000, 2003) proposed three components for working memory: a central executive, 
a phonological loop, and a visuospatial sketchpad. This model is a multiple component 
model, what has become known as the “standard” model of working memory. Braddeley 
and others (e.g., Knodo and Osaka, 2004) argue that, from the neurophysiological activity 
in frontal areas, the central executive, an attentionally limited control system, regulates 
the two “storage” systems: the phonological loop for processing verbal and acoustic 
information and the visiospatial sketchpad for processing visual and spatial information. 
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Although some aspects of this model may seem to be more mechanistic than theoretical, 
it is impossible to separate the conceptualized features of working memory from the 
mechanisms of working memory. I point out this difficulty because it shows the close 
link between theory and fact when operationalized constructs so closely describe physical 
processes. 
There are alternatives to the multiple component model of working memory, with 
much agreement among alternatives, especially on the point of the limited attentional 
capacity (Baddeley, 2003). For example, Cowan (2008) emphasizes attention. But other 
alternatives such as Nairne (2002) and Ericson and Kintsch (1995) emphasize the long-
term nature of memory in models of working memory. Also, Postle (2006) and others 
(e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1987) argue that Baddeley’s standard model of the central 
executive as a memory “storage” system cannot account for findings of a delay-period 
activity in the PFC. Instead of viewing the delay-period PFC activity as evidence of 
memory “storage,” they argue that the delayed phases reflect an emerging process of 
memory. This view seems to fit with one of Postle’s hypothesized functions of PFC 
working memory, which is to control the gain of activity in sensory processing areas of 
posterior cortex (Knight et al., 1999) in a manner that would minimize the disruption of 
working memory storage processes by suppressing the sensory processing of potentially 
distracting information in the environment. Thus, they argue that the delay-period activity 
may correspond to basal level of operation of such a distraction detection mechanism 
rather than an actual memory “store.” Now I focus on the standard or multi-component 
model. 
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Ishvara pranidhana requires constantly reciting the mantra. In the multiple-
component model of working memory, the phonological loop is one system by which 
sound and language are rehearsed and processed in the brain (Valler and Baddeley, 1984; 
Baddeley, 2003). The phonological loop of working memory is theorized as having two 
components: one holds memory traces in acoustical form, which fade within a few 
seconds, while the other subvocally articulates or rehearses information (Valler and 
Baddeley, 1984; Baddeley, 1992; Repovos and Baddley, 2006). The function of the 
rehearsal process is to “retrieve and rearticulate the contents held in this phonological 
store and in this way to refresh the memory trace” (Repovos and Baddeley, 2006, p. 7); 
thus, rehearsal forms a short-term memory store and information from other modalities 
enters only through recording into phonological form via articulatory rehearsal process 
(Valler and Baddeley, 1984). This resembles mantra in which sound and language are 
silently rehearsed. Subvocal rehearsal is associated with frontal and parietal areas 
(Brodmann areas 6 and 40 respectively), and usually the left side of these areas, while 
storage is thought to be in cortical Brodmann area 44 (Repovos and Baddeley, 2006; 
Baddeley, 2003; see also Vallar and Pagagno, 2002). When verbal information is 
“silently” repeated in the subvocal rehearsal system - as opposed to overt articulation - 
this rehearsal allows for fuller processing of the information before being transferred to 
long-term memory systems.  This enhanced processing is likely to generate greater 
biological subilization at relevant connections, thereby increasing the strength of a 
memory trace of the auditory experience. 
Ishvara pranidhana meditation also involves continuous visualization of the 
mantra to gain access into deeper states of absorption. Working memory also involves a 
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visuospatial sketchpad that maintains and manipulates visual and spatial information 
(Baddeley, 1992; 2003), with visual and spatial subcomponents of working memory 
operating somewhat separately (Della Sala et al., 1999; reviewed Repovs and Baddeley, 
2006). Baddeley asserts that visual working memory is closely related to perception and 
visual imagery, although some argue that mental imagery has distinct components of both 
Farah and Hammond (1988). Baddeley (2003) suggests that since visual imagery 
integrates visual information from various sources, including long-term memory, the 
imagery representations might be held in the theorized episodic buffer rather than the 
visuospatial sketchpad.  
Both the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop are proposed to be 
regulated by the central executive (Repovs and Baddeley, 2006). Baddeley’s concept of 
central executive is thought of as a supervisory attentional system by Norman and 
Shallice (1980) and is also what Posner and DiGirolamo (2000) call executive control, 
operated by the executive attentional network. Both of these alternative 
conceptualizations emphasize that the central executive component of working memory 
functions largely by regulating attention as a means to control working memory.  
A number of separable attentional functions and capacities are attributable to the 
central executive (see Repovs and Baddeley, 2006 for review). For example, the central 
executive regulates the capacity to focus attention or divide attention between tasks, and 
regulates attentional switching. Moreover, increased attentional control is thought to 
increase working memory capacity (Barrett, Tugrade, and Engle, 2004). This attentional 
control regulatory capacity is especially important for understanding meditation since 
meditation training has been shown to improve attention and self-regulation (Tang et al., 
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2007). This finding supports previous evidence that working memory can be trained 
(Olesen, Westerberg, and Klingberg, 2004). For example, Qin, Hermans, van Marle, Luo, 
and Fernández (2009) show that working memory activity in the PFC becomes impaired 
by psychological stress. Thus, there is another link here between memory processes and 
meditation, since meditation reduces stress (Benson, Beary, and Carol, 1974; Delmonte, 
1985; Shapiro, Schwartz, and Bonner, 1998; Coppola, 2007). Along these lines, Sharma, 
Das, Mondal, Goswami, and Gandhi (2006), recently showed that Sahaja Yoga 
meditation (a form of Kundalini Yoga) is effective in improving working memory. Like 
Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana, Sahaja meditation uses the yogic subtle body as a 
template for attentional focus during meditation, but unlike ishvara pranidhana Sahaja 
does not uses mantra.   
In addition to regulating attentional processes, the central executive also relates 
the contents of working memory to long-term memory. Sara (2000) reviews the tradition 
of those who argue that “remembering is an activity similar to perceiving” in that it views 
present-tense experience “in light of past experience” (e.g., Bergson, 1896; Bartlett, 
1932; Tulving and Thomson, 1973). For example, Tulving and Thomson (1973) 
described retrieval in terms of the mind integrating new information within a memory 
network that is “driven by” that new information. This conceptualization gives us the 
impression that cognition is, at least in some way, dependent on the environmental 
context. In current terminology, new experiences are said to “reactivate” - certain 
memories and the mind processes these past and current information streams together to 
form new impressions of the world. But the brain is not just driven by information about 
external events. It can generate information, too (Vogels, Rajan, and Abbott, 2005). This 
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additional aspect of memory suggests that cognition is also independent, at least to some 
degree, from the environment. Working memory is the mental function that operates on 
information stores that need to be manipulated, including complex binding and 
integration of new, old, and self-created information (Suzuki et al., 2004). Therefore, 
meditation, like any experience, should impact memory via attentional regulation and 
working memory processes.  
Finally, Kosslyn (1988, 2005) argues that long standing evidence is now widely 
accepted suggesting that mental images, like perception, reflect principles of information 
organization in long-term memory. An individual’s “knowledge about objects and 
events” determines the types of mental images one is able to form (Finke, 1980). Kosslyn 
theorizes that images are generated by activating the stored memories in such a way as to 
draw out the salient information necessary to form the desired image. 
 
Comparison of Tantric Yoga and Neuroscience Types of Memory Processes 
One can easily recognize an agreement between the two systems in general 
conceptualizations of memory processes in recording experiences and, especially, in 
recalling them. Both agree that recall affects present moment perception; yet relating the 
two perspectives when considering the yogic sense of samskara (memory trace) proves 
trickier. Some comparison could be made between the concept of samskara and long-
term memory but on this comparison the two perspectives have different standards for 
what constitutes knowledge. 
There is agreement between the two systems about understanding memory as 
recall in a broad sense. Recall is involved in both neuroscience concepts of long term 
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memory and working memory, and recall is also involved in both the tantric yoga 
concepts of smrti and samskara. This is the ordinary sense of remembering some past 
experience. However, the yogic concept of smrti is not like the neuroscience memory 
processes of encoding, consolidation, and storage. Yet, these processes do seem to be 
necessary to form the yogic samskara (memory trace) rather than having to do with the 
actual memory. 
There also seems to be more specific similarity between the mental process of 
remembering or recollection in the yogic smrti (as a cittavrtti or mental process) and the 
analogous neuroscience conceptualization of recall in the brain, as it relates to working 
memory. Working memory retrieves information from memory stores to interpret the 
present. Both systems convey a sense of “in-the-moment” conscious attention to an 
object of interest, and blend attention and recall. In both, calling to mind past impressions 
in the present moment influences what we experience in the present moment. However, it 
is only a very specific sense of smrti (one that evokes the concept of mindfulness) that is 
like working memory in neuroscience.  
In both tantric yoga and neuroscience memory and attention are interrelated 
processes. Working memory seems to function in a similar way as several different types 
of attention (e.g.,wandering, distracted, and forgetful), and these different types of 
attention are influenced by smrti (memory). Also, because cultivating ekagrata (one 
pointed concentration) is important to attain nirodha (mental cessation) and entrance into 
different stages of samadhi (absorption), memory processes are tied in with the 
meditative states.  
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Tantric yoga and neuroscience also resemble one another in the sensory memory 
stages. The “sense memory” of neuroscience seems like the sensory impression of yoga, 
because in both systems the body takes in energy from the world and the energy 
somehow forms or constitutes the impression (see attention mechanisms section). Early 
phases of meditation involve quieting fluctuations of memory (smrti) that drive shifts of 
attention and bring working memory to a state of sustained operation. In this mode, the 
long-term type of memory stores the momentary experience. This is similar to the 
neuroscience sense of experience or knowledge as moving from an impression formed in 
sensory memory (or attentional system) and progressing though short term memory to be 
stored in long-term memory is similar to the tantric yoga of samskara in which an 
impression is stored in the mind as a memory trace. In both systems, this concept of 
memory is not like recall, but like an early stage of storage.  
Another commonality is that, for both systems, repetition is important to hold an 
object in conscious awareness in the absence of its physical presence. In tantric yoga, 
mantra requires constant recitation (or japa), especially during the purification processes 
of ishvara pranidhana, whereas subvocal rehearsal from the neuroscience perspective 
also requires continuous recitation. Also similar is that visualization requires constant 
recall in both systems. Thus, the rehearsal concept is similar between the two systems. 
Another similarity is the way in which the yoga concept of samskara and the 
neuroscience concept of long-term memory compare. In the broad sense, they both have 
the sense of storage and long-term nature. Also, that samskaras are subliminal is a 
defining characteristic of the concept. Subliminality indicates processes that are not 
conscious. From a neuroscientific perspective, long-term memory can (and often does) 
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operate automatically rather than in a controlled way, suggesting that it operates 
subconsciously or out of conscious awareness. Procedural memory, especially, seems to 
operate largely out of conscious awareness (Lewicki, Hill, and Czyzewska, 1992; Fahle, 
2005). This subconscious level of operation seems similar to the notion of subliminality.  
Moreover, the yogic concept of samskaras carries with it the idea that a cycle of 
cause and effect operates in the realm of human action. In this view, samskaras 
(subliminal activators or reactive momentum) are accumulated through action such that 
when humans act, they generate a cycle of further samskaras that can only be broken 
through the practice of yoga. Neuroscience largely does not hold this concept of causality 
associated with long-term memory in the same sense; rather it has the notion that 
“outside” events and experiences are imposed on each person, and that it is through 
specific processes that evaluate processes such as saliency, attentional focus, and 
emotional salience that have influence on actions.  
Last on this point of how samskaras and long-term memory compare, they both 
differentiate further sub-types. In yoga, samskara is discriminated into a subset of 
memory traces (karmasaya) that forms into a habit pattern (vasana), which forms the 
personality. Neuroscience differentiates further sub-types of long-term memory such as 
implicit (or procedural) and explicit memory, with episodic and semantic types of 
memory as further types of explicit or declarative memory. Some people see the 
collection of episodic and semantic memories as constituting personhood in some way, so 
these seem similar to the yogic subtype of memory that also relates to personality. Yet 
because it is more encompassing than specific types of memory, it seems that the yogic 
concept of vasana might subsume these neuroscience types of memory. This is because 
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vasana seems to more simply explain the role of memory in personality while 
neuroscience differentiates a number of specific types of memory, such as implicit or 
procedural memory as the memory of “how to” learning and episodic memory involved 
in self-representational cognition. Thus yoga forages a richness in its idea of memory 
trace (samskara) by embracing its “sameness in form” with smrti (memory). 
While samskara and long-term memory are not identical concepts, they are 
similar in a general sense of storage, recall, and longevity. Thus, it could be that the type 
of “memory” involved in the meditator’s recognition or remembrance of the self’s nature, 
cultivated into recollection by the liberative samskaras intended during meditation, is a 
specific instance of long-term memory stored in the brain. 
The last issue to consider in this comparison of types of memory is how each 
system accounts for knowledge, because yoga and neuroscience seem to differ in some 
important ways on this matter. A crucial point of difference is that meditative practice 
aims for a particular type of recall: the tantric yoga notion of remembrance that turns out 
to be directly unfiltered, “in-the-moment” experience. According to yoga, extinguishing 
the samskara is like drawing attention away from these phenomenal realities of past 
conscious experience and instead focusing on an “in-the-moment” experience. 
Neuroscience, or at least the theory of mind that underpins the materialist model currently 
dominating neuroscience, does not have this concept of unfiltered experience. Instead 
neuroscience has a representationalist theory of causality of the mind in which 
connectionism is thought to explain higher order mental processes. In this model, mental 
processes emerge from interconnections among networks of simple units. Thus, activity 
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at the unit level, or at least the collective activity among networks should, at least in 
theory, explain mental phenomenon. 
For yoga, memory is not involved in the knowledge borne from gaining access 
into states of samadhi (absorption); memory must be quieted for yogic knowledge to 
occur. The remembrance connotation of memory in yoga is more akin to mindfulness of 
some natural state. In contrast, in neuroscience, present moment experience is shaped and 
formed by past experience and the present moment activity of the brain. This plays a 
crucial role in the big-picture difference between tantric yoga and neuroscience in 
interpretations of samadhi (absorption). 
The type of remembrance borne from reflective awareness and mindfulness 
during ishvara pranidhana meditation depends on practice and devotion. This practice 
turned expertise makes meditation based in part on skill learning, and this learning is 
what changes the embodied reality of the practitioner. Similarly, practice dependent 
mental skills can also be learned from the neuroscience perspective, and this learning also 
changes the hard-wiring of the brain. 
We must consider whether memory is involved in all experience. Both systems 
answer no. For yoga, the special case of yogic knowledge gained during high states of 
meditative absorption occurs on the necessary (but not sufficient) condition that the 
mental processes, including memory, become quiet. For neuroscience, while it is true that 
the brain typically draws from memory for experience in normal psychological 
functioning – the brain naturally does this, it encodes experience and forms memories all 
the time - there are numerous conditions in which past memories are not involved in 
experience. For example, simple conditioned responses occurring in single-trial learning 
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do not need memory. When someone wakes from anesthetization, no memories of self 
are needed to remember the experience of waking and coming out of influence of the 
drugs. But these examples do not seem to pertain to the high order complex state of 
conscious awareness during meditation. 
How, then, can neuroscience interpret the finding of hippocampal activation 
during meditation? Could neuroscience reason from a theoretical perspective similar to 
that of yoga that hippocampal activation does not necessarily indicate memory 
functioning? There are some reasons to think so, and many neuroscientists would agree 
with this view that the hippocampus being important for memory does not equate with it 
being only important for this function. For example, the hippocampus is also highly 
active during sleep and this is related to “offline” memory consolidation (Stickgold and 
Walker, 2007). This sort of “offline” process could also operate during meditation.  
Consider that the usual reasoning process is to accept the function typically 
assigned to any given structure such that when that structure changes activity we assume 
that that function first identified must be occurring on. Taking this typical perspective, 
one might interpret hippocampal activity during meditation to be a reflection of memory 
retrieval, that memory is active during meditation. Furthermore, one might infer that such 
evidence possibly supports the interpretation that cognitive appraisals that draw from past 
experience operate during meditative absorption, thus leading to the appraisal of a 
“transcendent” experience.  But this is a faulty assumption. The function of the 
hippocampus is currently debated in memory literature, for example its role in sleep. 
Thus the hippocampus might have a wider role in participating in the regulation of the 
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range of consciousness (that is, ranging from unconscious states like sleep to partially 
conscious, to fully awake, to meditative states, etc.) than originally thought.  
From the neuroscience perspective, we can consider implications of the fact that 
both sleep and meditation are examples of the independence of recollection and 
hippocampal activation. From a tantric point of view, a sort of reversal occurs during goal 
states of meditation. This reversal could be compared to the notion that rather than 
retrieval or recall occurring as the basis of hippocampal activation, activity in this region 
could reflect the activity of consolidation processes. In this view, memory centers of the 
brain would be active not in the ordinary sense of memory, but in the sense of 
formulating new impressions and storing the present-tense experience of meditation such 
as any insights or perceptions that arise during meditation. Whether recall is necessary for 
consolidation processes during a given phenomenon such as meditation remains to be 
determined. Perhaps it is unlikely that conscious recall is necessary for consolidation 
since consolidation occurs in sleep, but since meditation and sleep differ in terms of 
states of awareness it is possible.  
This discussion has resulted in bringing to the surface the issue of conceptualizing 
what kind of knowledge comes from the state of absorption. Neuroscience might classify 
“yogic knowledge” (because the goal of yoga is to transcend knowledge and gain direct 
experience of the nature of reality) into the category of episodic knowledge. Such a 
classification could be based on the reasoning that the meditative event is essentially 
autobiographical. But in neuroscience, episodic knowledge is synonymous with episodic 
memory. The knowledge is memory, whereas in tantric yoga, yogic knowledge is 
claimed to be independent from any of the normal mental processes. With meditation we 
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have the condition in which the learning processes hard wire new skills into the brain’s 
structure, and in this way certain aspects of learned behavior are not exactly memory-
based in the sense of recall. But there is also the fact that new wiring does not obviate 
recall. One way to solve this conceptual difficulty could be to focus on the fact that 
wiring and neural activation are independent of function; then we might conceive of 
absorption as a state which uses the same neural circuitry as normal memory processes, 
but in association with different experiential states from those of normal memory. The 
subtle differences between memory and knowledge are more closely examined in the 
following section on memory mechanisms and also the implications of comparisons. 
  
2. Mechanisms of Memory 
The problem of trying to relate concepts to percepts is particularly relevant when 
trying to understand absorption in the two dimensions of physicality and embodiment. 
This is the case in absorption when the meditator perceives the reality of self and world 
during meditation and then infers that this phenomenological state is transcendent or 
mystical. This cognitive problem directly involves the meditator’s concepts of self and 
reality, which influence the perception of mystical experience and meditative absorption. 
How the meditator relates the concept of mysticism to the perception of absorption 
during meditation is an important feature of the meditation experiential phenomenology. I 
will now analyze the processes of memory and knowledge that are involved in meditative 
cognition.  
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Tantric Yoga Mechanisms of Smrti (Memory) and Samskaras (Memory Traces), 
Especially during Meditation 
In his discussion of nirodha and yogic praxis, Whicher (1997) refers to the 
“mechanism” of cittavrtti, the mental fluctuations (Feuerstein, 1979) or turnings (Miller, 
1995). The cittavrttis contribute to the mechanism of both our karmic identity and 
spiritual liberation, depending on how experience is generated during a mental state; that 
is, whether the vrtti (fluctuation) is formed through shaping of past experience or 
unbounded by smrti (memory). In this sense, the mechanisms of the vrttis are “undone” 
during meditation. Thus, memory in the sense of smrti as a main cittavrtti is one 
mechanism of yogic transformation. Similarly, memory traces (samskaras) become 
mechanisms of meditative absorption. In this section we will examine the mechanisms of 
how this undoing occurs from the tantric perspective. 
As explained in chapter four, a number of scholars have noted that all cittavrttis 
work in cyclical relationship with samskaras (e.g., Whicher, 2005; Eliade, 1958). For 
understanding meditation, the cycle of samskara - smrti – samskara is central (see 
Whicher, 2005), with memory as a causal force of action. Aspects of this analysis pertain 
to other vrttis, too, and not just smrti (memory), since identification with any of the 
cittavrttis (mental processes) constitutes the ordinary sense of self. Experience leaves 
impressions (samskaras) on the mind. Vrttis (mental fluctuations) produce samskaras and 
vice versa; both arise in the citta (the mind), which, as we have seen in chapter four, is 
within the material realm and not in purusa or the spiritual realm. Thus, samskaras 
(memory traces) function both as a binding and liberating influence, either in the form of 
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ignorance or knowledge depending on whether it is bound by the three forces ruling the 
flow of prakrti or matter (tamas (inertia), rajas (activity), and sattva (luminosity). 
By analyzing the causal means or processes by which cittavrtti fluctuate, I 
discovered that binding is the mechanism of memory and samskara (as well as the 
underlying mechanism of all mental functions). To understand this mechanism, it is 
necessary to assimilate the role of the gunas (binding forces) on physical-mental events 
into the tantric yoga view of absorption; we will proceed towards this aim by focusing on 
the mechanistic role of gunas in the cycle of memory (smrti) and the memory traces or 
reactive momentum that drives action (samskara).  
In the Samkhya system adopted and modified in tantra, there is a cycle of 
evolutionary and involutionary processes by which the material world (prakrti) and the 
spiritual or ultimate causal world (purusa or Siva) interact (Larson, 1969). In the tantric 
version of this account, the evolutionary phase of the cycle is the one in which the world 
and thus the mind emanate directly from Siva (Muller-Ortega, 1992). This is the 
emanation theory discussed in chapter four in which in the evolutionary phase the 
elements of the cosmos emanate from the subtler forms. In this theory, the gunas 
(especially rajas and tamas) bind matter, therefore they bind the citta of each individual 
purusa (consciousness) and generate cittavrtti (mental processes), including smrti 
(memory) and samskaras (memory traces). What we consider here is the yogic 
proposition that the variable influence of each guna (binding force) leads to the 
expression of different qualities in the mind. For example, as discussed in chapter four, 
the binding of tamas generates the qualities of lethargy and dullness and rajas gernerates 
activity, while sattva guna generates the qualities of sentience and radiance. 
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Anandamurti (1962; Anandamitra, 1981) explains that before evolutionary 
processes commence, however, the three gunic forces (the binding forces of tamas, rajas, 
and sattva) form a “triangle” in which all the three forces balance each other, thereby 
creating one single vibration in the cosmos. Muller Ortega (1992) echoes this idea, 
explaining that before the beginning there was not silence but a “perfectly coherent and 
self-contained vibration (spanda), one in which the various waves coherently and 
implicitly cancel each other out.” Anandamurti elucidates that this harmony between the 
three gunas and consequent vibration creates a centripetal and centrifugal spiritual force 
that attracts the mind to Brahma, the composite of Siva and Sakti, the spiritual center of 
the cosmos (Anandamurti, 1962). This attraction process underlies the purification of the 
mind from its impure qualities be reestablishing the balance between the three gunas. 
Thus the balance between the gunas is what creates the cosmic vibration (spanda) that is 
the goal of yoga. In this state, there is no mental activity in the sense of perturbances or 
cittavrtti because the mind (and the entire world) is absorbed into the same cosmic 
vibration. 
An axiom of tantric theory is that fluctuation in the cosmic vibration - the 
oscillation of Brahma (or Siva) - from a state of equilibration through the evolutionary 
process results in cognitive activity. Specifically, psychological experience of worldly 
perception and cognition is theorized in terms of those moments when the coherent 
triangle becomes disequilibriated and gunic forces generate what we call mental 
phenomena. Muller-Ortega (1992) explains that in the moments when the gunas become 
disequilibrated, the disequilibration of the gunas generates phonemes: eventually the 
evolutionary process of Siva manifesting in the world unfolds onto the plane of ordinary 
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embodied language rooted in phonemes. Muller-Ortega goes on to explain that when the 
gunic equilibrium is disturbed, the phonemes become arranged such that they create 
patterns in the fabric of the cosmos that interfere with the unbroken and undisturbed 
vibration of Siva. The coagulation or thickening of realities around the interference 
patterns of phonemes sets up separate cognitions that will give rise to the phenomenonal 
universe of everyday experience. Along these lines, Chapple (1982) views cognitions as 
ripples: a state of awareness is actually cognition of areas of patterned experience. 
Moreover, these cognitions are attentional moments that get stored as memory traces.  
In this theory, phonemes are linked with the tattvas, or the elements of the 
universe that, as we have seen in previous chapters, play a central role in the purification 
practices of ishvara pranidhana. Phonemes along with tattvas are postulated as areas of 
patterned disturbance that yield emotional experiences and memories that are all 
dissolved during meditation (Muller-Ortega, 1992) as the kundalini rises up through the 
cittavrttis embedded in each chakra, piercing and purifying each along the way. Note that 
just as in Samkhya, tantra theorizes that the world’s elements (i.e., tattvas) include all the 
psychological structures of awareness of the individual. Within limited areas of the 
cosmos (that is, each individual body), the phonemes are conceived as embodied in the 
practitioner, and by extension, cognitions are thus also formulated as embedded in the 
practitioner (explained further in the next section on emotion and absorption). 
Symbolically ordered saktis (or energies) create the patterns that result in the specific 
cognitions of apparently separate and finite objects, with kundalini sakti as the highest 
ordered embodied sakti within a human purusa (consciousness) or being (White, 1996). 
In this way, attentional moments get stored as phonemes in the body. More will be said 
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about the existence and structure of the phonemes in the body later in the mechanisms of 
emotion section. 
From this theorized evolutionary process, we can infer that the realm of the 
disequilibration between the binding forces in which one can dominate the others is the 
“mental” level, and where memory operates in the normal sense. Memory is recalled or 
called to present moment awareness depending on the flux of gunic forces. From this 
perspective, memory is therefore both a cosmological and psychological process. In this 
theory, objects themselves are cognitions because the matter that constitutes any object is 
imagined as nothing more than areas of fluctuation within cosmic reality. Perception is 
thus a process in which the infinite consciousness encounters its own interference 
patterns and takes cognizance of them (Muller-Ortega, 1992). Thus knowable objects, in 
their essence, are nothing more than the absolute consciousness.  
The difference between objects and consciousness (or spirit, purusa) is that 
objects which appear to be solid and separate in reality are discrete areas of patterning set 
up by the internal interferences of the saktis and the disequilibrated influence of the 
gunas (binding forces). By contrast, absolute consciousness is unbounded and 
unconstrained by patterns of any sort. This reality can get stored as a memory, too: a 
moment of remembrance. The goal of yoga is for the mind to achieve this remembrance 
and become absorbed in absolute consciousness. Muller-Ortega (1992) explains that 
meditation coheres around the reversal of the cosmogonic act: what was described above 
as the emanation of phonemes and worldly events. The withdrawal of the mind (citta) 
from the elements (tattvas) and from the phonemes and subtler emanations in the world 
through purification processes of ishvara pranidhana that we have been examining is this 
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reversal. Yogic withdrawal and the reversal of samskaric memory processes occur 
through the mechanistic changes in the equilibration of the gunas. We will examine the 
unfolding of this process in the body more closely in the next section on absorption. Here 
I conclude this analysis of binding as the mechanism of memory by recapitulating that 
tantric yoga advances an interpretation of the cosmic cycles in which, through yogic 
practice, the gunas lose influence over the activity of the mind. In this state, the 
equilibrium of the binding forces is reestablished and therefore no mental activity occurs 
(at least in the normal modes of mental fluctuations (cittavrtti)).  
Yogic theory holds that the binding mechanisms of the gunas (binding forces) 
operate on a cosmic level; operations on this level create and influence mental processes 
within human minds. The process of sublimation during meditation purportedly unbinds 
the citta from the influences of the gunic forces. 
Even when the sensory mind becomes quiet (such as during meditation or sleep), 
the mind can still be active with memories (both memory and stored samskaras) and 
thoughts about the future (manomaya kosa). Therefore, during meditation, after the yogin 
internalizes mental focus and begins purification of the kosas, conscious dissolution of 
the mind’s habituated mental-emotional patterns begins. This is done through a yogic 
process of sublimation, in which the meditator “applies” the mantra to unwanted 
distracting mental content (thoughts, memories, emotions, etc.). By continuously 
rehearsing the mantra with conscious awareness of this rehearsal process, the meditator is 
able to sublimate or “quiet” this deeper, often subconscious and unconscious, activity of 
the mind. 
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The process of citta suddhi (purification of the mind) is associated with the 
movement of the meditator’s consciousness through the deeper kosas (layers of the 
mind). Anandamurti (Sarkar, 1959) explains that the mind becomes clearer as lower 
kosas (conscious sensory mind and subconscious memory) merge into subtler higher 
layers (intuitive higher layers of mind). Through the force of mental attention and 
concentration on one’s innermost layer (the Atman), the sattvik force comes to dominate 
the mind as consciousness moves through the layers and becomes absorbed in the 
superconscious Atman. This movement of consciousness into deeper layers of mind 
purifies one even more deeply and frees the mind for original – that is, non-habituated – 
action. To progress through these layers, consciousness must become free from the 
gunas, the “prakrtic bonds” of matter or substance that tie it to the phenomenal world 
(Feuerstein, 1979). These gunas (binding forces) are the ground forces of the mental 
layers and through meditation these bonds are broken. 
Breaking these deep bonds is one of the main transformation processes of 
sublimation that occurs during yoga. The “sattvatization” of the mind occurs when the 
mind becomes free from its stagnant and active habituations that keep it from 
experiencing oneness with purusa (spirit or consciousness). For example, the mind is 
stagnant and bound by tamas when in a state of depression and the mind cannot pull itself 
away from thinking in a particular pattern. These habituations play a central role in 
shaping present experience, since they express themselves in thoughts and actions 
(Feuerstein, 1998).   
According to yogic theory, the store of subliminal impressions or samskaras is 
obliterated only when the chain of causal relations is broken (Feuerstein, 1979; Whicher, 
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2005). Anandamurti (Sarkar, 1959; Anandamurti, 1962) emphasizes the aspect of this 
theory that views samskaras as reactions and in terms of in their potentiality. In other 
words, he claims that when an action has taken place but the reaction has not yet 
occurred, the reaction to the action remains in a seed form, which is samskara. Thus in 
Anandamurti’s terms, samskaras are ‘reactive momenta.’ In this theory, samskaras are 
collectively stored in a deep layer of the causal mind and extinguished through yogic 
practices such as Anandamurti’s ishvara pranidhana meditation. Extinguishing is thought 
to involve the reactive momenta being dissolved by subliminating each samskara to the 
mantra. In this way, it is believed that by purging the mind from its stored reactive 
momenta, the mind moves closer to the state of nirodha (cessation). In this state of 
nirodha, the deep effects of mantra recitation on the idea of Brahma are thought to set in.  
In ishvara pranidhana, practitioners sublimate all the thoughts and emotions, all 
the mental content, with ishvara or Parama Purusa (god or cosmic consciousness). 
Anandamurti asserts that sublimation is able to occur during ishvara pranidhana through 
the use of mantra because god is the singular idea contained within the phonemes of the 
mantra. In other words, the technique of ishvara pranidhana is thought to work with the 
use of mantra because of the reality of god is theorized in terms of the oscillating nature 
of the phoneme structure. Later we will elaborate on the idea of mantra itself as a 
mechanism of the mind during meditation, but here we will stay focused on 
understanding sublimation. Any time a thought arises, the meditator simply continues to 
direct attention to the mantra, to its recitation and to the feeling that arises in association 
with the meaning of the mantra. In this way, with sustained concentrated attention to the 
mantra, the reactive momentum (samskaras) and contents of the thoughts and emotions 
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that arise in the mind become associated with the feeling generated by mantra recitation. 
Each samskara comes to “ripen” or express itself, rather than continuing to drive new 
thoughts as reactions. This is sublimation during ishvara pranidhana, and this act of 
sublimation effectively extinguishes the reactive momentum of samskara; it no longer 
drives the cycle of action.  
Yet one must be in a certain state to be able to achieve sublimation within the 
deep layers of the mind. “It is only when you achieve the act of witnessing that the 
process of purging the samskaras begins, and the energy force of the emotions is 
channeled creatively to arouse an inner experience” (Swami Satyananda, 1968). 
Anandamurti (Sarkar, 1959) explains how one overcomes samskara by “transcending the 
inertness of [one’s own] mind” during yogic practice: 
What we generally call the causal or unconscious mind is also a blending of the 
three attributes, sattva, rajas, and tamas, which are part of the citta…. It is for this 
reason that the seeds of the reactive momenta (sam'ska'ras) are stored in the causal 
mind. In order to fully visualize the unconscious mind or causal mind, one's 
identity must remain unaffected from its … [stored and habituated] … 
sam'ska'ras. With the expression of the sam'ska'ras the crude and subtle minds get 
agitated and it becomes impossible for the sam'ska'ra-laden … [meditator]…  to 
reach the stage of tranquility of the causal mind. [Thus] … in order to know or 
comprehend the causal mind one must transcend the inertness of the mind. At this 
stage the Ahamtattva (doer-I) [ego] is bound to merge in [the meditator’s] 
mahatattva (existential-I). In that event the … [meditator’s] … mahatattva (“I am-
ness”) will then have no alternative but to temporarily identify itself with the 
[cosmic existence] (pp. 33-34). 
 
 Anandamurti is saying is that the unconscious mind is really a blending of the qualities 
of all three gunas, which are all a part of citta. The seeds of the reactive momenta or 
samskara are stored in this aspect or layer of mind. When consciously reflecting on and 
visualizing this layer of mind, a person must not allow the stored samskaras to affect 
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one’s identity; this effort requires that the meditator overcome or purify the inertness and 
other gunic qualities of the mind. When the influence of the guna’s qualities on the mind 
has been overcome, the meditator’s mind merges into higher identifications and then 
temporarily identifies with Siva’s cosmic existence. This quote emphasizes that the 
samskaras agitate the mind, and that one must try to not let one’s identity be affected by 
samskara. This requires merging the mind into Atman, Brahman, or ishvara so that it can 
attain quiet. Identifying each thought with the mantra is thought to foster the cognitive 
“shift” in identification away from the ego identity towards an existing “I” feeling. The 
core transformation process of ishvara pranidhana is sublimating these samskaras or 
memory traces. One witnesses mental processes bubbling up and then subsiding as one 
identifies the mental content with Brahman. Continuously directing the mind towards 
Siva, Brahman, or ishvara, that all express god or ultimate reality, maintains this success, 
for attachment to the phenomenal world is the root of mental imbalance (Whicher, 1997; 
Feuerstein, 1998).  
But one must learn to properly use a mantra to be able to successfully sublimate 
the unwanted mental content. Several scholars argue for the view of mantra as learned 
action. Coward (1989), for example, says that Fritz Staal argued that there is a direct 
relationship between ritual actions and mantras. Wheelock (1989) also points to mantra 
as ritual action. Alper (1989) shows support for believing that a social process is involved 
in learning mantric ritual utterance. Adepts necessarily learn and implicitly accept social 
rules and beliefs about mantra when they learn and then adopt mantric ritual as personal 
practice. Therefore, putting mantra into play to sublimate the mind is content and rule 
dependent, and requires properly learning the action.  
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Thus, the process of meditation brings the emotional turbulence brought about by 
the five forces of corruption (kleshas) under control by holding this single thought: 
sublimating all other thoughts to this single thought stills the fluctuations of the kleshas 
(ignorance, ego, attachment, aversion, and will to live) so that they no longer activate any 
of the five modes. But sublimation also rids the deep memory (the “seeds” of samskara) 
of its past impressions. It transforms memories, cognitions, and emotions by channeling 
them towards god.  
Here I have presented mantra and visualization as tantric yoga processes of 
learned actions that change samskaras (memory traces), and thus enable entrance into 
absorption. Thus we have arrived at the view that learning these techniques offers the 
“how to” by which one alters learned habits. The gunas or binding forces have been 
identified as the primary mechanisms theorized in tantric transformation processes, with 
sublimation during ishvara pranidhana as an aspect of the process that transforms the 
mechanistic operations of the gunas. These processes are important because, as we will 
elaborate in the next section, they play a central role in tantric theories about how 
meditation ultimately changes an individual’s self-identity.                
 
Neuroscience: Memory Mechanisms  
There are many detailed mechanisms of memory discussed in the neuroscience 
literature on memory. I focus on one overarching mechanism of memory: binding. Hebb 
(1949) proposed binding as a cellular and neural network mechanism for learning that 
involves the transfer of short-term memory into long-term memory, and this model has 
become the dominant view of neural bases of memory formation (e.g., Goelet, 
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Castellucci, Schacher, and Kandel, 1986; Axmacher, Mormann, Fernandez, Elger, and 
Fell, 2006). One can see at least four main memory processes based on the mechanism of 
binding that commit episodic and semantic knowledge to long-term memory, all of 
which, I believe, must be involved in stages of meditation (because they are involved in 
all learning processes): encoding, consolidation, storage, and retrieval (Gazzaniga, Ivry, 
and Mansun, 1998). These processes constitute the phases requiring the mechanical 
operations of cellular and network binding.  
Learning requires acquiring and storing new information – the functions of 
encoding - which is the first phase of cellular binding. During the process of encoding, 
independent features of perception somehow become bound together into a unified 
conscious experience. The “binding problem” is the theoretical and scientific problem of 
explaining the explicit association between features of objects of perception (von der 
Malsburg, 1999; Roskies, 1999). For example, colors and shapes, as well as words, are 
each encoded within different areas of the brain. How does a person recognize the blue, 
rectangular object as a table?  
One aspect of binding is temporal binding where events co-occurring in time are 
more likely to be bound and this has been linked with increased firing of neuronal 
populations (von der Malsburg, 1999; Triesman, 1996, 1999; Ward, 2003), especially 
when the firing is synchronous. Synchronized temporal binding occurs at multiple levels 
from the level of individual neurons to the systems level in different regions of the brain 
when neuronal activity is temporally linked. Increased neuronal activity is evidence of 
synchronous activity over large numbers of neurons (Ward, 2003; Buzsaki and Draguhn, 
2004).  
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The process of learning is thought to change the neural activity of circuits 
normally mediating whatever behavior is to be changed (e.g., the perceptions, actions, 
feelings, thoughts, etc.) (Axmacher, Mormann, Fernandez, Elger, and Fell, 2006). The 
learning is accomplished by having sufficient change in neural activation of connections 
between neurons, e.g., in more specific terms, a population of presynaptic connections 
fire in a manner that increases activation of postsynaptic neurons. The learning encoding 
process is thought to result from a change in firing patterns, e.g., increased firing 
frequency of specific inputs and synchrony across the inputs (Butz, Worgotter, and van 
Ooyen, 2009). If the activation across this population of synapses is sufficient, it 
instigates the synaptic plasticity cascade that result in the creation of memory (Axmacher, 
Mormann, Fernandez, Elger, and Fell, 2006). The potency of the postsynaptic activation 
is enhanced when the presynaptic neurons fire together, that is, at the same time, 
synchronously (Butz et al., 2009). Synchrony strengthens the synapses in the 
hippocampus (Bontempi et al., 1999), and from this evidence it is thought that this 
synaptic plasticity from synchronous firing could likely be widespread through out the 
brain. 
Synchrony works best when the neuronal firing of the population that is 
synchronous with the population and with theta oscillations (Buzaki, 2006). Gamma 
oscillation is thought to reflect the experience-driven activity: the firing. Thus, the 
synchronization of fast wave gamma and the slow wave theta oscillations helps it achieve 
the postsynaptic activation needed to instigate plasticity (Buzsaki and Draguhn, 2004). 
This is not equal to theta oscillations being the mechanisms, though, because it is not the 
oscillations per se that creates memories – these are happening all the time and probably 
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reflect memory formation and many other processes. The reason that synchrony is such 
an important mechanism, then, is that because of synchronous activity in the brain, 
experience becomes encoded via neuronal-activity-dependent plasticity (Butz, Worgotter, 
and van Ooyen, 2009).  More simply, synchrony makes it easier to get to the sufficient 
activation needed to instigate the plasticity. 
Shifting attention has been found to modulate synchronous neural firing (Fries et 
al., 2001) and sufficiently increased neuronal firing can induce synaptic plasticity (Traub 
et al., 1998), especially if synchronous with theta oscillations during working memory 
and memory formation (Axmacher, Mormann, Fernandez, Elger, and Fell, 2006). In this 
way oscillations are not only related to the experiential aspects of cognition, but can also 
help change the structure of the brain.  As discussed earlier, attention is an important 
aspect of working memory, and evidence has accumulated showing oscillatory neural 
activity during attention and conscious states, which oscillate around 40Hz (in the gamma 
range) (Engel and Singer, 2001). Tallon-Baudry et al. (2001) found evidence that 
synchronized oscillatory activity occurs during object rehearsal in visual short term 
memory. This finding could be important to understanding ishvara pranidhana since the 
meditator rehearses the visualization of an abstract image of oneself becoming one with 
god during meditation.  
 After encoding, the brain “stabilizes” this new information through consolidation 
processes (Debiec, LeDoux, and Nader, 2002). At the cellular level, new protein 
synthesis results from the temporary changes i.e., in synaptic activity, and this results in 
persistent modifications of synaptic potency and architecture (Goelet, Castellucci, 
Schacher, and Kandel, 1986; Debiec, LeDoux, and Nader, 2002). This culminates in a 
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lasting change in the strengths of synapses in relevant neuronal circuits and this is 
thought to be the long-term memory.  
A growing body of evidence supports the idea that sleep plays an important role 
in memory formation and functioning by consolidating memories through the mechanism 
of oscillatory neural synchrony (Buzsaki and Draguhan, 2004; Axmacher et al., 2006).  
Recent neuronal firing patterns present during learning have been found to be “replayed” 
during sleep, and this replay is thought to stabilize the synaptic strengthening of the 
network. In addition, thalamo-cortical oscillations synchronize the brain during sleep in a 
way to reduce environmental influences on neocortical activity, thereby actively shifting 
sleep into deeper stages (Steriade, McCormick, and Sejnowski, 1993). This activity is 
thought to be how sleep supports memory consolidation and participates in changing the 
physical structure of the brain. The memory function of sleep may not be just about 
consolidation, but also about filtering, clearing, or correcting the “noise” of irrelevant 
circuits.  
Although different in important ways, meditation has similarities to sleep.  For 
example, as discussed in chapter three, alpha and theta bands recorded during several 
types of meditation, including ishvara pranidhana, closely resemble those of sleep (e.g., 
Elson, Hauri, and Cunis, 1977). At one time, researchers wondered whether the alpha and 
theta bands during meditation reflected sleep, although now the two are generally 
recognized as distinct states. Theta and gamma are the most typical phases during sleep.   
Both meditation and sleep share the feature that the brain’s responsiveness to external 
stimuli progressively decreases. Experimental studies have shown that both sleep 
(Moroni et al., 2008) and at least one type of compassion meditation (Lutz et al., 2004) 
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exhibit synchronous gamma oscillations. Another commonality is that there is evidence 
that both sleep (e.g., Rauchs, Desgranges, Foret, and Eustache, 2005) and meditation 
(e.g., Fabbro, Muzur, Bellen, Calacione, and Bava, 1999) improve memory. For example, 
perhaps meditation is necessary for the formation of one particular kind of remembrance: 
one’s relationship with reality. Perhaps meditation performs a similar role as sleep in 
clearing or filtering irrelevant circuits from memory processes. Because of the 
commonalities between sleep and meditation and their relation to memory, meditation 
could have a similar role in the formation and functioning of memory.  
Consolidation is the memory process that stores the formed memory traces. The 
hippocampus has been shown to have a time-limited role in memory storage, such that 
after a period, the memory trace exists independently of the hippocampus (Zola-Morgan 
and Squire, 1990). This “unbinding” of a memory trace from the hippocampus may mark 
the end of consolidation process (Bontempi, Laurent-Demir, Destrade, and Jaffard, 
1999). The memories persist or endure through cortical and subcortical connections. 
Because all experience is imprinted in the brain, we should be able to assume that the 
meditation feeling and states of consciousness undergo these processes of encoding and 
cellular binding, and are consolidated into long-term memory stores as well.  
Though consolidation represents memory stabilization, it does not indicate 
unchanging performance. A study by Lewis and colleagues (1968) challenged the long-
held view that consolidated memories persist unchanged  over time, instead suggesting 
that retrieval, a process of reactivating Misanin, Miller, and Lewis consolidated 
memories, returns the memory trace to a “labile” state, and that reactivation (or retrieval) 
initiates a second consolidation process. This second process is now established in 
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memory research literature as reconsolidation (e.g., Przbyslawski and Sara, 1997; Nader, 
2003).  
Reactivation draws established memory traces from both the hippocampus and 
neocortex into working memory (Debiec, LeDoux, and Nader, 2002), where memory can 
be operated on and manipulated. Sara explains that “original” memories are always 
stored within the context of a “memory network;” i.e., by retrieval of past experience. 
Each time a memory is retrieved, the brain reorganizes the trace by integrating new 
information from the current environmental context with the recalled information, and 
then stored again within the existing memory network (Przybyslawski and Sara, 1997). In 
this way, memory and experience reciprocally affect one another, and memory “colors” 
present-tense experience (Nader, 2003). Like LTM consolidation, reconsolidation 
depends on protein synthesis and both have time windows within which to operate 
(Debiec et al., 2002), with growing evidence that reconsolidation also requires 
transcription (Nader, 2003). Reconsolidation is different from consolidation, though, 
because different stimuli are presented to trigger consolidation of the learning event; a 
reinforcer is present during consolidation but not present for reconsolidation (Nader, 
2003). Thus, because of less cellular processing, reconsolidation is faster than 
consolidation (Nader, 2003).   
Retrieval occurs when the central executive (attentional system) of working 
memory, located in the frontal areas (Baddeley, 2003) recruits different information 
broadly from different cortical and subcortical circuits, depending on what type of 
information is needed for retrieval (Debiec, LeDoux, and Nader, 2002). The 
hippocampus and frontal cortex are the brain structures most commonly implicated in 
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retrieval processes (Sara 2000). Thus, as with other memory processes, different brain 
systems subserve retrieval of implicit and explicit information. (For further reading on 
retrieval processes see, for example, Anderson, 1983; Cowan, 1995; Ruchkin et al. 2003.)  
Retrieval could be important for understanding meditation because attentional and 
working memory systems draw from long-term memory to form imagery, and imagery is 
used during ishvara pranidhana. In one view, working memory is believed to draw from 
or “retrieve” long-term memory stores to form imagery by reactivating cortical structures 
that were activated when these representations were initially encoded (Denis, Mellet, and 
Kosslyn, 2004). In this way, mental imagery is a way to have the experience of an object 
in the absence of actual physical sensory input (Kosslyn, 2005). 
Baddeley (2000) cites conscious awareness as the mechanism of retrieval from 
the episodic buffer, his theorized working memory system that holds temporary stores of 
unitary episodic representations. Although conscious awareness might mean something 
different in tantra and not a narrow definition of some kind of attention, there could be a 
similarity between the conscious awareness of retrieval and the kind of conscious 
awareness during the visualization phase of meditation. Because one aims to achieve 
continuous conscious awareness during the phase of meditation in which one 
concentrates on the visualization, mechanisms of mental imagery such as conscious 
awareness in response to conditioned cues might explain mechanistic processes that 
occur in the brain during meditation and the way that meditation impacts memory.   
A further point is that retrieval initiates two separate but potentially opposite 
processes of reconsolidation and extinction (Suzuki et al., 2004). Reconsolidation is a 
process that links memory retrieval to experience-dependent neuroplasticity, that is, this 
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process changes past memories rather than just forming new ones by “redoing” 
intracellular memory consolidation events (Przybyslawski and Sara, 1997).  
In addition to initiating the memory reconsolidation process, retrieval can also 
initiate a similar process of extinction (Suzuki et al., 2004). Extinction involves the 
unpairing of conditioned stimulus with unconditioned stimulus during retrieval phase 
(Meyers and Davis, 2002). Extinction is a protein synthesis dependent memory state and 
has some of the same cellular and molecular mechanisms of both consolidation and 
reconsolidation (Debiec et al., 2002, Nader, 2003). However, whereas reconsolidation 
requires just a brief reminder of the cue for recall, the subject needs to be exposed to the 
contextual cue for a longer period to initiate extinction processes (Debiec et al., 2002; 
Eisenberg, 2003).  
Santini, Muller, and Quirk (2001) showed that extinction consolidation involves 
the transfer from NMDA-independent to NMDA-dependent memory and dopamine, 
GABA, and protein synthesis are examples of other biochemical systems involved in 
extinction (see Meyers and Davis (2002) for review). There is some evidence that 
imagery might function in extinction in the same way as an actual presented stimulus. 
Dadds, Bovbjerg, Redd, and Cutmore (1997) reviewed empirical evidence to explain in 
detail the role of mental images of conditioned stimuli and unconditioned stimuli during 
pre-exposure to stimuli – the actual pairing of the conditioned stimulus unconditioned 
stimulus – and extinction when the conditioned stimulus was presented alone. The 
authors concluded that the evidence suggests that mental imagery can facilitate or 
diminish the outcome of classical conditioning in humans and, more tentatively, that 
mental images can substitute for actual conditioned stimuli and unconditioned stimuli in 
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autonomic conditioning. These findings are relevant to meditation if mantra and 
visualization become conditioned stimuli. See Dadds et al. (1997) for a discussion and 
review of imagery literature. 
In sum, information central to memories is constantly being retrieved and shapes 
in-the-moment perceptions. Old memories are also constantly being modified and 
reformulated based on new experiences, and sometimes old stores are dissolved 
(extinguished). These memory processes are embodied at the cellular level through 
biochemical changes and at the systems level when the activity is synchronized 
throughout networks. Because meditation has been shown to enhance effects of both 
short-term (or working memory) and long term memory, there is reason to believe that 
retrieval and change processes of memory are involved in meditation. 
 
Comparison: Liberative Samskaras and Reconsolidation of Retrieved Memories  
This comparison concerns the memory mechanisms involved in the processes of 
how we develop knowledge from in-the-moment perception, with a special focus on 
change as these processes operate during meditation. These processes involve learning 
and memory; on the most basic level, both neuroscience and tantric yoga locate memory 
in the body. As has been discussed, neuroscience associates structures such as the 
hippocampus and cortex with consolidation processes necessary for forming long-term 
memory and areas of the prefrontal cortex with attentional processes necessary for 
generating working memory. Yoga locates memory in the body, too, since yoga identifies 
memory as a cittavrtti that operates within the person and cittavrtti is part of the material 
structure of the universe. The theme of comparing models of the body recognized in 
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tantric yoga and neuroscience thus begins here in this section on memory mechanisms; 
however, later sections on emotion elaborate on this comparison and go into more detail 
on the point of how cittavrttis, and samskaras, too, are theorized in the body. 
Explaining conscious states requires explaining binding information across 
multiple interacting systems. Ishvara pranidhana involves associating the mantra, which 
is continuously held in conscious awareness, with all previous memories and past as well 
as present-moment emotions. 
Both systems also suggest “binding” as a primary mechanism of memory, and this 
seems to be the most important comparison point. Through the action of oscillatory 
neural synchrony at multiple levels in the neuroscience view, the mechanism of binding 
changes the physical structure of the cell and network connectivity, and instantiates new 
and reshapes old memories in the brain. In tantric yoga, theorized shifts in the balance 
and dominance of the three cosmic binding forces or gunas, that operate on all matter and 
directly influence the emergence of differing mental qualities, create different kinds of 
impressions or memories (samskaras and smrtis) in the mind. Neuroscience binding 
operates only in the brain and specifically on cellular processes, and tantric yoga binding 
is theorized as driving material transformations both throughout the cosmos as well as at 
individual levels of the mind (such as, in theory, the brain). Despite this difference, the 
binding mechanism a basic homologous similarity in their memory processes. The 
activity dependent binding that operates in the brain in response to environmental cues, 
and its dependence on oscillating synchronous activity, might suggest some broader 
binding forces, possibly akin to the yogic gunas. Yet the difference in focus of analytical 
level makes a comparison beyond the general concept of “binding” difficult.  
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Since the gunas are postulated as operating within the person and existing as 
forces within the realm of matter (prakrti), we might infer that they also operate, in 
theory, within the brain and influence its processes. Of course, traditional texts offer 
nothing on this matter; they do not discuss or mention the brain at all in reference to any 
aspect of the yogic theories of mental processes. Because the gunas have psychological 
qualities to them, it may also be reasonable to think that they compare with operations 
that influence the brain’s processes in light of the neuroscience view that 
neurophysiological processes create mental functioning. Along these lines, the facts about 
different structures of the brain being associated with different kinds and stages of 
memory (such as long-term memory stores vs. short term working memory) suggests 
some similarity with Anandamurti’s teaching about samskaras being stored in certain 
kosas (layers of the mind) in that yoga presents different layers of mind associated with 
different mental functions.  
We might also compare the tantric yoga processes of binding and liberation with 
the neuroscience processes of cellular binding and gaining knowledge in terms of 
psychological processes relevant to meditation. For example, when the mind is bound by 
tamas guna, the mind is said to have a lethargic tendency and quality of dullness. These 
are the qualities that people use to define depression, and depression is thought to be 
associated with low levels of activation in the prefrontal cortex, etc. (Henriques and 
Davidson, 1991; Abercrombie, 1998) In contrast, when the mind is dominated by the 
sattvic quality, as theorized during meditation, it has a sentient quality that suggests 
wakefulness, attentiveness, and calm alertness. In neuroscience, these qualities are 
associated with activation in the prefrontal areas. The brain seems to exhibit some similar 
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qualities attributed to the gunas, such as the quality of “activity” (rajas guna) when there 
is increased bloodflow and chemical activity in certain regions over others, or the quality 
of “inertia” (tamas guna) when a given brain area has been structurally injured and no 
longer working or somehow otherwise inactive.  
One observation that seems especially relevant to this comparison is that recent 
neuroscience literature has proposed a mechanism of theta binding across the brain as a 
“global” mechanism, because this principle seems more suggestive of the yogic concept 
of binding “forces” that act across the brain rather than just in localized areas within cells. 
Further analyses are needed to compare how or if the cosmic mechanisms posited in 
tantric yoga operate in connection with the localized substance of an individual brain, but 
this topic extends into the areas of cosmology and potentially into physics.  
An additional commonality is that both systems suggest a cyclical, mechanical, or 
driving relationship between memory and experience. In yoga, the cyclical causality 
between samskara and smrti operates mechanically in the mind (in the same way that 
samskara exhibits cyclical causality with other mental processes such as valid cognition 
(pramana)) such that the deep stores of samskara (subliminal activators) catalyze actions 
and then the experience generated from such actions becomes contained in the form of 
new memory traces, which then also create subliminal activators, and so on. In 
neuroscience, the brain forms new impressions through memory encoding processes that 
retrieve memory traces from memory stores and integrate these with present-tense 
experience to form current impressions, and similarly cycles. Moreover, in both systems 
action can be generated internally, as opposed to externally-driven activity via 
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environmental stimuli. So, although the two systems describe memory mechanisms on 
different levels, descriptions on all the levels underscore this basic mechanical principle.   
Both systems describe a process of associating present moment percepts with 
stored mental content as a way of both interpreting current experiences and also changing 
memory stores. In sublimation from the tantric yoga perspective, the meditator seeks to 
dissolve mental content and transform emotionally distressing states of mind into either 
peacefully calm or joyfully ecstatic emotional states by associating distressing content 
with the mantra. By focusing on repeating the mantra while contemplating the meaning 
of the mantra and continuously attending to the visualization, the meditator consciously 
directs attention towards the cultivation of peaceful as opposed to distressed states. In this 
way, sublimation is a psychological process. Similarly, from the neuroscience 
perspective, incoming information that represents present-moment perceptions is 
associated with recalled information from both short and long-term memory stores. These 
associations help a person assign meaning to perceived stimuli and events, and this 
includes reshaping memory stores. 
Along these lines, I found that both systems convey the notion of change. The 
change processes of sublimation in tantric yoga and plasticity (and its processes of 
consolidation, reconsolidation and extinction) in neuroscience are similar conceptually in 
that both evoke a notion of change. But the tantric yoga process of sublimation has a 
clear intentional goal for the direction of change (that is, intentionally directing the mind 
towards Siva) whereas plasticity occurs for positive adaptive changes as well as the 
learning of “bad” habits.  We have seen that in neuroscience, cellular binding and 
retrieval processes of reconsolidation and extinction lead to plastic changes in the 
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physical structure of the brain. The physical structure of the person is also thought to 
change with experience as viewed from the tantric yoga binding processes.  
A major difference between the two systems’ accounts of memory processes is 
that, because the tantric yoga theorizing does link physical processes of the body to 
cosmic structures, this account provides meaningful interpretations. In the tantric yoga 
view, the physical structure of the person is constituted at the most basic level in terms of 
phonemes and tattvas and, as described above, changes in the domination of the gunic 
forces cause transformations of this fundamental structure. Putting aside for the moment 
the question of whether these structures actually exist and instead focusing on how they 
are thought to function within the tantric yoga system, I found that the processes of the 
gunic forces causing perturbances in the fabric of the reality, interpreted as cognition, 
seems to be a more basic and psychologically meaningful explanation of mental states. 
The theorized tantric yoga structures, albeit metaphysical structures, seem to be at a more 
basic level of reality in the same way that chemical processes explain biological 
phenomenon or physical descriptions of reality explain chemical processes. However, the 
neuroscience view of activation of neuronal cells and neurophysiological systems is not 
meant to provide meaning in this sense, but rather mechanisms.  
Even if one did consider the ontological status of these theorized structures, I am 
not sure that these are theorized in the same dimension because the neuroscience 
structures of cells are complex biological entities and seem to be in a more condensed 
state than the structures in tantric yoga.  More directly to the point, the substance of the 
tantric yoga structures seems to be imbued with consciousness as opposed to existing in 
the same form of brute matter of neuroscience cells and neurotransmitters. This matters in 
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terms of functionality because the fluctuation and movement of the phonemes and 
influence of the tattvas itself can be interpreted in terms of changes in cognitive 
perceptions, whereas another level of explanation is still needed to understand mental 
processes such as memory when one considers changes in the activation of the brain 
structures. The problem with this view from a scientific perspective is that there is no 
way to observe and measure these proposed structures; therefore, it is difficult to advance 
a scientific hypothesis that a) either these structures exist or b) changes in these structures 
are associated with or embody mental phenomena such as memory and cognition either 
during meditation or in any normal waking state.  
 
3. Overall Comparison and Implications 
We also must consider that the language differs dramatically between the systems, 
and that this difference has some broader implications for understanding absorption. For 
example, “cellular” and “gunas” (translated as forces) can be thought of as central forces 
in memory in these systems. While the adjective “cellular” indicates actual physical 
processes, the (translated) yogic notion of “forces” is indistinct since it is not itself 
physical. This sort of difference matters for understanding higher-level psychological 
processes. In the modern tantric view, for example, consciousness is understood to be 
located within every cell (e.g., Swami Satyananda, 1984); however, consciousness is not 
yet understood from the neuroscience perspective and the idea that consciousness is in 
every cell seems incomprehensible, given that mental functions are thought to be 
associated with combinations of local and global activation of specific structures and 
widespread circuits rather than any sort of “activity” within any single cell. This basic 
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difference of conceiving binding in terms of its material processes versus underlying 
forces reflects deeper differences in views of causality embedded in each system’s theory 
of mind. Whereas neuroscience focuses on an efficient material cause-effect type of 
explanation, the tantric yoga explanation indicates other types of causality, especially the 
final causality in which the divine source of the gunas as Siva is the primary cause of 
memory and samskara. 
However, perceptions and cognitions of the world, shaped by memory, necessitate 
that the mind deals with meanings, sense, and values. In tantric yoga, the binding 
principles essentially carry a subjective quality to individual experience; however, 
material structures of cellular processes do not. In neuroscience, content and meaning are 
perceived and shaped by saliency, attention, and emotional valence to encode stimuli 
from the environment (though the environment could be the mental context). Thus, at this 
theoretical level one can see a further similarity between neuroscience and tantric yoga in 
that both take the environmental context into account to explain what needs to happen to 
put memories together. But in neuroscience, the space within which all these memory 
processes occur is contained within the well- defined structure of the brain in the 
individual person. This condition greatly differs from the yogic concept of binding, since 
the gunas operate not just in the mind, but are cosmic principles. For both, though, the 
individual is understood to be organically and fundamentally interactive within the 
environmental context and the person’s experiences are had because of this interaction. 
This self-environment relationship suggests the need for some (further) exploration of 
theories of energy transfer between the two systems to explicate this comparison. 
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In neuroscience, energy in various forms, such as light and sound, enters sensory 
organs and is chemically (light) and mechanically (sounds) transformed into neural 
signaling. These transformations within the sensory systems are well understood. Such 
transfer of energy indicates how the brain engages with the environment, suggesting that 
it relies on extended sensory organs to interface with the environment, gather 
information, and channel-selected information into processing centers. In this model, the 
transfer between the environment and the person is energy. Tantric yoga also has this 
idea that energy transfers between the person and the environment, but the tantric yoga 
cosmology that underpins this theory of energy transfer explains the interactions beyond 
a material and mechanical level of cause and effect.  Tantric theory about the oscillating 
universe puts forward the notion that the person and the rest of the cosmos are more 
interconnected than the appearance of differentiated bodies suggests. This difference in 
ideas about interconnection between neuroscience and tantric yoga is at the heart of the 
differing epistemologies between the two systems.  
We see the concept of synchronous oscillation at work in mechanical descriptions 
of memory function in the brain in the evidence of mechanistic theta binding across 
disparate areas of the brain, and chapter three discussed evidence of synchronized 
oscillation in the brain during meditation. We have also seen that there is an oscillating 
nature of the cellular activity during meditation. Because neuroscience advances 
explanations about neurophysiological processes, and not about what happens at the 
mental level, it might be impossible to determine whether this sort of relationship exists 
between mechanical explanations about memory from the two systems, except for the 
insight that the physical structure of the brain changes with experience. Therefore, two 
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implications of these comparisons between yogic and neuroscientific models of cognition 
memory and knowledge is that they challenge us to both examine what reality is depicted 
by each model and acknowledge our uncertainty about how it is that we come to know 
reality.  
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Chapter Eight 
The Embodied Feeling of Meditative Absorption 
 
Although we might not think of absorption as an emotion, per se, this sort of 
quality and the states of one’s emotional experiences that come along with it, namely 
calmness, peacefulness, and even ecstatic blissfulness, are states associated with 
meditation that can be recognized as having emotional qualities. According to tantric 
yoga these states are all linked to the awareness that the individual “I” feeling has shifted 
away from a sense of a separate self identified with worldly realities and instead became 
absorbed in the cosmic entity (Feuerstein, 1979; Muller-Ortega, 1992). This chapter 
focuses on comparing tantric yoga and neurophysiological perspectives on these sorts of 
emotional states of meditation, especially regarding questions of where and how 
emotional qualities of meditative consciousness are embodied. 
The Yoga Upanishads refer to the mind in terms of the concepts of citta (mind), 
kosas (sheaths of mind), chakras (energy centers), and nadis (energy channels), along 
with other concepts to indicate various domains of mind, but these concepts are discussed 
as existing in a subtle body that is distinct from the physical body. When referring to the 
physical body, Indian religious texts important to various understandings of yoga point to 
the gross level of organs, fluids, and tissues. References to the ‘physical’ body in yogic 
texts include entities such as ‘heart,’ ‘navel,’ and ‘throat,’ (Brown, 1921) but they do not 
refer to any cells or molecules, although cosmological theories make reference to atoms 
(anu). Tantric yoga theory also evokes the Samkhya-Yoga analysis of matter, whereby 
cosmic entities such as the elements (tattvas) of earth, fire, water, and air are all 
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simultaneously located within the physical body. These physical structures are all 
involved in absorption processes during meditation that result in emotional states.  
Significantly, however, traditional yoga literature does not anywhere refer to the 
brain (Brown, 1921). Suggestions from scholars of Modern Yoga regarding translations 
that have occurred in the past decade especially between traditional forms of yoga and 
modern science (De Michelis, 2004; Alter, 2004; 2005) might lead one to wonder 
whether the trend for modern yoga teachers to discuss the role of the brain in yogic 
processes is a result of changes in modernity’s influence over understandings of the brain. 
Although there is a tradition of Western thought that goes at least as far back as 
Aristotle that maintains a body-based philosophy of emotions, the thinking for several 
hundred years during the Enlightenment Era in which dualism prevailed assumed that 
emotions are soul-based (Olson, 2004). As a key player in the progression of modernity, 
William James marked a shift in thinking about the emotions in Western thought that 
continues today when he (re)linked emotion to the body (Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin, 
2000). James viewed emotions as “physiological response tendencies.” In this view, 
emotions are instantiated in the body via physiological responses that engender certain 
tendencies. Along with this claim of body-based emotions was the notion that emotions 
have evolutionary significance; James advanced the idea that emotions function within 
situational contexts that motivate adaptive behavioral responses. Researchers today 
continue to draw on the James-Lange adaptive response-tendency perspective of 
emotions (for review, see Gross, 1998).  
A second assertion within James’ view was that there were no emotion circuits in 
the brain; however, this view came under major challenge from Cannon (1927/1987; 
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Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin, 2000). The issue here is that James thought of emotion 
more as a whole body phenomenon - an embodied emotion - whereas many have and still 
think that emotion is generated in the brain. Early views of the neural basis of emotion 
pointed to the limbic system as the center of emotion (e.g., Papez, 1937; Maclean, 1949, 
1952; see Davidson et al., 2000 for discussion of these findings), but more recently 
evidence suggests that emotion circuits in the limbic system are widely connected with 
cortical areas (LeDoux, 1995). This evidence supports the view that people apply 
cognitive appraisals to interpret emotional feelings (see seminal articles by Schacter and 
Singer, 1962; Lazarus, 1984).  However, cognitive views of the mind are challenged by 
attempts at more holistic understandings of the brain and mind, such as those perspectives 
arguing for an embodied understanding of emotion and mental phenomena (Valera, 
Thompson, Rosch, 2001).  
Understanding the link between cognitive phenomena and emotional qualities of 
meditative states is a central question in understanding absorption in ishvara pranidhana, 
as it is in understanding any mystical phenomenon. Here in this chapter I examine tantric 
yoga and neuroscience views of emotion located in the body, focusing especially on 
emotion states involved in meditation states and the transformation of emotion during 
meditative processes. Because both systems hold that emotions of emotion is embodied, 
we focus, especially in the mechanisms section, on analyzing exactly what embodiment 
meant in each system. 
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1. Types of Emotion: Emotion Programs 
In the following analysis, we examine the range of experience of emotion to 
discover what types of emotion are decribed by each system. The discussion focuses 
especially on the types of emotions involved in the processes of meditation. While both 
systems describe largely the same types of emotions, they also differ as to desriptions of 
the emotional quality of meditative states. 
 
Tantric Yoga: Subtle Body Mechanisms of Emotional Expression 
In chapter four the standard six-plus one model of the yogic subtle body was 
described. In this model, seven energy centers (chakras) are located within the nervous 
system and many more channels circulate energy throughout the body (Avalon, 
1919/1974; White, 1996; 2000). Activity in this subtle body system is thought by tantric 
and hatha yoga traditions to generate emotional and mental flux. In this model, the 
kundalini rises through the central channel (sushumna nadi) when the other nadis, 
especially the ida and pingala, are balanced during states of absorption. This chakra 
model is one commonly used in tantric yoga traditions. But Anandamurti teaches 
something that I have not come across in any other literature. He claims that specific 
emotions – regular everyday emotions such as fear, anger, and joy – are associated with 
specific petals of the chakras (Sarkar, 1959; 1991).  
According to Anandamurti (Sarkar, 1959; 1991; Ananda Mitra, 1981), each 
chakra (energy center) is surrounded by petals and these petals each reflect a particular 
type of vrtti or mental fluctuation. For example, Ananda Mitra (1981) writes that the 
psychological feeling of cruelty is associated with perturbations of a vrtti of the 
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svadhisthana chakra. So, when this chakra is vibrated or perturbed, the vibration results 
in a feeling of cruelty upon which one may or may not act. Thus, disturbing the chakric 
flows (and the flow of the chakric petals in particular) is what causes or creates the 
cittavrtti (mental perturbance) and the psychic experience associated with that particular 
vrtti. Further, these vrttis (perturbances), or petals of the chakras (energy centers), are 
located in the body just as the chakras are themselves associated with physical changes in 
the body. Thus, Anandamurti’s psychological teaching links the yoga view of vrtti with 
the tantric notion of a subtle body such that mental fluctuations are tied into the tantric 
subtle body. The concept of vrtti takes on much more specific forms in this view than 
other chakra models and Classical Yoga teachings about vrttis because in this view the 
material substance of the cittavrtti is specifically located around any given chakra. In 
other words, a specific cittavrtti manifests as an individual petal of a particular chakra. 
These claims are an extension of claims asserted by Avalon (1919/1974). In his 
seminal scholarship on tantric yoga, Avalon writes extensively about correlations 
between tantric and neuroscientific physiological understandings. In these writings, 
Avalon claims that the “letters” of each chakric petal also exist in the sahasrara chakra 
(Anandamurti also makes this claim, as it is one aspect of the standard view of yoga). 
White (1996) also describes the letters or phonemic sounds of the Sanskrit alphabet 
situated on the petals of the chakras (energy centers). What is important about these 
energy centers, from Avalon’s perspective, is that a) these centers are ascribed not only to 
the spinal centers but also exist in the cerebral centers and b) ultimately these cerebral 
centers (via their control of the spinal centers), control physiological function (such as 
vascular innervation, hormone secretion, etc.) “only in relation with the manifestations of 
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volition, feeling, and emotion” (1974, p. 106). Avalon points out that this tantric view is 
in contrast to the scientific view of the spinal centers (including the sympathetic system) 
as mechanisms of only unconscious adaptation to environmental conditions. Anandamurti 
also holds this assertion that the sahasrara’s control over the vrttis, whether in the 
sahasrara or chakras in the body, links the body’s physiological functions to emotional 
and cognitive processes. What distinguishes Anandamurti’s position, though, is that he 
attributes specific emotional and other types of states to each of these letters on the 
chakric petals. We will examine the operations of the vrttis as “seeds” of emotional states 
in more detail in the next section on the mechanisms of emotion. 
Moving to another point on the tantric views of different types of emotion, 
according to a standard view of yoga, there are two general tendencies that generate 
emotional processes: attachment and aversion (Whicher, 2007; Miller, 1995). In Yoga, as 
we saw in chapter four, klista vrttis or painful mental processes are created by the activity 
of the kleshas. Attachment and aversion are two of the five kleshas that are particularly 
relevant when discussing quieting of emotional “afflictions” (kleshas). These two are 
central to the Yoga Sutra view of psychological process whose quieting during yogic 
practice brings emotional flux under self-control, especially transforming negative 
emotion. Thus when the mind’s tendency to move in patterns of attachment and aversion 
to the worldly character of existence is quieted, one can enter higher stages of meditation.  
 
Neuroscience: Valenced Action Tendencies and Emotion Programs  
To understand a neuroscience perspective on the emotional state associated with 
meditation, it is helpful to have a context of psychological research on emotion. The 
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neuroscience of emotion focused for a long time on negative emotion (Fredrickson, 
2004). For example, LeDoux (e.g., 1985) characterizes the neurocircuitry of fear and 
anxiety. Two related notable exceptions to this trend are reward and pleasure (Papez, 
1937; Maclean, 1949, 1952). The field of emotion research seems to have followed this 
path of examining negative emotion for some time, likely because of the advantages of 
using animal models to study fear through both behavioral and, more recently, 
neuroscience techniques. However, Fredrickson (2000) explains that more recently there 
has been increased attention given to studying positive emotion. Early accounts of 
positive emotion, such as concepts of well-being, suggested that well-being could be 
viewed in terms of an absence of negative emotion, with later accounts suggesting that 
additional features were needed to be classified as a state of well-being such as the 
presence of positive emotion. Contemporary neuroscience research on meditation is one 
line of research in this direction of understanding positive emotions.  
Frijda (1986) argues that there is a qualitative aspect of emotions accompanied by 
physiological changes, a view of emotion he terms “action tendency.” Meanwhile, Gross 
(1998) points out that Darwin and more recent emotion theorists such as Izard (1971, 
2007) and Ekman (1992, 1999) argue for a small set of discrete basic emotions, or 
“emotion programs” of specific emotions such as fear, anger, and happiness. These views 
are not necessarily incompatible, however, since emotions as action tendencies differ in 
terms of mode of activation and autonomic response (Frijda). Thus, emotion programs 
stored and then enacted in the brain could elicit action tendencies motivated via bodily 
responses. Compassion (Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, Davidson, 2008) and joy 
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(Fredrickson, Coffey, Pek, Cohn, and Finkel, 2008) have been recently studied in 
association with meditative practice.  
Starting from the early 1970s, Western research on meditation that dealt with 
emotional issues was focused on the relaxation effect, which is associated with with 
positive feelings of calmness and peacefulness as experienced in a wide range of 
meditation techniques (Murphy and Donovan, 1997). More recently, meditation 
researchers (e.g., Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson, 2007) have called for understanding 
meditation techniques with greater specificity, with the hope of understanding how goals 
and variances in techniques can result in different effects, such as changes in emotional 
states. Along this line is research that investigates meditation methods that are aimed at 
cultivating specifically positive emotional states such as happiness. For example, a 
meditation technique that has been the focus of many recent studies in neuroscience and 
clinical research on meditation is meta-meditation (or loving-kindness meditation) that is 
aimed at cultivating a state of compassion (e.g., Pace et al., 2009; Lutz, Greischar, 
Perlman, and Davidson, 2009). This technique has been associated with increases in 
empathy. A possibly surprising finding of one study of meta-meditation was an increase 
in joy associated with the state of compassion (Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, and 
Finke, 2008). These findings are relevant to this study on ishvara pranidhana because 
there are important similarities between meta-meditation, a Tibetan practice that has close 
ties with tantra, and tantric yoga meditation. Most significantly, meta-meditation involves 
the use of repetitive phrases, which is similar to mantra. Thus, while relaxation may 
result as a side benefit of ishvara pranidhana, the specific state of absorption may be 
more important.  
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Comparison: Emotion Programs and Meditation 
Yogic and neuroscience systems identify similar conceptual systems for specific 
emotion programs of normal states. There are many of these programs in common for 
both systems, such as happiness, anxiety, fear, anger, and joy.  Also, both systems’ 
descriptions of these emotions invoke similar qualitative states of emotion. However, the 
qualities of the emotions described by the different systems seem to differ in an important 
way. The neuroscience descriptions of emotions of meditation describe concrete 
emotions such as joy, empathy, and compassion, that all have positive connotations to 
them, thus they could be described as more “emotional,” while emotion in tantric yoga 
states of meditation have a more spiritual connotation – absorption - which focuses on 
peacefulness and calmness. These yoga qualities seem to have a more neutral, although 
still positive in some sense, connotation; however, absorption also is associated with joy 
and even ecstasy, and these are positive. Thus, an important difference is that tantric yoga 
reveals a mystical quality to the meditation state of absorption, which is often not 
identified in scientific studies of meditation. 
Another difference between the two systems is the location of the source of the 
emotions. The cittavrttis of the tantric yoga system are located around the chakras within 
the spine and torso of the body, as well as in the head and neck, while the neuroscientific 
structures of emotion are in the brain, thought to be in the limbic and cortical cognitive 
systems of the brain (Le Doux, 1995). More will be said about this point in the next 
section on mechanisms of emotion, as well as the similarity in explanations from both 
systems regarding the shift in “I” feeling. 
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2. Mechanisms of Emotional Experience and Perception 
The current view in neuroscience is that the experience of emotion is in the brain 
(or at least in the CNS), but that this experience happens as a result of central nervous 
system (CNS)-body (e.g., neuroendocrine, peripheral nervous system) and environment 
interactions, although the directionality of these interactions is not well-understood 
(Lazarus, 1993); LeDoux, 1995; Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin, 2000). The finding that 
brain area X changes activity more than area Y is an important step towards articulating 
mechanisms (Davisdon and Irwin, 1999). This view is supported by a huge line of 
research on hormone-CNS interactions, counting adrenaline/noradrenaline and stress 
hormones, etc (Fredrickson and Joiner, 2002). Hormones are now thought to have great 
influences on mental process and emotion; the brain is filled with receptors for these 
hormones and manages the secretion of hormones (Davidson and Irwin, 1999; 
(Fredrickson, Mancuso, Branigan, and Tugade, 2000). Moreover, emotional experience is 
shaped by past experience (e.g., learning and the effects of stress hormones on the 
structure and function of the hippocampus) (Fredrickson, Mancuso, Branigan, and 
Tugade, 2000). Emotion can also be modulated or primed by the periphery of the body 
(that is, non-central nervous system tissue). In sum, while the experience and perception 
of emotion is still considered to be in the brain, their instigation and modulation is now 
conceptualized as a brain-body and environment interaction.  
 
Tantric Yoga: Mechanisms of Absorption 
One of the central ideas of tantric theory is that cosmic structures operate within 
the body of each individual (White, 1996; Padoux, 2002; Flood, 2006). When analyzing 
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tantric processes of absorption, I found that a central feature of this process was that 
cosmic structures take on an emotional nature when operating in the human dimension. 
Tantric yoga theorizes two mechanisms involved in normal emotional flux and 
meditative absorption that are both linked to cosmic configurations and located in the 
body. The first involves the structure of the tantric subtle body and the second is the 
mantra itself; though, according to tantric theory, mantra itself is postulated to be 
embedded within the structure of the person (Muller-Ortega, 1992).  
White (2000) explains that the cosmic structures of the tantric mandala of energy 
levels manifest themselves in a number of ways (see also Avalon, 1919/1974). For 
example, in one form, the energy levels manifest as the hierarchized chakras located 
within the yogic body. In another form, these energy levels also represent themselves on 
a graphic level as written characters of the hieratic alphabets, and thus manifest on 
acoustic levels as phonemes in the form of mantras. These acoustic levels are also 
implicated within the structure of the yogic body. This dual manifestation is important for 
tantric meditation because mantras are recited for the purpose of influencing the 
perturbances of the chakra centers in specific ways. In this way, the cosmic energy 
structures are theorized from this emic perspective to operate within the person in two 
primary ways: through the fluctuation of the chakras and through mantra. Both of these 
processes stem from the theorized emanation of the material world from the divine core 
of reality, and this theorized core source is important to understanding absorption and 
other emotion processes of meditation (Muller-Ortega, 1992).  
White (1996) explains that there is a phonematic nature to the emanation 
substances, including those of the human body. This insight is crucial to understanding 
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the role of mantra in transforming the psycho-emotional states during meditation as one 
enters absorbed consciousness. Wheelock (1989) makes clear that in the tantric view, 
mantras (as phonematic expressions) are themselves fundamental constituents of the 
universe. The subtle nature of the consciousness of the universe interpenetrates with the 
mind-body structure through the complex network of chakras and nadis. Muller-Ortega 
(1992) explains that the cosmic urge to manifest eventually results in the generation of 
phonemes and these coalesce in interference patterns or cognitions. Earlier in the 
mechanism section of the memory chapter I explained that for tantra, perception results 
when the individual consciousness coalesces around the phonemes that are organized into 
interference patterns (or cognitions) that form subjective/objective orders of human 
perception. Now we can add to this understanding of tantric thought by recognizing that 
cosmic phonemes become patterned within the yogic body around the chakric centers, 
and these phonemes are therefore what constitute the petals of each chakra (White, 
1996). What White calls petals (of the chakras) Anandamurti refers to as vrttis 
(perturbances). This phonemic nature of the chakra structure constitutes the individual 
nature of citta (mind) within the person. In other words, these patterns take on an 
emotional nature when located within the body in the specific areas of the “petals” of the 
chakras. The flux of these phonemes in motion is the expression of the ordinary 
personality complex. 
The two subtlest phonemes or vrttis, which are petals of the chakras, are located 
in the ajna chakra - the chakra located near the eyebrow center (Avalon, 1919/1974; 
White, 1996) - which Anandamurti (Sarkar 1959; 1991) associates with the pituitary 
gland. Anandamurti declares that these petals reveal the twofold function of the ajna 
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chakra, worldly knowledge and spiritual knowledge, making the ajna chakra (from the 
yogic perspective) the seat of the mind. Anandamurti links these functions with the 
spiritual (the left side petal) and material (the right side petal) visions of the world. 
Through these two petals, the mind controls the kleshas (or mental afflictions) of aversion 
and attachment. The kleshas are linked into the fluctuation of these cittavrttis of the 
chakras, and thus this fluctuation that is tied into the cosmological emanation process is 
the mechanism of how we continually generate and quiet the same painful wave patterns 
(Chapple, 1982). Yet even subtler non-manifest vibrations or substrates of sound exist 
beyond the mind located within the ajna chakra and its two petals (White, 2006). This 
concept of functional laterality (or functional asymmetry) also plays a major role in the 
mechanisms of emotional programs described by neuroscience.  
Anandamurti’s (Sarkar 1959, 1991) “seed” view of mental propensities reveals 
important particulars of how Anandamurti localizes Samkhya-Yoga philosophy in the 
body. For Anandamurti, the seed of every petal or vrtti of each chakra is located in the 
brain, with the first expression of the vrtti occurring in the “sub-station” or gland – that is, 
it is expressed through the lower chakra with which it is associated. Thus “waves” of the 
mental perturbance or activity are theorized in terms of the activation of the seed in the 
sahasrara, stimulating the glands and expressing the cittavrtti through the nerves, 
because the vrttis as the petals of the chakras are associated with the glands of the 
endocrine system.  
Eliade (1958) describes correspondences between the first five chakras and tattvic 
elements (earth, water, fire, air, and ether), thus associating the tattvas with the body as 
well. Eliade explains that the Yogatattva Upanishad indicates that each element also 
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corresponds to a particular mantra, a “seed-vibration” or mystical syllable that can be 
recited during tantric ritual practice. This chakric system forms the model for 
Anandamurti’s method of ishvara pranidhana meditation. White (1996) explains that, 
when the yogin raises the kundalini, the tattvas and material substrates of the body 
dissolve because the meditator “telescopes” phonemes, absorbing each into more subtle 
ones. This is an important meditation process with emotional significance, because the 
emotionally charged petals all become pierced by the kundalini sakti (spiritual energy) 
during deep states of meditation and this transforms their perturbance pattern.  
A primary claim about mantra from the tantric yoga perspective is the view of 
mantric utterance during meditation as a method for attaining a “real” religious or 
spiritual transformation: the purpose of mantra recitation (japa) is to “recollect” the pure 
awareness (Timalsina, 2005). Alper (1989) suggests that mantra can be seen as a tool that 
can lead one to cognize the world in such a way that he “realizes” the world really is all 
right. Such cognition depends on a particular type of memory discussed earlier: memory 
as remembrance. This memory is an emotional memory. This is because during tantric 
meditation, the deity that is the object of visualization and subject of mantra recitation is 
thought to develop into a complex embodiment of the entire created universe within the 
person rather than remaining an abstraction (Wheelock, 1989). Thus the deity operates 
within the individual personality as a cosmic structure. In this way, the cosmic structure 
takes on psycho-emotional nature. Both human nature and the devotional character of the 
meditative process of ishvara pranidhana make it emotional.  
It is possible to see the yogic perception or realization as a “remembrance,” rather 
than as solely an in-the-moment perception or insight by thinking about memory (smrti) 
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in the sense of mindfulness (Miller, 1995). This perspective helps us bridge between 
certain cognitive and emotional processes that are supposedly quieted during meditation 
such as memory in the form of smrti (recalled phenomenal experience). In this sense, we 
can see the “remembrance” as awareness. What is remembered or brought to awareness is 
postulated in this theory as an eternal truth: “remembering” one source of truth in the 
present moment. During this state of awareness, the object becomes the subject and the 
subject becomes the object.  
We have just examined the basis of how the meditation technique of ishvara 
pranidhana uses mantra to telescope the phonemes of the chakras and absorb lower ones 
into more subtle ones. Because in this theory the mantra that is recited during ishvara 
pranidhana exists in some way within the chakra structure itself, in the same way that the 
other phonemes are, the mantra that is recited itself becomes a mechanism of emotional 
transformation. When it is recited, it vibrates; in this way mantra influences the 
surrounding phonemes in a particular way. This theory further posits that each phoneme 
is pulled or drawn back to the “source” the phoneme resonating at the highest frequency. 
While the ordinary personality manifests as the flux of consciousness vibrating 
throughout the chakra system, this ordinary fluctuation becomes absorbed during 
concentrated states of absorption. In other words, in ordinary states, individual 
consciousness expressed through unique patterns of phonemic activity fluctuates within 
the subtle structure of the body according to an individual’s personality complex 
interacting with social-environmental and moral contexts. But while vibrating within 
particular environmental contexts, the matrix of the phonemes (i.e., sounds, vibratory 
resonances, powers, etc.) also vibrates within the cosmos.  
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The important point for meditation is that, through the meditation process, the 
matrix of the phonemes of the chakras within the yogin’s body comes to resonate with 
the matrix of the whole of the cosmos. Muller-Ortega (1992) asserts that this singular 
vibration equals a “self-referential doubling back,” and is a unique motion 
“asynchronously present” within the cosmos. This motion is the vibration or spanda 
(oscillation) of tantra. The meditative feeling comes when an individual’s vibration (or 
consciousness) becomes harmonized with the oscillation of Siva (Muller-Ortega, 1992). 
In absorptive meditation, an individual’s “I” feeling transforms and becomes identified 
with Siva. Awareness of absorption of one’s own psychomental flux into this cosmic 
motion is what feels blissful to the practitioner. Thus, states of awareness and emotion are 
linked with the nature of the chakra system as a pulsating vibrational flux within the 
universe.  
 
Neuroscience: Mechanisms of Emotion  
One major challenge of neuroscience has been to establish whether there are 
specific neuro-activation patterns for discrete types of emotion. Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, 
and Lawrence (2003) used a meta-analysis to find clear support for separate neural spatial 
distributions (or regional specialization) associated with three different affect programs 
(fear, disgust, and anger), while they found no significant difference between the spatial 
distributions associated with other affect programs (happiness and sadness). For example, 
they found evidence for regional specialization of fear in the amygdala, and of anger in 
the lateral orbitofrontal cortex. They also found a more general role for the anterior 
cingulate and medial prefrontal cortices; for example, both of these frontal areas were 
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found to be activated during happiness and sadness as well as other discrete emotions. 
Similarly, the insula and anterior cingulate regions have been shown to be activated in the 
positive emotion of empathetic response to another’s pain (Singer et al., 2004; de 
Vignemont and Singer, 2006; see also Lutz et al., 2008).  
Further lines of research have investigated that the well known phenomenon that 
emotion is at least partially separable into dual categories of valence (positive vs. 
negative emotions), emotional arousal (calm vs. excited), and affective style (approach 
vs. withdrawal) (Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, and Lawrence, 2003). Together, variances 
among these categories, which reflect phenomenological experience, yield subtle shifts in 
emotional tone. For example, variability in brain activation is associated with specific 
types of emotion. A number of theorists argue that emotions are organized around the 
two basic response patterns of approach and withdrawal (or avoidance) action tendencies 
(e.g., Davidson and colleagues, 1992, 1998, 2004; Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert, 1997; 
Schmidt and Schulkin, 2000), basic response patterns fundamental to adaptive behavior 
(Carver, Sutton, and Scheier (2002). Approach systems facilitate goal-directed behaviors 
in which subjects move toward pleasant stimuli and abstract goals, and approach systems 
can generate certain positive emotions (Davidson and Irwin, 1999). In contrast, 
withdrawal systems facilitate moving away from aversive stimuli or perceived harmful 
circumstances and generate a selection of negative emotions, whereby one may identify 
such a situation and enact a proper course to respond (Davidson and Irwin, 1999).  
Davidson (1998) proposed well-defined neuroanatomical underpinnings for 
approach and avoidance (or withdrawal) systems, with strongly similar left/right 
activation patterns as positive/negative (respectively) valence. Specifically, high levels of 
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left prefrontal activation and effective modulation in the amygdala is associated with the 
approach system, while right-sided prefrontal activation and slow recovery in response to 
negative and stressful events is associated with withdrawal systems. (For a more detailed 
review regarding behavioral activation and inhibition systems, see Cloninger, 1987, and 
concerning appetitive and aversive systems, see Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert, 1990).  
One of the main patterns found to distinguish between positive and negative 
emotions is asymmetrical activation of the brain’s hemispheres, (especially the PFC or 
frontal lobe) (Hellige, 1993). Hemispheric asymmetry is evident in electrophysiological 
studies of cortical activation in normal subjects exposed to stimuli that elicit emotion. A 
number of brain studies on emotion processes show a general tendency for right side 
neural activation associated with negative emotion, while left side activation correlates 
with positive emotion, especially associated with right and left anterior (frontal) PFC 
activation (see Davidson, 1992, 1998, 2000). For example, Waldstein et al. (2000) found 
that happiness-inducing tasks evoked more prominent left than right frontal EEG 
activation, and greater left frontal EEG activation than anger-inducing tasks. An 
alternative hypothesis is that the right hemisphere is dominant in all forms of emotional 
expression and perception, such that overactivation is associated with negative emotion 
and underactivation is associated with positive emotion (Hellige, 1993).  
Note, however, that the approach-withdrawal model varies somewhat from the 
valenced asymmetry model, since not all negative emotions tend toward withdrawal 
actions; anger, for example, tends to motivate approach behaviors. This is consistent with 
findings that anger-inducing tasks were, on average, associated with comparable left and 
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right frontal EEG activation (Waldstein, et al., 2000). Shifting emotion programs in the 
brain by way of attentional tasks like meditation could impact emotional behavioral style.  
Davidson and colleagues investigated individual differences in lateralized 
activity. For example, individual differences in the degree of lateralization have been 
found in infants and adults in behavioral studies (Davidson and Fox, 1989). Moreover, 
right sided activation has been found to be associated with a number of factors including 
mood and anxiety disorders (Henriques and Davidson, 1990, 1991). Davidson (2000) 
suggests that activation asymmetry can be viewed as a trait-like construct, since some 
measures have been found to be stable over time and meet a number of psychometric 
criteria (Tomarken, Davidson, Wheeler, and Kinney, 1992). A number of studies of 
meditation have suggested that individual differences are important in studies of 
meditation, too, and individual differences in the emotion processes may play a role in 
the differences seen between individuals reported in meditation experiences. For 
example, it could be that while everyone might be able to experience Oneness in theory, 
not everyone will experience it in the same way. 
As discussed previously, one of the most consistent findings from outcome 
studies of meditation is that meditation helps decrease stress (Delmonte, 1995; Murphy 
and Donovan, 1997). Insight into these stress modulatory mechanisms could come from 
studies of startle responses. For example, Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin (2000) argue that 
findings showing that greater left-sided prefrontal activation is associated with faster 
recovery time imply that individual differences in prefrontal activation asymmetry play a 
role in emotional responding and recovery from stress. As Davidson et al. (2000) note, 
LeDoux’s (Morgan, Romanski, and LeDoux, 1993) lesion studies of rats might provide 
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some evidence suggestive of possible mechanisms of this asymmetrical activation 
because this study suggests evidence for a descending pathway from the medial PFC to 
the amygdala, a pathway that is inhibitory and could mediate extinction. Davidson (1998) 
suggests that it is specifically the left PFC that exerts inhibitory influence on the 
amygdala in humans and other primates. The amygdala is thought to be centrally 
involved in threat perception and in generating negative emotions of fear and anxiety 
(e.g., LeDoux, 1995). Support for this idea is the coupling of decreased glucose decreased 
metabolic rate in the amygdala with increased metabolic rate in the left PFC 
(Abercrombie et al., 1996).  
Davidson et al. (2003) showed extremely high levels of activity in the left 
prefrontal cortex of a meditating monk, an area of the brain closely correlated with 
happiness and positive affect. Davidson points to a number of questions surrounding this 
finding that need to be answered to determine how to interpret its wider significance. For 
example, if his PFC levels were high before he started practicing meditation, perhaps this 
is what drove the monk to pursue a life on monastic contemplation. Combining findings 
on the amygdala and PFC with evidence that meditation affects changes in the PFC (see 
also e.g., Lazar et al., 2000), Davidson suggests that neural pathways between the PFC 
and the amygdala could mediate the stress-reduction effects of meditation. Although 
there is evidence that the switch from negative states to positive meditation states 
involves moving between unique configurations of circuitry for specific emotion 
programs, there are still theoretical questions about what drives these shifts. 
Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, and Davidson (2008) extended findings on 
positive emotion in meditation by showing that activity in regions implicated in 
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empathetic responses (e.g., the insula) can be modulated through voluntary regulation of 
emotional responses by intentionally generating compassion during meditation. In their 
study, Lutz et al. used fMRI to probe affective reactivity during a compassion meditation 
state and found that expertise in cultivating positive emotion through meditative practice 
alters the acting of circuitries previously linked to empathy. In an earlier study, Lutz and 
colleagues (Lutz, Greischar, Rawlings, Richard, and Davidson, 2004) found self-induced 
sustained electroencephalographic high-amplitude gamma-band oscillations and phase-
synchrony during meditation. This synchronization and de-synchronization of firing 
between patterns of neural populations has been suggested to indicate large-scale 
integration of functionally specialized regions of the brain involved in different aspects of 
conscious experience (Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson, 2004). Taken together, these studies 
might indicate that coordinated oscillations in the brain potentially contribute to 
emotionally valenced phenomena such as states of consciousness entered into during 
meditation. 
While the exact functional role of specific neural structures remains to be 
clarified, the conclusion so far is that there is some regional specificity, and hemispheric 
specialization, for at least some types of emotions. Other brain regions appear to be more 
globally involved in emotion generation, and emotions may be involved in the 
coordination between distinct brain areas. This hemispheric asymmetry in the brain of 
emotional processing plays a key role in emotional processes, and in the emotional 
dimensions of meditative phenomena. 
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Comparison: Asymmetric Activation and Emotion Programs of Meditation 
Both perspectives have views of partial separability of positive or negative 
emotion and approach and withdrawal and motivational forces, and both instantiate this 
separability in terms of affect programs located in the body. A comparison between the 
tantric yoga and neuroscientific perspectives on the emotion mechanisms of meditation 
indicates that both systems agree that meditation alters emotion processes and that 
asymmetry is the general mechanism of emotion. Yet these two perspectives differ as to 
how the mechanism of asymmetry operates. This is largely because of radically different 
views of the energetic systems and structures of the body. On the one hand, tantric yoga 
theorizes a non-physical reality that generates the experiential phenomena of absorption, 
while on the other hand neuroscientific accounts posit physical structures localized in the 
brain. Any non-physical propositions from the neuroscientific perspective describe 
theoretical processes with functional significance, although these are also usually 
theorized in terms of their association with physical processes of the brain.  
Although hemispheric asymmetry is evident in both systems, this concept is 
directly utilized in the neuroscience literature to explain an element of emotion 
processing. Though it can also be seen in the tantric yoga explanations of emotion, the 
term is not used. Both systems cite activity in right vs. left-sidedness within the head as 
an important mechanism to generate contrasting sorts of emotionally-valenced 
experiences. In neuroscience, right and left-sidedness has to do with the two hemispheres 
of the brain, while in tantric yoga sidedness is related to the right and left petals of the 
ajna chakra. In both systems, the same side (left) is associated with good experiences 
while the other side (right) is associated with undesirable experiences, though the 
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concepts and values of “good” and “bad” differ between the systems. Specifically, in 
neurophysiology the right side neural activation is associated with negative emotion and 
that left-side activation correlates with positive emotions, especially in the anterior frontal 
PFC. Meanwhile, Anandamurti asserts that the left-side petal of the ajna chakra is related 
to spiritual discrimination while activation of the right petal generates worldly 
experience. Thus positive emotion and spiritual experience are linked to the left 
hemisphere of the head while negative emotion and worldly experience are linked to the 
right side of the head.  
Affective style in neuroscientific literature, conceptualized in terms of approach 
and avoidance, also seems to closely parallel the two related yogic kleshas of attachment 
and avoidance. Moreover, both tantric yoga and neuroscience have a notion of specific 
emotions or “affect programs” associated with separate spatial distributions located in the 
body within the nervous system. The specifics on this point differ significantly between 
the two systems, though, since Anandamurti claims that specific affect programs are 
associated with particular chakras located within the body, while the affect programs of 
neuroscience originate in the brain. 
However, localization of emotion programs within the body is not the complete 
picture for tantric yoga, because this system also has a “seed” notion of the mind whereby 
a collection of the seeds of all possible mental expressions are located within the head, 
and in particular within the sahasrara chakra within the head. Thus, the “seed” view of 
the chakra system matches more closely with the affective neuroscience view in that, in 
both, views emotions are first generated via activity in the brain region.   
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Taking note of another difference between yogic and neuroscientific views, yoga 
literature also associates the various chakras with specific bodily organs whose functions 
seem to loosely relate to the designated function of the chakras (see chapter four). 
Anandamurti extends this claim of association with bodily regions and organs to specific 
endocrine glands.  
Although both yogic and neuroscience perspectives locate emotion generation in 
the body, and within the nervous system, they each offer very different views of the body 
to explain emotion. It is useful to again mention here the historical point that traditional 
tantric yoga models of the body made no mention of the brain. But modern yoga does 
incorporate the brain into its view of the body, as its relation to emotion function. In other 
words, modern tantric yogis such as Anandamurti, the Sivananda yoga school, and Bihar 
School of Yoga, accept neuroscience ideas of the brain, but still retain traditional 
medieval tantric alchemical and yogic views about the body being associated with the 
subtler level. Nevertheless, even though the tantric yoga model of ishvara pranidhana is 
closer to the modern neuroscientific view of the body than a medieval model would be, it 
is still sufficiently different. 
Perhaps one avenue towards determining whether there is some sort of 
consilience between these two views is to consider the possibility that the tantric view 
taps the human body into the deepest underlying structure of the universe, while the 
neuroscience perspective examines the close-up view of neural systems and cellular 
mechanisms with analysis deepest at the ionic level, but without consideration of 
potential continuous interconnections with systems outside of recognized bodily systems. 
One point of similarity on this issue of self-environment interconnection is that both 
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systems identify oscillation as a primary process associated with mental states of 
meditation. As we have seen, synchronization of oscillations across different brain 
regions (each with its own unique function) has been proposed as an underlying 
integrative process to explain conscious states. Synchronization of fluctuation of an 
individual’s phonemic structure of the chakras system with the oscillation of the cosmic 
structure has been asserted as the aim or resultant state during meditative absorption. 
Oscillation is evoked in a similar manner in both systems, though the significance of 
oscillation as a process differs, as do the mechanisms associated with this process. 
Moreover, yogic and neuroscience systems have differing concepts of energy and 
sources of power. The idea of emotion as “action tendency” gives the sense that emotion 
somehow powers the body into action. But the two systems have different notions of 
power. For tantric yoga, power (sakti) is ultimately sourced by Siva, which is contained 
within the body in the form of kundalini sakti. Thus, power has connection to the spiritual 
principle that is thought to lie in a dormant form coiled at the base of the spine, i.e., 
kundalini sakti. This is the spiritual power/force of the person. In the neuroscience view, 
the brain is powered through electrical impulses that move within and between each 
neuron, impulses that are generated through on-going electrochemical activity throughout 
the brain, and also powered through the influx of electrochemicals from blood that flows 
with greater volume in regions of increased electrical activity. Here we can note the 
difference that in tantric yoga the body is phonemic in nature while in neuroscience 
phonemes of sound are energy rather than matter. However, examining potential ways in 
which electro-chemical energy compares with the “spiritual” energy of tantric and hatha 
yoga’s kundalini sakti goes beyond the scope of the project at hand in this dissertation, 
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though I think that such a comparison would be useful towards comprehending important 
core differences in the worldviews of these two systems.  
 
3. Implications: The Role of Appraisal Processes in Emotion Generation 
The preceding comparison between the tantric yoga and neurophysiological types 
and mechanisms of emotion has implications for Alter’s (2004) problem of understanding 
the “truth” of yogic experience, and how this problem is related to Proudfoot’s (1985) 
problem of trying to explain mystical experiences such as meditative absorption. 
Therefore, here we consider whether, in light of the above comparative analysis of 
emotion processes of meditation, the “truth” of yogic experience cannot be explained by 
either philosophy or science as Alter claims. Alter’s position is similar to Proudfoot’s, 
with the distinction that Proudfoot thinks mystical phenomena, such as yogic absorption 
(in the specific case examined in this dissertation), can be explained by naturalistic 
accounts.   
Proudfoot (1985) argues that the particular beliefs of the subject, beliefs that are 
necessarily cognitive in nature, generate an appraisal and that this appraisal becomes the 
label of “mystical” or “transcendent” regarding an experience such as absorption during 
ishvara pranidhana meditation. The cognitive appraisal is the judgment someone makes 
that that experience is a “mystical experience.” Proudfoot asserts that this appraisal is a 
cognition or belief that constitutes the experience. This view contrasts with James’ (1902) 
view of the ineffable quality (the feeling) of the mystical experience as being primary. 
Also in contrast to Proudfoot’s position, Barnard argues that the mystical experience is 
precognitive, that it is an immediate, intuitive, and direct emotion. In Barnard’s view, the 
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labels “mystical,” “absorptive,” or “transcendent” do not reflect cognitive operations or a 
raw emotional experience; rather, these labels indicate a phenomenological state. Barnard 
criticizes Proudfoot’s model of emotions, arguing that it is based on faulty psychological 
analysis and on faulty philosophical grounds. What is at issue is whether there is a special 
quality of “mystical” feeling of absorption. This debate is important in the context of my 
argument for an interdisciplinary approach to understanding meditation because it 
addresses whether religious theories are secondary or primary to explaining experience.  
Proudfoot (1974, 1985) thinks cognitive appraisals are primary because he 
assumes that cognition is identical with belief, and, in his view, the belief fundamentally 
constitutes the religious experience. In this view, the appraisal that is the religious belief 
generates the religious nature of the experience. In this way, meditators interpret 
physiological signals (that can occur in the form of arousal) as signs of religious 
experience. Proudfoot further argues that scholars who argue for the primacy of emotion 
over the primacy of religious theory to explain religious experience do so by way of 
conflating emotion with religious experience. He names James and Eliade, among others, 
as scholars who fall victim to the mistake of contending that the emotion itself, such as 
the feeling of absorption during meditation, is constitutive of the experience labeled 
“mystical.”  Proudfoot’s argument to interpret religious experience via the lens of the 
religious theory – the belief – reflects a naturalistic approach; i.e., understanding religious 
experience through a “social-scientific” or “psychology of religion” approach of asserting 
belief systems as causal rather than accepting some “supernatural” explanation. In 
addition, naturalism assumes a subject-object ontology that is in conflict with the 
“reality” expounded in some emic traditions such as yoga. By conflating emotion with 
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religious experience, Proudfoot argues, James, Eliade, and others fail to recognize the 
evocative power of language in shaping, constituting, or generating religious emotion, 
and instead see emotion solely in religious terms. Their criteria for religious experience – 
that the experience is ineffable, for example - necessitates that the experience cannot be 
explained by naturalistic accounts. This strategy of viewing emotion as primary for 
generating religious experience protects their approach from other, e.g., naturalistic, 
accounts.  
Proudfoot (1985) argues against using this sort of “protective strategy” to study 
religious experiences such as the sort of mysticism associated with yoga meditation. He 
distinguishes between descriptive reduction and explanatory reduction, arguing that it is 
correct and necessary to formulate descriptions of mystical experience from within the 
perspective of the mystic. However, when attempting to explain the mystic’s experience 
– the feeling of transcendence, for example - it is correct to step outside the practitioner’s 
worldview (emic explanatory model) and evoke naturalistic etic accounts. He argues that 
explaining mystical feeling requires some account of the cognitive appraisal that 
generates the experience. He reasons that James, Eliade, and others conflate emotional 
and religious experience, and thereby fail to adequately explain the phenomena they seek 
to reveal. Instead, Proudfoot argues, they evoke descriptive language that contains an 
explanatory criterion within the description of the experience – the criterion of 
“ineffability” - thus protecting the description as if it explains the phenomenon. In 
actuality, according to Proudfoot, this sort of causal description does not explain; rather, 
the belief is constitutive of the experience and, therefore, must itself be elucidated to fully 
explain the phenomenon. 
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This debate bears on the fundamental issue of scientific research on mystical 
experience. Alter (2004) argues that science, what Proudfoot terms a “naturalistic” 
framework, cannot explain the “truth” of yogic experience. In other words, scientific 
theorizing about experimental data related to meditative phenomena can never fully 
explain what the meditators themselves experience during states of absorption. Because 
an examination of the philosophical issues relevant to the question of explaining 
meditation are beyond the scope of this dissertation, I will focus here on the 
psychological analyses that draw out what sort of criteria are used to label mystical 
experience.  
One of the main psychological studies Proudfoot cites is the now-famous 
Schachter and Singer (1962) adrenaline experiment in which the researchers injected 
adrenaline into subjects to increase arousal. Schachter then manipulated environmental 
contexts, in which appraisals (or cognitive interpretations of events) were drawn from 
situational contexts to explain adrenaline-induced emotional states. The findings of their 
study, although highly controversial, provided support for James’ original theory that 
emotions result from physiological arousal. However, the study also lends support to the 
notion of emotion as a non-specific state of arousal whose meaning we derive from 
context. Thus, the evaluative component of intuitive direct appraisal ties the object to 
oneself in some meaningful way. Schachter argued that there is a preponderance of 
evidence showing no physiological difference among various emotion states, that high 
levels of emotion results in a high level of sympathetic activation with few if any 
physiological distinctions among the many possible emotional states. Therefore, he 
argues, cognition determines the emotional labels applied to a common state of arousal; 
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emotion accompanied by undifferentiated physical arousal is attributed to whatever is the 
most salient contextual cue. Schachter specifies that arousal plus cognition equals two 
necessary ingredients that combine to form specific emotions. In this view, specificity of 
emotional nuance is derived from cognitions and not from the physiological change. 
Subsequent emotion theorists have used Schachter and Singer as evidence for the non-
specificity of autonomic activity during emotion, and as evidence for ambiguity in the 
interpretation of emotional experience, thus necessitating situational contexts to provide 
appraisals or interpretations of autonomic and emotional reactivity.  
Issues at the heart of Schachter’s study reflect a main source of debate between 
Proudfoot and Barnard on the issue of explaining mystical experience. The findings and 
theorizing from Schachter’s experiment were used as an opening for Proudfoot to argue 
that claims appraising “mystical” experience or transcendence are drawn from the 
religious or emic context rather than from an internal perception of some altered state, 
and therefore those claims carry no weight as proper appraisals or labels of such 
phenomena. This argument undermines the yogic belief system and potentially all belief 
systems suggesting the reality of mystical phenomena. While I agree with Schachter that 
appraisal processes certainly play a role in determining the emotion labels, there is a need 
for a better model of Schachter’s “cognitive factor” and for describing ways in which 
cognition and physiological states interact. I have tried to do this by distinguishing 
between a personal biological level and a cosmic level, and by recognizing that the two 
must operate simultaneously within each individual. 
More recent studies suggest a better model of Schachter’s “cognitive factor,” and 
it is the one described above as the neuroscience mechanisms of emotion. Now we need 
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to apply this updated naturalistic model to understanding meditation. An older 
psychological view of appraisal from Schachter’s time is still useful for this because 
rather than focusing on physiological arousal, Arnold’s (1960) appraisal model offers 
psychological theories of appraisal processes based on her intuitions about brain 
processes that are still applicable today in light of recent understandings from 
neuroscience (Kappas, 2006; Reisenzein, 2006). I will re-examine Proudfoot’s argument 
for cognitive primacy generating mystical experience, and the related experimental 
findings, in terms of Arnold’s brain-based psychological view of appraisal. According to 
Kappas, Arnold (1960) asserts that there are two types of appraisals: one type is direct, 
immediate, and intuitive, while the other is reflective and conscious. The first type of 
appraisal is like what many emotion theorists seem to have in mind when they argue for 
the primacy of emotion (e.g., Zajonc, 1980), while Arnold’s second type of appraisal 
indicates the sort of appraisal that cognitive appraisal theorists (e.g., Lazarus, 1984) argue 
for as primary. The “intuitive” appraisal is immediate and the reflective judgment follows 
(Kappas, 2006). Schachter’s appraisal theory leaves out the evaluative function (or 
process) of emotion specifically about the actual causation of emotion, while focusing on 
the role of cognition “in the process of emotion generation in terms of the attributions 
regarding the cause of the perceived arousal” (Kappas, p. 959). I think that it is the 
evaluative rather than the intuitive type of appraisal that Proudfoot argues for as primary 
to explain religious experience.  
Arnold’s central point is also that emotion is generated by appraisal processes. 
However, her intuitive appraisal is not reflective like, for example, decoupling from the 
rigid stimulus-response connection as a main and adaptative function of emotion 
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(Kappas, 2006). On the issue of evaluation, Arnold assumes that the person first acquires 
the factual belief, for example, through perception or inference (Reisenzein, 2006). This 
acquisition occasions the evaluation of emotion as positive or negative. The evaluation is 
typically direct, immediate, and intuitive; it seems at least in part that the evaluation is 
intuitive because it frequently consists only of the retrieval of previously made 
evaluations from memory (Reisenzein, 2006). Together the factual and evaluative belief 
then causes an emotion directed at the same object. As we have seen, memory processes 
are involved in present moment appraisals of events. The main issue for meditation from 
this perspective is the acquisition of a factual belief (through perception or inference) and 
the subsequent evaluation of the state of affairs as a positive or negative retrieved 
memory.  
Arnold explains that while there are two types of appraisal there are three 
appraisal processes, and these all center on her assertion that emotions have an object 
with these properties: 1) evaluation of the object as good or bad for oneself (i.e., appraisal 
in the narrow sense of the word); 2) presence-absence of the object; 3) the coping 
potential, i.e., the ease or difficulty to attain or avoid the object. However, Arnold herself 
points out that only the first is evaluative in nature (an evaluative belief), while the 
remaining two are factual beliefs. Proudfoot also discusses the object of emotional 
experience. He says that when describing the religious experience, one must identify the 
religious or mystical feeling by reference to a specific object (and by this cognition or 
belief religious theories come to be primary).  
As we have seen throughout this dissertation, practitioners of ishvara pranidhana 
meditation take ishvara (or god) as the object of meditation. Because we are trying to 
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understand absorption and especially the application of such labels as “transcendent” to 
meditative phenomena, let us briefly analyze the meditation processes of ishvara 
pranidhana in terms of Arnold’s three appraisal processes with a focus on ishvara as the 
object and practitioner’s evaluation of absorption in terms of transcendence or samadhi. 
Looking at this will help us see what type of appraisal best encapsulates the subjective or 
theorized evaluation of absorption as being transcendent or mystical.  
Cognitive evaluation has been shown to be evoked by a variety of emotional 
stimuli such as emotionally evocative pictures (images) and words with affective 
meaning. Evidence from several lines of research supports the idea that emotional 
concepts are structured and stored in semantic memory (see Holt, Lynn, and Kuperberg, 
2008 for discussion of this literature). Emotion has been shown to modulate the cognitive 
process of semantic memory-based analysis, in which meaning is mapped onto 
knowledge stores, by recording changes in the N400 ERP waveform, an 
electrophysiological index of semantic memory. An additional cognitive process is 
recruited that evaluates a word meaning with respect to its preceding context, and this 
process is indexed in the late positivity of ERP.   
There is evidence that this evaluation process structures emotional knowledge, 
including valence, arousal, and dominance. For example, evidence suggests that late 
positivity is sensitive to affective valence. Holt et al. (2008) argue that this line of 
research supports social psychology findings of negativity bias or an increase in output 
from negative motivation systems. But there is no definitive idea yet about what 
cognitive processes are reflected by emotional late positivity. The most common 
interpretation is that it reflects both allocation of attentional resources to emotional 
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stimuli and a re-evaluation of emotional stimuli with respect to the surrounding context. 
Thus, variations in late positivity may be important in signaling changes in strategy 
during pursuit of rewards and avoidance of harm. Choosing negative over positive value 
may have survival value that comes from attending to threatening stimuli over 
pleasurable ones. Although this proposal likely explains many instances of changes in 
late positivity, that these changes also need to be considered with regard to contexts in 
which no external threat, or even externally pleasurable stimuli, demand attention; such 
contexts apply to meditation.  
One might easily see that there are distinct moments during the meditation 
process. First there is the decision to sit for meditation, and then there is the action of 
sitting, followed by the practitioner actually performing the ishvara pranidhana tasks of 
bringing attention to the mantra and visualization of its various meanings expressed 
through the three suddhis. Out of these phases, changes in mental states occur. 
Performing the tasks results in entrance into quieter and subtler mental states where 
discursive qualities diminish, followed by the potential to eventually enter a state of 
absorption of conscious awareness. I think that the perception during these states of 
absorption is Arnold’s intuitive appraisal, but, in addition, these meditation processes are 
all followed by the practitioner then coming out of the meditation. It is while coming out 
of the meditation that the ecstatic feeling of bliss takes over the person. The bliss feeling 
comes only at the moment when the meditator takes note of the passage of time, and 
thereby makes an inference that during that time he/she was not in a normal conscious 
state (but also not asleep or unconscious). One might think that this inference involves an 
intuitive appraisal that the object (ishvara) is good. In actuality, during the meditation the 
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meditator has recognized that what had been the object of meditation (ishvara) is actually 
the subject and that oneself is actually the object of ishvara. This is the tantric reversal, 
and this recognition results in the yogin’s reflective appraisal of the phenomenon as 
“samadhi.” Therefore, I think that both types of appraisal (the direct, immediate, and 
intuitive type and the conscious and reflective type) as defined by Arnold occur 
throughout these moments in the meditation process. The direct, immediate, and intuitive 
appraisals that occur during absorption were described in chapter four. These appraisals 
come with the feeling and awareness of increasing absorption into the object of 
meditation. In the ultimate state of absorption, one loses the sense of individuality, the “I” 
feeling and, therefore, the appraisal that comes after this stage of the meditation process 
seems to be the one of greatest confusion. The appraisal that oneself has just been in a 
“transcendent” state of consciousness comes about due to the occurrence of ecstatic 
emotion that we associate with absorption during this state. I think that this type of 
appraisal is a reflective appraisal (Arnold’s second type of appraisal and the one that 
Proudfoot has in mind).  
In both Arnold’s and Lazarus’s views, this evaluative component of intuitive 
reflective direct appraisal ties the object to oneself in some meaningful way (Reisenzein, 
2006). In other words, reference to the object (such as ishvara during meditation) 
includes the evaluation of the personal meaning to one’s well-being of that very object 
(see Lazarus, 1984). Understanding of this meaning-based aspect of emotion and 
appraisal is aided by Arnold’s insight that emotions are characterized by intentionality, 
and the idea that the meaning of an object motivates a person to approach or avoid that 
object. This is where the personal meaning comes in. This notion of intentionality might 
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be combined with Proudfoot’s idea of identifying the belief with reference to concepts 
from a particular tradition as a reason to reconsider his argument for the role of appraisal 
in explaining the mystical experience. To proceed, let us examine Alper’s (1989) analysis 
of mantra on the point of the importance of establishing whether the practitioner has a 
personal or impersonal view of god for how one evaluates the object - that is, for the 
yogin’s “truth.”  
There are those who take the emic tantric yoga view of the body and perturbance 
of citta within the chakra system as a generator of emotion programs as an actual model 
of the body. But as declared above, the purpose of the project at hand is not to analyze or 
assess this claim; such a task would need an interdisciplinary approach of content beyond 
the scope here. Others, though, might propose seeing the tantric emic view of the body as 
a metaphor rather than as some theoretical model of reality. Alper (1989), for example, 
considers seeing mantra as the phonemes of the chakras as a metaphor, and arrives at 
conclusions relevant to the discussion here.  
On the one hand, Alper (1989) points out that seeing tantric mechanisms as a 
symbolic metaphor can be used as a tool to assess the human situation indirectly. The 
mantra itself (the sound) enables one to see the self-disclosive power of the act of mantric 
utterance. Moreover, Alper points out that metaphor is emotionally appealing for its 
explanatory power over intellectual explanations that characterize naturalistic 
explanations. When viewed in this way, we could conclude a comparison between 
neuroscience and tantric yoga models of the body with the statement that neuroscience 
models of the body are more accurate models because they are grounded in empirically 
tested concepts. Pushed a bit further on this idea of whether mantra should be viewed 
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strictly metaphorically, one might suppose that there could be an organization in the 
nervous system reflective of some structured order of the universe of which the chakra 
system is a metaphorical description – an order not yet seen and therefore not yet 
characterized by neuroscience. 
However, Alper (1989) asserts that metaphorical assertions make claims that need 
to be evaluated epistemologically; simply translating (the meaning of) mantras not only 
limits their explanatory power but also ignores these underlying assertions. Seeing mantra 
in strictly metaphorical terms leads one to lose potential interpretative power. Therefore, 
as a way of bringing to light the potential to assess the truth of the existential assertions 
implicit in the mantra, Alper argues that there is a need to propose a non-metaphoric 
translation of mantra. Taking one particular mantra AHAM as his example, Alper 
proposes that this mantra “be read as a single word.” Thus he suggests the following 
translation: 
“I” is the subject of the sentence; its predicate has to be supplied. There would 
seem to be two possibilities. If one concludes that the implied referent is personal, 
then the great mantra may be translated as “I [am Siva]!” If one concludes that the 
implied referent is impersonal, then it may be translated as “I [am That]!” In the 
first case, we would have to classify the sentence as mythological. In the second 
instance, we can admit that it is meant literally. If the two sentences are taken, as 
must surely be the case, to have the same referent, then the word That in the 
second sentence must refer to that to which the word Siva refers metaphorically. 
What can that be but the cosmos understood comprehensively as the redeeming 
object of religious fascination. The mantra AHAM taken to mean “I am Siva!” is 
thus revealed to be a metaphorical utterance whose indirect reference is precisely 
conveyed through the literal statement “I am That!” (pp.  280-281). 
 
In this way, Alper concludes that he has shown a path for articulating in language what is 
often considered to be “ineffable.” What does this mean for appraisal? We could apply 
this same translation to mantras used in ishvara pranidhana such that the referent of the 
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ishvara pranidhana mantras also could either be the personal Siva or the impersonal 
That. Both of these translations function equally for achieving the goal of absorption. 
Accepting Alper’s translation of the mantra and applying this same translation to ishvara 
pranidhana allows us to have a literal worldly referent of ishvara, in addition to the 
typically understood metaphorical translation of Siva (god), and a referent that could 
potentially be indicated in natural as opposed to supernatural interpretations of mystical 
phenomena.  
Regarding Proudfoot’s “protective strategy,” I found that modern neuroscience 
research on appraisal might help shed light on descriptive reduction. One theoretical 
problem left is that Proudfoot seems to think that the mind can never break from 
conceptualization (i.e., break from its fixation on thought (de Wit, 1991)), during certain 
religious practices such as tantric meditation techniques aimed at focusing the mind on an 
idea and moving the mind in that direction. Yoga identifies conceptualization as a 
cittavrtti or mental process, and as such asserts that this mental process is transformed 
through yogic practice, as are all mental processes. What does a non-conceptual state 
look like? Dunne (2006) suggests that when a concept is taken as a mental event, it can 
be considered a particular and thus an object of non-conceptual cognition. With this 
approach, what is important for understanding or explaining yogic perception is the 
positive or adaptive effects induced by the meditative experience, not whether the object 
is real. Therefore, we must work to better clarify the state entered into during meditation, 
and study the effects of this. Ultimately, Barnard calls for spiritual judgment in which one 
evaluates the value of the experience of such a state, and Proudfoot calls for a 
multidisciplinary approach to appreciate traditional religious approaches. These positions 
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indicate that an interdisciplinary approach that includes both naturalistic explanations and 
also traditional accounts can potentially satisfy a wide range of concerns that have been 
brought to bear on the problem of explaining absorption. 
 
4. Meaningful Outcomes of Yogic and Neuroscientific Processes of Meditation 
The analysis now turns to looking more closely at the question of meditation’s 
utility or purpose or practical purpose as envisioned by both systems. One reason this 
issue is important is that a system’s ends shapes the means and methods that one uses to 
obtain those goals. The aim in this analysis is to flesh out the differences between the 
differing approaches with regard to how their perspective interprets the purpose of 
meditation. 
 
Tantric Yoga: A Spiritual Purpose of Meditation 
As we have seen, tantric yoga is about “becoming” (Pensa, 1969). Muller-Ortega 
(1992) and others (e.g., Rastogi, 1992; Chapple, 1982) also emphasize the central 
importance of attaining a mystical state of becoming. Rastogi explains that by way of 
establishing “becoming” as the outcome of practice, tantra augments Classical Yoga’s 
cessation or suppression goal of the state of nirodha with the process of sublimation or 
upliftment that accounts for continuity of awareness. Emotion plays a special role in 
spiritual attainment because through meditation normal emotional states such as 
attachment, aversion, anger, and fear are quieted. During purification processes of 
ishvara pranidhana, the mind’s habit patterns are thought to dissolve. In this process, the 
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meditator consciously alters the learned habits associated with identification as a separate 
self.  
However, for tantric meditation, the emotional well-being experienced through 
absorption is a side benefit - the real benefit is spiritual knowledge. This sublimation of 
emotional processes associated with habituated mental patterns results in changes in an 
individual’s self-identification. The consequence is a transformation of the ordinary sense 
of self or the “I” feeling. In this state of becoming through direct contact with god there is 
a shift in identity such that the ordinary “I” feeling transforms into a transcendent “I” 
feeling. The meaningful outcome of concentrated sustained attention is direct experience 
with god, and this is seen in terms of spiritual knowledge: realization of one’s spiritual 
identity is perceived as knowledge of god. Wheelock (1989, p. 116) explains, “The 
reason for performing the tantric puja does not lie in some external goal but is the 
experience of oneness with the deity to be obtained within the ritual itself. It is a form of 
sadhana [spiritual practice or meditation] whose final result should be the consciousness 
of god doing homage to god.” Muller-Ortega (1992) explains that the tantric theologian 
Abhinavagupta pronounces this state as one of “illuminated” intellectuality, explaining 
that this state of mystical enlightenment operates in the functioning mind and senses. 
In ishvara pranidhana, as is common in tantric practice, this resultant state is 
directly related to the mantra. Alper (1989, p. 52) links the epistemological or knowledge 
character to mantra utterance, asserting that it is a cognitive insight resulting from 
mantric utterance. According to Ksemaraja, as cited in Alper, “Cognition of that to which 
the mantra refers attains fusion with that reality.”  Mantra “works” only when it 
engenders the proper sort of cosmic consciousness – in yoga conceptualization is not a 
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form of knowledge, so “yogic knowledge” is direct perception. Thus mantra indicates 
that with which the practioner identifies. Mantra enables contact between the individual 
and the divine (Alper). This identification with cosmic consciousness occurs because in 
tantric theory, mantra is grounded in Siva (Alper); Siva is the ontological referent of 
mantra. The transformation to a higher state of consciousness leads to a cognitive insight 
of a spiritual “I.” In this state the meditator’s “I” feeling vibrates with the cosmic 
pulsation of the cosmic flux that is Siva (see Muller-Ortega (1988, 1992) on emission). 
This idea of “becoming” ties into the cognitive insight and knowledge resulting from 
absorption. The goal in cultivating nirodha (or absorption) via ishvara pranidhana is to 
attain knowledge of one’s deepest self underneath the layers of normal identification.  
In tantric yoga achieving the goal of samadhi has also been characterized in terms 
of recognizing the sameness between two things. Rastogi (1992) also writes about tantric 
yoga as the realization of identity between two objects (see also Chapple, 1982). Yoga 
Sutra 2.28 declares that “Once impurity has been destroyed through … [meditation] there 
arises an intuitive illumination that leads to discriminative knowledge” (Pensa, 1969, p.  
207). Thus becoming, which might also be understood as evolving, involves developing 
the faculty of discrimination (Chapple, 1994). Chapple explains that the state of 
absorption in samadhi eventually leads to discrimination between sattva and purusa (YS 
3.53), and that this is the recognition of the sameness between two objects. This 
recognition is spiritual knowledge: entering into this state of reflexive cognition allows 
one to overcome the perception of duality (Muller-Ortega, 2005). In addition to 
recognizing the temporary nature of duality (between subject and object), however, one 
must also recognize the gift of duality in that it allows for embodiment. Ultimately, 
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though, the goal of yoga is to sustain the realization of the non-duality throughout any 
state of human consciousness (Goldberg, 2005). This knowledge of god is the ultimate 
goal of ishvara pranidhana. 
 
Neuroscience: Meditation as Adaptive Action: “Better Functioning” as the Adaptive 
Value of Meditation  
For the most part, neuroscience outcomes of meditation are framed in terms of 
generating emotional well-being and overall better functioning. As we have seen, much 
of the literature on meditation concerns how meditation improves a person’s functioning; 
for example, how meditation improves attention and self-regulation (more than relaxation 
alone), and improves memory functions and the ability to regulate emotions. In previous 
work, Posner and colleagues have shown that executive attention is an important 
mechanism for self-regulation of cognition and emotion (e.g., Posner, Rothbart, and 
Sheese, 2007; Rueda, Rothbart, McCandliss, Saccomanno, and Posner, 2005; Posner and 
Rothbart, 2000). Recently, they have extended these findings to suggest that integrative 
meditation improves attention and self-regulation, and improves these more than 
relaxation alone (as the control condition) (Tang et al., 2007). Another recent study also 
suggested that meditation improves functioning in the executive attention network, via 
increased control over the distribution of limited brain resources (Slager et al., 2007). 
Taken together, these studies paint a picture of meditation leading to better functioning 
via the manipulation of the neurophysiological processes of attention. In this way, the 
meditator is able to self-regulate the brain to improve functioning.  
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In the previous chapter, we also discussed the usefulness of altering memory for 
more adaptive behavior. In addition, neuroscience outcomes of meditation are framed in 
terms of generating emotional well-being (Shaperio, Carlson, Astin, and Freedman, 2006; 
Davidson, 2004), such as attaining a more habitually compassionate state. In this chapter, 
we discussed evidence suggesting that meditation changes emotional states, reduces 
negative emotions such as symptoms of anxiety and depression, and builds positive 
emotions such as happiness and peacefulness, possibly producing enduring changes in 
pleasure and reward circuits. In sum, neuroscience outcomes emphasize usefulness and 
adaptive significance of altering mental processes by way of meditation for better overall 
functioning. 
 
Comparison: Meaningful Outcomes 
One obvious difference between the outcomes of the tantric yoga and 
neuroscience approaches to explaining meditation is that the disciplines themselves focus 
on different goals. Whereas the tantric yoga explanations focus on spiritual purposes of 
practice, neuroscientists structure experimental designs and interpretative perspectives 
from the standpoint of well-being. Thus the two often frame the meditation processes 
differently, with neuroscience focusing on mental processes such as attention and 
emotion, while tantric yoga often describes meditation processes phenomenological terms 
such as absorption. These differences have important implications for explaining other 
aspects of human behavior. For example, as we have seen, the tantric yoga account of 
emotion processes accounts for agency, but literature suggests that neuroscience accounts 
do not. 
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Some attention has been paid to this disconnect of neuroscience research on 
meditation from the implicit/explicit spiritual purposes of meditation. Walsh and Shapiro 
(2006), for example, emphasize that why you sit (i.e., intention) is important, but 
neuroscience does not look at this intentionality factor. They also contrast the way that 
neuroscience looks at mental health but meditation traditions focus on spiritual goals. 
This difference of focus could be because neuroscience research often builds 
experimental approaches from previously theorized categories of mental phenomena. But 
because meditation is a relatively new behavioral practice within Western culture, and 
because there remain numerous unsettled debates throughout cognitive science as to how 
to theorize cognition and the mind, the categories employed in empirical studies may not 
reflect such specialized and uncommon states of mind. Because there is a question as to 
whether these categories are adequate when it comes to mystical or spiritual phenomena, 
there is reason to doubt, while certainly useful in accounting for some aspects of 
meditation, that the results and approach to conceptual issues in experimental design can 
yield a complete understanding of meditative phenomena.  
However, although these two perspectives operate largely on different levels with 
respect to meaningful outcomes, they may be more similar than they seem on the surface. 
For example, both systems recognize the outcome of reward that comes along with 
meditation practice, and that this outcome can drive future practice. Also, the tantric yoga 
notion of becoming and the neuroscience view of adaptive advantage may be similar, 
since both relate to the evolution of consciousness. The self-reflective consciousness 
cultivated during meditation (with the intention of spiritual progress) also results in 
measurable changes in the physical body that have functional advantages. Finally, the 
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main motive according to both perspectives is that they are concerned with relieving 
suffering. These similarities regarding meaningful outcomes provide a point of 
consilience between the two views.                         
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Chapter Nine 
Towards a Theory of Meditation 
 
We have described two broad approaches to understanding meditation. In the 
course of comparing the two, we found striking parallels and many common or similar 
terms and principles in their accounts of mind. Yet we have also seen important and 
serious differences between the two. We are also intuitively aware of dimensions of 
mental life that seem not to yet have been satisfactorily explained by facts about the 
body. Now we have to address directly the vexing question as to how these two accounts 
might be harmonized or combined in some coherent overall view of meditation, to the 
extent that it might be possible. 
We might think of these two accounts in terms of mechanism and meaning. Each 
is powerful in itself (Alter, 2005) but they remain largely in separate worlds. One of them 
gives an objective, fairly impersonal analysis of the physical and chemical events 
involved in the phenomena of meditation. The other describes the flow and process of a 
personal, subjective, living experience. They are obviously “about” the same basic 
reality, but so different that it is a puzzle as to how they can be reconciled.   
Here I can only begin to set up and explore this question. I hope to have set the 
stage for more in-depth discussions of this question in the future, by myself or others. 
Here is a preliminary sketch of some of the main issues to be explored. 
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The Naturalistic Approach 
In an age of science and technology, one of the approaches to reconciliation (and 
thus to understanding meditation) most likely to be proposed is some kind of scientific 
naturalism or reductionism (Proudfoot, 1985). From this perspective, the physical events 
and laws or principles that seem to govern those physical events are the “real” dimension 
of meditative phenomena. The subjective, meaningful aspect of meditation are merely 
epiphenomenal, tacked on, and don’t play any significant causal role in the activity or 
event of meditation.  
Are there any good reasons to question this kind of reductionism, which has a lot 
of prestige because of the stunning successes and utility of natural science and its 
applications in our age? I will not attempt to convincingly disprove this kind of 
reductionism, but only try to articulate what may be some of the problems associated 
with it. Then assuming it might not be adequate, I will go on to briefly explore other 
possibilities. 
A number of theoretical psychologists and cognitive scientists have discussed the 
appeal of reductionism, but also stressed its limitations (e.g., Taylor, 1985; Bruner, 1990; 
Slife and Williams, 1995; Osbeck, 2009). Taylor (1985) offers an especially effective 
analysis of this question. He examines the question of whether the kind of cognitive 
psychology prominent in recent decades that adopts a strong reductionistic approach to 
explaining human action and cognition is adequate to the task. He concludes that this 
approach cannot fully account for meaningful action. His analysis and arguments apply 
equally well, if correct, to the reduction of meditation phenomena to a material base. If he 
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is right, we will need to look elsewhere for a way to interrelate neuroscientific and yogic 
views of meditation. 
 
Machine Models of the Mind  
The  “doctrinaire view” (Osbeck, 2009, p.17) of cognitive science, which 
encompasses a number of fields including the neurosciences, cognitive psychology, and 
philosophy of mind that are central to this dissertation, is a theory of mind that 
understands it in representational and computational  terms. Machine models of mind are 
at the center of this view.  
One of the strongest reasons to adopt a machine model of mind is that the 
appearances of reality are often misleading (Taylor, 1985, p. 192). The logic here is that 
because the way that we normally see reality is often misleading, we need to take a 
deeper look at nature or reality to see what is really going on. It has often been the case in 
history that some event or phenomenon appears one way and we explain it in particular 
terms, and then later through closer observation and applying modern scientific methods 
of observation and measurement discover that another explanation is better. That is, 
another explanation fits the observations more logically and is a simpler account of the 
world. One example is the discovery that the earth orbits around the sun, rather than the 
other way around as it once appeared to be the case.  
This logic leads cognitivists to assume that phenomenological descriptions are 
misleading as to the underlying structure of things (Taylor, 1985). By this logic one 
would conclude that the yogic model that interprets meditation phenomenologically is 
misleading as to the true nature of meditation. Rather than looking to experiential 
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understandings of the world, machine models instead would depict the mind as a complex 
system of representations that processes at the individual level of representations 
(Osbeck, 1999). In this model, “Brain is the boundary of mind; or cognition is ‘bounded 
by the brain,’ meaning that cognition is contained within the brain and limited to its 
unique modes of processing” (Osbeck, 1999, p.18). In other words, in the machine model 
of the mind phenomena at one level are explained by a theory invoking factors at another 
level, where the second level offers us the more basic explanation. Because this second 
level is viewed as “truer” in an ontological sense, phenomenological descriptions can be 
eliminated from the most adequate explanation of that phenomenon. A second reason 
supporting machine models of mind is that the concepts and tools we use to explain the 
functioning of machines can be used to explain physical systems. By mapping physical 
stages of human computing processes on to formulae and law-like principles presented in 
computational language, we can assume that the causal relations between the physical 
states match the logical relations among the computational formulae (Fodor, 1975).  
Building on this assumption, we can explain human actions in the same terms and 
principles as computers, such as the monitoring function discussed in chapter six on 
attention. Taylor (1985) explains that this logic suggests that because a machine does 
something, we can therefore make an analogy between the action of machines and the 
action of humans as a way of trying to explain human action. For example, a computer 
monitors some of its own operations, and this seems an analogue to some of the actions 
performed by humans, such as when humans monitor or observe their own actions. 
Notably, the monitoring function has been used widely in attention literature to describe 
an observational function of cognition (e.g., Gehring et al., 1993; Compton et al., 2008). 
 331 
Specifically in the meditation literature it is used to describe a particular skill that is 
thought to be developed during meditation (Lutz, et al., 2008). Thus the observation that 
a machine does something like this, that it performs the same or a similar task, offers a 
third reason to accept the machine as a model of mind. 
However, although the representational view of machine models has long been 
the guiding theoretical viewpoint of the cognitive sciences and its naturalist paradigm, 
there are reasons to doubt that this model can fully explain human life.  
 
Self-interpreting Agents  
Taylor (1985) argues that a primary reason not to adopt the machine paradigm is 
the fact that human beings are what he calls “self-interpreting agents.” He explains:  
There is no adequate description of how it is with a human being in respect of his 
existence as a person which does not incorporate his self-understanding, that is, 
the descriptions which he or she is inclined to give of his emotions, aspirations, 
desires, aversions, admiration, etc. What we are at any moment is, one might say, 
partly constituted by our self-understanding (p. 198). 
There is no way to answer the question of a person’s state of feeling without self-
description. This is because self-understanding shapes how we feel (Taylor). Proudfoot 
(1985) argues that this is the case for mystical experience, too, that attitudes and beliefs 
adopted prior to a mystical experience are formative of that experience. In fact, he argues, 
a person’s interpretations of what occurs in these moments are constitutive of it. Thus, 
self-interpretations are constitutive of what we are.  
In countering the naturalist’s motives for adhering to a machine model, some 
thinkers argue that rather than being misleading, the supposedly phenomenal features of 
action and understanding are in fact a crucial part of explaining behavior. Descriptions of 
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phenomenal experiences are sometimes seen as a person’s unique interpretation of 
actions and events. Proudfoot (1985) suggests that attempts to differentiate an 
experiential core from its interpretation may cause theorists to lose the very experiences 
they try to analyze. 
Proudfoot explains that the emotion is defined by our understanding of an object 
or situation. Even before we are fully aware of it, an emotion is characterized by the 
sense we have of the meaning of its object to us. The quality of an emotion is given by 
the description of the emotion; having a particular emotion is defined in terms of being 
inclined to give that particular kind of description. The analytical distinction between 
description and object cannot be made (Taylor, 1985). In this way, our feelings are 
constituted by self-understandings. In this view, there is no core feeling which might 
exist independently of the sense of its object which constitutes it. The terms in which 
subjects understand what is happening to themselves are constitutive of the experience 
(Proudfoot, 1985, p.121).  
Taylor (1985, p. 201) argues that we can have a certain emotion before we are 
ready to apply what we can later recognize as the essential description. We can 
understand our emotions either better or less well and emotion can be more or less 
explicitly formulated. This translation from implicit to explicit is important because by 
bringing implicit emotions into an explicit characterization we clarify the emotion, and in 
this way it is often transformed. The implicit/explicit distinction has crucial explanatory 
relevance in the understanding we have of ourselves as agents. It is because these 
interpretations can be explicitly formulated that the implicit/explicit distinction plays an 
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important role for human beings. This process of drawing out and explicitly articulating a 
feeling changes our self-understanding.  
In this view, because of our nature as self-interpreting beings, the quality of our 
self-understanding plays an important role in explaining human behavior, and the 
implicit/explicit distinction has a crucial explanatory relevance in the understanding we 
have of ourselves as agents, and subjects of feeling. Taylor explains that our being agents 
is a condition of our self-interpretations being constitutive of what we are. He discusses 
subjectivity and meaning in terms of an explicit sense of self-understanding that arises 
out of an interpretation of oneself as an agent and the interpretations of actions and events 
as they have meaning for the agent. 
The self-interpreting and self-understanding dimension of human nature is 
unmatched by machines, or perhaps this dimension could be seen in machines by the 
weakest of analogies. For example, a computer may monitor some of its operations, and 
this may be viewed as an analogue to self-understanding. However, Taylor points out that 
in this case there is a clear distinction between description of what the machine does (e.g., 
monitoring) and object (the machine). The operations are independent of the monitoring, 
even if the act of monitoring may bring about other operations which interact with the 
original operations. In other words, in computing machines there is no analogue of the 
relevance of the implicit/explicit distinction, and what this means for how we interpret 
ourselves as agents. The connected features of self-interpretation and an implicit sense of 
things have no place in machine models. However, because they are central to explaining 
human phenomena, this should lead us to rethink relying on the machine model to 
explain the mind. 
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The “Significance Feature”  
Taylor (1985) responds to the claim of some cognitive scientists that a machine 
“does” something when we have designed it to do a task (and their suggestion that we 
take this as a reason for accepting the machine model) by pointing out a crucial 
difference between the operations of humans and machines. This difference centers on 
the significance of an action. He points out that the underlying processes of computing 
are different between humans and machines in terms of action attribution, and the force 
that attribution carries for each. Humans are able to explicitly identify the significance 
actions have for their intrinsic purposes, while machines cannot, providing an additional 
reason to rethink reliance on the machine model.  
In one sense, computers are like humans in that they both accomplish a task. 
However, in a strong sense of action attribution, people and machines differ in the way 
that they get a task done. Humans and machines also differ in what kinds of actions they 
can do – humans can do more. On the one hand, we tend to see a machine as made for a 
particular purpose, and then attribute an action term describing that function as that 
machine’s purpose. But Taylor (1985, p. 191) points out that this kind of attribution is 
external to the machine’s make-up and function. Attribution of action-terms to machine 
operations is therefore relative to our own interests and projects. This is a weak sense of 
action attribution because it is relative to the observer. Moreover, if one asks, “What is it 
really doing?” there is no answer to the question for a machine. But the same is not true 
of humans. For a person, the answer to the question ‘What am I doing?’ is not irrelevant. 
In contrast to machine operations, human actions have intrinsic meaning and significance 
to a person that are not relative to the interests and purposes of the observer; action is a 
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directed activity with a certain privileged outcome. Our actions have significance that 
designate non-observer relative answers the question of what one is really doing. 
Moreover, Taylor continues, if we broaden our consideration of what types of actions get 
done, we can see that man can accomplish a much wider variety of actions than 
machines. For example, machines cannot meditate. 
This significance, what Taylor (1985) terms the significance feature, emphasizes 
the difference between a human and a machine by describing action not from an 
observer’s standpoint of what is getting done, but identifying a description intrinsic to the 
action itself. These action-descriptions focus on the significance of actions to agents 
themselves, on the meaning things have for the agent or self in a non-relative way. Taylor 
explains that this meaning perspective underlies our attributions of action to ourselves in 
a strong sense, and also underlies attributions of feelings and desires to states of being. 
Taylor further explains that references to the significance actions have to the agent are 
essentially involved in our definition of emotions. One might infer that this type of 
reference to the significance meditative consciousness has to the meditator is involved in 
the meditator’s attribution of the “emotion” or quality of absorption to certain meditative 
states. These (emotion) concepts cannot rationally apply to non-agents, even, Taylor 
argues, in a metaphorical manner. 
Taylor (1985) elaborates that the significance feature is crucially bound up in our 
characterization of ourselves as agents. This characterization underlies a strong sense and 
attributions of feelings and desires; reference to agency is essentially involved in the 
definition of emotions. Emotion concepts cannot logically and rationally apply to non-
agents, even in a metaphorical manner. They make sense only in relation to us, and the 
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objects and events meaningful to us. For example, during ishvara pranidhana, the object 
of meditation is ishvara. This object is meaningful and significant to the meditator. Thus, 
the absorption associated with meditative consciousness makes sense as a phenomenon 
only because of it significance to the meditator, especially when the meditator describes 
the meditative state(s). 
Because we are agents with a linguistic capacity, we have the capacity to 
formulate the significance things have for us. In this sense, formulating the significance 
of actions is to make it explicit, but formulation is to alter the significance. Therefore, the 
significance feature underlies other features including the distinction between implicit 
and explicit formulations, and self-interpretation. This sort of interpretation transforms 
the meaning or significance of something. 
Taylor (1985) argues that just because features of self-understanding have no 
place in a computing machine we should not be dissuaded from explaining human action, 
because these are actually an essential part of what we must explain. Perhaps we could 
explain human behavior in the same principles as computers, but since computers do not 
do the same things as us, or only within the analogy of weak and strong action 
attributions, it is not clear that the principles apply. Thus how can we be sure that the 
weak sense explains the strong sense of explicit actions? Applied to meditation, 
“sidestepping” results in reductively explaining the feeling of oneness experienced during 
meditation, and the perception that this feeling comes from expansion and absorption of 
one’s awareness into ultimate reality, in terms of biophysical and neurochemical activity 
within the physical boundaries of the skin, especially in the central nervous system. 
Those who accept the machine paradigm must believe that we can ignore the significance 
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feature, that which leads practitioners to describe absorption in terms of a feeling of 
oneness, because appearances are misleading and because phenomenology can be 
misleading as to the underlying structure. In other words, cognitivists assume that the 
significance feature is misleading and must be eliminated or set aside from events to be 
explained.  
Taylor (1985) argues that if after broadening our consideration to these actions we 
are still confused (that is, if we still think the machine analogies apply), it is because we 
are in the grip of an old metaphysical view, one embedded in our epistemological 
tradition. This tradition makes awareness an inner medium of representation, which 
monitors what goes on in our bodies and the world. In this view, consciousness is 
understood as representation and as such is entirely separable from the processes which it 
monitors. Thus if consciousness plays any role in explaining these processes, it must be 
in interacting with them. But since interaction is ruled out in materialist assumptions, 
consciousness cannot be allowed any explanatory role. It is eliminated from the 
explanandum. In this model, consciousness can only serve as a way to access the 
processes which are the stuff of cognitive science. We have seen that tantric yoga has a 
very different view of consciousness from this old representational view and will not 
repeat these differences here. What is important is that there does not seem to be much 
agreement in contemporary thinking about consciousness from etic perspectives rooted in 
modern science. Moreover, focusing on consciousness as a way of interrelating 
subjective and objective realities may be a wrong track because the real difference 
between men and machines is not consciousness, but the significance feature (Taylor). 
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Consciousness is dependent on our capacity to focus on things significant to us, and this 
is especially evident in the case of emotions. 
Taylor’s (1985) argument that there is all the difference in the world between 
creatures with and without the significance feature argues against attempts to eliminate 
phenomenological description and subjectivity. Once we broaden the range of actions 
under consideration, the supposedly secondary character of the significance feature 
ceases. Significance is not a detachable feature that action has in some internal medium 
of internal representation. Once we look to emotions and feelings as an essential part of 
human nature, and see actions defined in terms of them, we undermine machine 
analogies. As we saw in chapter six on attention as a mental process of meditation, the 
machine analogy of monitoring cannot explain meditative absorption. 
 
Conditions versus Causes 
Throughout this dissertation we have considered a great amount of evidence that 
suggests that there are correlations between mental states of meditation and the 
physicality of the body. A major issue concerns how we should interpret this correlation. 
The theories we use to interpret this correlation vary as to the causal forces underlying 
the occurrence of meditative absorption. Which theoretical perspective, then, ought to 
guide our efforts to conceptualize the processes of meditation? 
Because physicality is an obvious feature of human nature, we must find some 
way of considering it in relation to mental life. In cognitive science, the causal nature of 
biological processes, especially neurobiological processes, in mental states is widely 
assumed (Slife and Williams, 1995). Many yogis themselves in modern times have come 
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close to reducing the whole of yoga, including meditation, to its physical substrates 
(Alter, 2004). However, more generally in the field of psychology, Williams (2001) and 
others argue that reductive strategies fail because of flaws in the way they view the 
interrelation of “inner” and “outer” realities. In their view, developing a theoretical 
perspective that adequately interrelates meaningful human experience and the physical 
dimension of human being may require rethinking reductionism as the favored 
perspective on mind. 
A promising alternative is proposed by Williams (2001), who argues that instead 
of seeing biological processes as brutely causally influencing mental realities, we view 
them as conditions that are necessary for mental happenings but do not generate 
meaningful experience in a deterministic manner. This proposal, I suggest, might serve as 
a cornerstone of our attempt to interrelate these two fundamental dimensions of human 
life. 
 
Physicality as a Causal Force  
The idea of physicality as a causal force is appealing as a theoretical stance on the 
mind for two main reasons. First, it aligns with the longstanding Western tradition of 
seeking a single explanatory principle. Second, it solves problems related to dualism, 
namely the many puzzles that arise when we try to conceptualize how two very different 
substances like matter and mind could possibly interact (Churchland, 1988; Olson, 2004). 
However, this position remains problematic for a number of reasons (Varela, Thompson, 
Rosch, 1991; Williams, 2001). 
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Williams (2001) explains that mind-body dualisms imply two things that make 
themselves untenable in mainstream psychology today. First, if minds constitute an 
ontological category apart from bodies, then the methods so far available to natural 
science and used in psychology from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to study 
persons may not be effective in studying the subject matter of psychology – that is, of 
phenomena that involve mind. The nature of the method itself may determine what 
phenomena are chosen for investigation—on other words, we may fit our subject to our 
pre-selected methods rather than adapt our methods to fit the subject matter. In addition, 
any theory in which mind stands as its own reality implies the “ghost in the machine” 
problem. This problem is that unless mind in conceptualized in completely naturalistic 
terms, there remains the theoretical possibility for souls, spirits, and other seemingly 
supernatural entities. Yet the field of psychology has sought to be wholly naturalistic and 
monistic and eliminate these theoretical potentialities.  
One way of resolving the problems of dualism and the problem of relating mind 
and body is to ascribe to a philosophy of materialism and reduce the reality of the mind to 
the activities of the brain (Churchland, 1988). This takes shape in modern psychology in 
the form of the well-recognized trend to account for human behavior including intentions, 
preferences, emotions, cognitions, and psychopathologies in biological terms (Williams, 
2001). Construing psychology in terms of biological processes is attractive in that the 
study of mental processes moves away from previous supposed impediments to the 
science of psychology (such as mentalism and spiritualism). In other words, reductionism 
meets modernity’s interest in explaining the mind in terms of the natural world rather 
than a supernatural realm. Williams explains that one reason reductionism is so endemic 
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within psychological theorizing is that it is consistent with our longstanding interest in 
showing that there is only a single causal substrate underlying human behavior. Thus 
psychology holds onto materialism with the faith that this is the explanatory ground that 
can satisfactorily resolve or explain all events within its realm. 
However, this strategy is distinctly anti-intellectual because it rather arbitrarily 
limits the range of theories and ideas at work in the field (Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 
1991). With the strategies of reductionism, psychologists tend to develop and believe 
“only those theories and models that can easily be brought into conformity with known or 
presumed biological realities or adapting theories and models … until they do [conform 
with materialism]” (Williams, 2001, p.53). However, biology as an explanandum may not 
be satisfactory if one feels that it neglects the moral, social, relational, and other 
meaningful contexts within which mental states occur. Williams (p.53) explains, “Once 
one decides that naturalistic and materialistic monism is the ontological foundation 
grounding all understandings of human behavior, one must still deal with the reality of 
the experience of mental life.”  
 
Reality and the Problem of “Truth”  
Slife and Williams (1995, p. 128) explain that the essence of reductionism in 
psychology is the claim that “X is really just Y”.” This claim amounts to a truth claim 
about reality. In other words, naturalists believe that when X, a psychological or mental 
phenomenon, such as absorption, is understood fully, it will not be what it has seemed to 
be to some people, that is, mystical or ineffable, but what it more basically and truly is, 
namely, Y, a biological phenomenon (Alter, 2004). In essence, this claim assumes that 
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the biological understanding is “truer” in an ontological sense. Accepting this theoretical 
position means that one no longer needs the category X in explanations of the world.  
For reductions of this sort to work, it is important to show that X really is just Y, 
otherwise one might be misled by the appearance of X (Taylor, 1985; Williams, 2001). 
“A reductive explanation, Y, must be simpler than X, but also adequate to the 
explanatory task for which X currently exists. [Moreover,] it must adequately account for 
everything that X accounts for, and it should do so without destroying or dismissing 
phenomena that used to fit in category X” (Williams, 2001, p. 54). Williams explains that 
one reason these requirements amount to an insurmountable conceptual challenge is the 
absence of a set of criteria by which reduction is judged to be adequate. In other words, it 
is impossible to judge whether Y has distorted phenomena of X too much, or whether 
something essentially important about the “X-like” phenomena is left unaccounted for. 
This is a judgment about whether only unnecessary complexity has been removed, or 
whether something more essential about the phenomenon has been eliminated. Yet, such 
judgments can only be grounded in a particular ontological perspective. What may seem 
unnecessarily complex and abstract in one metaphysical system may be quite simple, 
concrete, and essential in another. Thus, Williams (p.54) argues that, “if biological 
reduction is to be more than just prejudice, some set of criteria must be evoked to justify 
the reduction on grounds other that those entailed in a prior ontological commitment to 
biological materialism.” As of yet, however, no criteria have been established that allow 
us to reasonably judge the simplicity or the truth value of a reduction, and Williams 
suggests that it is hard to imagine how such criteria could be established.  
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Theoretical Positions of Reductive Approaches 
Contemporary literature from the philosophy of mind is replete with various 
positions that have been taken to describe potential relationships between the body and 
mind (e.g., see Churchland (1988) for an overview). Williams (2001) analyzes three main 
positions - derivation, eliminitivism, and especially supervenience (or functionalism) - at 
work in the reductive trend of psychology today. The first type of reduction, called 
derivation, occurs through language and consensus about language use. In this approach, 
either the theoretical constructs or the phenomena they are intended to explain are altered 
to the point that the reducing theory is seen to offer a better explanation. Williams gives 
the example of reducing the construct of agency to the ability to avoid noxious forces in 
one’s life. For example, this is very close to the strategy used by Vivekananda and other 
yogis who psychologicalized yoga by theorizing it in modern terms (De Michelis, 2004). 
This strategy also ends in the criterion problem discussed above, since we still do not 
have a clear basis on which to judge whether a nonagentic account is adequate or whether 
it simply defines out of existence the constructs it seeks to explain  
A stronger type of reduction than derivation is reduction by elimination. In this 
approach, one seeks to entirely replace one theory and its ontology with another. Applied 
to psychology, elimination occurs when one completely removes the concept of mind 
from explanations of behavior, such that there is a total identity between mind and brain. 
In this view, the mind does not exist in any way that cannot be accounted for by the brain 
and the ontology of brains.  
Williams (2001) argues that reduction by elimination strikes right at the heart of 
our understandings of persons because of what we take ourselves to be and be about, and 
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therefore it has substantial consequences for psychology. To conclude that our thoughts, 
emotions, behaviors, etc. are fundamentally biological strips them of most of their 
meaning. However, biological events cannot mean what agentic acts mean. Following a 
biological eliminative reduction, mental, emotional, and moral actions and events are 
epiphenomenal on biological events and at most serve an instrumental function, helping 
us to carry out what we are bound to carry out anyway. Moreover, if the reductive theory 
were true, the epistemology underlying the natural scientific method would be the only 
type to satisfy or persuade a well-trained brain. Yet at this time, there is no body of 
research that can convincingly establish the validity of eliminative reduction. This is a 
conclusion I cannot argue for fully at this time. But many in the social sciences seem to 
believe—they seem almost take it as a matter of faith—that such research explaining 
mental, emotional, and moral actions by way of general laws that predict their occurrence 
precisely under specified circumstances should be forthcoming. However, such well-
developed empirical theory is widely acknowledged to be lacking (Bernstein, 1976; Root, 
1993).  
Lacking empirical evidence to validate eliminative reduction, yet still intent on 
adhering to a materialist philosophy, many psychologists embrace a position that 
advances reductionism through the supervenience thesis (Williams, 2001). Supervenience 
assumes that one realm of phenomena (e.g., the mental) depends entirely on another (e.g., 
the biological), even though explicit and evident relations between the two are lacking. 
This position stops short of eliminating the entire reality of mental phenomena. 
Supervenience is unconvincing and problematic because it assumes as true precisely what 
it accepts as unproven and perhaps as unknowable. Also, it reduces in the end to an 
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eliminative position: supervenience is a necessary condition for eliminative reduction. In 
addition, supervenience must rely on the same data, generally lacking, as an eliminative 
reduction does to establish its validity.  
 Positions built on some kind of supervenience hypothesis acknowledge 
meaningfulness in human life and the depersonalizing or undermining effects eliminative 
materialism has on meaningful human life. Humans have rational propensities and are 
capable of moral concern and action. How these propensities evolved from the material 
substratum is impossible to explain given the present state of the cognitive and 
neurosciences. But for nonreductive materialists, how these qualities arise is not 
important. What is important is to understand human propensities and how to help people 
develop interest in living a fully functioning life. Yet, Williams argues, the unconcern for 
the lack of evidence supporting naturalist assumptions upon which this position is based 
is intellectually problematic. While nonreductive materialists call for rigorous research 
evidence for all aspects of treatment, they have no problem with the lack of evidence for 
their most far reaching ontological commitment or assumptions about human nature. We 
lack both the methodological knowledge to both establish the validity of the materialist 
assumptions of this position and to conduct a crucial test that would falsify the position. 
Research becomes merely suggestive, with findings that look like they might someday 
satisfying the desire for verified  knowledge, even though concrete claims that are 
capable of being falsified are currently lacking. Williams argues that this theoretically 
thorny position, even though widely held, seems largely unexamined in psychology 
today. It is attractive because it allows psychologists to avoid such constructs as souls and 
agentic minds, and preserves the scientific status of psychology as a discipline, while at 
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the same time relieving them of the burden of defending their naturalistic or materialistic 
faith as true. However, as a weak form of eliminative materialism, Williams believes that 
supervenience is ultimately destructive of human agency, meaning, and morality.  
 
Logical Problems with Biological Reductionism  
To argue against the biological reduction of psychology is not to dismiss the 
importance of brains and chemical processes in psychological life (Williams, 2001); 
rather it is to ensure that we understand the proper role of our bodies in connection to our 
experience. With this goal in mind, let us now briefly consider several logical problems 
encountered when psychologists use to reduce mental processes to biological processes.  
First, post hoc inference, in which indirect and inferential logic is used to 
implicate physiology in psychological disorders, is tautological (Slife and Williams, 
1995). Post hoc logic proceeds by using the brains of abnormal subjects to assign 
psychological functions to discrete brain structures. This logic affects the very 
conceptualization of a disorder and its relation to the brain. However, this logic is quite 
different from studies that classify brain structures based on behavioral observations.  
Similarly, Williams (2001) criticizes the logic behind implying that certain disorders have 
chemical causes based solely on evidence of the chemical effects of certain drugs on 
neurochemistry.   
A related strategy of argumentation results in what Williams (2001) calls 
ontological drift.  To illustrate this strategy, he focuses on the relationship of genes as a 
specific biological element to behavior. By attributing behavior to genes, psychologists 
are able to invoke the concept of predisposition or tendency. In other words, with this sort 
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of biologicalization of psychology, one is able to claim that rather than inheriting traits or 
dispositions we actually inherit genetic material composed of chemicals. However, this 
attribution ensnares us in the problem that by evoking the concept of genes to explain 
behavior, one allows the concept of tendency or propensity to drift from one ontological 
state to another, drifting from a mental state to a physiological state and back again.  
Williams (2001) describes another explanatory possibility illustrating ontological 
drift, in which behavior arises from an interaction between biological and environmental 
events. Because events such as stress level and childhood experiences are not physical 
phenomena, to speak of such things as “interacting” with physical, biological conditions 
ignores the ontological gap because there is no ontological ground on which two such 
different things (physical and nonphysical) can meet. Thus in this sense, the term 
interaction drifts between ontological states.  
A further type of argumentation used to explain psychological events in biological 
terms involves argumentation from deficit (Williams, 2001). In this case, one argues that 
because we know that a deficit in brain region X results in a deficit of behavior Y, we can 
conclude, therefore, that normal brain structure/function of region X is responsible for 
normal functioning. Where the body of research evidence of a relationship between the 
physical and behavior is the strongest, it rather clearly shows that neurological deficits 
result in behavioral constraints. However, this type of study cannot be taken as evidence 
for the viability of biological reduction, nor of causality at all, since to constrain a 
behavior is actually the logical opposite of causing it. Thus argumentation from deficit 
cannot support the concept of biologicalization. Williams concludes that perhaps the 
strongest statement such evidence will legitimately permit is that a functional nervous 
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system is a necessary condition for behavior and perhaps, even that a normal nervous 
system is advantageous to normal functioning. Yet, he acknowledges, this seems to be 
little more than a banal truism.  
The last type argumentation utilized in the biologicalization of psychology 
involves a misunderstanding of heritability. Heritability is accurately understood as the 
proportion of variability in a trait that can be attributed to genetic rather than 
environmental sources. But heritability of a trait is irrelevant to the question of whether 
the trait can be changed or influenced by environmental or other interventions. Williams 
(2001) argues that for this and other reasons, the biologicalization of psychology is 
unlikely to be achieved by the weight of evidence that any particular behavior has a high 
heritability.  
 
Causality and Agency  
When contemplating the role of biology in mental processes, psychologists ought 
to consider how causality is handled in the field of medicine where a disease is usually 
not seen as the result of the simple effects of a single cause or the end result of a chain of 
causes (Williams, 2001). Rather, medical disorders are the body’s reaction in the 
presence of a host of relevant conditions. The old model of disease based on cause-effect 
type thinking has been replaced with newer intricate models of systems of nature. So 
while the separation of causes from effects continues to operate in psychology, Williams 
explains that this view is not at the cutting edge of modern In this view, causes are better 
thought of as a description of how things happen with necessary conditions for them to 
happen, rather than as the name of some independent force that makes them happen. 
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Williams (2001) argues that our modern understanding has become blind to this 
important aspect of causality, which Aristotle clarified long ago. His notion of cause 
carries responsibility, with implied rationality and meaningfulness. Williams cites more 
recent trends in science that similarly emphasize the point that causes are not to be 
divorced from the things and events that we take to be effects. A cause is thus more a 
property of an event, part of the ontology of the events, than a separate entity with its 
own ontological status outside of the event. Causes, even in the physical world, are 
holistic and contextual. Rather than trying to reduce persons to material biological things, 
psychologists should be interested in maintaining the status of persons and in 
understanding how person take account of their external and internal material 
circumstance.  
Williams (2001) describes three ways to use the term influence that  avoid how it 
is used in psychology as a way of imputing determinism and reductionism, as a way of 
hedging one’s metaphysical bet in the absence of hard evidence for such determinism. To 
account for the mind-body relationship in human phenomena, including 
psychopathology, one might account for influence as a strictly causal influence in which 
there may be a direct connection from physical states to mental states. Second, influence 
could be conditional such that bodily conditions may constrain human action. The results 
of this sense of influence are constraints and limitations, with no reason to assume that 
these constraints operate without the intelligent contribution and cooperation of persons. 
Conditional influences operate like input but are not reductive.  
A third type of influence is consequential influence in which life factors are 
influential because of their anticipated consequences, consequences symbolic and 
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anticipatory requiring a sense of purpose in life. It may be more difficult to connect this 
type of influence directly to bodily conditions. The mere existence of physiological 
conditions that introduce conditional constraints in a person’s life will also introduce 
consequential influences as intelligent persons seek to take account of the conditions 
(physical, social, and moral) of their lives and set a course of action deemed worthy by 
them.  
The belief that all human nature reduces to mere matter, according to Williams 
(2002), erodes our sensitivity to the moral tenor of life. At the same time, we must 
acknowledge the importance of the biological reality in our existence. Therefore, a 
foundation of relating these two dimensions of human life is to see neurophysiology as 
necessary conditions, but not wholly sufficient for appreciating the meaningful nature of 
human experience. This view of physiological processes as conditions might serve as the 
cornerstone of any attempt to interrelate the bodily and meaningful aspects of human life. 
 
Meditation and the Embodied Mind 
One perspective that has emerged from the ongoing inquiry into the best way to 
conceptualize cognition and mind, especially in light of the “facts” that have come to 
light about the mind in recent decades from experimental research in cognitive science 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), is the idea that cognitive processes are embodied and deeply 
rooted in the body’s interactions with the world (Wilson, 2002; Osbeck, 2009). In this 
view, cognitive processes are not disembodied, rather they are embodied; this means that 
cognition is deeply rooted in and arises from the body’s interactions with the world. 
Bodily experience is integral to, even preconditional to cognition (Varela, Thompson, 
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Rosch, 1991). This “embodied mind” or embodied cognition perspective is an alternative 
to the classical cognitive science perspective that takes the machine as its model of mind 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Osbeck, 2009), including connectionism and emergence 
positions that are more recent developments in cognitive science (Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch, 1991; Osbeck, 2009).  
There are several central theses within this general perspective. The first is that 
cognition is “embodied” in the sense that cognition is body based, especially through 
mechanisms of sensory processing and motor control (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). A 
second it that cognition must be understood primarily in terms of goal directed actions 
which occur in real-time, analyzed as interactions between cognition and the environment 
(Wilson, 2002), as opposed to cognition as static internal states. This idea moves beyond 
connectionism’s system focus by conceiving of an agent’s body and environment as one 
coupled dynamical system rather than two systems (Osbeck, 2009). A third thesis of the 
embodied mind approach is that cognition is situated, occurring in the context of the real-
world environment rather than in an abstract symbolic world. Finally, embodied mind 
positions often involve the extended mind thesis of distributed cognition: the 
environment is part of the cognitive system, though this is the most controversial claim of 
embodied mind perspective (Wilson, 2002).  
Part of the embodied mind critique of representationalist theory (and its machine 
model of mind) is that the representational focus on “internal” processes of cognition 
underplays or overlooks environmental factors that are essential to explaining cognition 
(Osbeck, 2009). Thus, embodied mind positions favor relational analyses in which the 
embodied mind and environment are inextricably linked. As part of their critique of the 
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representational model of mind, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) also question the 
central premise about reality upon which representationalism is based: that there is a 
stable world “out there.” They explain (p. 150), “if this critique [of representationalism 
and a stable world out there] is valid, then scientific progress in understanding cognition 
will not be forthcoming unless we start from a different basis from the idea of a pregiven 
world that exists ‘out there.’” In this view, we must challenge, both theoretically and 
empirically, the idea that a pregiven world exists out there and is internally recovered in a 
representation.  
Rather than seeing cognition as recovery of a pregiven outer world (realism) or 
projection of a pregiven inner world (idealism), they see cognition as embodied action. 
Varela (e.g., 1991) proposes “enaction” as a way of seeing our activities as reflections of 
a structure without losing sight of our own experience. The enactive approach highlights 
the long-held (since Piaget) idea in psychology that “cognition depends on the kinds of 
experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities” and 
emphasizes the idea that “these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves 
embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context” 
(Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991, p.173). This position resolves the tension between 
realism and idealism because we accept that the neither the world nor our experience is 
independent of the other. No longer can we take the exclusive approach of asking what 
must the world be like for science (which views entities) to be possible, as is the position 
of positivism (Soskice, 1985). 
Thus, extending Merleu-Ponty’s phenomenological program, Varela et al. (1991) 
argue for a “circularity” between science and experience, such that our phenomenological 
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reality informs and shapes scientific pursuits. We cannot assume the realist’s claim that 
the world, its structure, and relations, exist independently of our theorizing. This position 
maintains that it is the combined ongoing circularity between our theorizing and 
experience that provides us with access to the structures. Clearer experiences beget better 
theories, and vice versa. This proposal includes the realm of scientific methodology: 
Varela proposes that meditation can be an instructive methodological tool to scientifically 
access the experiential dimension of cognition that has been so elusive of empirical 
approaches to mind. 
A discourse of science that is grounded in experiential insights borne from daily 
meditative contemplation will surely refine the metonymic process that unfolds as the 
practitioners of both methods, sometimes (perhaps often) one and the same person, 
continually exchange ideas between the two perspectives in an ongoing effort to discover 
the “truth.” At the same time, the discourse of practice is brought to light in a heightened 
climate of rigor for rational examination. Whereas the cultural milieu of meditation 
practitioners and spiritual seekers, as any religious context, often can become doctrinaire 
(Proudfoot, 1985), influence from the tenor of science pushes back to clarify meanings. 
With this circularity between science and experience we gain the most sophisticated 
access to the structures of cognition, whether phenomenological or physical.  
If Varela is right, and the embodied mind perspective successfully closes the book 
on the ontology of realism, then this solves the problems with relativism that Alter (2004) 
brought to light regarding the shifting theoretical realms of yoga and the confusions that 
come with hybrid models of reality. 
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The embodied mind perspective also affords us an opportunity to revisit the use of 
metaphor in everyday language, philosophy, and the discourse of science. Previously we 
had operated with the contention that the tantric model of subtle physiology, and the 
mantra used to visualize the reality depicted by this model – the meaning of which 
suggested that the meditator’s self-identity is the same as the cosmic reality - should be 
understood in terms of subjective experience. With the insights about how the mind 
works gained from cognitive science, and the embodied mind perspective, we can now 
talk about metaphor in terms of embodiment from within an etic perspective (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1999). Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive treatment of metaphor expands on recent 
challenges to linguistic theories about metaphor (e.g., Soskice, 1985) by arguing that 
metaphor conceptualizes subjective experience. At its heart, this approach proposes that 
we see metaphors as experientially grounded mappings within the neural systems of the 
body. 
Soskice (1985) raises the question of how any non-observational terms (like 
metaphorical theory) can be regarded as reality depicting, especially in cases when we are 
using models and metaphor to depict things we cannot possibly comprehend. 
Metaphorical theory terms seem to open to criticism of lacking specifiable referents. For 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999), reason and metaphorical thought grow out of sensorimotor – 
that its, nervous system - experience. Human concepts and reason are shaped as much by 
the body and the brain as by reality (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). 
In light of this view, I suggest that previous attempts to theorize the yogic body in 
terms of physicality failed because they sought a too literal, basic, and rudimentary 
translation of scientific conceptualizations of the body and approach to and mapping the 
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body of science and the body of yoga. The embodied mind approach takes a more 
sophisticated approach towards mapping subjective experience within the body. It is 
mapped through the sensorimotor and higher neural networks of cognition (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1999) through an ongoing moment-to-moment engagement with environmental, 
social, cultural contexts – in essence a “lived world” (Slife and Williams, 1995). This is 
the embodiment of subjective experience. This perspective still allows us to retain the 
traditional interpretation of the yogic body as experiential; however, now we can see 
more clearly how this dimension is embodied.  
 
Where Does this Dialogue Leave Us?  
Examining ishvara pranidhana from this multidisciplinary perspective has helped 
us to clarify important distinctions between yoga and science and take a few steps 
towards resolving some of the problems that have developed in modernity with the 
modern theories of yogic meditation. This approach has also allowed us to consider 
broader questions that have faced contemporary scholars regarding cognition, the mind, 
and the body. Thus, this dialogue has also contributed to the ongoing conversations in 
cognitive science. I have extended the scholarship on modern yoga by examining a yogic 
method of meditation that does not fit so clearly within the predominant theories of 
modern yoga and showing links between modern yoga research, which is often in fields 
of anthropology and religious studies, and the cognitive sciences.  
My examination has led to the insight that these two systems of tantric yoga and 
neuroscience, which originated in vastly different socio-historical contexts with different 
theories about and methodologies for discovering the way the mind works, have both 
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arrived at strikingly similar truths about the mind: synchronization, amplification, 
extinction, sequential activity, etc. This surprising convergence helps us recognize the 
importance of maintaining the integrity between the two systems, especially because we 
have seen so clearly the kinds of problems that develop with that there are major 
problems with translation between the two systems. Holding in balance the essential 
truths of the two systems maintains the power of both (Alter, 2004) to pursue and clearly 
articulate the truth from these dual expressions of physical and experiential. The two 
systems each pursue this purpose of discovering truths about human nature and the way 
we cognize the world in their explanations about meditative absorption. Surprisingly, the 
two different purposes of these two systems do not color what each comes up with; both 
systems see the mind as operating in largely the same way. Therefore, we can see tantric 
and neuroscientific approaches as complementary approaches.  
This dissertation examined the phenomenology of meditative absorption and the 
way we think about “mystical” experience in ways advocated by Proudfoot (1985). It 
suggests that absorption, including the “mystical” kind of absorption described in yogic 
literature, need not be seen as “ineffable”, or solely in emic terms. Rather, a dialogue 
between the two systems allows us to see cognition in terms of embodiment, and 
recognize that both physicality and experience are embodied within the person. By 
focusing on moments of balance between the seemingly distinct realities of subjectivity 
and objectivity, mind and body, self and consciousness, we can see absorption as a means 
of consciously enacting embodied transformation. 
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Conclusion 
Indian yoga has traveled across many centuries and many lands, and traversed 
many intellectual systems to arrive in our life today. An authentic inevitable meeting of 
yoga with science today requires that we examine the challenges of meditative practice in 
the body and scientific study within the context of experience with an open mind. This 
dialogue between the two has forced us to talk about yoga without the threat of 
eliminating the yogic phenomenon of transcendence. The embodied mind perspective is a 
way of thinking about meditative phenomena in a non-dual, non reductive way. It allows 
us to credit the reality and meaningfulness in the sphere of yoga, if we are so inclined. At 
the same time, the embodied mind perspective curbs tendencies in the meditation 
tradition towards authoritarianism and dogmatism. This perspective requires an 
empirically grounded philosophy that avoids speculative excess. Considering meditation 
from this perspective gives us new models and methods with which we can analyze the 
reality of the mind. 
When approached in this way, what results from the meeting of western and 
Indian ways of knowing human nature? We come to a common understanding of the 
embodied transformation of meditative absorption as an ongoing process in which 
consciousness expresses itself in multifaceted dimensions of human nature. At the very 
least, a balanced critical dialogue can help both science and yoga advance the shared goal 
of knowing reality in a way that allows both to reside in the complementary embodied 
dimensions of physicality and experience.  
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Appendix A 
The Brain: A Brief Overview of Neuroscience and the Approach of Neurobiology 
and Neurophysiology 
 
The field of neuroscience has different levels of analysis by which scientists infer 
knowledge about the material substance of the brain and its interactions with the world. 
For example, neurobiology is a subfield of neuroscience, with the aim of studying the 
nervous system at the molecular, cellular, and biophysical levels. Neuroscience also 
studies the nervous system at the systems and behavioral levels. Within the field of 
neurobiology, neuroscientists have identified specific neuroanatomical centers, cell types, 
and neurotransmitters and receptors of a range of psychological phenomena and behavior. 
As another example, the neuroscience subfield of neurophysiology defines the functional 
workings of the brain from its neurobiology to higher processes.  
Cellular mechanisms underlying nervous system functioning and communication 
are well understood. One of the central cellular mechanisms is the synapse at the junction 
between two neurons that enables chemical flow of information between neurons. Figure 
7 shows the basic features of this mechanical transfer of molecules. The synapse at the 
junction between two neurons enables chemical flow of information between neurons and 
lies at the heart of neurobiological communication in the body. This cellular activity is 
the crux of all neural activity measured through different neuroscientific methodologies. 
A main philosophical assumption of neuroscience is that this sort of activity at the 
neurobiological level causes all mental process, including such mental processes as 
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cognition and consciousness. Therefore, some basic understanding of synaptic 
mechanisms is essential for advancing a dialogue between neuroscientific and yogic 
explanations of the state of consciousness of meditation.  
 
 
Figure 7 Neuron synapse or chemical signaling between two neurons. Neurotransmitters are shown 
emptying from the synaptic vesicles into the synaptic cleft signal the post-synaptic neuron on its 
dendritic spine. Ions that pass through the receptors, and ions that pass through the axon membrane, 
can be seen passing through the receptors represented as black dots.                                                             
Source: www.coolschool.ca/lor/BI12/unit12/U12L04.htm accessed 4/4/08 
 
Chemical molecules called neurotransmitters and ions enter cells through protein 
channels embedded in the membranes of the cells. As shown in Figure 7, 
neurotransmitter molecules pass from the end of the axon terminal of one neuron’s axon 
to the receptors in the cell membrane of the dendrite of the next neuron. Ions also pass 
through cell membranes to regulate cellular signaling, but are not shown in the figure. 
Cells have both ligand (molecule) gated and voltage gated ion channels. When the ligand, 
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or chemical molecule, binds to the cell’s receptor, the channel opens it so that ions can 
then pass through the channel. In contrast to ligand gated channels, voltage gated 
channels operate by sensing the cell’s voltage level. According to Kandel (2000, p. 105), 
“ion channels have three important properties: (1) they conduct ions, (2) they recognize 
and select specific ions, and (3) they open and close in response to specific electrical, 
mechanical, or chemical signals.” Variability in voltage levels affects the opening and 
closing of the voltage-gated channels, thus regulating the passing of ions through those 
channels. The movement of these ions and molecules regulates the activities of nerve 
cells and communication throughout the nervous system. The number and frequency of 
ions and molecules moving across the synapse regulates the cells’ action potentials and 
neurotransmitter release responsible for cell-to-cell communication. This synaptic 
communication regulates functions on cellular and systems levels throughout the nervous 
system.   
Nomenclature in neuroscience literature used to reflect the brain areas of activity, 
including research literature on meditation, are based on well-defined subdivisions or 
lobules of the brain rather than subtler neurobiological activity. Physical differences in 
the structure of the brain are obvious just by looking at it. There are four main lobes of 
the brain, with the term “lobes” generally designating areas of the brain’s outer covering, 
or cortex, with specific regions of the cortex known as cortical areas. Large general 
regions of the brain are as follows: frontal lobe as the area in the front part of the brain 
near the forehead; temporal lobes as areas on the left and right sides of the head near the 
ears; parietal lobe as the area of the brain near the top of the head; and occipital lobe as 
the brain area in the back of the head. Figure 8 indicates the nomenclature for the 
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directions of these different regions such as prefrontal cortex being in the very front of 
the brain and medial frontal cortex located more in the medial or center of the front brain. 
These lobes help to define specific orientations of the brain such as front (anterior) and 
back (posterior), right and left, and help pinpoint specific areas of the brain that are 
associated with specialized mental functions and behaviors.   
The cortex of the central nervous system (CNS) as a whole is generally 
recognized as the area of the brain specialized for cognitive functioning (Kandell, 2000), 
although all of these cortical regions have specific functional mental capabilities. The 
frontal lobe, for example, is the area of the brain thought to be involved in the highest 
order of mental processing; the parietal lobes as the top areas of the brain that process 
sensory information and temporal and spatial perception that are involved in meditation 
(Lazar, 2000; Newberg, 2001); the temporal lobes are the regions of the brain on either 
side of the head and primarily have to do with perceptual experience, such as auditory 
(sound) and visual processing, especially object recognition, and memory functions; and 
the occipital lobe is the area in the back of the head primarily involved in vision (Kandel, 
2000).  
Neuroscience further defines more specialized regions within these major areas by 
obvious structural differences and more subtle anatomical differences such as differences 
in cell types. For example, the frontal cortex is further divided into more specialized 
areas, including the prefrontal cortex (PFC), including the orbital frontal cortex (OFC), 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) – areas 
which, as discussed later, are all activated during absorptive meditation and similarly are 
all involved in some mental processes associated with meditation. The name 
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“dorsolateral” prefrontal cortex, illustrates the usefulness of directionality nomenclature 
to indicate specific location within the brain. Specifying the directionality within the 
names of these areas is important for identifying the locations of the brain areas since 
these areas each play a different role in cognitive processing and it is important to 
distinguish between discrete areas. For example, as is discussed later with regard to 
meditation, these two areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) are differently activated during 
subtle changes in mental processing. These types of functional differences between 
cortical brain areas are generally distinguishable only through knowledge about 
differences between cell types within the cortex.  
In addition to the cortex, there are numerous other areas where brain matter is 
structurally and functionally quite different from the cortex. Areas of the brain other than 
the cortex are anatomically distinguishable by sight because of the shape of physical 
features of the brain tissue as well as cellular morphology. These areas are distinguished 
further by their functional attributes. Figure 8 shows these non-cortical regions, including 
subcortical limbic areas (emotional and learning centers) of the brain (including 
hypothalamus, amygdala, hippocampus, septum, and thalamus); the midbrain; the brain 
stem; and cerebellum. The spinal cord (not shown) is also an obviously visually 
distinguishable brain area. Subcortical limbic areas of the brain and their main functions 
include the amygdala involved in emotional processing, the hippocampus involved in 
memory, and the hypothalamus involved in regulating basic body functions and 
regulating the endocrine system. More rostral brain regions include the pons, the brain 
stem and cerebellum. These brain areas regulate basic functions, such as breathing, heart 
rate, arousal, eating, sleeping, and mating. In the peripheral system, the brain interfaces 
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with the body through nerves extending from the spinal cord into the body; the spinal 
cord receives sensory information and controls motor function. The cranial nerves at the 
base of the brain receive sensory information and exert motor function to the neck and 
face region. These neurons connect the body and outside world with the brain regions 
inside the head and their associated higher mental functioning. The peripheral nervous 
system (PNS) also includes the sympathetic (arousal and expenditure of energy) and the 
parasympathetic (that controls functions that occur during a relaxed state) systems.  
Neurobiological activity at the molecular, cellular, and biophysical levels forms 
the basis of both neural-activity and neurophysiological interactions between the brain 
and the body. The terms “neural activity” and “neural activation” are used in this 
dissertation to refer to both activity at neurobiological cellular and molecular levels, as 
well as changes in mental states. When used in this second sense of changes in mental 
states, these terms reflect higher activation - the activation of entire circuits, for example. 
In this view, a “neurocircuit” is defined as a functional circuit that is physically 
(anatomically) connected by neurons. When neurons that are anatomically connected 
activate – that is, when an axon of one neuron is so close to the dendrites of another 
neuron that they form a synapse or functional connection when activated, the activation 
forms a functional neurocircuit. Activation of the circuit – that is, activation of the 
neurons comprising the circuit – corresponds to some mental function. In neurobiological 
usage, however, “neural activity” refers to any activity within the neurons themselves, 
specifically neural firing, or the spiking behavior of action potentials. Thus, in 
neurobiological usages, the terms “neural activity” and “neural activation” indicate both 
intra and extra cellular processes, such as movements of ions through cell membranes and 
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the effects these processes have within the cells, such as DNA transcription, 
communication between neurons (neurotransmitter signaling through synaptic gaps), and 
overall patterns of neural-hormonal flow through blood vessels and capillaries. Since 
neurobiological activity forms the basis of both neural-activity in terms of mental 
processes, brain and body interactions, and activity at molecular and cellular biological 
levels, when the terms “neural activation” and “neural activity” are used in this 
dissertation they refer to systems of molecular level processing.  
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Figure 8: Major areas of the brain. 
Three primary distinctions convey directionality of brain regions. Dorsal refers to the front part of the body 
while ventral refers to the back part. Lateral refers to the outer parts of the head while medial refers to the 
inner portions. Rostral (anterior) means towards the forehead part of the head while caudal (posterior) 
refers to the back region of the head. Source: Brain image adapted (photoshop to highlight brain areas) 
from The University of Washington Digital Anatomist Image Collection Manager website: 
http://imagemanager.biostr.washington.edu accessed 6/15/06. 
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